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WILLIAMSON

SIR JOHN HAWKINS

SIR JOHN HAWKINS

THE TIME AND THE MAN



Qui Vicit totiens ins trucis classibus hostes
 Ille Regis HAWKINS vitam reliquit in undis

SIR JOHN HAWKINS

From the print in 'Hercologia'

SIR JOHN HAWKINS

THE TIME AND THE MAN

by

JAMES A. WILLIAMSON

'Advancement by dilligence'



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P R E F A C E

THE object of this book is to reveal the character, influence, and achievements of a great Englishman in their relation to the outlook and problems of his time. In writing it I have tried to avoid hero-worship and preserve proportion, and if the reader finds nevertheless that Hawkins takes a more commanding position than has hitherto been judged his due, I can only answer that I have followed the evidence where it has led me without seeking to force its interpretation.

The writing of history in the form of biography is apt to falsify perspective. The great man is made responsible for everything, his great contemporaries are thrust into the shadow, and the mass of the small men is ignored. The remedy, especially in dealing with a time remote from our own, is to depict the period as clearly as possible, to show what the many were thinking and doing, and what impressions they received from events as they occurred. Only so can the stage and the background be provided for the proper unfolding of our subject's life history. Some of my chapters therefore deal much with the time and little with the man, and the above considerations must be their justification; to a man of John Hawkins's varied interests few facts of maritime bearing were irrelevant.

Although the story of the Elizabethan seamen has been often told, it would be a mistake to suppose that there is nothing more to be learnt about it. There is rather a danger of its becoming stereotyped in an in-

correct form. The romantic handling of the subject has led to a concentration upon objective detail, often interesting in itself but insignificant to the historical synthesis. The materials for the latter are not explicitly set forth in the pages of Hakluyt and have to be sought rather in official letters and administrative documents. These in their turn need excavation, a task which the apparent completeness of the printed record may cause to be neglected. The Calendars of State Papers, for example, are not all of the desirable standard either in scope or accuracy, and the original documents which they summarize have still their secrets to reveal. The records of the Admiralty Court have as yet been scarcely used, for of them there exist neither summaries nor even indexes; yet they teem with illustrative detail and furnish a setting that was vivid to contemporary minds although it has been forgotten by posterity; and in some instances they provide facts that modify accepted stories. Even so well known a collection as the Cotton MSS. in the British Museum has yielded a hitherto unused account of Hawkins's third slaving voyage, full of new incidents and embodying significant correspondence between the English leader and the Spanish officials; whilst the Lansdowne MSS., which contain much of Burghley's private accumulation of state documents, give information about matters upon which the Record Office papers are silent.

The rendering of Elizabethan dates is sometimes a source of confusion. The contemporary custom was to defer the beginning of the new year until 25 March. In the narrative I have corrected this and followed the modern usage in every instance, but have allowed dates

occurring in quotations to stand as originally expressed. I have not made any correction for the Gregorian reform of the calendar in 1582, since it was not then adopted in England and nearly all the papers cited after that year are of English origin.

In conclusion I should say that I have not had the advantage of reading some important works on this period which are known to be in course of preparation. If, therefore, my book contains anything in disagreement with them, it should not be taken as of controversial intent, and I must beg indulgence for any imperfections which might have been remedied if those works had appeared in time for me to make use of them.

J. A. W.

12 April 1927.

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BOOK I
THE ANGLO-SPANISH AMITY

I

OLD WILLIAM HAWKINS

IN the early part of the sixteenth century there were families bearing the name of Hawkins to be found in various parts of England. One group, of land-owning status and long descent, lived in Kent. Another, possibly an offshoot from them, were men of business in London. Others appear in Lincolnshire and in the Midlands, in Surrey, at Bristol, at Weymouth, and at Plymouth and in the neighbouring district. The Plymouth Hawkinses, the subject of this book, have been surmised, on no satisfactory evidence, to have been descended from a member of the Kentish family, who 'probably' migrated to the west in the middle of the fifteenth century. The supposition is possible but not reasonably probable, and is best disregarded until proof shall be forthcoming: it is a common tendency to connect a family newly risen to eminence with an older one of the same name. But the question is of no real moment. The influence of ancestry is biographically important where there is an unbroken tradition of family conduct amid unchanged surroundings, but it does not amount to much when a junior branch begins a new life in a new place and loses touch with the original stock. For practical purposes the study of the Plymouth family begins with the career of the first historical William Hawkins, which demonstrably moulded those of his sons.

Here it is necessary to pause a moment on the question of spelling. By contemporary lawyers and officials the name of the London family was commonly spelt Hawkins, that of the Bristol men often Hawkens, and that of the Plymouth group Hawkyms. Old William of Plymouth and his sons always signed as Hawkyms. The last is therefore in strictness the correct form for them. But historians, with some exceptions in our own days,

have adopted Hawkins, which has been for three centuries a household word. To alter a usage so ancient and harmless smacks of pedantry, and the extension of the process gives forms repellent to the normal eye, such as Gylberte, Frobiser, Greynvile, and the like, which merely breed confusion and are not likely to establish themselves. So in this book the spelling will be Hawkins, and those whom the *i* offends may mentally substitute the *y*.

Old William Hawkins, so described in order to distinguish him from his elder son of the same name, was the son of John Hawkins of Tavistock and of Joan, daughter of William Amydas of Launceston. That is as far back as his origins can be authentically traced, the information having been furnished to William Harvey, Clarencieux, in 1565 and embodied in a grant of arms made to John Hawkins in that year.¹ The date of old William Hawkins's birth is unknown, but it is likely to have been between 1490 and 1500. In 1497-8 there was a William Hawkins doing business as a merchant in Plymouth,² but his relationship to the rest of the family does not appear. In 1513 again there is record of a Hawkins serving in the Navy as master of the *Great Galley*,³ but no identification is possible, and there is nothing to show even that he belonged to the Devon group. Hakluyt says that Henry VIII had a great respect for the historical William Hawkins as an authority on naval affairs, a remark which might suggest that he was the man thus entrusted with one of the great ships of the fleet; there was, however, much in his subsequent career to give ground for the King's opinion, and it is straining

¹ College of Arms MSS., Harvey's Grants, I.C.B., No. 101, f. 109, corrected draft of grant. John Prince, the antiquary, gave the details in his *Worthies of Devon* (1810 ed., p. 472), but omitted one or two points which will be referred to in their place.

² Exchequer Records, E. 122, 115/7 (Plymouth customs ledger).

³ *Letters and Papers of the Reign of Henry VIII*, vol. i (orig. ed.), No. 3979.

probability to date it as early as 1513. It is not until some years later that we reach firm ground. In 1524-5 a William Hawkins served as Receiver or Treasurer to the Corporation of Plymouth,¹ and in the former year also as Collector of the subsidy for Devon. It is reasonably certain that this was the merchant who afterwards made his mark in the national history, for his career is traceable with few gaps from that time forwards, and it was one of frequent office-holding in the government of the seaport. Caution, however, is still needful, for some eighteen years later there is local mention of William Hawkins, a baker,² evidently a different person, whilst the existence of yet another William Hawkins who was engaged in maritime affairs as Bailiff of Weymouth in 1533³ must further put us on our guard against hasty identifications. The Receivership of Plymouth was an annual appointment, often held, as the records show, by younger men who afterwards rose to higher office in the town.

The next mention in the local archives occurs in a copy of some proceedings in 1527 at the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, where William Hawkins, merchant, James Horsewell, gentleman, Peter Grisling, merchant, and three others were charged with beating and wounding John Jurdon of Plymouth so as to endanger his life.⁴ Horsewell was a firm ally of Hawkins in the stormy politics of the town. Grisling, who is elsewhere described as a gentleman of the King's Chamber, was to be in after years a no less constant enemy. The result of their trial on this occasion is not recorded. In the same year Hawkins took part in another piece of active service, the manning of the defences to repel a French

¹ Plymouth, Old Audit Book, in R. N. Worth's *Calendar of Plymouth Municipal Records*, 1893, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³ *Letters and Papers*, vi, No. 858; vii, No. 1338.

⁴ *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 43.

raid on the anchorage. An Italian merchantman sought refuge from some French pirates, who threatened to cut her out but were deterred by the resolute attitude of the townsmen. On this occasion, or in consequence of it, the Corporation purchased from Hawkins 196 lb. of gunpowder at 6*d.* a pound. A little later he sold the town two brass guns, for which he received £24 in instalments.¹

But these are petty matters. It is Hawkins's contribution to the maritime expansion of his country that makes his story worth writing. He was a merchant engaged in foreign trade, exporting English cloth and tin to the ports of Western Europe. The Plymouth customs accounts contained in the Exchequer records² show that his ships brought home cargoes of fish, wines, and salt, with occasional consignments of oil, woad, sugar, soap, and pepper. The fish is often described as Newland fish, but that alone is not enough to prove a Plymouth fishery on the banks of Newfoundland. The bulk of the supply, until after the middle of the sixteenth century, was bought from Frenchmen in their home ports, as its presence amid general cargoes indicates. The salt was imported from Rochelle, where it was produced by the evaporation of the water of the Bay of Biscay in the salt marshes of Saintonge. Not until long afterwards were the rock salt deposits of England exploited, and in early Tudor times salt and Bay salt were almost synonymous terms. Wines came also from Rochelle, but more extensively from Bordeaux, which shipped in addition most of the woad used in the cloth dyeing industry. Sugar, pepper, and other spices were obtained by Plymouth men from Portugal, although London drew its supplies

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 107.

² The Plymouth customs records are very incomplete, being missing for several years in which they might be expected to throw light on Hawkins's proceedings. The particulars here given are drawn from ledgers of the last ten years of Henry VIII.

from Antwerp, which the Portuguese made their staple town for distribution over Northern Europe. Oil and soap were the special products of Spain; and from both Spain and Portugal and occasionally from the Mediterranean came the sweet wines separately entered in the customs ledgers to distinguish them from the 'vinum non dulce' of France. These trade connexions are important for their bearing upon the inspiration which impelled Hawkins to carry his flag to the tropics and across the Atlantic.

His oceanic expeditions took him to Guinea and Brazil, regions of which Portugal claimed the monopoly and of which she had hitherto enjoyed most of the trade. It seems therefore natural to suppose that he drew his information about them from Portuguese acquaintances whom he talked with in Lisbon or Plymouth. Portugal owned also the Azores, with which she permitted English intercourse, although there is no evidence to show that Hawkins did business there. Thus there was ample opportunity for him to hear about Africa and South America from their first exploiters. But vague information was not enough. To plan a profit-yielding voyage he needed a pilot. The Portuguese pioneers, it is true, had found their way without such an advantage, but they were explorers, and exploration is a different thing from trade. Its immediate object is to acquire information rather than to gain a profit; but the merchant staking his private capital requires something definite to work upon. Thus we may regard it as certain that Hawkins obtained a pilot with personal knowledge of the new lands. It is not so certain that he had him from Portugal, although it is true that in after days Portuguese renegades betrayed their country's secrets to foreigners. There was another possible source of information.

From the earliest years of the sixteenth century French adventurers had been finding their way across the Atlan-

tic. In January 1504 Binot Paulmier de Gonneville had touched the Brazilian coast, having sailed from Honfleur in the ship *Espoir*. Other voyages took place in subsequent years and resulted in frequent hostilities with the Portuguese. In 1523 John III of Portugal ordered his subjects to sink any Frenchmen they caught on the Brazilian coast; and in 1530 a French squadron plundered Pernambuco. By this time Rouen, Havre, Honfleur, and Dieppe were deeply engaged in the Brazil traffic, and no efforts availed to put a stop to it. The chief attraction was the Brazil wood, which yielded a useful dyestuff and commanded a high price in Europe. Brazil pepper, although of lower value than oriental pepper, was also worth lading, and among the minor products were cotton, monkeys, and parrots, the latter, as English customs records show, being valued for duty at five shillings a pair. The Brazil voyages were of two types; one route led to Bahia and Pernambuco and the coasts of Eastern Brazil; the other followed the northern coast, passed the delta of the Amazon, and then skirted the Cannibal Coast, a term which signified Guiana and was still in use in Defoe's time. The coastal currents and the north-east trade winds made it almost compulsory for a ship following the Guiana coast to pass on westwards into the Caribbean, and there can be little doubt that in this manner the French adventurers came to the Spanish West Indies, where they committed depredations from the beginning of the Hapsburg-Valois wars in 1521. Similarly, a consequence of the voyages to Pernambuco was the development of a French trade with Guinea, which was an obvious halting-place on the outward passage; and in Guinea there were to be had not only a pepper similar to that of Brazil, but also gold and ivory. The French made no permanent lodgement either in Guinea or Brazil, and Portugal always claimed possession by virtue of prior discovery. There has been therefore a tendency to ignore all efforts but those of

the Portuguese, and in England at least the work of the French pioneers has been generally overlooked.¹

The Frenchmen were nevertheless a fact, and before Hawkins was a merchant they knew the way to Brazil. Here, then, is a probable source for the expert guidance he must have had if his voyages were to pay their way in competition with the experienced frequenters of the trade. He was in contact with Frenchmen in his European business, and they, as interlopers pursuing a forbidden trade, were under no patriotic inhibition to reveal the secrets of their navigation. It is established also that in later years the sons of William Hawkins were closely allied with the freebooters of Rochelle and Rouen who preyed upon Spanish commerce. The family connexion may well have begun in the earlier generation.

However that may be, we must leave speculation and pass to facts. The authority for the first oceanic voyages of William Hawkins is Richard Hakluyt, who may be presumed to have drawn his information by word of mouth from Sir John Hawkins at least fifty years after the voyages took place. This presumption is fairly justified by the fact that when Hakluyt works from written documents he usually says so and gives quotations. In this instance he cites Sir John as the witness to one minor fact and leaves it to be implied that the rest of the story came from him. Fifty years is a long time, and Sir John was not born when these adventures began; in consequence the chronology and lucidity of the account are by no means satisfactory.

Its title in the first edition of Hakluyt (that of 1589) is as follows: 'A voyage to Brasill, made by the worshipfull M. William Haukins of Plimmouth, father to Sir

¹ For the early French Brazil voyages see E. Gosselin, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la marine normande*, Rouen, 1876; C. Bréard, *Documents relatifs à la marine normande*, Rouen, 1899, and *Le vieux Honfleur et ses marins*, Rouen, 1897; P. Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français au seizième siècle*, Paris, 1878; and C. de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, vol. iii.

John Haukins, knight, now living, in the yeere 1530.’¹ In his second edition (1600) Hakluyt amended the title thus: ‘A brief relation of two sundry voyages made by the worshipful M. William Haukins of Plimmouth, father to Sir John Haukins knight, late Treasurer of her Majesties Navie, in the yeere 1530 and 1532.’ The wording of the subjoined relation is identical in the two editions, and it is not accurately covered by either title; for it is an account of three voyages, to none of which is any individual date assigned. The narrative states that Hawkins, a man beloved of King Henry, and one of the principal sea captains of the West Country, went three times to Brazil in his ship the *Paul* of Plymouth, of 250 tons burthen. On the outward voyage he touched at the River of Sestos on the coast of Guinea—it is in $5\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N., in modern Liberia—and there traded for ivory and other goods; thence passing on to Brazil (locality not indicated) he made friends with the natives and laded cargoes of the local commodities, whose nature is not specified. This statement is so worded as to apply to all the voyages, and to the first there is no further reference. Of the second we learn that Hawkins grew so friendly with a Brazilian chief that the savage consented to take passage to Europe. He reached England safely and was exhibited at court, but next year, on the voyage back to Brazil (the third), he died. Hawkins had left as a hostage for him one Martin Cockeram of Plymouth, whose life was expected to be endangered by the death of the chief. But the natives were so impressed by Hawkins’s fair dealing that they gave up Cockeram without demur.

Here we have all the material facts in Hakluyt’s relation. From them we extract very few details about the

¹ Sir C. R. Markham, who edited the *Hawkins Voyages* for the Hakluyt Society (1878), gave the title from the first edition, but omitted to collate it with the second. This is always worth doing when dealing with Hakluyt’s narratives, for the second edition contains a fair number of corrections of the matter contained in the first.

African trade, and none at all about the Brazilian. We glean no hint of the geographical and commercial guidance which Hawkins must have obtained. And for chronology we have 1530 as the date of the first expedition, and 1532 as that of the second or third, which were in successive years. Hakluyt had to be content with what Sir John Hawkins chose to tell him, and Sir John, as others of his narratives bear witness, was a man who did not talk freely of past affairs. There were passages in his own career which he could not wish to see discussed, and we may imagine him as looking sourly on the whole enthusiastic project of the *Principal Navigations*.

Hakluyt himself was dissatisfied, for he was generally a precise writer. In his second edition, after Sir John was dead, he partially cleared up the ambiguity, but whether he had any additional information is not apparent.

So much for our leading authority; we turn now to collateral evidence. First, if 1530 is a true date, as we must suppose it is, it was probably the date of the first voyage; for in 1527-8 Hawkins was in Plymouth manning the bulwark against the French pirates, and in 1528-9 he sold the two guns to the Corporation, which also argues his presence in the town. These dates are mayoral years, and the Plymouth records do not specify the months and days of the entries. There are, unfortunately, no customs ledgers for these years, nor for any others near them. Next, in 1532-3 (October to October), William Hawkins was Mayor of Plymouth,¹ which virtually precludes the possibility that he could have gone to Brazil in that period. It is feasible, then, to fit the three voyages neatly into the years 1530, 1531, and 1532, and this is probably the best interpretation. But there is something more.

In 1536 Hawkins introduced a project to Thomas Cromwell in the following letter:

'Most honourable and my singular good lord: so it is that I

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, List of Mayors, pp. 15-21.

durst not put myself in press to sue unto your good lordship for any help or succour to be obtained at your hands in my poor affairs, until such time I had first put my ship and goods in adventure to search for the commodities of unknown countries, and seen the return thereof in safety; as, I thank God, hath metely well happened unto me, albeit by four parts not so well as I suppose it should if one of my pilots had not miscarried by the way. Wherefore, my singular good lord, I now, being somewhat bold by the reason aforesaid, but chiefly for the great hope and trust I have in your accustomed goodness, I most humbly beseech your good lordship to be mean for me to the King's highness, to have of His Grace's love four pieces of brass ordnance and a last of powder, upon good sureties to restore the same at a day. And furthermore, that it may please His Grace, upon the surety of an hundred pound lands,¹ to lend me £2,000 for the space of seven years towards the setting forth of three or four ships. And I doubt me not but in the mean time to do such feats of merchandise that it shall be to the King's great advantage in His Grace's custom, and to your good lordship's honour for your help and furtherance herein. And nevertheless after my power I shall presently deserve (?) your pains taken in this behalf, and continue your daily bedeman and servant to my little power.

Your most bounden orator,

William Hawkyns of Plymouth.²

This letter points to at least one voyage having been made before it was written, but not long before. The sense of it is undoubtedly that the writer would have addressed himself to Cromwell before, but waited until he had some earnest of success to show. The voyage to which he refers may not have been under his personal command—one ship at least seems to have been under a subordinate who 'miscarried'; yet there is no evidence to preclude the possibility of Hawkins having been away for long periods immediately prior to 1536. With the exception of the record of his year as Mayor in 1532-3, there is only one trace to be found of his presence in England between 1529 and the end of 1535. The letter

¹ Lands worth £100 a year.

² S. P. Hen. VIII, § 113, f. 180.

thus yields a mere suspicion that there were further expeditions shortly before 1536.

Hawkins's appeal to the King for £2,000 meant that he had a large extension of his business in view; for, as we shall presently see, the equipment of a single ship did not cost anything like this sum. It seems unlikely that he obtained the money, for any series of large expeditions to Brazil under government patronage would hardly have failed to leave their mark, in one way or another, in the records which have survived. Hawkins's own presence in England is also fairly continuously traceable from 1536 to the beginning of 1540, and if voyages took place in those years they could not have been made under his own leadership.

It is at this point that the customs ledgers begin to yield evidence. The earliest for the Hawkins period relates to the year 1536-7 (Michaelmas to Michaelmas),¹ and in it there are entries showing that the *Paul* of Plymouth was making European voyages with cargoes belonging to William Hawkins and others. There is no mention of any expedition that might have been designed for the distant countries in which we are interested. The presumption from this ledger is therefore that there was no Brazil voyage in 1536-7.

For 1537-8 and 1538-9 the ledgers are missing, but that for 1539-40² exists and contains an entry as follows:

[Feb. 24, 1540] 'Navis voc. le Pawle de Plymouth vn. John Landye est mr. exivit eodem die.

Willō Hawkins ind. p. ix. ^c xl hachettes ix. ^c xl comes & iiij. ^c	} val. lxxv ^s subs. iiij ^s ix ^d
lxxv sarpes pond. xxx ^c fer.	
eod. p. v ^c coper & v ^{c^s} plumb. in manelios	val. vj ^{li} subs. vj ^s
eod. p. iiij ^{vz} pan. lan. sine grano	cust. iiij ^s vj ^d
eod. p. xix ^{xl^s} doz. night cappes x ^c cop. & x ^{xl^s} plumb.	} val. xiiij ^{li} subs. xiiij ^s .

This, being interpreted, indicates a likely cargo for

¹ E. 122, 116/9.

² E. 122, 116/11.

trade with African and Brazilian natives. The 940 hatchets and 940 combs need no explanation. 'Sarpes' is an old word meaning pruning-hooks or knives; and the 375 of them, together with the hatchets and the combs, passed the customs, not as manufactured goods, but as thirty hundredweight of mere iron valued at £3 15s. and paying the subsidy of one shilling in the pound, or 3s. 9d. We may infer that Hawkins had a friend in the custom house. The next item is of 5 cwt. of copper and 5 cwt. of lead, worth £5 and £1 respectively, made up into manelios or manells, a word which the *Oxford English Dictionary* shows to mean arm-rings and to be frequently used in connexion with the Guinea trade from 1555 onwards. Then follow three pieces of undyed woollen cloth, upon which English merchants paid no subsidy, but only a custom of 1s. 2d. per piece; nineteen dozen night-caps, worth £2; 10 cwt. copper, £10; and 10 cwt. lead, £2. The whole cargo was thus valued, excluding the cloth, at £23 15s. and paid export duties of £1 7s. 3d. As yet there was no great advantage to His Grace's custom.

Away sails the *Paul* on 24 February 1540, and to the end of this ledger at the following Michaelmas no further mention of her is to be found. Luckily the next ledger has survived,¹ and ere it has run a month the *Paul* comes home with a cargo that speaks for itself.

[1540, October 20] 'Navis voc. le Paule de Plymouth vnd. Johñs. Landye est mr. int.^avit xx^o die Octobris.

Willmo. Hawkyns ind. p. lxxxxij doll. brasyll	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{val. } \overset{c}{vj} \overset{li}{xiiij} \overset{s}{vj} \overset{d}{viiij} \\ \text{subs. } \overset{li}{xxx} \overset{s}{xiiij} \overset{d}{iiiij} \end{array} \right.$
j dos. olyfantes tethe pond. jc	
	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{val. } \overset{s}{xxx} \text{ subs. } \overset{d}{xviiij}. \end{array} \right.$

An absence of eight months, a hundredweight of elephants' teeth, and ninety-two tons of Brazil wood, all point fairly plainly to another of the famous voyages to Guinea and Brazil. And the value of the return, £600

¹ E. 122, 116/13.

and more, with a duty of £30, was enough to engender respect, even in the King, for the man who could do such 'feats of merchandise'. Another point is worth comment. The master of the *Paul* was a certain John Landye, but he was master for this voyage only. Before and after it the ledgers show the vessel making short European voyages—the next began on 18 December 1540, when she was freighted with Cornish tin—but John Landye is not in command. He was evidently a specialist in the tropical passage. Was he a Frenchman brought in for the occasion? ¹ The French, as has been shown, were before us in this business, and it is at least possible that they showed Hawkins the way. The quickness of the voyage argues a knowledge of ocean winds and the proper trading places which could only have come from expert pilotage. Hawkins had learnt much, no doubt, in previous expeditions, and was perhaps a fair navigator; but, as his record shows, he was primarily a merchant and not a seaman, and he passed most of his life on shore. His reputation as a sea captain, as the word was then used, involves no contradiction. The captain, in merchantmen as in warships, was the director of the general policy of the voyage and the leader in battle, but he had always under him the master or pilot, the man of professional detail, indispensable for navigation and the daily routine of the ship. To return to John Landye, it is at least fairly certain that he was not a Plymouth skipper, else we should find him in the ledgers commanding Plymouth ships on other occasions than this.

Plymouth was not the only port from which Brazil voyages were made. From Portsmouth there sailed on 7 March in this same year 1540 the *Barbara* of London

¹ In the records of the period French names are almost invariably anglicized, no attempt being made to preserve the proper spelling. Spanish and Portuguese names, on the other hand, are generally rendered with some fidelity, the terminations being occasionally latinized.

commanded by John Phillips. He, if Spanish complaints were justified, was little better than a pirate, for he took two small Spanish vessels on his way out. He arrived in Brazil, without touching at Guinea, on 3 May, traded and fought with the natives, and sailed home through the Caribbean. Coming to San Domingo at the beginning of July Phillips passed along the southern coast, where he took a Spanish ship laden with hides and sugar. The English *Barbara* was now leaking badly, and her crew, finding they could not keep her afloat, turned the Spaniards out of the prize, renamed her the *Barbara*, and sailed home in her. The Spaniards were set ashore on San Domingo, and with them there landed the pilot of the expedition who, it is significant to note, was a Frenchman. Phillips was back at Dartmouth in August and was arrested for piracy at the instance of the Spanish ambassador.¹ This is evidently an example of the northerly voyage, passing on from Brazil to the Guiana coast and thence to the Caribbean. Indeed, as the whole passage was very brief, the first landfall may well have been made in what is now called Guiana, then loosely confused with Brazil. Sixty years later there was attractive trading to be done in the mouths of the Guiana rivers, where Dutchmen and Englishmen obtained cotton and dyestuffs from the Indians. An outward passage of two months was then usual.

Southampton also was a nest of Brazil traders. Hakluyt was told by Anthony Garrard, a member of a family much concerned with ocean ventures, that about the year 1540 several wealthy Southampton merchants habitually sent ships to Brazil. Among their number were Robert Reneger and Thomas Borey. Further, Hakluyt

¹ *The Voyage of the Barbara of London*, by R. G. Marsden, on the authority of High Court of Admiralty documents, in *Eng. Hist. Review*, xxiv. 96; additional information in J. F. Pacheco, *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento . . . de las posesiones españolas*, Madrid, 1864, i. 572.

had it from Edward Cotton, a gentleman of Southampton, that one Pudsey of that town made a Brazil voyage about 1538 and built a fort in 1542 on the coast near Bahia de todos los Santos, the head-quarters of the Portuguese settlements; and that altogether they made of the business 'a commodious and gainful voyage'. Hakluyt evidently pursued his inquiries after the publication of his first edition, for the entry about Pudsey appears only in the second.

Testing this information by contemporary documents we obtain the following scraps of evidence. For Southampton there are customs ledgers (or controlments, which give the same facts) for 1534-5, 1538-9, and 1542-3, running in each case from 1 October to 30 September. Those for the crucial year 1540 are unhappily missing. Numerous entries confirm the statement that Reneger and Borey were substantial merchants; Borey in particular did a large business in everything from cloth and wines in bulk to frying-pans and straw hats by the dozen. The name of Pudsey seems nowhere to appear, although the book of 1542-3 might be expected to contain an entry of his return from the Brazil voyage recorded by Hakluyt. But Pudsey was not a myth. From another source we learn that in June 1549 John Pudsey of Southampton did service at sea, conducting shipping with the King's victuals to the Channel Islands.¹ The Southampton ledgers, although yielding no direct evidence of Brazil voyages by Englishmen, do indicate a trade in the substance termed *brasil*. In July 1535 a merchant imported 2 cwt. of it, value 10s.² Another, in June 1539, paid duty on 2,000 lb. of *brasil*, worth £5.³ But both these consignments form part of general cargoes of salt, woad, prunes, and Gascon wines, evidently bought in France. Again, we have an entry in July 1539 of a great ship freighted, probably for the Mediter-

¹ High Court of Admiralty, Examinations, No. 7, 20 Feb., 1551/2.

² E. 122, 143/9.

³ E. 122, 143/11.

anean, by a number of English and foreign merchants. In her William Gonson, Paymaster of the Navy, exported 3,700 lb. of brasil, and two others 2,100 lb. between them.¹ Finally, in December 1542,² another vessel sailed from Southampton for the Mediterranean carrying 60 kintalls of brasil, the property of Nicholas Thorne, the well-known Bristol merchant. These large parcels exported may have been obtained from the French, but it is possible that they were the fruit of English expeditions. Chapuys, the ambassador of Charles V, evidently knew of an active trade being carried on, for he wrote to his master in January 1541 that he would try to obtain security that Englishmen going to Brazil should not attack Spanish ships.³

The French trade with Brazil was even more extensive than the English. Francis I, no believer in the colonial monopolies of other kings, connived at his subjects' ventures. In 1538, it is true, he issued a prohibition; but he soon allowed it to become a dead letter, and in 1541 Portuguese ambassadors were vainly suing for a stoppage of the traffic.⁴ In the English Court of Admiralty records there are some particulars of an Anglo-French voyage by two ships from Dieppe to Brazil in the last-named year.⁵

On a review of the whole question as it concerns William Hawkins we may conclude that he was the earliest Englishman recorded to have frequented the Brazil trade, that Hakluyt's dates 1530-2 for his first voyages are probably correct, that he continued to invest in the business although not, from 1536 to 1539, going on the expeditions in person, and that his ship *Paul*, with or without him, made a Brazil voyage as late

¹ E. 112, 143/11.

² E. 122, 143/13.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, vi, pt. i, No. 148.

⁴ *Letters and Papers*, xvi, No. 488; see also Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 143-7.

⁵ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 4, 27 Nov. 1541.

as 1540. One other point stands out. Hawkins is the only one of these pioneers who combined the West African trade with that to Brazil; there is no hint that the others ever went to Guinea. The fact that Hawkins regularly did so renders it possible that his adventures were based on different information from theirs.

The last recorded English voyage of this early series was made in 1542. Thenceforward Hakluyt, the customs ledgers, and the Admiralty archives are silent upon the matter. So far as our present information goes no English ship went again to Guinea until 1553, and none went to South America or the West Indies until John Hawkins made a round voyage of it in 1562-3. Nothing is more unsafe, in matters of this sort, than to base positive statements upon the silence of the records; yet there are intelligible reasons why the voyages should have ceased at the time we lose sight of them. For in 1544 began Henry VIII's last French war, bringing in its train a partial estrangement of England from her old allies of Spain and Flanders. Thenceforward freebooting in the Channel under letters of marque became a surer game than speculative voyages to the tropics; and we know that William Hawkins and Robert Reneger, two of the Brazil traders, took a leading hand in it.¹ Henry's naval system relied largely upon the services of armed merchantmen as a supplement to the royal fleet, and he may have given orders for the ocean voyages to cease. Portugal also, as advices from France bear witness, sent out fighting ships to defend the Brazilian coast from 1541 onwards. These are reasonable grounds for assuming that the English undertakings were interrupted; but they are not conclusive, for similar considerations applied to France, and there is good evidence that the French Brazil trade continued and expanded. There we must leave the question until one day, perhaps, the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon will yield up its secrets, and

¹ See below, pp. 26-30.

some document be found to throw a flood of light upon these ancient enterprises.

From the time his ocean ventures began William Hawkins was one of the leading townsmen of Plymouth. In 1532-3, as has already been mentioned, he served as mayor. In the same year also one William Hawkins was Town Serjeant.¹ Whether the mayor filled this second office, or whether the serjeant was William Hawkins the baker, is not apparent. For the following two years there is no trace of the merchant Hawkins, who may possibly have been engaged on the expeditions of which he wrote to Thomas Cromwell. Then, at the end of 1535, Plymouth entered upon a period of turmoil in which he filled a prominent place as a faction leader. In 1535 we read, 'Peter Grisling brought a suit against the town'.² Its purport is not recorded, but from subsequent references it seems to have been concerned with his exercise of the office of searcher of the port, and to have been envenomed by the religious differences that were then tearing English life in twain. The case was sufficiently important to be noticed by the central government. The Privy Council summoned the litigants to appear before it—Grisling on the one side and Hawkins and John Elyot, on behalf of the townsmen, on the other. There was a violent controversy, in which Grisling was accused of calling James Horsewell, a friend of Hawkins, 'a naughty heretic knave'. His opponents tolerantly commented thereupon that they considered the words malicious, but not treasonable, being spoken in fury and drink.³ Horsewell was at that time Mayor of Plymouth, and it is significant of the civil discipline of the period that defaming a mayor could be seriously thought of as treason—for it may be assumed that correspondents of Cromwell did not permit themselves to

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*

³ Elyot and Hawkins to Cromwell, 1536, 1 Jan., *Letters and Papers*, x, No. 52.

be flippant. The Council pacified the dispute, and all rode down to Plymouth in company.¹

On the journey Grisling announced that he should leave Saltash, where he had been living, and return to Plymouth, his native place. He further proposed that Hawkins and Elyot should get him a seat on the Council of Plymouth by the exercise of their voices overbearing the rest, 'he to walk up and down among the Commonalty, and they to invite him to sit with the Council'. They answered that they could not do this, but would try to get him chosen after the ancient usage. Accordingly he removed to Plymouth and stayed there six weeks; but finding that the Council remained closed to him he went back to Saltash meditating revenge. His chance came in the autumn of 1536, when Horsewell's mayoralty ended and one Thomas Bull succeeded him. Bull was no friend of the Horsewell and Hawkins party, and was soon in alliance with Grisling. They cultivated a following and obtained a Privy Council order banishing Horsewell for a year and a day. But the opposition were defiant. At a town meeting they invested Horsewell with the office of Town Clerk, and Hawkins improved the occasion 'with divers slanderous words'. Mayor Bull and Grisling thereupon 'devised a testimonial' to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Privy Seal (Cromwell), setting forth the outrageous conduct of Hawkins and Elyot and declaring that the annulment of Horsewell's banishment would mean the destruction of the town. Cromwell took the part of authority and sent down an injunction debarring Hawkins and his friends from the Town Council under heavy penalties. They

¹ Star Chamber Proceedings, Hen. VIII, Bundle 25, No. 323. This is a suit brought by Hawkins against Grisling in 1538, the bill of complaint and the answer of the defendant containing their versions of the quarrels of the previous four years. They are quaint documents infusing a certain human personality into figures which otherwise lack such illumination.

replied by suing out a commission under the Privy Seal, by which Sir Piers Edgecumbe and three other county magnates were directed to investigate the whole matter. The commission sat two days and claimed to have composed the dispute, Bull, Hawkins, and Elyot agreeing to waive their differences and live in peace according to the ancient customs of the town.¹ Once again Grisling's teeth appeared to be drawn, for the commissioners, if we are to believe Hawkins, reported that his conduct was intolerable.²

Grisling, however, had still a means of entry and annoyance in Plymouth affairs. He was searcher of the port, a government and not a local appointment, concerning which Hawkins alleged that, although the office was unpaid, Grisling made it his sole means of livelihood and exercised it with extortion and bribery. Then, at Michaelmas 1537, Grisling got himself chosen Mayor of Saltash; and here we touch another phase of the matter, a local war between that town and Plymouth. For the mayor and burgesses of Saltash claimed certain ancient harbour dues and a boat rent throughout the entire haven and its members, including Plymouth, and also the right to hold a court every three weeks to determine pleas personal; and further a right to compel twice a year the attendance of all owners and masters of boats at a court to inquire into illegal proceedings in the river; in support of which jurisdiction the Mayor of Saltash claimed the power of arresting the bodies and goods of defaulters. It was a galling position for a self-conscious, rising place like Plymouth, of whose feelings Hawkins and his turbulent friends were the embodiment.

Already, before the quarrel with Grisling, Hawkins

¹ *Letters and Papers*, xi, No. 166, gives the date of the Commission's report as 25 July 1536, but the Star Chamber pleadings show that this must be a mistake for 1537. Bull was not mayor in July 1536.

² Star Chamber Proc. *ut supra*.

had been in revolt against the Saltash supremacy.¹ In February 1535 one Walter Warwick had obtained a judgement against him at the three-weekly court, and the Saltash authorities had arrested the *Paul*, which was then riding in their river; but Hawkins had found sureties and got her released. He denied the jurisdiction and tried to have the case transferred to Chancery; but Saltash persisted in summoning him, and he in declining to appear. Grisling, on becoming mayor, took up the case with glee, and swore by blood and wounds that no ship or goods of his enemy should pass the river but he would levy on them. At court after court he summoned Hawkins, with no result, until on 12 February 1538 the defendant sent in a King's writ of error quashing the proceedings. But the writ was returnable at a date which had already expired when it was put in, and Grisling claimed to disregard it. He continued the three-weekly summonses and piled up fines for contumacy until the total reached £80. So the matter stood when in the autumn of 1538 Hawkins appealed to the Star Chamber.

That Court's decision cannot be directly traced. But the upshot of the whole affair was a triumph for Hawkins and very likely for Plymouth as well. For in 1538-9 he was once more chosen Mayor of Plymouth, James Horsewell was Town Clerk, and in the following year both of them, together with John Elyot, were members of the Town Council.² Moreover, at the general election of 1539, Hawkins and Horsewell were sent up to Westminster as members for their borough.³ It was an election at which Cromwell strained every nerve to have a favourable majority returned, and there can be little

¹ The Star Chamber documents are the authority for all this, unless otherwise stated.

² *Plymouth Calendar*, pp. 14, 15-21, 44.

³ Mary W. S. Hawkins, *Plymouth Armada Heroes*, Plymouth, 1888, p. 5, on authority of local records.

doubt, from evidence we have next to consider, that the pair were ardent supporters of his policy. And since the Star Chamber was pre-eminently his court we are left to guess how he had given them cause to love him.

The Grisling affair is of something more than local interest. It is an illustration of English society and administration. England was not yet a nation, although it was in process of becoming one. All over the country there were these little peculiar jurisdictions, like that of Saltash, whose owners tried hard to preserve them as sovereignties independent of the national law. Liberties they were usually called, and, as a historian of the constitution has shown, the word commonly meant liberty to oppress. These liberties had to be choked by the iron hand of the central government before real freedom could be born. Thomas Cromwell was one of the furtherers of the process; in these very years he was tackling the greatest liberty of all, that of the Church to be a state within the state. He had many enemies, and there was at least a possibility that a rebellion of the conservative forces might sweep away himself and his sovereign with their work half done. Hence his anxious finger on every pulse of the national life, and his interference in the details of a local dispute; it was good to let these headstrong brawlers know that they had a master. So he banished Horsewell and disqualified Hawkins and Elyot from holding office, and then, finding that after all they belonged to the progressive new England and not to the obstinate old, he took them into favour and used them. The nature of the public service here revealed is also notable. Everything is done by unpaid local men, who find their recompense in the influence they acquire from serving the state. The town governs itself unhindered while it can do so without scandal; failing that, the county is called in to adjudicate; and behind all stands the Privy Council and its Star Chamber. This part-time service of the state by able men as



PLYMOUTH IN THE TIME OF HENRY VIII

an incident of their social position is an age-long characteristic of the English polity, surviving in a diluted form to this day. It forms the background to the careers of all the Tudor worthies, and of the Hawkins family most particularly. It had its drawbacks, its dishonesty and petty tyranny. But the alternative was a paid and irremovable bureaucracy, and we can imagine what that would have meant when recruited from men of the temper and training here disclosed. England was lucky to escape it.

Religion, as we have surmised, had something to do with the Plymouth faction disputes. In the late fifteenth-thirties it was a dividing force in every English town. Plymouth had one small religious house, that of the Grey Friars, whose dissolution was accomplished in 1538. On 19 September the King's Visitor received its surrender and turned over the guardianship of the property to Thomas Clowter, Mayor, and William Hawkins, mayor-elect. James Horsewell and others valued the movables, some of which were sold by the visitor and the rest left with Hawkins. He subsequently disposed of them, 73 $\frac{3}{4}$ ounces of silver plate for £12 9s. 2d., and other stuff making up the total to £15 2s.¹ It seems possible that the goods were undervalued and that the Corporation bought them at a bargain; for in 1543-4 we find the town entrusting some former church plate to Hawkins for sale in London and realizing £41 13s. 5d. upon it, a sum which Hawkins laid out in the purchase of arms and powder for the town's defence.² If this is what happened Plymouth was doing locally what the King did nationally. With the major proceeds of the dissolution Henry rebuilt his Navy and erected a series of fortresses on the east and south coasts, but he expected the local men to garrison the defences and to arm themselves for the purpose. In Plymouth, it is evident, the triumph of Hawkins and his party ensured the

¹ *Letters and Papers*, xiii, pt. ii, No. 389; *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

peaceful accomplishment of the dissolution, although there is nothing to show that they were yet Protestants in the full sense of the word. It is more than likely that Hawkins and Horsewell voted with the majority which carried the Act of the Six Articles in 1539.

From that time onwards the two men were Plymouth's leading townsmen, constantly associated in civic, state, and private affairs. In January 1543, when Horsewell was mayor for the third time, Hawkins was acting as his deputy and received an admonition from the Admiralty Court about the unjust detention of a prize ship.¹ This is the first of several occasions on which he came near to overstepping the law in the business of channel privateering, which absorbed much of his energy in the succeeding years. The tragic end of Thomas Cromwell caused no interruption of the two friends' official careers. In March 1544 there is an order directed to them from Lord Lisle, the Lord Admiral, enjoining them to facilitate the passage to Spain through Plymouth of ambassadors and their retinue.² In September of the same year, the French war being in full progress, Hawkins, Horsewell, and John Elyot made suit to the Privy Council for letters of marque, and received a commission to annoy the King's enemies and defend the realm with four, six, or eight barks at their own costs and charges.³ For this purpose they were empowered to impress shipmasters, pilots, mariners, gunners, and soldiers, and also to take up victuals and artillery.

By these means, generally employed throughout the seaports of the realm, Henry was able to let loose a swarm of wasps upon his enemy at no expense to himself. Until the summer of 1545 they ranged the Channel and the Bay of Biscay, effectively sweeping French commerce off the sea. Then, on a serious threat of invasion, when

¹ H. C. A., 7/1 (Exemplifications), No. 11.

² *Ibid.*, 1/79 (Oyer and Terminer), No. 98.

³ *Letters and Papers*, xix, pt. ii, No. 340 (6).

the French fleet blockaded Portsmouth and landed troops in the Isle of Wight, the privateers were called in to assist in the defence and bore their part in foiling the effort and driving the invaders back to their own ports. But Hawkins, although his ships may have helped, was not personally at sea in these actions; he was already in serious trouble on shore.

In the autumn of 1544 the Emperor Charles V, who had entered the war in alliance with Henry VIII, suddenly made a separate peace with France at Crespy. By so doing he foiled a promising plan for an advance on Paris from the Flemish border, and threw England on the defensive, exposing her to the invasion threat of the following year. By all good Englishmen his act was regarded as the blackest treachery, and its consequences soon appeared upon the sea. Spaniards and Flemings were now neutrals, and their neutrality took a form very benevolent to the French. They began to carry the goods of French merchants unable to venture shipping of their own. The privateers, their taste for plunder whetted, refused to let their prey escape. They made prize of the neutrals whenever they could find an ounce of French cargo on board them. So much the international practice of the time condoned, but inevitably there arose contentious cases. Englishmen alleged the French origin of merchandise, Spaniards denied it; there were accusations of the use of false papers, and the Admiralty Court was congested with trials which it had no true evidence to decide.¹ In Flemish and Spanish courts the decisions went against the Englishmen, who lost prizes which they had been driven to carry into the ports of those countries; and with rough justice but no legality they began to make reprisals which were clearly outside the scope of their commissions. Henry VIII was em-

¹ Many graphic details appear in H. C. A. Examinations, No. 5 (1546-50). The Portuguese were also prominent among the neutrals affected.

barrassed. With France and Scotland on his hands he had no wish for war with the Emperor; but in licensing the privateers he had let loose a monster which even he could not control.

Robert Reneger of Southampton, one of the Brazil traders, scored the greatest success in this business. His letters of marque had been granted only on his entering into a recognizance not to attack the Emperor's subjects. But he claimed that a just prize of his had been confiscated at Vigo, and he took his own remedy. In March 1545 he was cruising with five vessels off Cape St. Vincent. There he took a Spanish treasure ship from the West Indies, with gold, silver, pearls, and sugar worth nearly 30,000 ducats. Such a stroke bought its own immunity. Reneger became a personage at court, where he bribed his way into favour and snapped his fingers at the Spanish ambassador.

Hawkins was less fortunate. One of his ships took a Spanish craft belonging to a certain Juan Quintana Dueñas, who appealed to the Privy Council for justice. Hawkins was summoned from Plymouth to answer the charge, and made his appearance on 31 May 1545. He asserted that the cargo was French, falsely coloured as Spanish, and that the factor of Quintana Dueñas was in possession of letters directing him to alter its ostensible nationality as expediency dictated. Had Hawkins only known it he might have made out an even stronger case, for a Rouen document shows that Quintana Dueñas had become a naturalized Frenchman long before the date in question;¹ but no one in England seems to have known of this at the time. The Council was impressed by the defence and commanded that Hawkins and Wyndham, his associate in the capture, should go to the Spanish ambassador and make a personal explanation; meanwhile the Admiralty Court should sift the evidence. There is,

¹ E. Gosselin, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la marine normande*, Rouen, 1876, p. 44.

unfortunately, no book of Admiralty examinations for 1545, and the case seems to have left no trace in the files of libels. But we can tell that, justly or not, the decision went against Hawkins. As the summer advanced the French preparations for invasion grew more formidable, and the government took them so seriously that arrangements were made for calling out the whole militia strength of England when the need should arise. It was vital to throw a sop to the Emperor, and so a privateer or two had to suffer mildly for the public good. Hawkins had misjudged the position and, with William Randall, Mayor of Plymouth, abetting him, had been selling the Spanish goods while the case was yet *sub judice*. At the end of July the two delinquents were ordered to Portsmouth, whither King and Council had removed as the French drew near. Hawkins was commanded to make restitution, and for their contempt of authority he and the mayor were committed to prison until Quintana Dueñas should be satisfied. They appear to have paid up and secured their release shortly afterwards.¹

The Wyndham concerned in this matter was Thomas Wyndham, who afterwards led an expedition to Guinea and Benin, and died in the course of it, in 1553-4. During this war he was a naval officer and also an owner of privateers which, to judge from Admiralty records, seem to have specialized in seizing Portuguese ships. His connexion with Hawkins is interesting as supplying a possible clue to the basis of his Guinea enterprise.

In 1546 Hawkins once more overstepped the mark by capturing a Breton vessel after peace had been signed. No sooner had he been ordered to make restitution than some Flemings came forward with a complaint of the seizure of their goods by a privateer called the *Mary Figge*, of which he was part owner. Once more the Council had to threaten him with arrest ere he could be

¹ *Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-7*, pp. 167, 176, 210, 220; *Letters and Papers*, xx, pt. i, No. 1293.

made to disgorge.¹ Channel privateering had now become a regular business which was scarcely to cease until the beginning of the following century. There were three more wars with France before the outbreak of the great Anglo-Spanish contest in 1585, to say nothing of relations with Portugal in the early years of Elizabeth which, on the sea, were hardly distinguishable from a state of warfare. To add to the confusion came the French religious wars and the revolt of the Netherlands, wherein the rebel leaders issued letters of marque broadcast to any who cared to take them. So, whenever other business flagged, we find the Plymouth Hawkinses employed in equipping or patronizing privateers.

The last years of William Hawkins were occupied with the political and administrative work in which he had already proved his value. He was now, if the traditional date for his birth be accepted, nearing sixty years of age, an old man for a time in which most died young. In 1547 he was again returned to Parliament as member for Plymouth, and bore his unrecorded part in the debates on the repeal of the recent heresy laws and the introduction of Cranmer's new Prayer Book. To judge from the known history of his family and the known proclivities of the Plymouth maritime interest we should expect him to be on the Protestant side in these matters; but there is no information—barely a local entry that he was paid £14 in 1548-9 for representing the town.² Official employment bound him to the government of Protector Somerset. In February 1549 he received money to expend upon the fortifications of Plymouth, and a little later he was charged with providing victuals for the fleet, to be used in the French war which had again broken out for the possession of Boulogne. These victuals, to the value of £250, are recorded to have been spoiled by the western rebels of 1549,³ in the rising which

¹ *A. P. C.*, 1542-7, pp. 530, 544.

² *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 116.

³ *A. P. C.*, 1547-50, pp. 243, 263, 379.

drove Edmund Drake and his eight-year-old son Francis to fly from Devon into Kent as Protestant refugees. The rebels took Plymouth, but the fort on St. Nicholas's Island (later Drake's Island) held out against them, and we may reasonably imagine old Hawkins as taking part in its defence, as he had certainly been instrumental in arming it. This forgotten campaign provided young Francis Drake and his somewhat older cousin John Hawkins with a common experience, a boyish memory of the clash of arms and the roar of guns. Half a century afterwards they were to die on a joint expedition with the same sounds ringing in their ears.

Somerset fell at the close of 1549, and Northumberland (the Lord Lisle of 1545) took his place. In 1552 Northumberland gathered a Parliament in whose election the boroughs had little freedom of choice, being simply required to return the Duke's nominees. William Hawkins was well known to Northumberland, by repute if not by personal contact, and it is significant of his views that he was not one of the nominees for Plymouth. So solid a man would not have been left out had he been a supporter of the Duke's policy. Northumberland failed and fell in 1553, and Mary mounted the throne amidst the congratulations of subjects who looked for the strong rule of Henry VIII to recommence. Ere the close of the year a Parliament had met, as freely chosen as was then customary, and for the last time old Hawkins journeyed up to Westminster. And that was the end. A deed of 8 February 1554 speaks of William Hawkins, merchant of Plymouth, as recently deceased.¹

He left two sons, William, the elder, and John, the younger, a good estate (as we can hardly doubt), a fleet of merchantmen and privateers, and a reputation which moulded the lives of his boys, and through them made no small contribution to that complex of prejudices, instincts and memories that is called the English tradition.

¹ *Plymouth Armada Heroes*, p. 6.

II

THE AFRICAN TRADE

THE discovery of America has received all the consideration it deserves as an event in world history. To its contemporaries it was a small affair, accidental and disappointing, for its pioneers were looking for something different and were heart-sick at the failure of their hopes. From our own standpoint it was indeed a great event and as such has been sufficiently recognized. The discovery of West Africa, on the other hand, was a more difficult achievement, deliberately planned and systematically carried out, and quite as important in the story of European advance as the subsequent expansion to the West; and, in the English view of history at least, it has not been accorded anything like its due proportion of regard. Portugal, by patient and heroic work throughout the fifteenth century, revealed the west coast of Africa from its beginning to its end. In so doing she learned for her own and Europe's benefit how to live in the tropics, to deal with savages, to build and navigate ocean-going ships, to conquer the superstitious fears these undertakings aroused in the breasts of her own seamen, and to bring down scientific studies from the clouds of fable and authority to the solid ground of experiment and recorded observation. Portugal did this in the first stage of her oceanic career, and in doing so she made possible the more dazzling and extensive Spanish conquests on the shores of the Caribbean Sea. And just as Africa provided for Europeans at large their first experience in maritime expansion, so a century later that continent was for Englishmen in particular the scene of their apprenticeship to the task of mercantile empire-building on the oceanic scale. In this English connexion also the African story has not received its due share of attention, and it is a common impression that the found-

ing of the British Empire began with the visits of the Elizabethan privateers to the West Indies.

England in the mid-sixteenth century passed through one of those economic crises which are inseparable from the struggles of an active people to keep pace with the changes occurring in the world around them. As often happens when a reconstruction of society and industry is dictated by world-causes, the process was accelerated and intensified by local phenomena which were apparently of independent origin. On the great scale the mediaeval organization of England was being sapped by the influx of wealth into Europe from Asia and the West, by the consequent rising standard of comfort and the dynamic force of mobile capital, and by the breakdown of tradition before the sceptical mentality of the Renaissance. On the local English scale occurred the ruin of the ancient nobility by civil wars and Tudor policy, the spoliation of the Church by Henry VIII, the endowment of a new aristocracy with the lands thus confiscated, and the rise of commercial interests to a greater share of power in the state than they had ever before enjoyed. Whether the whole metamorphosis was for good or ill is a debated question, and for realists an idle one; for it happened, and no individual had power to prevent it. Yet the process itself has the fascination of all manifestations of natural law, and from that point of view is worth study. Its reaction upon the careers of a certain set of men is one aspect of the subject of this book.

Locally and temporarily the evolution of mediaeval into modern England caused considerable stress and *mal-aise*, the economic crisis above mentioned representing one of the evils so produced. The new landowners were less conservative than the old. They sought to increase the incomes accruing from their property by evicting the peasantry from its traditional rights of common cultivation and by creating enclosed holdings which could be let to individuals for money rents. In some districts

there was actual depopulation by the conversion of arable land into sheep pastures, for the growing European demand for cloth rendered wool a profitable commodity. This agricultural revolution was not general throughout the country—had it been so it must have resulted in a period of anarchy; but it did take place on a scale large enough to fill the land with grievances, to cut loose numbers of people from their social roots, and to break down some of the age-old customs of the remainder. Population began to increase, instead of remaining almost stationary as in the old conditions when no man, tied to the soil, could marry and become a householder until some other householder of his manor should die and make room for him. There were more mouths to feed and less food, it seemed, wherewith to feed them; ‘never more people, never less employment’ was still the cry of an economist in the reign of James I, and the Elizabethan writers are full of it. It was not the whole truth, for the phenomenon was the redistribution, not the reduction, of national wealth, but the groans of those who lost were naturally louder than the rejoicings of those who gained. Statesmen, from Henry VIII to James I, recognized that they had a problem to cope with. Their measures may be summarized as the resettlement of agriculture and industry, the finding of new markets for English manufactures, and the planting of colonies both for ease of surplus population and for further commercial advance. It is the second of these which concerns us here, for manufacture was the obvious hope of the new England, the chief resource for employing the growing population; and the search for markets wider than Europe could offer became a national duty and instinct. One of its manifestations was the opening of trade with Africa and the challenge to the prescriptive rights of Portugal in that continent.

Portugal, her most enterprising leaders pushing on to wealth and power in the East, had reduced her African

activities to a system which had become rather stagnant by the middle of the sixteenth century. In the north she conducted the foreign trade of Morocco, but made no pretence to conquest or suzerainty over the Moslem princes of that country. From the Senegal down to the Congo she did claim political jurisdiction over the coast. Her authority was more nominal than real. At Elmina on the Gold Coast, and perhaps at two or three other places, there were fortifications and Portuguese garrisons. Elsewhere, in river-mouths and negro settlements offering good trade, there were Portuguese factors and a few priests. But in general the occupation was so thin as to be invisible. The Portuguese claimed that the negro chiefs were Christians and vassals of the crown, yet it is certain from their observed behaviour that the claim was fictitious. More effective was the Portuguese exploitation of trade. The commerce of the African conquests was a royal monopoly, shares of which, for given places, commodities and times, were farmed to capitalists who paid a fixed sum and made what they could of the bargain. One of the most important of these farms was that of the slave trade. The chief place of sale was in the Spanish colonies of the West, and the Spanish slave-dealers, having no African property of their own, had to obtain their supplies from groups of Portuguese undertakers.¹ The Portuguese crown maintained this monopoly system with strictness, allowing no African trading to the unprivileged among its own subjects; but its enforcement against foreigners rested upon the assumption that Portugal had the power as well as the right to debar them.

¹ Georges Scelle, *La Traité Négrière aux Indes de Castille*, Paris, 1906, i. 225-31, shows that from 1532 to 1580 there was no *asiento* or general contract for the slave trade, but that numbers of limited licences were granted by the Spanish crown to Spaniards, Genoese, and Portuguese. All these persons had to obtain their negroes from the Portuguese farmers of the trade, who alone could collect on the African coast.

The sustained English interest in Africa did not begin until the reign of Edward VI, for, as we have seen, the Guinea trade of William Hawkins had been dropped when the wars broke out. Englishmen had long cast their eyes at Barbary, or Morocco without the Straits. Hakluyt quotes an authority for saying that in 1481 John Tintam and William Fabian, English merchants trading in Andalusia, prepared an expedition at the request of the Spanish Duke of Medina Sidonia, whereupon the King of Portugal complained to Edward IV, and he forbade the undertaking.¹ There are indications in the Admiralty records that Englishmen residing at Seville and Cadiz traded with Barbary before 1551, but until that date we have nothing definite.² In the Atlantic islands English ships had been seen for many years. A voyage from Bristol to the Azores is recorded in 1519,³ and trade with the Canaries is known to have begun not much later. From thence to the Barbary coast was no great step.

The initiation of the regular Barbary trade in 1551 was claimed by James Alday, a Dartmouth skipper who appears fairly often in the maritime records of the period. He was of the less reputable class of adventurers, hovering between privateering and piracy, getting into debt, and acting as a government spy upon other loose characters.⁴ He made his statement about Barbary at a much later date whilst applying for employment in Martin Frobisher's search for the North-West Passage. He said that he introduced the Barbary project to a group of adventurers which included Sir John Lutterell and Henry Ostrich, and also (by implication) Thomas Wyndham, since he was part owner of the ship employed. Alday

¹ Hakluyt, MacLehose ed., vi. 123-4.

² H. C. A. Examinations, No. 13, 1560/1, 30 Jan.

³ Exchequer (Customs), E. 122, 21/3, 17 March.

⁴ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 5, 1548, 23 Apr., 5 May; No. 7, 1552, 22 Oct.; 1551, May; S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 4, Nos. 64, 65.

does not state the source of his own knowledge of Morocco, but makes casual mention of the fact that the expedition conveyed to their own country out of England two Moors of noble blood. Perhaps they may have been passengers in some Portuguese vessel captured by Alday or Wyndham or one of their piratical associates. Undoubtedly they supplied the means of introduction to the rulers of Morocco. Before the ship, the *Lion* of London of 150 tons, was ready to sail an epidemic remembered as the Great Sweat broke out. Lutterell, Ostrich, and others of the merchants died, and Alday himself took the infection. Before he had recovered Wyndham assumed command of the *Lion* and sailed from Portsmouth. The details of his voyage have not been preserved, but it evidently encouraged a repetition of the venture.¹ This meagre record leaves Wyndham as the real pioneer. Alday's contribution may have been that of the two noble Moors; but his character, as has been said, was bad, and he himself admits that he had been defamed as one who undertook voyages and then found excuses for abandoning them, so that altogether there is not much trust to be placed in his assertions. Wyndham was a commander of courage and enterprise, a naval officer of good repute in the wars of Henry VIII and Edward VI, and an owner of privateers which preyed upon Portuguese shipping in the Channel.²

In the following year, 1552, Wyndham sailed again to Barbary with the *Lion* and two other ships.³ The promoters of this voyage included Sir John Yorke, Sir William Garrard, Sir Thomas Wroth, and Francis Lambert, all well-known Londoners, although the squadron sailed from Bristol. After a passage of a fortnight Wyndham arrived at Zafia (now Saffi) and landed goods for conveyance to the city of Morocco. Then he went on to a second port, Santa Cruz, where he obtained cargoes of

¹ Hakluyt, vi. 136.

² S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 95, ff. 253, 253 b.

³ Hakluyt, vi. 138.

sugar, molasses, dates, and almonds. On the homeward voyage he touched at Lancerota in the Canaries and had some trouble with the Spanish inhabitants, but the misunderstanding was cleared up and left no ill effects at the time. The Portuguese, on the other hand, were very bitter about the new trade, and threatened to attack any Englishmen they found in Morocco. Thenceforward a number of English merchants, for the most part Londoners, maintained and extended the Barbary trade, which in twenty years grew more valuable than the traffic with Portugal. The traders employed resident factors in the country, and sent out large and well-armed ships. In addition to sugar and molasses they obtained large quantities of gum, necessary for one of the many processes of cloth-finishing. They supplied Morocco with English cloth and with quantities of arms and munitions. Against this latter export the Portuguese made especially loud complaints, alleging that attacks upon Christians would result. They charged also another crime against the English, that of selling Hebrew Bibles to the Jews of Morocco. The Portuguese professed to be shocked at the impiety of the transaction, but since we learn from another source that the whole business of Morocco was in the hands of the Jews it is easy to read between the lines that the English, having long ceased to persecute Jews, were in better repute there than the Portuguese, and that it was jealousy rather than intolerance that prompted the complaint. It would be interesting to learn where these Bibles were printed and whether any of them still exist.¹

¹ The Barbary trade of the Tudor period is a subject that would repay a detailed investigation which it seems not yet to have received. The above particulars, and many others, are to be found in H. C. A. Examinations, No. 12, 1559, 12, 20, 30 Nov.; No. 13, 1560/1, 30 Jan.; No. 16, 1568, 27 May, 11, 23 Nov, 7, 8 Dec., 1568/9, 3, 17, 19 Jan., 22 Feb., 9 Mar. 1569, 6, 28, 30 Apr.; No. 17, 1569, 4 May; Lansdowne MSS., 171, f. 154; *Cal. For. S. P.*, 1561-2, Nos. 279, 401; S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 42, Nos. 22, 49.

The Barbary trade was a step to that with tropical Africa, and with the taking of that step the interest shifts to the southward; for shortly afterwards occurred the first English voyage to the Gold Coast and Benin.

Here it is necessary to emphasize a fact which has been too little regarded in speaking of these transactions. The region called Guinea was not a small point but a huge stretch of coast extending, from the mouth of the Senegal to that of the Niger, for over two thousand miles. The whole of this coast was easily accessible from Europe by a short voyage with favourable prevailing winds. But to leave the coast was a different matter from approaching it, and it was this which gave the trade its peculiar perils. From the Senegal down to Cape Palmas there was little difficulty, for a ship could steer directly out into the ocean and make a good westing before turning northwards up the Atlantic. But after Cape Palmas the coast turns east and even a little north of east towards the Bight of Benin, the wind blows almost continuously from the westward, and the Guinea current flows from the same direction, making it exceedingly difficult for a sailing-ship to retrace her course from any point on the Gold or Ivory Coasts. The English voyagers, after they had learnt the conditions, used to quit the Gold Coast by steering southwards to the equator. By so doing they escaped the Guinea current, but ran into a region of calms and inconstant airs which often caused a deadly protraction of the voyage. For purposes of sixteenth-century commerce, therefore, it is important to regard Guinea as consisting of two distinct coast-lines, each about 1,000 miles long and joining at Cape Palmas, the first fairly safe for traffic but not yielding the choicest commodities, the second producing some quantity of gold as well as other goods, but dangerous by reason of the natural conditions above described. The Guinea voyages of old William Hawkins had been made, if Hakluyt's scanty data are correct, to

the River Sestos on the first, innocuous, Guinea coast, and this accounts for the absence of any mention of gold in the reports of his proceedings. In the voyages now to be considered the English rounded Cape Palmas for the first time and tried their fortune on the perilous Tom Tiddler's ground beyond.

In the spring of 1553 a syndicate of London adventurers prepared a Guinea expedition. The members were Sir George Barnes, Sir John Yorke, Sir William Garrard, Thomas Wyndham, and Francis Lambert,¹ of whom all except the first have already been named as promoters of the Barbary trade. They intended to place Wyndham in command, but they had secured also the services of a pilot expert in Guinea navigation. This man, Antonio Anes Pinteado, a native of Oporto, who had served many years on the coasts of Guinea and Brazil, was now a fugitive from his own country. For reasons unknown he came to London and there undertook to guide Wyndham to the Gold Coast and Benin. Frenchmen had already found this trade, and it is just possible that Pinteado reached England by way of France, for Rouen was at this time a cosmopolitan city harbouring a number of Spanish and Portuguese renegades.² At least there was a French connexion of some kind, for Garrard sent to Rouen to enlist the services of a French surgeon for the voyage,³ a circumstance which indicates not only that the Frenchmen had experience of Guinea, but also that the English knew of it and were in touch with them. Wyndham himself, as we have seen, was acquainted with old William Hawkins, and had probably picked up some Guinea information from him, but the project now in hand was very different from those of Hawkins and proceeded on the first-hand knowledge of the Portuguese traitor.

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 9, 1554/5, 6, 8, 12 Feb.

² E. Gosselin, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la marine normande*, Rouen, 1876, p. 44, &c.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-7.

If the origins of the undertaking are partially obscure the record of its course is also unsatisfactory. Although there are a few facts to be gleaned from the Admiralty documents above cited the main authority is the narrative of Richard Eden, a contemporary historian who was rather credulous and unsystematic, and who entertained a violent prejudice against Thomas Wyndham. Eden undoubtedly distorts the truth and omits important events, but, such as he is, we have to make the best of him.¹ He relates that the squadron, consisting of the *Lion*, the *Primrose*, and the *Moon*, a pinnace, sailed from Portsmouth on 12 August. The *Lion* was Wyndham's own ship, and the others were hired from the Navy, a practice characteristic of most of the oceanic expeditions of which we shall have to treat. Sailing in leisurely fashion, to avoid reaching their destination until the sun should be south of the line, they called at Madeira and the Canary Islands and passed on to the River Sestos, their first landfall in Guinea. This was on the first and better-known Guinea coast, and here they could have had cargoes of the Guinea grains which commanded a fair price in European markets. But the expedition was planned to seek gold, and the gold lay farther on. Rounding in succession Capes Palmas and Tres Puntas they reached the true Gold Coast, in the midst of which was the Portuguese Castle of Elmina. The negro chiefs on either side of it stood little in awe of the Portuguese and traded freely with the Englishmen until the latter had secured 150 lb. of gold.

At this juncture there arose a difference of opinion between Wyndham and Pinteado, whom Eden represents as joint commanders of the squadron. Wyndham desired to leave the Gold Coast and push on eastwards

¹ Richard Eden, *Decades of the New World*, 1555, a translation of the Latin work of Peter Martyr of Anghiera. To it Eden appended accounts of the first two Guinea voyages, and these accounts were reprinted by Hakluyt in his *Principal Navigations* (vol. vi, pp. 141-77).

to Benin to seek cargoes of pepper. Pinteado demurred, although he had undertaken to pilot the expedition to Benin. He now said that the season was too late and that further easting would be perilous. The warning was grave enough, as the event was to prove, but it moved Wyndham only to an exhibition of sixteenth-century firmness in the handling of foreigners. 'This whoreson Jew', he declared, 'hath promised to bring us to such places as are not, or as he cannot bring us unto: but if he do not, I will cut off his ears and nail them to the mast.' Whereat the unhappy Portuguese could but shrug and submit. On the coast of Benin they anchored the ships at the mouth of a river which cannot now be identified, and sent Pinteado, Nicholas Lambert, and other merchants up into the interior to bargain for pepper with a native king. The collection of the pepper was a work of time, and meanwhile the crews began to die of the coast fevers. Wyndham, growing alarmed, sent word for the merchants to return at once. Instead of complying they sent down encouraging accounts of their pepper trade. Once more Wyndham sent a peremptory summons, and even then the merchants contented themselves with dispatching Pinteado alone to arrange a further delay. Pinteado arrived to find Wyndham dead of fever and the survivors clamorous to set sail. They would not wait for the merchants to be fetched, but forced Pinteado to guide them at once from the fatal coast. Already there were so many dead that the *Lion* and the pinnace had to be abandoned, whilst all the survivors took passage in the *Primrose*. She, after a terrible voyage, arrived at Plymouth with forty men, living or half-dead, of the 140 who had set forth. Pinteado died on the homeward passage. Of the fate of the merchants not a word is directly recorded; later expeditions were instructed to seek news of them, but none is known to have brought any.

Tragic as the voyage had been the financial success

was considerable. Sailors were cheap, their wages and food cost little, their deaths nothing. Even the loss of the ships was outbalanced by the gold, the ivory, and the Guinea grains brought home by the *Primrose*. The merchants therefore equipped a larger expedition for the season 1554-5. The syndicate now changed its composition and consisted of Sir George Barnes and Sir John Yorke of the old association together with three new men, Thomas Lok, Anthony Hickman, and Edward Castlyn.¹ Thomas Lok was a son of Sir William Lok, prominent as a London merchant and alderman under Henry VIII. Hickman and Castlyn were originally Lisbon and Seville traders who were now extending their business to the Canary Islands, where they maintained permanent English factors from the beginning of Mary's reign. The Canaries, the only Spanish colony in the eastern Atlantic, were a convenient port of call on the way to Guinea, and they and their inhabitants were to play in after years a prominent part in the schemes of John Hawkins. Spain had never attempted to make the Canaries a closed colony like those in the west, and Englishmen had long been trading there, certainly since the middle years of Henry VIII. The change in the composition of the syndicate, with the dropping out of Sir William Garrard and Francis Lambert, may be more apparent than real, for there is good reason to believe that the published names in most of these syndicates were those of a managing committee and that the actual list of investors was much more extensive. There was evolving, in fact, a form of joint-stock company, with shareholders and a board of directors, but with a capital fund which was wound up and distributed to the subscribers at the close of each undertaking instead of remaining as a permanent working stock.

The second Guinea expedition was commanded by John Lok, brother of Thomas, and consisted of three

¹ Hakluyt, vi. 154-77, reprinting Eden's account of the voyage.

ships and two pinnaces. Some of the officers, including Lok himself, were probably survivors of Wyndham's voyage. One man we know to have been in both ventures, and he was no less a person than Martin Frobisher. By his own account, given many years afterwards, he was captured by the negroes on the second occasion, handed over to the Portuguese at Elmina, detained by them for nine months, and then sent to Europe and liberated.¹ There is no need here to follow the voyage in detail, for the route was similar to Wyndham's except that there was no extension from the Gold Coast to Benin. With greater experience and better fortune the venturers achieved a haul of rich commodities for which they paid a much lower toll of lives. The booty included over 400 lb. of gold, together with 250 tusks and some Guinea grains from the Sestos region. The gold was probably the largest consignment that private men had yet brought into an English port.

The first proprietors of this auriferous traffic were not slow to protest against the new competitors. In the early summer of 1555, whilst John Lok was still at sea, a Portuguese envoy, Lopez de Sousa, came to England to lay a complaint. He asserted that the Guinea trade was the monopoly of the crown of Portugal, which did not allow unrestricted venturing even among its own subjects. He declared that in the previous January three English ships (evidently Lok's) had visited the coast and compelled the natives to trade with them, denuding the country of gold and ivory; that these natives were the subjects of the king of Portugal or under his protection; and that they had now been stirred by the English to disaffection against their lawful masters. De Sousa therefore demanded the prohibition of English Guinea voyages and the surrender to justice of any Portuguese subjects who might have been abetting them, together with the restitution of the gold already obtained and a pro-

¹ Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 148-9; *Foreign Calendar*, 1562, No. 102.

clamoration of penalties against merchants attempting the voyage in future.¹ It may be deduced from the second of these demands that Pinteado had not been the only renegade in the business. In later years we hear of several more, including some who were Protestants taking refuge with the Huguenots of Rouen.

The obvious answer to the Portuguese case was that the African coast was free to all comers since it was not effectively occupied by Portugal or any other power. This answer was in fact made, but not by the English government. It was left to the merchants to lay down a principle of English policy which was to become a permanent maxim with English statesmen and ultimately a part of the law of nations; but on this first occasion the merchants were to urge their view in vain. In response to an invitation to justify themselves they declared that their ships and factors had not entered any place where the King of Portugal maintained a garrison or any officers or other persons to forbid them; on the contrary, they had trafficked only in places where the princes and governors had received them in friendly and gentle manner and had assured them they were no subjects of the King of Portugal, 'thinking that without any offence we might use there, where we found no resistance, the same liberty that we use and do find in all other places of the world'.² Thus at the outset of English oceanic expansion the great question, whether prescriptive right or effective occupation should be the title to non-European possessions, found its terms defined; and had the political circumstances not been peculiar there is little doubt that England would have made her decision there and then. But the country was at that time being governed in an interest other than its own. Philip of Spain had married Queen Mary and was claiming to use her prerogatives

¹ S. P. For. Mary, vol. 14, Nos. 4, 5 (erroneously assigned to 1558 in the *Foreign Calendar*).

² *Ibid.*, vol. 7, No. 449.

for his own purposes. His interests caused him to reject the merchants' pleading and to countenance that of Portugal; for once a breach should have been made in the validity of prescriptive right there was no telling where the process would end. Accordingly, after a summer and autumn spent in argument, Philip carried his point, and the English Privy Council, acting on his orders, forbade the equipment of any more Guinea expeditions.

It is evident that the Council came with reluctance to this decision, and that even the Queen sympathized more with her subjects than with her husband. On 30 December 1555 one Guinea syndicate was formally summoned and interdicted.¹ Its members were Edward Castlyn, Jeffery Allen, Rowland Fox, and Richard Stockbridge. Yet, although there had been a provisional stay for six months before the final prohibition, an expedition had sailed for Guinea in September. It was commanded by a merchant named William Towerson, but is unlikely to have been at his sole adventure. The names of the other promoters are not disclosed; they may have included Garrard and Lok and the others who had originated the traffic, but since the venture was now illegal the narrator of the voyage omits to mention them. What should be noted, however, is that there is a practical certainty of connivance on the part of highly placed persons, for even if the Council had been unable to stop the sailing of the ships it could certainly have confiscated the booty on their return, and the expectation of this would have been an effective deterrent to investors.

Towerson commanded two ships of moderate size and made a prosperous voyage of little more than seven months' duration, of which time he spent one month in trading upon the Gold Coast.² Other English venturers were similarly engaged, as may be inferred from an entry

¹ *A. P. C.*, v. 214.

² Hakluyt, vi. 177-211.

in Towerson's journal, but of their names and proceedings nothing has survived. The lure of the trade was powerful, and Towerson's success encouraged many to match their wits against the languid prohibitions of the Privy Council. Some succeeded and others failed in getting their ships to sea. Towerson himself was one of the fortunate, and he sailed again in November 1556.¹ This time he had two ships and a pinnace, and on the nearer Guinea coast fell in with a French squadron with whose commanders he struck an alliance. Already it was war, open and vindictive, beyond the tropic of Cancer. The Frenchmen had just burnt a Portuguese ship of 200 tons, killing the whole crew except three persons, and now as they worked along the Gold Coast they had to fight a Portuguese squadron based upon Elmina. The allies, excluding pinnaces, numbered five ships, and against them they had five Portuguese sailing warships; there were galleys also at Elmina, but they seem to have played no part in the campaign. There were several encounters between the rival fleets, one of them, by Towerson's description, being well worth the attention of naval historians, for it appears to furnish the earliest instance of the close-hauled line ahead formation whose alleged invention against the Armada thirty years later has been a subject of controversy. On this occasion both sides used it, and the narrator of the story evidently regarded it as a matter of course which required no special explanation. Towerson, in the intervals of fighting, managed to do some trade, but the arrival of two more armed Portuguese ships warned him and his French allies to depart. He reached England with some gold and ivory in April 1557.

In the following January he sailed for Guinea for the third time.² Yet again he reveals nothing of his backers, but we glean nevertheless a hint or two concerning them. They were a powerful syndicate, influential in the Coun-

¹ *Ibid.*, 212-31.

² *Ibid.*, 231-52.

cil, rich enough to equip three ships and a pinnace and to secure their clearance by lavish bribery. Two of the ships, the *Minion* and the *Tiger*, belonged to the Royal Navy, and the Lord Admiral, allowing their use, could not have been ignorant of their destination.¹ The *Minion* was in after years to make the Guinea passage again and again, although she was more than middle-aged on the occasion of her first venture thither. She was, apparently, the second ship of her name in the Navy, having been built, or rebuilt from some of the material of her predecessor, in 1536. She was of 300 tons, high-charged in poop and forecastle, had four masts, of which the two mizzens carried lateen sails only, was armed with half a dozen heavy guns and a larger number of light ones, and when mobilized for war against the French required a crew of 100 sailors, 100 soldiers, and 20 gunners. These details rest on the authority of an illustrated manuscript in Magdalene College, Cambridge,² and, even if strictly accurate in 1546, the date of composition, may have been modified when the ship was fitted for ocean voyages at a later date. In a sense the *Minion* was a lucky ship, in another sense unlucky; she emerged battered but whole from many a disastrous voyage, but she killed her crews with terrible regularity. Repeatedly she crept home bearing some starving, fever-stricken remnant scarce able to handle helm or sail, and her grim fortune held to its climax at San Juan de Ulua, whence she carried Hawkins to Mount's Bay with fifteen survivors out of two hundred that escaped from the Spanish guns. The *Minion* is a name which the Navy does well to remember in token that men will yet dare the omens attached to it.

Towerson, thus provided, slipped off to Guinea, alleging that he was bound for Barbary, and giving bonds,

¹ Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Pays-Bas et l'Angleterre*, i. 152.

² The relevant part reproduced in the illustration facing this page.



THE MINION

From Anthony's Roll at Magdalene College, Cambridge

never meant to be executed, that he would not attempt the forbidden voyage.¹ The Council, we are told, deeply resented Philip's prohibition, and Queen Mary herself assented to it with an ill grace. On the outward passage the expedition traded at the Canaries, where a certain Edward Kingsmill was responsible for the business done.² This is an indication that the men behind Towerson were the Garrard, Lodge, Hickman, and Castlyn syndicate, for Kingsmill was the resident factor in the Canaries for Hickman and Castlyn. On the Guinea coast Towerson did some trade, but obtained much of his lading by plundering a Frenchman. He had to fight also with the Portuguese armada, but his possession of a warship like the *Minion* gave him the advantage, and after one encounter the Portuguese left him alone. The homeward voyage was disastrous. Pestilence raged through the squadron, and the *Tiger* had to be abandoned in mid ocean for lack of hands to work her pumps. The other two, the *Minion* and the *Christopher*, staggered into Portsmouth with no more than twelve men upon their feet, but with gold and pepper to a notable amount.³ Portugal, and Spain also, made ready to expostulate, but before Towerson had been home a month Queen Mary died, and English relations with those countries entered on a new stage.

Portugal had, apart from the African trade, long-standing grievances against England. The last French war of Henry VIII had seen the development of Channel freebooting into a regular branch of maritime enterprise, from which the Portuguese had been prominent sufferers; for they were in the habit of shipping their tropical produce through the narrow seas to Antwerp for dis-

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 2, 11.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1560-1, No. 412.

³ Hakluyt, *ut supra*, supplemented by *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 11. Towerson in Hakluyt mentions only the arrival of the *Minion*, but the Spanish document speaks of 'ships' reaching Portsmouth.

tribution over Northern Europe. A Portuguese protest in the Record Office ¹ sets forth a long list of unredressed piracies. In 1546-7 Thomas Indema (Wyndham) had committed great depredations. In 1550 some Englishmen unnamed took a sugar-ship from Madeira; complaint was made to Edward VI with no result. At the same period one Thomasius (possibly Wyndham) captured several Portuguese vessels going up Channel with sugar and gutted them at his leisure in Waterford. In 1550-2 an English captain named Gemeschus (James?) haunted the same cruising ground and carried ship after ship into Gataforda (Waterford). In 1555 Stranguishe (Strangways), formerly a naval officer of the English crown, extended the danger zone down to the coast of Portugal itself, where he took four valuable ships off the Burlings; and three years later he was still happily pursuing the same occupation with another gentleman named Phetipace as his rival and emulator. And so the list continues; with a notable increase in the number of outrages after the accession of Elizabeth. So long as Mary lived, with Philip II at her elbow, there was at least a chance that the English government would do something as soon as its hands should be freed of the French wars. But Elizabeth from the outset treated the Portuguese with scant sympathy, reversing, as will be shown, her sister's prohibition of the Guinea trade, and refraining from the steps it was in her power to take to check the freebooters in European waters. Elizabeth, in fact, had a game to play in which the seamen were to bear a part, and she could as ill afford to deprive them of their training-ground in the handling of fighting craft as to demilitarize any other section of her people which trained its hands to war without occasioning any expense to the state. Elizabeth did on occasion round up the pirates, but she hanged them very sparingly, and her captives usually escaped with a period of forced service in the

¹ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 95, ff. 242-67.

Royal Navy.¹ Then, an emergency having been met, they were turned loose to earn their livelihood as before. It seemed a light price for these conveniences that they entailed a state of war with a country so remote and powerless for offence as was Portugal. The state of war, undeclared but none the less effective, came quickly into being after 1558.

Relations with Spain had naturally been good during the joint reign of Philip and Mary. Although there had been occasional mishandling of Spanish and Flemish craft on the English coasts, it had reached nothing like the proportions of the offence against Portugal; and as yet there was no colonial question to set the two powers at variance. English merchants traded largely in the ports of Andalusia, at Seville and Cadiz, and particularly at San Lucar at the mouth of the Guadalquivir, where they had chartered privileges and an English church of their own. They did business also on the Biscay coast, whence there was an iron export to England; whilst Vigo Bay in Galicia, the Cornwall of Spain, served as a place of assembly, victualling and repair for any expeditions, mercantile or piratical, which had a lengthy passage before or behind them. Vigo, as the oceanic interests of England expanded, grew ever more important; for, although on Spanish soil, it was so remote from authority that Spanish writs seldom ran so far, and some very surprising transactions took place there. One Spanish colony, that of the Canary Islands, was open to English trade. In it two of the Guinea venturers, Hickman and Castlyn, had established a regular business, employing two factors, Edward Kingsmill and Thomas Nicholas, who flourished until the accession of Elizabeth brought a change in the aspect of affairs.

The change sprang from the disappointment of the Spaniards at the loss of the matrimonial alliance by which England was to have become part of their empire, and

¹ An instance occurs in *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 29, No. 23 (1563).

at Elizabeth's refusal to renew it. No sooner was Mary dead than the ambassador de Feria was writing of the ill-will borne to Spain not only by the people of England, but by the new government also. Spanish officials were quick to resent the slight their master had suffered, and on the other side the pirates realized with sure instinct that what they had been doing against Portugal they might now do against Spain. Trouble broke out first in the Atlantic islands. Two enterprising pirates, Poole and Champneys, haunted the seas between the Azores and the Canaries and picked up prizes homeward bound from the Indies. In 1560 they put in at one of the Canarian ports, where the governor took them off their guard and made them prisoners. However, on Christmas Day, when the whole island was at mass, they slipped on board a ship lying in the harbour and in her made their escape to English waters. Spanish jealousy was now aroused against all Englishmen. Five English ships, genuine traders sailing to the Azores for woad, encountered the homeward-bound plate fleet, which found in their holds certain wines stolen by Poole and Champneys and brought them all to Seville as pirates. The ships were restored after a long haggling, but the incident rankled. Meanwhile in the Canaries the Spanish authorities had arrested the factors Kingsmill and Nicholas. Kingsmill at Grand Canary was fined 1,000 ducats for keeping his books in English, contrary to statute, although he had kept a Spanish copy as well; and his master's goods were all seized. Nicholas at Teneriffe fell into the hands of the Inquisition, which argued that since he professed himself loyal to a heretic queen he must be a heretic himself. He alleged that the witnesses against him were two thieves and two prostitutes, whilst the chief inquisitor was a Jew who avowed that his motive was plunder. Twenty months after his arrest he was still in prison, and his employers had lost all their goods. Hickman and Castlyn, the principals in England, carried their case to

the higher authorities in Spain, but, although Philip wrote a general injunction to the Canary officials to behave better towards the English, there seems to have been no redress for the wrongs already committed. These were some of the oceanic grievances between England and Spain at the opening of the new period. Their effect was to exasperate individuals but not yet to modify the policy of governments. Spain and the Netherlands were necessary markets for the English cloth trade, and Philip had his hands so tied with awkward problems that he had no desire to force a quarrel with England. Anglo-Spanish friendship, maintained in the face of outrageous provocation on either side, continued to hold until the close of 1568.

To return to the English Guinea trade, we find that for the first two years of Elizabeth's reign its records are scantier than for any other period since it had commenced. Hakluyt has no narratives between Towerson's last voyage in 1558 and the sailing of an expedition promoted by the old adventurers at the close of 1561. Yet in the spring of that year an ambassador had come from Portugal to protest against the trade, so we know with certainty that it was being actively pursued; had it been otherwise the Portuguese would have been only too thankful to let the matter sleep. In January 1562 de Quadra, Philip's ambassador, wrote, 'They keep sending more ships from here round Cape Verde, and the French are doing the same'; and two months earlier he had reported, 'Cecil said to me that the Pope had no right to partition the world and to give and take kingdoms to whomsoever he pleased'.¹ This last is curious, for it constitutes one of the only two discoverable references in these disputes to the Bulls of Alexander VI, which have in modern times been accorded so great a place in world history. The men of the sixteenth century may have had them at the back of their minds, but they said surprisingly

¹ *Spanish Calendar, 1558-67, No. 144.*

little about them. Spain and Portugal based their prescriptive claims upon prior discovery and formal annexation rather than upon the papal disposal of the new continents. Cecil's protest, made with reference to Atlantic voyages, does, however, indicate something, namely that Mary's policy of deference to the peninsular claims was now to be reversed.

On 1 May 1561 Elizabeth regularized the Guinea trade by ordering that any of her subjects preparing expeditions for that region should first report their intentions to the Lord Admiral, he on his part being directed not to stop them, but to see that they conformed with certain regulations.¹ A few weeks later the old Guinea syndicate, now comprising Sir William Chester, Sir William Garrard, Sir Thomas Lodge, William Winter, Benjamin Gonson, Hickman, and Castlyn, renewed its operations.² On 18 June it entered into an indenture with the Queen for the use of four ships of the Navy, the *Minion* and the *Primrose* and the pinnaces *Flower de Luce* and *Brygandine*.³ —

The full terms of the agreement on this occasion have not been preserved, but a charter-party for the *Minion* exists, of probable date 1564,⁴ which shows the respective obligations of the merchants and the Queen in these ventures. In this document the Queen grants to the merchants her ship *Minion* for a voyage to those parts of Africa where the King of Portugal 'hath not presently dominion, obedience, and tribute'. The Queen undertakes to have the ship ready by a given date, rigged and equipped except for sheathing, and provided with tackle, artillery, munitions, and boats. Her Majesty bears the whole charge (expense of equipment) and adventure (risk of loss) of the ship for the voyage. The merchants

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1561-2, No. 157.

² The list of names is combined from S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 17, No. 43, and Hakluyt, vi. 253.

³ S. P. Dom., *ut supra*.

⁴ Lansdowne MSS., 113, ff. 9-17.

on their part undertake to lade £5,000 worth of goods at their sole risk, to provide competent and sufficient pilots, gunners, and mariners, and to bear the cost of all victuals and also that of keeping the ship in good repair. At the end of the voyage the merchants shall pay the Queen one-sixth of the profit on the sale of the merchandise, reasonable expenses and charges being first deducted. The above may be taken as typical of a large number of such arrangements made in the reign of Elizabeth, the details varying on particular occasions; and it should be added that the crown's share of the profits was paid into the hands of the Treasurer of the Navy¹ for the use of his department, and not into the Queen's private purse as has sometimes been assumed. In 1561 the two ships and the two pinnaces were lent on condition that the merchants should pay one-third of the profits, from which, however, they were to deduct £500 for victuals to be provided at the Queen's charge.²

The syndicate chose John Lok, who had made the brilliant voyage of 1554, to command the squadron, and on 8 September he received his orders. He was to trade upon the Gold Coast and to establish an English occupation by selecting a site for a fort in the country of the king of Habaan, a chief who had already offered this facility to Towerson some years before; further, he was to try to obtain news of the merchants left in Benin after Wyndham's death in 1554.

The squadron sailed from the Thames on 11 September 1561, but encountered bad weather in the Straits of Dover. The *Minion* and the *Primrose* collided in the darkness, suffering damage which caused them to seek shelter in Portsmouth and Harwich respectively. This caused a delay of nearly two months, and it was not until the first week of November that the four ships, reunited at Portsmouth, sailed again on their voyage, accompanied by five French vessels which had been equipped in the

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 26, No. 45.

² *Ibid.*, No. 44.

same port.¹ Once more the luck was against them. Another gale scattered the combined fleet, the *Minion* put back alone and in distress to Bristol, and the pinnace *Flower de Luce* to Milford Haven, as we learn by a letter from John Lok to the adventurers written from the former place on 11 December.² In this letter Lok declines to proceed on the voyage. The season, he says, is now too far advanced; news has come from Lisbon that a Portuguese armada of four great ships and some pinnaces has gone to protect the Guinea coast; the *Minion* is unseaworthy, her upper works spent and rotten so that the men are continually wet; and there is no certainty of joining the *Primrose*, which has probably taken refuge in Ireland. In spite of all this the adventurers drove the ships once more to sea, whether under Lok or another does not appear. Still misfortune dogged them. The *Flower de Luce*, again separated from her consorts, called at the Canaries, where the governor arrested her crew for heresy.³ But the others went on and traded with some success on the Gold Coast. There is no record of their adventures, but we learn their result from an administrative document which states that the Queen's third of the profits amounted to £1,000.⁴ This, after such a string of mishaps, is eloquent testimony to the gains of a more normal Guinea expedition.

At the close of 1562 the syndicate—now consisting of Lodge, Garrard, Chester, Hickman, and Castlyn—prepared another venture, hiring this time only the *Minion* and *Primrose* from the Queen, upon terms which differed in minor detail from those of the previous voyage.⁵ Hakluyt gives the story of the expedition, which sailed from Dartmouth on 25 February 1563. The ships went direct to the first Guinea coast, not calling at Canary, and

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558–67, Nos. 139, 140, 144.

² Hakluyt, vi. 255.

³ *Foreign Calendar*, 1562, No. 1461.

⁴ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 26, No. 45.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nos. 43, 44, 45; Hakluyt, vi. 258–61.

traded for grains in the rivers of Sestos and Potis. Then, wishing to get ahead of some Frenchmen, they pushed on to the Gold Coast. Before reaching it they fell in with two Portuguese warships bound for Elmina, exchanged shots with them, and failed to head them off from that fortress. On either side of Elmina they trafficked with the negroes, but had to fight repeatedly with the Portuguese, who were now reinforced by two galleys. In one action the galleys had the best of it, and the *Minion* narrowly escaped destruction by the firing of a barrel of powder below decks. The galleys also intimidated the negroes so that there was little profit to be had by remaining on the coast. Accordingly the English put to sea, touched again at Sestos, and thence made a fairly quick passage home. They brought 22 butts of Guinea grains and 1,758 lb. of ivory, but there is no mention of gold, and probably little was obtained.¹ In the two ships twenty-one men died, and only twenty were fit to work at the end of the voyage.

Next year the same five 'chief adventurers', with Benjamin Gonson and others in association with them, sent out the *Minion*, whose charter-party has already been described; the *John Baptist*, an armed London ship; and the *Merlin*, belonging to Gonson.² These vessels sailed in October 1564 under Captain David Carlet, a man already accused by the Portuguese of piracy against them.³ Shortly after leaving the Channel the *Merlin* was blown up by some negligence in her powder room and sank immediately, the survivors saving themselves in the boat at her stern. The *Minion* and her other consort went on, but had ill luck on the Gold Coast. Carlet and a dozen men, going ashore to trade, were seized by the negroes and handed over to the Portuguese, whilst

¹ But cf. *Domestic Calendar, Addenda, 1566-79*, pp. 246-8, an undated document which, on internal evidence, may possibly refer to this voyage. It says the expedition it describes obtained 3 cwt. of gold.

² Hakluyt, vi. 262-5.

³ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 95, f. 247 b.

the galleys were a continual hindrance to further operations. Yet such was the spirit of merchants and seamen that extraordinarily rich cargoes were obtained. The *John Baptist*, indeed, appears to have been captured with all her crew. The *Minion* was reported lost, but she was an ill ship to beat. At midsummer, 1565, an Englishman coming from the Azores declared that he had seen her there, her victuals finished, most of her crew dead, and the few survivors refitting for the voyage home. On 5 July she herself came into the Thames, with a great haul of gold, ivory, and other wares.¹ These bare facts alone have been preserved, and they are enough to show that a ghastly story of the sea has been lost.

Such was the Guinea trade when John Hawkins began to take his share in it and to divert it into channels unthought of by the older adventurers. Before taking up the story of his career it is necessary to glance at the diplomatic reactions of these intrusions upon the Portuguese monopoly. In the spring of 1561 the government of Portugal dispatched a gentleman named Emanuel d'Aranjo to the English court with instructions to complain that Englishmen had been seizing Portuguese at sea and selling them as slaves to the Moors, that English ships were trading at Elmina and elsewhere on the Guinea coast, and that English port officials were affording shelter to Scottish pirates who were preying upon the traffic from Lisbon to Antwerp.² In due course the Queen replied that she was doing her best to put down piracy, and that it was more than other princes were doing. As for the Scots their own government did not esteem them as pirates, and so she would be breaking amity if she closed her ports against them. On the main business, that of Africa, she did not acknowledge the King of Portugal's right to forbid her subjects to trade where they liked, and would take care that her people

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 305, 307.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1561-2, No. 96.

were no worse treated in the King's dominions than his in hers.¹ After taking a fortnight to digest this answer, so different from that of Queen Mary, d'Aranjo returned to the charge with a more extended statement. The kings of Portugal, he declared, had conquered the African coasts with much outpouring of blood and treasure, and they now distributed African commodities freely over Europe in the course of trade, so that there was no necessity for English voyages in search of them. All these regions acknowledged more or less the dominion of the King, although he imposed a lighter hand in some places than in others, for the purpose of spreading true religion by kindly treatment. Finally, the King would not on any account consent to English trade in these places.² To these sophistries—no other term can be applied to the latter part of the argument—Elizabeth and her ministers made a short response: English subjects should be commanded not to traffic in any part of Africa under the dominion and tribute of the King of Portugal.³ In other words, effective occupation would be respected as conferring the right to close the trade. With this answer d'Aranjo went his way, and in due course the King of Portugal acknowledged, without apparent dissatisfaction, the receipt of his message.

It was soon apparent that the significance of the Queen's promise lay in its omissions. The Lord Admiral duly received orders to regulate the Guinea trade in accordance with its terms,⁴ and English ships, as we have seen, ranged the Guinea coasts exactly as they had done before. For obvious reasons they had never yet attempted to trade under the guns of Elmina, and so the new pro-

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 98.

² Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 137 b-9 b. This has been wrongly dated 1562 by the copyist, but the further date 24 Apr. shows that it cannot belong to the negotiations of that year, which began only at the end of May.

³ *Foreign Calendar*, 1561-2, No. 137.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 157.

hibition meant nothing to them ; the negroes with whom they dealt were patently not ' under the dominion ' of Portugal, for Portugal disapproved of the traffic and yet could not stop it ; in the realm of hard fact the English case was unanswerable. Yet it was so for a reason worth dwelling upon. Portugal herself had not chosen to appeal to the donation of Alexander VI. She had based her claim partly upon the expenditure of blood and treasure, but mainly upon prior occupation, whose effectiveness she sought to demonstrate by very flimsy assertions. This was to meet the English upon their own ground, and thenceforward the dispute turned upon the definition of effective occupation. Why Portugal made so little of her prescriptive claims—those of prior discovery, the papal bulls, and the Treaty of Tordesillas—is not explained. Probably it had already been found by experience that prior discovery yielded a poor case for negotiators, since it was so easy for the opposition to fake a counter-story of discovery to suit themselves, and proof and disproof were equally difficult. The papal bulls, no doubt, would have worked more harm than good to their beneficiaries if urged in the anti-papal England of Elizabeth. So the Portuguese were driven to admit effective occupation as the touchstone, and their fate, in the battle of diplomacy, was sealed. Elizabeth and Cecil held all the cards and played with easy confidence to win. Their own display was not faultless ; there were stages at which one could wish they had been more graceful winners.

In the summer of 1562 Portugal tried again, sending this time João Pereira d'Amtas, her resident ambassador in France, on a special mission across the Channel.¹ He opened at once with a complaint of the Guinea trade, wasting no time over other subjects of dispute.² He

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1562, No. 18.

² *Ibid.*, No. 78, and Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 142-3, containing additional matter.

based his King's claim to monopoly first upon right of discovery and prior exploitation, and secondly upon the effectiveness of the Portuguese conquest and occupation. On this latter point he had a poor case, and he knew it. He was at pains to set forth that his countrymen, mildly spreading the Christian faith, had made some conquests otherwise than by force of arms. In such regions the native chiefs paid no tribute, nay, some of them received pensions from their conquerors. Only in regions where there was fear of rebellion had fortresses been built; elsewhere the conquest was maintained by trade alone, although organized in ecclesiastical dioceses. He therefore requested that Elizabeth would utterly forbid her subjects, without subterfuge or exception, to resort to the disputed coasts. The English answer ignored everything but the question of effective occupation, upon which alone England was prepared to treat. The Queen, it said, could get no satisfactory definition of the regions occupied by the King of Portugal. She was informed that the greater part of Guinea did not acknowledge his authority; and she had no mind to forbid her subjects to trade with friendly powers. She considered that she had made last year a great concession in issuing the order then framed, and she had looked for thanks rather than new demands in consequence. That order should now stand and should not be amplified; if there were any further recrimination it might be withdrawn. The King, if not satisfied, had his own remedy; the negroes, he claimed, were his subjects; let him then settle the matter by forbidding them to trade with the English.¹

Pereira was loath to take this for his answer, and he kept up an interchange of notes for the greater part of a month. But he had really nothing more to say and could only cover the same ground in different words.

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1562, No. 103, and Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 143-7 b. The latter is the better document, the former being a draft.

His opponents were inflexible, and at length he had to retire as his predecessor had done, with a concession which meant nothing. Next year he sent the Queen ten pairs of gloves from Paris.

What the Portuguese Government really thought of the English attitude it is difficult to judge. One would think it had been stated plainly enough. Yet two years later a third envoy appeared and opened fire with the old claims as if they were novel propositions introduced for the first time to English consideration. His name was Aires Cardoso, and he arrived in London in November 1564. Within a fortnight he was packed off with scant ceremony. The Queen, he was told, regretted that he seemed to have no knowledge of the reply made to Pereira in 1562, for she had no other reply to make. A royal letter to the King of Portugal was equally short and frigid, and with it negotiation ceased for four years to come.¹ Portugal was left to resort to ships and guns, the only argument that would meet the case.

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1564-5, Nos. 804, 820, 824; Lansdowne MSS., 171, ff. 163 b-6 b.

III

WILLIAM AND JOHN

BETWEEN the two sons of old William Hawkins there was some disparity of age. William, the elder, was probably born in 1519. The date rests on no very satisfactory evidence, but must be accepted until something more definite shall come to light. For the present all we have to go upon is that in 1579 Miles Philips, an English prisoner in Mexico, was interrogated by the authorities there concerning Francis Drake and whether the said Drake were a brother of John Hawkins; to which he answered, 'that Captain Hawkins had not any brother but one, which was a man of the age of three score years or thereabouts, and was now governor of Plymouth in England'.¹ This, if we can trust it, gives 1519 as a roughly approximate date of birth for William Hawkins. As corroboration of Philips's accuracy it may be mentioned that in 1578-9 William was actually Mayor of Plymouth,² although it is curious that a captive in distant Mexico should have been in possession of the fact.

John Hawkins, according to a phrase in his epitaph, formerly in the Church of St. Dunstan's-in-the-East, was born in 1532,³ and was thus about a dozen years younger than his brother. The epitaph is corroborated by an inscription on a portrait reproduced in a later chapter of this volume, and the date may be taken as fairly well established.

By the above calculations William Hawkins was about thirty-five years old at the time of his father's death in 1554, and John about twenty-two. They inherited a fleet of merchantmen and privateers, as well as some exclusive knowledge about trade and navigation on the

¹ Hakluyt, ix. 433.

² Worth's *Plymouth Calendar*, list of mayors, pp. 15-21.

³ Hakluyt Society, *Hawkins Voyages*, p. iii.

African and Brazilian coasts. A few early notices concerning them, all unimportant, may here be dismissed. In 1541-2, in a Plymouth account of various petty revenues for the year, occurs the name of John Hawkins as farmer of the 'wynewyts' for the sum of ten shillings.¹ It is not impossible, if not probable, that this little job was accorded to the ten-year-old son of the town's most illustrious inhabitant. Boys then began their practical education at an early age, and a man like old William Hawkins would have seen the value to a promising child of some responsibility for real business. However, it is a small matter. More likely is the attribution of the next record of John's proceedings. On 6 July 1552, on the report of Nicholas Slannyng, coroner of Plymouth, John Hawkins was granted a royal pardon for the manslaughter of John White, barber of that town, since it appeared that he had not killed the man feloniously, but because he could not avoid him.² White was evidently the aggressor, but a pardon inscribed on the Patent Roll cost money, and points to the slayer having been a man of some position. We may assume that it probably concerned the historical John Hawkins. Another hint comes from the Southampton customs ledgers of 1555. On 20 December of that year one John Hawkins is shown importing congers and Newfoundland fish, included in a general cargo not brought direct from the banks.³ Here again there is no certainty that it was the right Hawkins, neither does anything depend upon it. Tudor England, as has been shown, swarmed with Hawkinses. Finally, there are two sure notices of William Hawkins. In 1555-6 he brought a suit for debt in the Borough Court of Plymouth against Thomas Hampton, whose name we shall meet with again; and in September 1557 he likewise proceeded against one Raynold Wendon for slander, claiming 1,000 marks damages be-

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 111.

² Patent Roll, 6 Edward VI, part 9.

³ E. 122, 145/11, 20 Dec.

cause the defendant had said to him, 'thou art a traitor, a thief and a very villain'.¹ Whether he succeeded in having his reputation so highly rated does not appear.

John Hawkins, as his career bears witness, was a man of a type which has no counterpart in our specializing age. He was a consummate seaman, able to save his ship when all on board gave her up for lost; he was a good navigator, and a merchant knowing every detail of varied business, great and small; he had such knowledge, if not personal experience, of ship-building that he could manage the royal dockyards more successfully than any official of his time; he had a wide grasp of politics, and as a diplomatist was able to outwit the most cunning practitioners of the craft; and to all his close acquaintance with many humble trades he added a social quality which enabled him to talk with kings and ambassadors as confidently as with his clerks and sailors.

The Tudor age delighted in variety of accomplishment, and had no great reverence for narrow specialization; and the secret of John Hawkins's talents must lie to a great extent in the sort of upbringing a wealthy merchant gave his sons. Such boys learned when they were quite young to read and write and to understand a little Latin. They learned also that books were to be read and treasured, not merely skimmed and thrown aside. Schooling or tutoring went very little further, and at the age when the modern boy first goes to school in earnest the Tudor boy was launched into the world of men. Michael Lok, for example, tells us that his father, although a knight and an alderman of London, never gave him any schooling after the age of thirteen, but sent him over to the Low Countries to serve his apprenticeship to an English merchant at Antwerp. Lok's school education was exceptionally liberal, for most men sent their sons away at an earlier age than that. The overseas merchant was nearly always a shipowner, and

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 230.

sometimes a ship-builder as well. His son had thus a chance to learn the trades which were the foundation of maritime commerce. He worked with his hands in the shipyard, seeing a vessel grow from the keel up; and he went to sea in his father's ships, doing the duties of an ordinary seaman, learning navigation from the master at sea and practical merchantcraft from the factor in port. Ten years of this life made him a man of courage and a man of the world, fit to share in his father's affairs at home, and to do his duty to his native borough in fulfilling the various unpaid offices which the system of local administration demanded of the freemen in their turns. The prolonged school and university education of to-day would have seemed sheer waste of life to a Tudor man of affairs, for life was shorter then, and the man of twenty had little longer expectation of years than the man of forty has now. Maritime commerce was the best university the time could offer to any but a professed student of letters, for the little sailing-ships were packed with skilled craftsmen, carpenters, gunners, coopers, sail-makers, pursers; and every man had to be prepared to take his turn at any other man's job, whilst all had to go aloft in a storm and serve the guns in a fight. Nor were men of breeding and true learning uncommon in these ships, as the pages of Hakluyt testify.

That John Hawkins had some such training as this is reasonably certain, although the details are lost. The extent of his possessions and his relations with his brother are also unknown; the fragmentary evidence points to their carrying on separate maritime businesses and also to their acting in partnership in various undertakings. During the reign of Mary their head-quarters were certainly at Plymouth, and their ships were frequently in that port. Yet the customs ledgers, fairly complete for the years 1554-8, contain not the slightest trace of any one named Hawkins, either as merchant or shipmaster. An explanation may lie in a document of a few years'



THE GREAT OCEAN SEA OF JOHN HAWKINS'S YOUTH

From the Atlas of Jean Rotz, 1542

later date, which asserts that there have been grave irregularities in the Plymouth customs, whereby the Crown has been defrauded of its dues.¹ It is significant that a new class of records, the port-books,² when they begin in 1565, show a great deal of mercantile activity on the part of the Hawkinses, including a regular trade with the Canary Islands. Mysteriously silent as the records are about the brothers' commerce in their early years, they throw some light upon another branch of marine business, that of privateering. In 1556 John Hawkins was in France for a considerable time, suing for the restitution of a ship called the *Peter*, detained at Brest. It appeared that the vessel had originally been a Breton and had been captured by the Hawkinses in the time of Edward VI. Her new owners had afterwards been incautious enough to send her into a French port and so had lost her.³ It is not certain whether John Hawkins recovered the ship; more material is the fact that his efforts brought him into contact with highly placed people, the English ambassador in France and the French ambassador in England. From the latter he had obtained a recommendation of his cause to the French authorities.

On the matter of private warfare it is necessary to be explicit. There was a very clear distinction in contemporary minds between piracy, robbing without the countenance of the law, and privateering, the plundering of the enemies of some sovereign prince who could issue commissions to that end. To modern minds there is little moral difference between piracy and privateering as Tudor England conducted it, and so the English privateers, great and small, have often been loosely set down as pirates, a charge they would have resented with real indignation. To them the law was everything, and the law made it no crime for Englishmen to rob the ene-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 15, No. 25.

² The port-books are in the Public Record Office.

³ *Foreign Calendar*, 1553-8, p. 280.

mies of their own sovereign or of any other who would license them to do so. Further than this the law permitted the issue of letters of reprisal, whereby the man who had suffered wrong upon the seas was empowered to capture the goods of any member of the offending nationality, even in time of peace; but the extent to which individual reprisals were sanctioned must not be exaggerated—the thing was always an extreme remedy, not lightly resorted to. Now, although there were many English pirates in the mid-sixteenth century, the Hawkins brothers were not of their number. They kept within the law and remained privateers, although they never scrupled to stretch the law almost to its breaking-point in support of their proceedings. That was a national trait of the period, as may be seen again and again in the dialogue of Shakespeare's plays. A man was either lawful and respectable, or unlawful and a felon. If the former, his veneration for the law was so great that he made it the keeper of his conscience and did without a qualm any unjust thing it allowed him to do.

War was again declared with France in 1557, and the Channel speedily swarmed with privateers. William Hawkins took an active part in equipping them, and so perhaps did John, although there is no record of him. A witness in an Admiralty trial deposed that he had served in the war on board the *Tiger*, a privateer belonging to William Hawkins.¹ In July 1557 Thomas Stukeley received a grant of ordnance and powder for the same purpose, and a few years later we find him at sea in command of one of Hawkins's ships.² Towards the close of 1558 a Hawkins privateer captured a Hanse vessel called the *Peter* of Lubeck and brought her into Plymouth. She had been laden at Bordeaux and carried a rich cargo of wines, aqua vitae, and woad. The Hanseatic League was at the time very hostile to England, but war had not

¹ H. C. A., Oyer and Terminer, 1/35, 1559, 21 Apr.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 20, No. 50; H. C. A., Libels, 3/37, No. 210.

been formally declared. William Hawkins, however, argued that the cargo was the property of one Negrollo, a Milanese, who was a naturalized Frenchman and therefore an enemy. The aggrieved parties complained to the Admiralty Court which was obliged to instruct its officer at Plymouth to arrest the goods, since Hawkins was alleged to be selling them in anticipation of a judgement.¹ How the case went is not recorded, but it illustrates the subtleties of privateering. It was typical of many, for English mariners had an animus against the Hansa for its persistent carrying of French goods in time of war, a practice which the privateersman regarded as a fraud upon himself.

The French war ended in 1559, and John Hawkins's Plymouth period was at the same time drawing to a close. He remained a resident for only two years longer, after which he generally described himself as John Hawkins of London. In his last year in his native place he was chosen a Common Councillor, and his brother at the same time became a Privy Councillor of the borough.²

Meanwhile, events had been so shaping themselves on distant scenes as to call him to a larger enterprise than those which have just been narrated. Hakluyt says that John Hawkins made in his youth several voyages to the Canary Islands, where he grew friendly with some of the inhabitants and gathered information about trade in the West Indies. The port-books show a brisk trade between Plymouth and the Canaries, conducted in small craft of from twenty to fifty tons, the voyage out and home commonly taking less than three months. It was in these vessels, doubtless, that Hawkins learned his seamanship before he was out of his teens. He learned more than that, for the islands were the gateway to Guinea and to the western Atlantic. If one stood southwards from

¹ H. C. A., Libels, 3/29, No. 38; 3/30, No. 23; 3/31, No. 69; Examinations, No. 12, 1559, 18, 20 Oct.; No. 13, 1559, 12 Dec. and several subsequent entries.

² *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 50.

them to the African coast there was a fair wind all the way to Sierra Leone and beyond. If one stood westwards, as Columbus had done, the north-east trades were favourable and constant for Northern Brazil, the Spanish Main and the islands of the Caribbean. The Canaries were a junction whence the sea-tracks, invisible but immutable, branched to all the newly discovered tropical regions of the world; in the same manner the Azores were equally a junction where all the homeward-bound tracks converged and whence the westerly winds provided a clear run into European ports. Spain had adopted from the outset the policy of closing her West Indian and American discoveries to all foreigners; but she had possessed the Canaries before the days of Columbus, and she never made any attempt to exclude other Europeans from them. Englishmen and Frenchmen could therefore come openly and lawfully to the very edge of the rich forbidden seas. It was natural that they should there pick up secrets and desire to go farther; and John Hawkins, 'by his good and upright dealing being grown in love and favour with the people [of the Canaries], informed himself amongst them by diligent inquisition of the state of the West India, whereof he had received some knowledge by the instructions of his father, but increased the same by the advertisements and reports of that people'. Among his friends were Pedro and Nicholas de Ponte, father and son, Spanish merchants dwelling in Teneriffe.

Long before his day foreigners had conceived the idea of carrying their trade from the Canaries to the Caribbean, and private Spaniards had been willing to abet them in so doing. To Spanish governments it had seemed a simple policy to make a close preserve of the western conquests, but unwittingly they had been undertaking the impossible, as not only they but all other colonial powers were to discover in their turn. For monopoly, although it favoured some of their subjects, inevitably

The NORTH ATLANTIC

Scale of Miles

0 500 1000 1500



caused injustice to others, and national sentiment was never strong enough to restrain the malcontents from allying themselves with foreign intruders. Already in the first quarter of the sixteenth century English merchants had secret factors in the Antilles receiving goods from the advanced Canary base,¹ although it is improbable that the cargoes were carried in any but Spanish bottoms. By 1540 the intrusion had increased in scope, and non-Spanish shipping was engaged in it. A Spanish document of that year states that foreigners, presuming on their liberty of trade in the islands, are making voyages from thence to the Indies, and great evils have resulted; officials are therefore to take care that foreign vessels, especially those of the English and Portuguese, are not to be allowed to trade in the Caribbean.² The wording of the order indicates that the practice was widespread. The English interlopers were dealers in manufactured goods. The Portuguese represented an unruly movement against their own government as well as that of Spain, for they were, many of them, unlicensed slavers. Spain, needing slaves and respecting the claims of Portugal to the Guinea monopoly, had instituted a system of licences whereby Portuguese syndicates were allowed to ship a limited number of negroes to the western colonies. The Portuguese complained of in the 1540 document were evidently infringers of the system, welcomed by the Spanish planters owing to the cheapness of their wares.

When John Hawkins came upon the scene, in the reigns of Edward VI and Mary, a new development was taking place, the beginning of the regular English trade with Guinea described in the previous chapter. This trade was promoted by London merchants, some of whom had factors in the Canaries. Until Queen Mary died it was hampered by government disapproval, but as soon as

¹ Hakluyt, vi. 125.

² *Colección de documentos inéditos . . . antiguas posesiones españolas*, Madrid, 1885-1900, 2nd ser., x. 516-19.

Elizabeth mounted the throne it became open and undisguised. Englishmen now had a footing in Guinea, and they had long been looking to the west. The time was ripe for them to combine the two enterprises by carrying negroes to the Indies in defiance of the regulations; and that was the plan which Hawkins revolved during the years of his apprenticeship.

But Hawkins had no mind to be a common interloper. Humble as his position yet was, he had the knowledge and the views of a statesman; and his slaving voyages, as will be shown, embodied an international policy which, had he succeeded in getting it adopted, would have changed the course of oceanic history. He failed, but it was a brilliant failure, which in itself led to great results, and it is worth study as one of the submerged springs of English action which came at last to the surface long after its originator was dead.

The Anglo-Spanish quarrel of Elizabeth's reign, one of the most exciting and creditable passages in our history, cannot be seen in its true bearings without making allowance for a thing which Englishmen have been prone to ignore, the Franco-Spanish war which filled the preceding period. Not content with intruding upon the Portuguese in Guinea and Brazil, the Frenchmen early found their way to the Caribbean, or to the sea-tracks by which the treasure ships returned from it. Under Francis I the chief nursery of the French corsairs was Dieppe, whence the great Jean Ango dispatched privateers and interloping traders in hordes. In 1523 Jean Fleury, one of his captains, took an early consignment of the treasure sent by Cortes from Mexico, and thenceforward scarcely a year passed without a raid in the forbidden waters. In 1536-8 the French attacks reached a high pitch of intensity, to be relaxed for a time by the Truce of Nice of 1538, and to break out more vigorously than ever with the renewal of war in 1541-2. In the latter year the Frenchmen sacked not only Cubagua and

Santa Marta, small places of no strength, but also Cartagena, the capital of the Spanish Main, whose capture by Drake was to be celebrated as a brilliant opening of the English war some forty years later. From the middle of the century the French assaults went on without intermission whether war prevailed in Europe or not. In 1553 François le Clerc, called by the French *Jambe-de-Bois* and by the Spaniards *Pie de Palo*, led a squadron to the plunder of Porto Rico and the coasts of Hispaniola. Next year he was cruising for homeward-bound prizes at the Azores, whilst other Frenchmen searched the Caribbean for treasure and pillaged Santiago de Cuba at their leisure after holding the place for a month.¹

The Spanish defence consisted in forts and garrisons, never adequate to their task, and in ordering the treasure ships and ultimately all other trade to sail in great convoys for mutual protection. This plate-fleet system was of little use without warships to accompany the merchantmen, a fact which Spaniards were slow to comprehend. In estimating fighting power they counted armed men and tonnage, the decisive factors in medieval sea battles. But the corsairs knew that guns and speed were now the only things worth counting, and that a thirty-ton bark with half-a-dozen nine-pounders had a 500-ton merchantman without ordnance at her mercy. So we find in 1553 a pair of Dieppe privateers chasing the whole plate-fleet across the Atlantic, hanging on to its skirts for forty consecutive days, watching it disintegrate as Spanish fleets always did under stress of weather, and picking up the lame ducks one by one, until by the time the survivors reached Cadiz the Frenchmen had scored six captures out of the fourteen treasure ships that had left Porto Rico.

At this time also the nature of the struggle changes,

¹ For the French corsairs the best general authority is Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, vols. iii and iv. Complementary accounts are to be found in C. Fernandez Duro, *Armada española*, Madrid, 1896.

for religion enters into it. By 1570, a contemporary tells us, nearly all the French seamen were Huguenots, except the Bretons and the Poitevins.¹ Twenty years earlier there would have been a great deal of truth in a similar statement; and whereas plain hanging had been the fate of the captured corsair under Charles V, under Philip II he might be flayed alive after enduring any obscene tortures that occurred to his captors' imagination. The Frenchmen were quick to retaliate, and sea warfare in the tropics entered upon a disgusting stage to which the genial piracy of European waters could show no parallel.

In 1555 the French plundered Santa Marta for the second time, taking care to insult the Catholic religion in every conceivable manner. Jambe-de-Bois himself was in his later years a Huguenot, if not at the time of his first exploits. But the greatest of all the Huguenot captains was Jacques de Sores, a fanatical Calvinist, sincere and pitiless, and a commander of genius in that *guerre de course* which has always evoked the talents of French seamen. In 1555 he sailed along the Main and thence steered north for Hispaniola and Cuba. On 10 July he landed his men at Havana, took the place after hard fighting, and won but little booty. During an armistice the Spaniards attacked some of his men, whereupon he murdered all his prisoners, burnt the town, and departed. Jean Bontemps was another of the same stamp, not so great or so lucky as de Sores, but a daring captain and a thorn in the flesh of the Caribbean authorities. Guillaume Le Têtu was yet another, who died fighting in Panama, helping Drake to capture the treasure-train in 1573. Others we shall meet in association with the Hawkinses, whilst of many more the very names must have perished, although they were notable men in their day. It is a popular fallacy, dating only from the ruin of the French navy by the revolutionaries of 1793, that Frenchmen are essentially inferior at sea. The older British

¹ L. Voisin de la Popelinière, *Histoire de France*, Paris, 1581, ii. 150.

commanders knew better, and were very loath to take liberties with the fleets of the French monarchy.

Over all the Huguenot activities presided Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France. He encouraged colonial schemes, invested in African and Caribbean ventures, placed the King's ships at the disposal of the merchants, and supported an undying war against the enemies of his faith; it was his constant aim to combine Protestant sea power, Huguenot, English, and Dutch, in a league for the overthrow of Spain and Portugal and their empires. Although such a combination as yet made no appeal to John Hawkins, he was destined in later years to be involved in it and to work in active association with the Admiral and with his gifted brother the Cardinal of Châtillon.

Anti-Catholic colonial projects, from which category the Canadian attempts of Jacques Cartier and Roberval must be excluded, began in 1555. In that year Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon founded a settlement in Brazil, where he built Fort Coligny at Rio de Janeiro, a splendid site as yet unoccupied by the Portuguese. In spite of much heroism the undertaking was unfortunate. Religious dissensions ruined discipline, and some of the sectaries deserted the place in 1558. Next year Villegagnon returned to seek aid in France, and during his absence the Portuguese took the fort and the whole scheme came to an end. A more serious menace to Spain was the settlement begun in Florida in 1562 by the Huguenot Jean Ribault, just as the wars of religion were breaking out in France. Frenchmen in Florida could establish privateering bases from which the exits of the Caribbean might be closely watched, and it was this venture more than anything else which at length caused Spain to organize her sea defences. The outcome belongs to a later chapter of this history.

The French activities have necessitated a long digression, but they constitute the background of Hawkins's early plans, a background that has passed to a great ex-

tent out of English memory. So far from the Spanish colonies having been a virgin hunting-ground when the Elizabethans first approached them, they had been racked and scourged by a whole generation of the French rovers, and when Hawkins first turned his eyes to the Caribbean the empire of Philip II was wellnigh bleeding to death. To an ordinary adventurer the obvious course would have been to imitate the French, a proceeding which in an Englishman of that date would have been sheer piracy. But Hawkins took longer views than were common, and he hated disorder and illegality. To him it seemed that the Spaniards needed defence, which they themselves were unable to supply, and that there must be a welcome for the honest leader of an armed force for the policing of the Caribbean. That force, if Philip were only willing, might live by legitimate trade, to the mutual benefit of itself and its Spanish hosts; and the thing might grow until its originator became a sea-king of the tropics, filling the position which Ferdinand and Isabella had promised Columbus, and knitting firm the ancient Anglo-Spanish alliance which still remained unbroken in the field of European diplomacy. That, in the present writer's view, is what lay in the mind of John Hawkins when Elizabeth succeeded to the throne. And before condemning the idea as fanciful, the critic is asked to weigh certain documents written by Hawkins himself, not hitherto published, which, with circumstantial evidence, will be unfolded in their due place as the narrative proceeds.

As is well known, affairs did not work out in the manner indicated. Three factors set too strongly in the contrary direction: Spanish pride, which preferred to suffer all things rather than admit incapacity; the religious contest then ripening to an explosion in Europe; and the work of a great Spanish captain, Pero Menéndez de Avilés, whom Hawkins never met, but who was destined to supply King Philip with a tolerable alternative to the employment of an English free company of the sea.

IV

THE FIRST SLAVING VOYAGE

IT is unfortunate that the first slaving voyage of John Hawkins has been less satisfactorily chronicled than either of the others, for the omission has meant the loss of interesting evidence upon his plans as well as his actions. The only narrative of the expedition, and that a meagre one, occurs in Hakluyt, and appears to have been written by the editor from information supplied by Hawkins himself. The date of composition was more than twenty years later than that of the voyage, the international situation had completely changed in the interval, and John Hawkins like other Englishmen had become anti-Spanish in his views. Always reticent about his own doings he was never more so than on this occasion, for he told Hakluyt nothing about any motives other than that of profiting by the sale of slaves, omitted to explain how he collected those slaves, and did not even trouble to see that his reporter had the dates and other details correctly recorded. To Hawkins, in fact, it was on many grounds distasteful to rake up policies and transactions that were dead, and the result is a jejune story. It is possible, however, to illuminate it a little by recourse to state papers which in Hakluyt's day were buried in secret archives.

Some time before the summer of 1562 John Hawkins had entered into relations with the group of Londoners who were interested in the Canary and Guinea trades. He had recently married the daughter of one of them, Benjamin Gonson, Treasurer of the Navy. The Gonsons had risen to prominence under Henry VIII, when William Gonson engaged in what was then a new branch of enterprise, the Levant trade. In this he had made a fortune, and the King, always able to find a use for a man skilled in 'sea causes', had appointed him Clerk of the

Ships and Paymaster of the Navy. The position carried with it large powers of administration, and when, under Edward VI, Henry's system was improved and developed, Benjamin Gonson, the second son of William, became Treasurer of the Navy, an office he was to hold until his death in 1578. His duties did not prevent him from engaging in commerce on his own account, particularly in the Guinea ventures of Elizabeth's early years. The exact date of John Hawkins's marriage to Katherine Gonson is unknown, but it was evidently before 1562,¹ for their son Richard was old enough five years later to remember some exciting events which he heard his elders talk about.

To his new allies Hawkins unfolded his plans, or some of them, and a syndicate undertook to raise the capital for a preliminary venture. It consisted of Sir Lionel Ducket, Sir Thomas Lodge, Benjamin Gonson, William Winter (Surveyor of the Navy), Mr. Bromfield, and others. It has been found that these syndicates were usually larger than appears on the surface, for the principal adventurers subdivided their subscriptions among others whose names were not published; and very often the persons in the background were of more importance than the ostensible promoters. However that may have been on this occasion, the known names comprise at least three of the men already interested in the gold trade about Elmina. Slave hunting, if practised on the Gold Coast, would have caused damage to the older business, because it would have alienated the negro tribes. But that was not Hawkins's proposal. He designed to make his captures on the nearer Guinea coast, from Cape Verde to Sierra Leone, and in fact he never went beyond the latter place

¹ If we may trust a piece of second-hand information the date was 1559. Katherine died in July 1591, and Stow printed a statement from her epitaph to the effect that she had enjoyed thirty-two years of mortal life. This is evidently a mistake, and it has been suggested that 'mortal' should read 'married'. The monument itself perished in the Great Fire.

on any of his voyages. The commodity trade of this stretch was relatively unimportant, consisting chiefly of ivory and Guinea grains, and it was largely in the hands of the French. They, rather than the English gold-traders, stood to lose by the disturbances that slaving might produce. The sixteenth-century French, it may be noted, had ethical objections to slaving. Jacques de Sores refused to countenance it, and a French legal decision of the period anticipated by two centuries the Mansfield judgement of 1772.¹ The Hawkins syndicate, therefore, was not a body inimical to the Gold Coast syndicates, and may well have been even more closely connected with them than the surviving details show. Upon the attitude of the government we have nothing positive. There is no trace of any effort being made to check the enterprise; and it is reasonable to assume that Gonson and Winter would not have allowed their names to appear in an undertaking of which Cecil and the Queen might disapprove. Tacit consent is therefore probable.

The expedition was equipped at Plymouth and consisted of three ships which made the round voyage to Guinea and the West Indies. The *Salomon* of about 120 tons, commanded by John Hawkins in person, and the *Swallow* of about 100, under Thomas Hampton, a Plymouth merchant, were both owned by the Hawkins brothers; so probably was the third, the bark *Jonas* of 40 tons. There are indications also that a fourth vessel accompanied them to Guinea but did not go on to the West Indies, being used to bring home the Guinea commodities that were obtained in addition to the slaves. It was an arrangement which was afterwards adopted in the voyage of 1566-7. The three ships named carried

¹ The Parlement of Guienne in 1571: 'La France, mère de Liberté, ne permet aucuns esclaves.' Cf. the dictum of an eminent lawyer in 1607: 'Toutes personnes sont franchises en ce royaume: si tost qu'un esclave a atteint les marches d'icelui, se faisant baptizer, il est affranchi.' La Roncière, iv. 80.

small crews, not more than a hundred men in all. Most projectors would have considered them undermanned, but Hawkins was enlightened enough to realize that much of the mortality on tropical voyages was due to overcrowding, and it was always his policy to ship small numbers of picked men with space for cleanliness and for adequate stores.

In October 1562 the ships sailed from Plymouth and steered first for the Canaries, where there was some needful business to be done. At Teneriffe the merchant Pedro de Ponte was in readiness not only with supplies but with a Spanish pilot, Juan Martinez of Cadiz, who knew the navigation of the Indies. De Ponte had also been in correspondence with other Spaniards in Hispaniola, with the result that Hawkins was expected there by a group of men who were ready to buy his wares. This information was transmitted to Philip II in 1567 by Guzman de Silva, his ambassador in England, who had been at much pains to probe the matter.¹ It is significant of the value of Hakluyt's account that it merely states that Hawkins touched at Teneriffe and received friendly entertainment there. This is a gloss typical of the Hawkins narratives, which, while avoiding false statements, contrive to suppress a great deal of the truth.

From Teneriffe the squadron sailed for Cape Verde and thence along the Guinea coast to Sierra Leone. Here the Hakluyt story says only that Hawkins stayed some time and got possession of 300 negroes, partly by the sword and partly by other means, in addition to some commodities of the country. 'Partly by the sword' is very artless in view of the complaint made by the Portuguese Government about the transaction.² According to this document, which includes depositions by Portuguese witnesses, John Hawkins came to the coast with

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 432.

² S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 99, a book containing forty-nine written and several blank leaves, Latin, compiled at Lisbon in 1568.

four ships at the end of 1562 and continued his operations into the following year. In the River Caces he took a vessel containing 200 negroes and other goods to the value of 15,000 ducats.¹ Her captain was Blasius de Veiga, a knight of Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands, 'and the said Blasius and his sailors and other Portuguese, overwhelmed with many insults and tortures, and despoiled of their goods, were cast out upon the bank of the River Mitombi in Sierra Leone'. In the Mitombi, Hawkins took two more ships, each containing 70 or more negroes, with ivory and wax and other things, and worth together 8,000 ducats. Near the same place he took also another ship with 70 negroes and other stuff worth 3,000 ducats; and yet another with 'many negroes', worth more than 6,000 ducats, the owner and crew being set ashore with many blows and torments. Finally, at Sierra Leone he took a great ship of the contractation—that is, of the holders of the monopoly—with ivory and wax and 500 negroes. This ship he carried over to the West Indies, to the port of Monte Christi in San Domingo. A Spanish document in the Archives of the Indies at Seville² gives some corroborative evidence, but has been based upon different information from the above, for it enumerates no less than thirteen prizes, whilst the Portuguese complaint speaks of only six.

These are *ex parte* statements and must be criticized in the light of English accounts. For the present voyage there are none such, except that of Hakluyt, but the similar voyage of 1567–9 is well documented, and since it gave rise to the same kind of Portuguese complaints, included in the same book of evidence, some pertinent conclusions may be drawn from it. In the first place, the statement that all the negroes were captured on

¹ The ducat was in 1585 valued at 5s. 6d.

² Archivo general de India, 47–3–51/8. For a copy of this document I have to thank the kindness of Miss I. A. Wright, who has made extensive researches in the Seville archives.

board the Portuguese ships must not be taken too literally, for it appears that the complainants were in the habit of counting among their lading the negroes who were still at large on shore; in other words, if Hawkins took negroes in a given river, they were reckoned as the property of the Portuguese shipowner visiting that river, who might or might not have captured them himself in the absence of the English. The same argument applied to commodities; on the assumption that the Portuguese owned West Africa and everything in it, any ivory obtained on shore there was stolen from them. Then, also, the writer of the best account of the 1567 voyage (not Hawkins himself) says most emphatically that his commander never took any man's goods, in Africa or elsewhere, without paying for them to the owner's satisfaction,¹ although he admits that force was used to compel the Portuguese to sell. It is easy to see how such a transaction became rank piracy in the complaint, for Portuguese traders giving evidence in Lisbon would have found it impolitic to confess that they had sold slaves and ivory to English interlopers. Returning to the Portuguese account it is to be noted that it does not state that a single Portuguese was killed in any of the piracies—only that they suffered insults, blows, and unspecified tortures. One would certainly expect that a great ship capable of carrying 500 slaves would have made some sort of fight against the 120-ton *Salomon* and the 100-ton *Swallow*, but there is no hint of anything but passive submission. On the whole it looks as though the proceedings were less violent than Lisbon alleged. The present writer is inclined to believe that Hawkins did no more than force a trade—a different thing from piracy—and that some at least of the negroes were no man's property but their own when he acquired them.

It would appear that the fourth English ship—the Portuguese evidence says there were four—was sent home

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho E. viii, f. 38 b.

with such commodities as were saleable in England, whilst Hawkins with the other three and the Portuguese slave-ship crossed the Atlantic. The Seville document above cited implies the latter fact, for it says in one place that Hawkins reached Hispaniola with four ships, and in another it speaks of his own squadron as consisting of two ships and a *patax* (*patache*, equivalent to the English word bark as then used). If he really took a Portuguese ship to the West Indies it is fairly certain that he was able to show that he had lawfully acquired her, for it was his constant aim to avoid giving any ground to the Spaniards for charges of piracy. About the number of negroes the evidence does not agree. Hawkins says he took 300, whilst the Portuguese complaint specifies 910 together with an unknown quantity in one of his prizes, and the Spanish account states that there were more than 400. The last is the most probable figure, for it was a point upon which the writer of the report had some incentive to be accurate. It provides further ground for the belief that he used the Portuguese vessel, since his own 260 tons of shipping would hardly have accommodated so many slaves.

The first port of call in Hispaniola, according to the English story, was Isabella, followed by Puerto de Plata and Monte Christi, all on the north coast of the island. The Spanish report mentions only the two latter places. At all of them there were willing purchasers of slaves, the business being abetted by the Licentiate Lorenzo Bernaldez and managed by a merchant named Cristobal de Santisteban.¹ By a royal *cedula* of 1556 the maximum price of a negro in the West Indies had been fixed at 100 ducats (£25-£30), and in Mexico at 120.² Hawkins, of course, must have taken lower rates or have given large

¹ The Seville document is here corroborated by *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 51.

² *Monson's Naval Tracts*, ed. M. Oppenheim, Navy Records Soc., 1902, &c., ii. 311.

bribes, but even so the business was evidently profitable, especially as he could invest the proceeds in commodities which normally reached England only by an indirect course. Everything went off in an orderly manner, and Hawkins received certificates of good behaviour from the officials and left behind him 100 unsold negroes, some for later disposal, and some as payment of the Spanish customs dues. In return he laded gold and silver (mentioned only by the Spanish report), pearls, hides, and sugar.

The quantity of hides and sugar must have been considerable, for it exceeded the capacity of his own 260 tons of shipping. He therefore freighted two other craft, described as caravels. One of them belonged to the Martinez family of Hispaniola, of the same name as the pilot who had come from Tenerife.¹ The other was named the *Sancto Amarco*, commanded by one Pedro de Strado, and it is possible that this was the Portuguese vessel brought from Sierra Leone. The *Sancto Amarco* was dispatched by herself with 476 hides of the largest sort and two chests of sugar, consigned to Seville, to the care of the English merchant Hugh Tipton. But her crew, whether unavoidably or not, carried her into Lisbon, where the goods were seized by the slaving contractors. Hawkins in due course began a process for recovery, but never obtained anything.² If the *Sancto Amarco* was the so-called prize it is plain that Hawkins had legally chartered her, or he would not have been so foolish as to send her away under her own crew with goods of his on board. The form of the ship's name is Portuguese rather than Spanish.

The other caravel, indubitably hired in Hispaniola, followed some days later. In her went Thomas Hampton, the second-in-command of the whole expedition,

¹ Archivo general de India, *ut supra*.

² H. C. A., Libels, 3/47, No. 155; Examinations, No. 21, 1575, 23, 24 Nov. Hakluyt wrongly states that both ships went to Seville.

and he duly reached Seville. There the authorities acted in the same manner as those of Lisbon, and seized the entire cargo. Hampton scented danger in time and escaped to England, but an Englishman with him was thrown into prison.¹

After finishing his trade at Monte Christi, Hawkins sailed for home with his own three ships. He made a successful passage without meeting with any adventures now on record. Hakluyt says he arrived in September 1563. More probably the real date was in August, for a letter of 8 September shows that he had already heard of Hampton's ill-success, travelled to London, and induced the government to intervene on his behalf. In spite of the loss of the two cargoes of hides, the adventurers were well satisfied with the gains of the voyage.

In considering the account printed by Hakluyt we may be fairly certain that its omissions and inaccuracies were calculated. The editor had his information from Hawkins in the years preceding 1589, when the first edition of the *Principal Navigations* was published. Hawkins was then a man of official rank with a sense of responsibility to government interests, and the course of events had modified the English attitude towards the Portuguese. For in 1580 Philip II had conquered Portugal, and Don Antonio, the native claimant to the throne, was an exile putting his trust in English assistance. The forward party in English councils were anxious to place Antonio on the throne of Portugal and to receive in payment admission to the trade of the Portuguese colonies. It was impolitic therefore to probe old sores, and so Hawkins said nothing of the Guinea transactions and allowed Hakluyt to think that both his cargoes of hides were seized in Spain. By the same reasoning he suppressed any wider designs he may formerly have entertained about serving Philip in the Caribbean. The Anglo-Spanish alliance, a reality in 1562, had long

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1563, No. 1465.

given place to hostility; and for Hawkins in the eighties to avow that he had once been pro-Spanish would have exposed him to the ill-speaking of his enemies. John Hawkins was a man who lived in the present and had no zeal for historical purity.

The dispatch of the two cargoes to Spain is hard to account for as a simple trading operation. One of them consisted of less than 500 hides and two chests of sugar; the other was apparently of a similar description. The former parcel of goods would weigh not more than twelve tons,¹ and seems hardly to justify the employment of a separate caravel for its conveyance across the ocean. But the political motive, if admitted, accounts for it. If the Spaniards were to be induced to trust Hawkins it was desirable for him to show that he trusted them; and he did so as cheaply as possible. Even after the rebuff of the seizure at Seville he persevered in the same course. Soon after his return he obtained a letter from the Queen to Sir Thomas Challoner, the English ambassador at Madrid, and another to Philip himself, recommending his claim for redress;² and with the former missive in his pocket he travelled in person to Spain in pursuit of his plans. In December he was with Challoner and in touch with the Spanish court,³ making an impression that was to prove useful in after years. In his ostensible object he failed, for he recovered neither his hides nor the negroes he had left in Hispaniola, they having been also confiscated upon instructions from Seville. This journey to Spain, with the Queen's letters to back it, shows the high value Hawkins set upon himself and imposed upon the acceptance of others. A smaller man would not have been so bold, and had he

¹ *Stevens on Stowage*, 7th ed., p. 316, a standard work, gives the average weight of a salted ox-hide as 62 lb. In the sixteenth century they were certainly not larger, and possibly not salted.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1563, No. 1210.

³ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 66, ff. 43-4.

been, would most likely have got no farther on the way to court than Seville jail; for the law which imprisoned the English companion of Hampton might equally have locked up his employer. But Hawkins knew how to talk with the great, and may well have thought the time and expense of his journey justified by its result.

The grounds upon which Hawkins claimed legality for his trade are nowhere expressly stated, and it has been generally assumed that they rested upon ancient treaties of commerce between the English crown and the ancestors of Philip II. By the Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1489 Ferdinand and Isabella had promised, for themselves and their successors, to grant full liberty of trade to English subjects in all their dominions.¹ At that date Spain had possessed no colonies but the Canary Islands, and in them the treaty had been observed. Similarly, in the *Magnus Intercursus* of 1496, between Henry VII and the government of Burgundy, which then included the Netherlands, a like clause is to be found.² These treaties had not been abrogated, and Philip II was the inheritor of both. It was obviously an arguable point whether 'all the dominions' of the contracting powers included those which had been subsequently acquired. Yet there is no direct evidence that Hawkins based his case upon these agreements. He must have put forward some reasoned claim when he appeared in Spain at the close of 1563, but what it was we do not know.³ It is certainly puzzling that the English Government is not found urging the favourable interpretation of the treaties or making any reference to them, for it is out of the question that their existence can have been overlooked. One consideration may be relevant: in the unlikely event of Spain extending the treaties to the western colonies

¹ Thomas Rymer, *Foedera*, 3rd ed., Hague, 1739, &c., vol. v, pt. iv, pp. 18-25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³ Unless it was simply that he had been licensed by the King's officials, as suggested in *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 51.

the trade would have been open to all Englishmen alike. In the sphere of practical politics there was no hope of any such concession, neither could Hawkins have desired it. What he aimed at was to secure for himself and his backers a privileged position within the Spanish Empire, and that was obviously better attainable by a particular negotiation than by raising the general principle. This, however, must serve merely as a provisional explanation of an obscure point, and it is liable to be upset by the emergence of additional evidence.

Meanwhile, the course of public events was taking an unfavourable turn, and the conditions in which Hawkins had conceived his enterprise were beginning to pass away. For in 1562 the French wars of religion had begun, with consequences destined to be far-reaching. In the summer the Huguenots had appealed for English aid, and in October, just as Hawkins had sailed from Plymouth, English troops had landed at Dieppe and Havre, and some had passed up the Seine to Rouen. In the spring of 1563 the compromise called the Peace of Amboise had caused the Huguenots to lay down their arms, and in July the English garrison of Havre had capitulated and gone home. By that date it was apparent that France, although temporarily pacified, was thoroughly unsettled, and the far-seeing might predict that the religious question had yet to be fought out. These things had a bearing upon the plans of Hawkins. So long as Valois France was strong for outside aggression, England had need of Spain, and Spain of England. Hawkins had been careful to behave in Hispaniola as the honest trader, paying his customs, securing recognition from the King's officials, and eschewing the violent methods of the French corsairs. His armed squadron had constituted an offer as well as a threat. So long as the Huguenot raiders were sweeping the Caribbean from end to end there was a chance that Philip might be driven to accept that offer of 'serving the King of Spain in the

Indies', as Hawkins himself phrased it on more than one later occasion. But the civil war had relaxed the pressure. In 1562-3 de Sores, Jambe-de-Bois, and Bontemps were all cruising in the Channel.¹ In the year of the peace the Council of Trent completed its work of Catholic reorganization, and the way was clear for the Counter Reformation to take the offensive. In June 1564 Philip's wife and the Duke of Alva met Catherine de Medici and Charles IX at Bayonne, and are there suspected to have framed a general plan for the extirpation of heresy. Philip might well hope that he had the Protestant question in hand—not only the Protestantism of his Netherlands, but the Huguenot plague which had drained the wealth of his Indies. If he could not catch the pirates in the Caribbean he might give them something to fight for at home. Further than this all English seamen were in bad odour in Spain in 1563-4 for the reason customary during an Anglo-French war; that is, that they had been seizing Spanish ships on the charge of carrying French cargoes. The upshot was that Hawkins got no countenance in Spain, and in the summer of 1564, when he was back in England but meditating another visit to Madrid, Challoner wrote that the suit for his goods was hopeless and that he had done well not to come in person; and that he had better bribe a court favourite to ask for them as a forfeit, and then compound with their new owner.²

Hawkins was already pushing forward the preparations for a second expedition of greater weight than the first.

[NOTE.—*The authenticity of Hawkins's journey to Spain.* Froude states (*Reign of Elizabeth*, Everyman ed., vol. ii, pp. 212-13) that Hawkins thought of going to Spain but did not actually do so, in support of which he quotes Challoner as writing with some sarcasm 'that he would do well not to come thither'. A careful reading of Challoner's letter to Hawkins (S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 73, ff. 6-7, 1564, July 5) reveals no trace of sarcasm but rather a very friendly tone throughout. What Challoner did

¹ La Roncière, iv. 41.

² S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 73, ff. 6-7.

say was, 'So in mine opinion ye did well not to come hither yourself', evidently referring to a proposed second journey. The first and actual journey is attested by Hugh Tipton's letter to Challoner from Seville, 1563, 8 Dec. (S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 66, ff. 43-4) which concludes: 'In one with this I do write unto Master Hawkins, who I think is with your lordship or this day, who will inform you of all largely.' This is good evidence that Tipton knew Hawkins was in Spain; and, indeed, Hawkins's most suitable route would have been to go to Andalusia by sea and travel up to court by way of Seville, where the details of the West Indian business were transacted. We may almost be sure that Hawkins had met Tipton at Seville. This is the ground for the account given in this chapter, but it must be admitted that everything turns on Tipton's phrase. There remains a bare possibility that he was mistaken.]

THE SECOND SLAVING VOYAGE

WHILST the prospects of Spanish acquiescence were growing fainter Hawkins had gained support in another direction, for the English Government had become involved in his schemes. He was home from Spain early in 1564, and by the beginning of February the plans for a new voyage were taking shape. The Queen took part by lending the syndicate a ship of the Royal Navy on terms similar to those described in an earlier chapter for the hire of the *Minion*.¹ A draft list of the adventurers, dated 3 March 1564, has been preserved, containing the following names: the Earl of Pembroke, Lord Robert Dudley (created Earl of Leicester in the summer of 1564), Lord Clinton (the Lord Admiral), Sir William Cecil, Sir William Garrard, Sir William Chester, Benjamin Gonson, Edward Castlyn, John Hawkins, and William Winter.² This was a preliminary suggestion, the actual amounts to be subscribed not yet being settled. From later documents it is confirmed that the three peers took shares. Cecil afterwards declared to the Spanish ambassador that he had declined to do the like, but the records show that he maintained an interest in the affair and took part in its supervision. The remaining names are those of men who had already ventured in the gold trade and were continuing to do so. As usual the named members subdivided their investments among their friends, so that the company was large and influential. It appointed Sir William Chester treasurer, and Edward Castlyn victualler.³ The royal association with the project is fur-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 28, No. 2. The *Domestic Calendar* misdates this paper by a year. See also *ibid.*, vol. 37, No. 61 for further light on the terms of hiring.

² Lansdowne MSS., 6, ff. 48-9.

³ *Ibid.*, f. 60.

ther attested by the fact that Hawkins had an interview with the Queen before he set sail.¹ He himself claimed thenceforward to be her representative while in the Caribbean; and writing in February 1577 he dated his entry into her service from 'thirteen years past'.²

From the foregoing it is clear that the government thought his aims worthy of support, just as it was then supporting the gold-traders by lending them the *Minion* and other warships. To the Guinea trade it had already given diplomatic backing in the negotiations with Portugal. On behalf of the Caribbean trade it had made no overt demands to Spain. Yet it is possible that Hawkins had brought some encouragement from his interviews in that country; certainly the government interest becomes active immediately after his return. It is habitual, but unsound, to regard Spain as an indivisible entity, marching solidly under the will of Philip II. But on a closer view it becomes apparent that there were cross-currents and dissentient factions there as elsewhere, and it may well be that Hawkins had found some sympathetic listeners even though the King was unconvinced. The Duke of Feria, powerful in Philip's counsels and a former ambassador in London, had an English wife and a half-English son, and one of Hawkins's adherents, George Fitzwilliam, was related to them. The Ferias were fanatical Catholics, but otherwise keen to maintain the English alliance; and as for Hawkins, he long avoided committing himself on the question of religion, so that years afterwards he was accounted by Spaniards a member of their faith. Again it must be insisted that it is untrue to read into the first decade of Elizabeth the convictions and aspirations held twenty years later: many a man was then undecided about questions which afterwards became clear enough to him.

The preparations went forward throughout the spring

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Pepys MSS. at Magdalene Coll., Cambridge*, pp. 64-5.

² *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 111, No. 33.

and summer of 1564. The Queen's ship selected for the service was the *Jesus of Lubeck*, generally rated as of 700 tons. She was at least twenty years old, having been bought by Henry VIII from the Hanseatic League in 1545. A drawing at Cambridge, which represents her in her original condition, shows a vessel with towering poop and forecastle, 'high-charged' to an extent already becoming unusual under Elizabeth, but carrying heavy guns and strong for defence against boarding. At the opening of the reign she had been condemned as not worth repair, although she had afterwards been reprieved and overhauled. But she had seen her best days, and her structure was becoming crazy, as Hawkins was to find to his cost in a voyage subsequent to the one now being planned. Probably he knew she was rotten, but she was also cheap, and her massive appearance would give prestige to her commander. For the purpose of the syndicate's accounts she was valued by impartial assessors at £2,012 15s. 2d.¹ With her were to sail three of the Hawkinses' ships: the *Salomon* of 120-140 tons, the flagship of the previous voyage; the *Tiger*, 50 tons, an armed ship which had been a privateer; and the *Swallow*, 30 tons, not the vessel of that name which had sailed in 1562—from other references it is apparent that the Hawkins brothers owned two *Swallows*.

The estimated crews necessary for these ships were small: for the *Jesus*, 80 men; the *Salomon*, 35; the *Tiger*, 20; and the *Swallow*, 15—in all 150, subsequently increased to 170 by the gentlemen adventurers and their servants. Some details of the victualling are of interest, for such particulars have not commonly been preserved. Biscuit formed the staple food, of which 25 thousand-weight were provided. There were also 120 barrels of meal and 20 quarters of beans and peas. For flesh there were 40 hogsheads of beef, 80 flitches of bacon, 6 lasts of stock-fish, and 12 cwt. of ling; for drink, 40 tuns of

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 37, No. 61.

beer, 35 tuns of cider, and 40 butts of malmsey (the latter, at £6 per butt, evidently for the good cheer of the cabin). Among miscellaneous items occur a tun of oil, a pipe of vinegar, a hogshead of honey, and a quarter of aniseed. Provision for 500 negroes consisted of 120 quarters of beans and peas, no other victual being mentioned. There were also estimates for 'cotts' (perhaps partitions or bunks in the hold) and, curiously enough, for shirts and shoes for the blacks. The total cost of the expedition, not including the capital value of the ships, amounted according to these calculations to £4,990; but this sum includes nothing for cargo, of which some was carried on the outward passage, although not perhaps to as great value as that taken by the gold-traders; and the usual routine of the voyage entailed also some disbursements to various parties.¹

Of the officers and other men of rank no full list has been preserved. Hawkins sailed in the *Jesus* as commander-in-chief, the captain of the *Salomon* was named Field, and Thomas Hampton was again present. Among the gentlemen adventurers were John Sparke, John Chester (son of Sir William Chester), George Fitzwilliam, Thomas Woorley, Edward Lacie, Anthony Parkhurst, and several others not named. Parkhurst had in 1564 been in Spain with Sir Thomas Challoner, by whom he was recommended to Hawkins. He left Bilbao on 3 July in order to be in time to join the expedition.²

If the first voyage had not been prepared with a single eye to trade in the Indies, still less was the second, although commercial success was an indispensable motive. Hawkins, so far as can be judged, had not abandoned his scheme of gaining a favoured position within the Spanish Empire by making himself useful to Philip, for we shall find him harping on that string for four years to come. But a new complication had arisen in the shape of the

¹ The above details are from Lansdowne MSS., 6, ff. 48-50.

² S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 73, ff. 6-7 and 64-5.

Florida colony, first planted by Jean Ribault in 1562. Ribault had settled the pioneers at Charlesfort and then, leaving Albert de la Pierria in command, had returned to France. He reached Dieppe on 20 July 1562 to find the first civil war in progress and the port in the hands of his fellow Huguenots. When the Catholics took Dieppe in October he fled to England and there published his *Relation* of the advantages of Florida.¹ Most people believed in the prospective wealth of that country; the implication of the religious wars, the prolonged weakening of France, was not yet fully apparent; and Elizabeth had no desire to see a hostile Guisard France, her near neighbour, enriched like Spain by streams of western treasure. It was therefore worth while to attach Ribault to herself, and he was accordingly made much of at the English court. Meanwhile, in 1563 the French colonists in Florida had mutinied, murdered Pierria, and sailed for home.

Here a new personality comes upon the scene. Thomas Stukeley, a gentleman of Devon, had long been engaged in Channel freebooting, and had even been implicated in piracy. In 1563 he was in partnership with William Hawkins as joint owner of a privateer, of which he himself sailed in command.² From this association he had perhaps gleaned some inkling of John Hawkins's plans, and he certainly determined to imitate them by serving Philip for his own advantage. He did not do so, however, in the straightforward manner of Hawkins. Instead he made interest at court and induced the Queen to turn over the Florida business to him. It was arranged in the summer of 1563 that he and Ribault should lead an Anglo-French expedition to Florida, a preliminary step to the acquisition of the colony by the English crown. Stukeley then treacherously revealed the whole

¹ La Roncière, iv. 47-51.

² H. C. A., Libels, 3/37, No. 220; Examinations, No. 15, 1565, 3 June.

scheme to the Spanish ambassador and delayed the preparations in order that Spain might take advantage of the warning; and he also undertook to bring over the ships to Philip's service.¹ In November 1563 fortune gave him a further grasp upon the Florida affair, for, whilst cruising in the Channel, he fell in with the returning Frenchmen from Charlesfort, made them prisoners, and brought their leaders to court.²

So far Stukeley appeared to be prospering, but there can be little doubt that Cecil and the Hawkinses, shrewd men all, knew he was not to be trusted. At any rate, they ousted him from control, and the visit to Florida became one of the objects of the expedition prepared by John Hawkins in 1564. It may have been originally intended that he should leave a party to occupy the vacant fort. If so, this purpose was forestalled, for in April 1564, a new French leader, René de Laudonnière, sailed from Havre with three ships and re-established the colony; and Ribault returned to France to take a further part in the project. It was still desirable, however, for Hawkins to go to Florida. On public grounds it was a matter of interest to the English Government to learn the truth about its alleged wealth; and for his private behoof Hawkins may have anticipated some opportunity of doing Spain a service without disloyalty to his own country. For the Anglo-Huguenot plans for Florida were now at an end; so also was the French civil war; and the advantages of Florida, if realized, would accrue to the government of Catherine de Medici and would be almost as prejudicial to England as to Spain. Altogether Hawkins was preparing to carry with his second expedition a very mixed cargo of motives. He took the precaution to enlist the services of a Dieppe pilot who had been in Florida and knew the coast.³

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 328.

² Lansdowne MS., 102, f. 81.

³ Hakluyt Society, *The Hawkins Voyages*, ed. Sir. C. R. Markham,

As the summer of 1564 advanced the air grew full of rumours about the Hawkins expedition, and Spain began to take official notice of his preparations. Alvarez de Quadra, Bishop of Avila, the retiring ambassador in England, seems to have shown little interest in oceanic affairs, but his successor, Diego Guzman de Silva, who came over in the summer of 1564, appreciated their importance and was tireless in his efforts to check the Hawkins undertakings. De Silva, described as a grave and courteous man, was the best ambassador sent by Spain to Elizabeth's court. He alone made some attempt to understand the English point of view and to overcome the difficulties that were driving the two nations asunder. His retirement at a critical juncture was ultimately fatal to the cause of peace, for his successors lacked his breadth of mind and behaved rather as advanced agents of conquest than as composers of differences. This is not meant to imply that de Silva was pro-English; he was far from that. But he faced the facts and realized that there was more to be gained by politeness than by bluster. His personality makes a clear impression through the centuries, so that the reader of his dispatches experiences a genuine sympathy with his efforts and a regret at their eventual failure. At the end of July he wrote to Philip that he had spoken to the Queen about Hawkins, and that she had made gracious promises which he would endeavour to see carried out. De Silva's details show that he had accurate information about the scope and equipment of the expedition.¹ A month later he made a further protest,² but obtained no real satisfaction, as indeed he could but expect in view of the composition of the syndicate.

pp. 50-1. Note that Markham's texts are taken from the 1589 Hakluyt, and that the last-mentioned reference is not in the 1599-1600 edition, and so has not been reproduced in other modern reprints.

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 258.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1564-5, No. 629.

Meanwhile, although England and France had signed a peace in April, the maritime disturbances arising out of the late war were slow to settle down. Spain was irritated by her losses as a neutral and enraged by the piracies of a well-connected Englishman after the peace. This was Thomas Cobham, brother of Lord Cobham, a privy councillor and Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. He cruised for months round the Spanish coast, took rich prizes, and gave especial offence by murdering a friar who fell into his hands. At length de Silva got him arrested and brought to trial. He was quite unabashed and gave an impudently frank account of his proceedings. It was rumoured that the Queen meant to have him executed for the sake of making an example of one of good family, but in the end the affair was allowed to blow over.¹ At the same time other projectors were seeking to imitate Hawkins. A witness in an Admiralty case mentions casually that in March 1564 (probably in modern style, 1565), he was employed on an intended voyage with two ships, the *Elizabeth Bonaventure* and the *Marmazett*, for Africa and the West Indies, but he does not make it clear that the vessels actually sailed.² A Portuguese complaint of 1565 declares also that early in that year an English slaver commanded by a Portuguese renegade, Bartholomew Bayon, had taken 125 negroes near Cape Verde.³ Several years later a Spanish document stated that Bayon had been arrested at Porto Rico and imprisoned at Seville, whence he escaped in 1570.⁴ This may represent the outcome of his voyage of 1564-5. All these things, for reasons already discussed, can have been little to the taste of John Hawkins himself.

Of this second voyage the Hakluyt account is written,

¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 1137, 1583; H. C. A. Oyer and Terminer, 1/37, first forty pages of volume.

² H. C. A., Examinations, No. 16, 1568, 8 Dec.

³ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 95, ff. 260, 260 b.

⁴ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 183.

not by Hawkins but by John Sparke, one of the officers of the *Jesus*. It does not suffer from the deliberate omissions of the story of the first voyage, being on the contrary full of detail; yet it is evident that Sparke observed only the ostensible, and was not privy to questions of policy. His account seems to be contemporary with the events, or at least to have been based on a journal kept during the voyage. Besides this, there exists a summary of the whole undertaking sent by de Silva to Philip II after its return; and for the Guinea transactions there are the usual highly-coloured Portuguese lamentations.

All preparations being at length complete, Hawkins set sail from Plymouth on 18 October 1564, having had a farewell audience of the Queen at Enfield shortly before. His four ships cleared the coast with a prosperous wind. Thirty miles out, he fell in with a gold-trading squadron from London, equipped by a syndicate having some members in common with his own. The history of this squadron—the *Minion*, the *Merlin*, and the *John Baptist*—has already been dealt with; it is sufficient to say here that the two expeditions were generally in touch with each other all the way to the nearer Guinea Coast. A contrary wind caused Hawkins to put into Ferrol, where he rode five days, secure in the knowledge that there was no Spanish force in Galicia likely to give him any trouble. There lay one of the advantages of a warship like the *Jesus*. At Ferrol he issued the sailing orders for the voyage, various details about signals and methods of keeping touch, concluding with the famous ‘Serve God daily, love one another, preserve your victuals, beware of fire, and keep good company’. On the 30th he left Ferrol and ran down in a week to the Canary Islands. There, at Adeia in Teneriffe, he had conference with Pedro de Ponte, who gave him a cordial reception and supplied some necessaries for the ships. It is evident that the meeting was for something more than this, for Hawkins took some trouble to reach Teneriffe,

having first sighted Las Palmas and Gomera. Sparke does not mention the more confidential business, save that Hawkins and the Spaniard talked 'of the fear they both had'; but it may be assumed that Pedro de Ponte gave him the latest news of their friends in the Indies and perhaps arranged to send notice of his coming to trustworthy parties. It was a necessary link in the scheme and, as de Silva afterwards wrote, 'if it were not for these Spaniards helping them in the islands, these expeditions would never have commenced'.

From Teneriffe they went southwards to Cape Blanco on the African coast, and obtained some fish from the Portuguese fishermen who worked there. The natives here were tawny Moors, unsuitable for slaves, and the expedition passed on without delay to Cape Verde. The Cape Verde region was well peopled with true negroes, goodly men, gentle and loving, and firm friends of the French, who, it may be remembered, were not addicted to slaving. But Hawkins had no luck there, for the gold-trading squadron, passing along the coast in advance of him, gave warning of his business, so that his snares were spread in vain. This has often been read as proof that the slavers and the gold-traders were mutually hostile; but there is little ground for the supposition, since the gold was all found on the modern Gold Coast, a thousand miles farther on, where the English slavers at that time never went. In the present instance Hawkins found his game spoilt by men who were serving the same employers as himself, and it is plain that the thing was unpremeditated, probably the indiscretion of some garrulous sailor.

Passing on, they landed an armed party on an island near the Rio Grande and attempted to take negroes by force, but after a running fight their prey escaped into the woods. Next they tried at Sambula, one of the Los Islands, and there they succeeded in capturing their first batch of slaves. On 22 December Sparke records

the first contact with the Portuguese. A number of caravels were trading twenty leagues up the River Calousa. Hawkins went in with the *Tiger* and the *Swallow*, and the pinnaces and boats of the larger ships. He found the Portuguese, 'and dispatched his business, and so returned with two caravels loaden with negroes'. A few days later some Portuguese gave information of a negro town where it might be possible to get a hundred prisoners. Hawkins landed forty men and with the Portuguese as guides went to see what he could do. The attempt was disastrous. The men scattered in search of plunder, hoping to find gold in the huts, and the negroes, who at first had fled, turned fiercely on them and drove them back to their boats. Hawkins rallied a dozen men and averted a massacre of the entire party; but the captain of the *Salomon* and six others were killed, almost all the rest wounded, and there were only ten captives to show for it. From here they worked along the coast to Sierra Leone, having friendly communication with the Portuguese, trading in various rivers, and fighting the negroes in some. This occupied about a month, by which time 'a great company' of negroes had been collected. From start to finish the English account says no word of any hostilities with the Portuguese. It bears all the marks of an honest, if vague and diffuse, narrative, its writer giving no sign of being aware that there were any sinister allegations to be answered.

Turning now to the Portuguese version, we find a completely different aspect given to the affair. There are two books of evidence bearing on this voyage,¹ one of them at least having been presented by an ambassador who came to make a general protest in 1568. According to these statements, backed by the evidence of witnesses whose names are given, Hawkins came early in 1565 to the rivers about Sierra Leone. He was in command of four ships by one account, of six by another, which

¹ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 99 (all) and vol. 95, ff. 242-67.

counts the pinnaces or great boats as separate units. He captured by force sixteen or seventeen Portuguese vessels and took from them more than 600 negroes together with quantities of ivory and some gold. He set some of the crews ashore, but is not stated to have killed any one. The total damage was assessed at 48,000 ducats. Some of the witnesses are described as 'of the contract', that is, of the company which legitimately supplied slaves to Spain, and one of them is recorded as making the following statement: 'This witness said that he himself heard the English call out to him in a loud voice that the contract (*tractatio*) belonged neither to the King of Portugal nor to the contractors, but to the realm of England and to John Hawkins.' This is certainly a straw showing the direction of the wind. The Portuguese contractors supplied slaves and nothing more; Hawkins was prepared to supply slaves and to serve the Spaniards with armed ships where they were much needed. He must have felt that his proposals were reasonable. Returning to the conflict of evidence about his dealings in Guinea, the conclusion must be the same as before. He forced a trade with persons who may not all have been unwilling; there was no fighting between him and the Portuguese, some of whom helped him against the negroes; and the witnesses afterwards coloured their evidence to suit their own interests. The contract, like all such monopolies, aroused discontent among the Portuguese themselves, and some of its servants may well have been better paid by Hawkins than by their own employers. But they would naturally suppress that fact in a Portuguese law-court.

Finally it should be noted that de Silva, when he wrote to Philip after the return of the expedition, said nothing of piracy. By his account Hawkins went to Guinea and traded with the Portuguese slavers; he had a number of negroes from them and set men on shore to get others; and in the land fighting some Portuguese

were killed in his service, side by side with the English.¹ De Silva, it is true, had the story from Englishmen, but he was a hostile observer who would have been keen to ferret out any grounds for a charge of piracy.

With about 400 negroes, Hawkins sailed for the West Indies on 29 January 1565. Calms delayed the voyage, and shortness of water threatened a serious mortality, but after eighteen days they picked up the regular trade wind and reached Dominica without mishap on 9 March. As Sparke put it, untroubled by any qualms on the godliness of slaving, 'Almighty God, who never suffereth his elect to perish, sent us the sixteenth of February the ordinary breeze'. The Puritanical phrasing is paralleled by some utterances of Hawkins himself, and it comes strangely from men who did not hesitate to conform to Catholic ritual when the law demanded it. But it was sincere enough, and it is one more warning to be on our guard in dealing with the mentality of a time so different from that which was shortly to set in.

At Dominica the expedition obtained much-needed water and was lucky enough to avoid an encounter with the Caribs. Thence they went on to Margarita, where there was a small Spanish settlement. The alcalde furnished them with beef and mutton, but the governor stood aloof and hindered trade as much as he could. He sent warning to San Domingo, the centre of Caribbean government, and also prevented a Spanish pilot from going forward with Hawkins from Margarita itself. It is clear from subsequent incidents that the lack of a pilot was a serious drawback and a cause of lost opportunities. Hawkins had visited only Hispaniola on his first voyage, and had no knowledge of the other islands and the coasts of the Caribbean. He had some Frenchmen in his ships, but apparently no good pilot for these seas among them, and the charts of the period could not supply the want of personal acquaintance

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 330.

with currents and land-marks. So we find him reduced to asking his way, with unsatisfactory results, from one point to the next.

He now went on to the continent of South America, whose northern shore, from the Orinoco to Darien, is the Spanish Main of history and romance. He first sighted it in the neighbourhood of Cumaná in Venezuela, where he obtained water and victuals from the Indians. Sparke here mentions the potato as a vegetable superior to carrots or parsnips, but that in itself does not prove Hawkins to have been its first introducer into England. From Cumaná the squadron followed the coast westwards, Hawkins sailing in a pinnace in order to keep as close in as possible, and on 3 April they came to the first Spanish settlement of real importance, Borburata, near the modern Puerto Cabello. There the Spaniards, on being asked for leave to trade, politely begged to be excused, saying that the King had sent strict orders to the contrary. Hawkins replied that his ship belonged to Queen Elizabeth, and that as her servant he might be trusted to act honestly, 'and for our parts we had free traffic in Spain and Flanders . . . and therefore he knew no reason why he should not have the like in all his (King Philip's) dominions'. This, as reported by Sparke, is worth quoting because it constitutes the nearest approach so far discovered to any appeal to the ancient treaties of commerce; and as such it is far from conclusive. The local Spaniards then said that they must send for instructions to the governor of the province, a matter of ten days' delay, and in the meantime they would admit the ships to the harbour and supply them with victuals.

Hawkins knew that the governor's answer would be only the beginning of a new argument, and he was unwilling to waste so much time. The Borburata people were obviously as friendly as they dared to be, and so he offered them a fresh excuse for doing what he and they

desired. He had, he declared, certain lean and sickly negroes who would die on his hands if not landed at once, and he desired leave to sell them pending the arrival of the governor's reply. The authorities found this so reasonable that they granted licence for thirty negroes, and after a prolonged haggling about the price they were actually sold. Soon afterwards the governor arrived in person. To him Hawkins repeated the former arguments for trade and added that he had been blown out of his course while on a voyage to Guinea, the implication being that his arrival on the Spanish Main was accidental. It was a tale he was to tell on many future occasions, and it has called forth some denunciation of his untruthfulness. His critics have taken him more seriously than his Spanish hearers could have done, for the yarn was so patently ridiculous that it lacked the first element of a lie, the intention to deceive. It was mere face-saving, useful as providing a Spanish official with his best way out of a scrape, the interchange with his masters at home of slow-travelling dispatches, wherein the real point might be evaded for years and an accusation stone-walled into oblivion. To it Hawkins added another consideration, likewise oft-repeated, but one which commentators have with one accord overlooked: 'for that there was a great amity between their princes, and that the thing pertained to our Queen's highness, he thought he might do their Prince [Philip II] great service, and that it would be well taken at his hands, to do it in this cause'. There, befogged by the vagueness of Sparke, is the offer of West Indian service which underlay the whole enterprise. We shall meet with it again in plainer form in Hawkins's own words. It must have made a strong appeal to the Borburata Spaniards, whose first action, on the sight of sails at sea, had been to hurry off all their valuables into the interior. So much had the French corsairs taught them.

The governor, after deliberation with his council,

granted the general licence to trade. The next dispute arose over the duties, for which the officials demanded the sum of 30 ducats per slave, payable by the vendor. Since the legal maximum price of a negro was 100 ducats the amount was unconscionable, and Hawkins, seeing that he was being trifled with, landed an armed party and declared that if the Spaniards would not take 7½ per cent., the ordinary custom, 'he would displease them'. The governor submitted, and trade went on satisfactorily until 4 May, when Hawkins had sold all that the neighbourhood could buy.

He sailed westwards again and procured fresh meat and hides at Curaçoa, then used as a huge cattle ranch; after which he came to Cabo de la Vela and obtained sailing directions for Rio de la Hacha, a little farther on. Rio de la Hacha, the centre of a pearl fishery and also of some gold mining, was ruled by an official called the King's treasurer. If, as is probable, he was the same man who filled the office three years later, his name was Miguel de Castilianos.¹ He had received strict orders from San Domingo to refuse trade, but he made of them merely an excuse to drive a hard bargain, offering for every negro half the price that had been paid at Borburata. For dealing with such an attitude, Hawkins already had a precedent. He landed with a hundred men, and with artillery in the bows of his boats. The treasurer drew out the townsmen on the shore, but as soon as a gun was fired they all fell flat on the ground. However reasonable now, this was not military etiquette in the sixteenth century, and it soon appeared that the treasurer's people did not mean to fight. The upshot was a licence to trade on fair terms. Before the business was finished the treasurer sent for reinforcements from other places and contemplated a fresh attempt to assert himself. Hawkins again embarked his force and kept it lying off the beach while he went ashore alone and,

¹ College of Arms MSS., Old Grants of Arms 4, f. 62.

covered by his guns, 'cleared all things between the treasurer and him'. Then, having demanded a testimonial of good conduct, he received it from the treasurer's hand and very courteously took his leave and departed. How far the treasurer's resistance had been genuine is on this occasion hard to say. On a subsequent visit from Hawkins he was determined enough, but he had in the interim been impressed by the fate of his superior at Borburata, who was sent a prisoner to Spain for his conduct in this year 1565.¹

This completed the business on the Spanish Main. It is evident that nearly all the negroes had been sold; otherwise Hawkins would have gone on to Santa Marta and other places to the westward. De Silva's report does indeed state that the squadron visited Cartagena, but in view of Sparke's account he must have been mistaken. De Silva further says that all the slaves and much other merchandise were disposed of, and that the resistance both at Borburata and at Rio de la Hacha was a sham. By the same account, which the ambassador had from a member of the expedition, the profits amounted to 60 per cent. on the outlay.² The slaving must not in itself be overestimated as a source of gain. By what we know of the expenses and of the prices obtainable, it could not have been very lucrative. The real attraction of the trade lay in the opportunity of acquiring West Indian produce, 'gold, silver, pearls, and other jewels great store', besides filling the holds with quantities of hides which were dirt cheap in the Indies but worth as much as 13s. 4d. each in Europe. Apart from the royal dues and the profits of middlemen, the normal cost of transport of this stuff to Europe was very great, owing to the limitations of the Spanish convoy system, the wastage from delay, and the high rates of insurance necessitated by the risk from French corsairs. Spanish

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii, f. 31.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 330.

shipping was also ill-built and ill-handled, and so subject to unusual perils from the sea.¹ Hawkins, with his fine seamanship and freedom from bureaucratic regulations, cut out most of these expenses and reaped a golden harvest, as English shipping has done ever since, by virtue of superior efficiency. The negroes were merely a link in a chain which included much besides.

On leaving Rio de la Hacha, Hawkins still hoped for further trade, thinking to lay out some of his treasure in more hides and sugar. For that purpose he steered for Hispaniola, where there were also inquiries to be made about the merchandise detained from the previous voyage. The lack of a pilot caused the scheme to miscarry. Although they steered for the western end of Hispaniola they found themselves in sight of the middle of Jamaica, having miscalculated the force of the current which sweeps through the Caribbean in the track of the trade-wind. For Jamaica their only guide was a Spaniard rescued from the negroes in Guinea. But he was a merchant and no navigator; and although his home was in Jamaica, he blundered and contradicted himself so much about its geography that the ships were to leeward of that island also before he could make up his mind about a port. By this means the unlucky Spaniard not only lost Hawkins the chance of £2,000 worth of hides for which there was tonnage, but also got himself carried back to England after having been in sight of his home.

The same want of local knowledge frustrated an attempt to approach the port of Santa Cruz on the south side of Cuba, a coast abounding in shoals and islets. Finally the expedition watered at the Isle of Pines, passed the western end of Cuba, and quitted the Caribbean by way of the Florida Channel. Still with trade in view, Hawkins tried to work along the north coast of Cuba to Havana, but he and all others were ignorant of its locality, and Sparke says they must have passed it unawares.

¹ Sir William Monson's opinion—*Naval Tracts*, iv. 66.

It was a rendezvous for the plate fleets, and de Silva asserts that Hawkins was loitering for the chance of picking up a treasure-ship. But we know by all other evidence that that was not his game, and the charge may safely be dismissed. At length he gave up groping for Havana and turned away for the last objective of the voyage, the French colony in Florida. These incidents show the uselessness of contemporary maps for any detailed work, and the emptiness of the great Spanish islands after seventy years of colonization; for the voyagers had landed repeatedly on the shores of Jamaica and Cuba and had found them a wilderness devoid of any inhabitants to give them guidance.

For Florida the squadron had a competent pilot, the Dieppe Frenchman who had been there with Ribault in 1562. Hawkins made a thorough examination of the outer coast of the Florida peninsula, working upwards from 26° to $30\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, where he found the French. The English liked the appearance of the land, judging it good for cattle raising, but since it was for the most part a false shore of spits and islands, with lagoons behind them, there was a lack of rivers where the ships could be watered. The dangers to navigation were also considerable, and many Spanish ships had been cast away there. It was this circumstance which had given rise to the reports of mineral wealth. For the French at their first coming had undoubtedly found the natives in possession of gold and silver, but had since come to the conclusion that they must have obtained it from stranded treasure ships.

In the River of May, at a point where the lagoons gave place to the main shore fronting the open sea, the French fort was discovered. Laudonnière and his party had now been there for over a year without relief, and were beginning to think themselves deserted by their fellow-countrymen. They were short of food, having exhausted the local Indians' supplies of maize, and al-

ready they had had some fighting with these natives. Sparke says that there were a French ship of 80 tons and two pinnaces lying in the river. Laudonnière's own account implies that he was completely cut off from France, and since he bought a ship from Hawkins he is probably right.

Hawkins was shrewd enough to see how things stood with these colonists, whose case was almost exactly the same as that of the first English party in Virginia twenty years later. After relieving their immediate necessities, he offered to give the whole of them a passage home, engaging to land them in France before touching the English coast. In making the proposal he was seeking to kill two birds with one stone. The English Government would have been pleased to hear of the end of the Florida colony, and the Spanish Government would have been delighted. For, once the French were thoroughly established in a fortified post some miles up a river—a strong position so long as it was guarded by warships—they would have had a stranglehold upon the plate fleets; and Philip II was keenly alive to the danger. The Mexican treasure ships had no alternative homeward route to that by the Florida Channel, the trade-winds and the currents precluding any attempt to beat eastward through the Caribbean. Hawkins, therefore, in eliminating the French would have had a strong claim on Philip's gratitude. Laudonnière also understood the strategy of the matter and knew that it was his duty to remain to the last gasp. He was a little surprised by the largeness of the Englishman's offer, and suspected a design to occupy the colony in his place; and so he firmly refused. His decision nearly caused a mutiny among his own men, who were clamorous to go home, but he appeased them by buying a fifty-ton ship from his visitors. He paid partly in ordnance and powder, and partly by a bill signed by himself, which he admitted twenty years later to be still owing. Hawkins took the rebuff

handsomely, like the honourable man he was. If the French would voluntarily do a weak thing, he would take it to his own advantage; but since he had found them in distress he would not put pressure upon them. Not only did he sell them the ship at their valuation, but of his shortened stock of victuals he spared them twenty barrels of meal, six pipes of beans, and other stores. Laudonnière, however much he may have guessed of hidden policies, placed his gratitude on record: 'So that I may say we received as many courtesies of the general, as it was possible to receive of any man living. Wherein doubtless he has won the reputation of a good and charitable man, deserving to be esteemed as much of us all as if he had saved all our lives.'

On 28 July Hawkins departed from the River of May and took a month to run to the Banks of Newfoundland. During this time provisions were very short, a circumstance which adds weight to the Frenchmen's recognition of his generosity. On the banks he had better luck, catching a great number of cod and buying some more from French fishing craft. Thence he made the English coast in three weeks. An undated reminiscence of Sir Richard Hawkins, written some fifty years after, casts a light upon his father as a seaman. It most probably refers to this voyage, for there are good reasons against placing it in the next.

'*The Jesus of Lubeck*', it runs, 'had her gunner-room set on fire with a match, and had been burnt without redemption, if that my father, Sir John Hawkins, knight, then general in her, had not commanded her scuppers to be stopped and the men to come to the pumps, whereof she had two which went with chains; and plying them, in a moment there was three or four inches of water upon the deck, which with scoops, swabs and platters they threw upon the fire, and so quenched it and delivered both ship and men out of no small danger.'

Elsewhere Sir Richard says that his father was the in-

¹ Hakluyt Society, *Hawkins Voyages*, pp. 145-6.

ventor of a method of sheathing for tropical voyages. It consisted of nailing thin planks over a layer of tar and hair; the hair killed the worms after they had bored through the outer woodwork.¹ Lead sheathing had been tried, but was heavy and apt to fall off. Copper sheathing was not used until long afterwards, the expense being prohibitive in Tudor England.²

The squadron reached Padstow on 20 September 1565. It had lost only twenty men in the whole voyage, seven of whom had been killed fighting in Guinea. The *Jesus* was so badly strained that she had to lie at Padstow until the following spring. The adventurers, by the terms of the charter-party, paid the Queen £500 for making good the wear and tear she had suffered.³ Apart from de Silva's statement that the profits of the expedition amounted to 60 per cent., there is no detailed evidence of the financial results. The Spaniard also said that the syndicate was dissatisfied with Hawkins, suspecting him of having obtained more treasure than he had declared; and that Hawkins on his side was discontented with his treatment at his employers' hands. But this was mere tattle picked up from the unknown ill-wisher who had given away the rest of the information. Every Elizabethan commander had such tales told of him, and none probably with less justice than Hawkins. The well-attested circumstances point to the satisfaction of all parties with the fruits of the voyage.

John Hawkins had by his ancestry some pretension to bear arms, but the success and the semi-official nature of his second voyage led to his being granted an additional coat on his return. Its specification is as follows: sable, on a point wavy a lion passant or; in chief three bezants; for a crest, a demi-Moor proper bound in a

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

² In 1540 copper cost £20 per ton, and lead £4 per ton. See above Chap. I, p. 14.

³ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 37, No. 61.

cord. The last item is illuminative of the contemporary attitude towards slaving. The grant was made on the recommendation of Sir William Cecil and the Earl of Leicester, and the draft in the College of Arms is corrected in Cecil's hand.¹

During this period the original commodity trade on the Guinea coasts was languishing, not by reason of the slavers' activity, but because the Portuguese were sending strong forces to their base of Elmina. The *Minion* and the *John Baptist*, which made the outward passage in company with Hawkins in 1564, had to do some stiff fighting in the Elmina region, and the *Minion* came through only because she was a ship of strength. It is almost certain that her consort, the *John Baptist*, was taken and her crew interned at the Portuguese fortress; some ship at least, belonging to Sir William Chester and others, suffered that fate in February 1565.² In September of the same year the brothers William and George Winter sent out the *Mary Fortune* of 70 tons on a Guinea voyage. She did not reach the Gold Coast, for she was caught near the River Sestos by two Portuguese sailing warships and two galleys. They sank her and drowned most of her crew, and took the survivors as prisoners to Elmina.³ It was a clear challenge to the English Government's doctrine of trading rights on the African coast. The Winters claimed a loss of £7,600, and the case, which will be referred to again, became of considerable importance.

The French also experienced difficulties in their Guinea trade, and were less successful in the Caribbean than of yore. In 1564 Jean Bontemps lost two ships in fight with the Spaniards off San Domingo. At the close of the same year he prepared a Guinea expedition of three ships, the largest being the *Dragon Vert* of 150

¹ College of Arms MSS., Harvey's Grants, I.C.B., No. 101, f. 109.

² Cotton MSS., Nero, B i, f. 120.

³ Royal MSS., 13 B. i, f. 188; S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, Nos. 26, 27.

tons. He reached the Guinea coast at the same time as the *Minion* and the *John Baptist*, was roughly handled by the galleys at Elmina, and lost both his smaller ships. With the *Dragon Vert* he then crossed the Atlantic, had a desperate fight with the Caribs of Grenada whilst trying to water, and came into Borburata in April 1565, just before Hawkins left that place. He had no slaves to sell, and it is fairly evident that his purpose was piracy, although he did nothing violent in Hawkins's presence. Again in 1566 he had the worst of a fight with the Portuguese at Cape Verde, two ships of his being attacked by seven of theirs. At length the Spaniards caught him in the Caribbean in 1571, and flayed him alive.¹ He was a gallant but unfortunate captain, well liked by the English who fell in with him.

The end of the Florida colony falls within the scope of this chapter, since its fortunes were linked with the plans of John Hawkins. Laudonnière, with the help given him by the English, held on until the arrival of the relief which, had he known it, was already on the sea when Hawkins was offering to bring the colonists home. On 28 August 1565 Jean Ribault reached Florida with his son Jacques and some 300 men and women for the consolidation of the position staked out by the pioneers. But at the same time another Florida expedition was crossing the ocean. At the end of June Pero Menéndez de Avilés left Cadiz with the strongest Spanish fleet yet employed on a campaign in the west. He also appeared at the Florida anchorage a week after Ribault had arrived there. Finding the French thus reinforced, he built a fort at St. Augustine farther along the coast and sent word to San Domingo for as many armed men as that colony could afford him. Before

¹ For these matters see La Roncière, iv. 82, and H. C. A., Libels, 3/39, Nos. 16-21; 3/46, Nos. 137, 315, 320. The *Dragon Vert* and others of Bontemps' ships were insured in London, hence the proceedings in the Admiralty Court.

their coming, fortune gave him a complete victory. Jean Ribault set out to attack St. Augustine by sea. His ships were scattered by a storm, and most of them were driven ashore at various places, so that his men, having struggled to land, were hopelessly disorganized. Meanwhile Menéndez had marched by land to attack the French fort. He found it lightly manned, took it with a rush, and massacred most of its defenders. Laudonnière and the younger Ribault escaped with a handful in a small craft and sailed straight for France. Menéndez retraced his route and fell in with Jean Ribault and his shipwrecked Frenchmen. They were in no condition to fight, each crew being caught separately where it had landed. They laid down their arms and were massacred, Ribault among them. Ten only, as Catholics, were spared. 'Menéndez avait achevé sa tâche. La Floride française avait vécu.'¹

The decision was indeed final, in spite of the raid of Dominique de Gourges upon St. Augustine in 1568, and his massacre of its Spanish garrison. For after the terrible example made by Menéndez there was no further idea of a French colony in Florida. To Hawkins the news must have come as a blow. For the first time Spain had grasped her nettle and Menéndez had shown himself capable of an active defence of the Indies, on whose defencelessness Hawkins had been counting in more ways than one. Henceforward it would be of little use to talk to Philip of the services of an English squadron at the price which he must pay for them. Yet the plan, as will be shown, died hard.

¹ Compare La Roncière, iv. 83-91, and Duro, *Armada española*, ii, ch. xiii.

TWO YEARS OF INTRIGUE

JOHN HAWKINS, back from his second western voyage, was thirty-three years old. Modern England is prone to picture him as a sea-dog, a word with a vague connotation of rough manners, childish cunning, and a picturesque habit of costume and speech. It is not hard to trace the idea to its source. Consciously or not we have it from Charles Kingsley, who thus depicts Hawkins in his gallery of portraits of the captains assembled on Plymouth Hoe in 1588: 'A burly, grizzled elder, in greasy sea-stained garments, contrasting oddly with the huge gold chain about his neck, waddles up, as if he had been born, and had lived ever since, in a gale of wind at sea. The upper half of his sharp dogged visage seems of brick-red leather, the lower of badger's fur; and as he claps Drake on the back, and, with a broad Devon twang, shouts, "Be you a coming to drink your wine, Francis Drake, or be you not?—saving your presence, my Lord"; the Lord High Admiral only laughs, and bids Drake go and drink his wine; for John Hawkins, Admiral of the port, is the Patriarch of Plymouth seamen, if Drake be their hero, and says and does pretty much what he likes in any company on earth.'

There we have the man's travesty, limned by a master of fiction. But the real man was so utterly different that the Kingsley picture is not even a caricature; it is safe to say that no contemporary would have dreamed of applying it to the John Hawkins he knew. For the real Hawkins was not a stage bargee but a man of the world, who dressed in the fashion, was at his ease at court, and lived according to the custom of his rank. His portraits show him as such a man, with long curved nose, widely-opened eyes, carefully trained moustache, and close-cropped pointed beard. In conversation he

chose his words well, producing the effect he sought, winning many by his charm of manner, yet revealing no more of his own mind than he intended. His letters bear witness to an educated mind, their handwriting is uniform and clear, and they are better spelt and put together than those of many a nobleman of the time. Always his bearing was suited to the occasion, which in that ceremonious age entailed an attention to etiquette. And, for his taste in costume, the following may be substituted for the greasy attire of Plymouth Hoe. It is quoted from the evidence of damages claimed for the loss of the *Jesus* in 1568: '[The witness] says that he saw Mr. Hawkins wear in this voyage divers suits of apparel of velvets and silk, with buttons of gold and pearl, with other apparel and furniture which in his judgement might be well worth £250 sterling.'¹ This, before passing on to more serious matters, ought to be sufficient to modify the sea-dog impression.

The second voyage had raised Hawkins to a much higher estimation than had the first. So great was his fame at the close of 1565 that he became a personage in international affairs and the subject of much diplomatic anxiety. Two years elapsed before he was free once again to command an expedition in person; and during those two years he was the centre of many intrigues and artifices, which throw light upon his character and form an explanatory prelude to his third disastrous voyage.

Guzman de Silva, as has been indicated, was a man of tact and good sense. He was well liked by the Queen, and was shrewd enough to disguise his feelings even from those who had reason to guess that he was not on their side. Part of his business was to get the slaving stopped, and to that end he spared neither pains nor civility. In November 1565, Hawkins having come to London, the ambassador gathered all the information

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 16, 1569, 19 Apr., evidence of Wm. Clarke. A copy is in S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 53.

I. yet in diverse supplications in the name of
plentiful men to the comittell of the day, the
matter of the same was not so the same be great
about goods, and in all things I am able to
show that my money by the same is the same of the
contrary to the same or rather in the name of you
show will forder my recompence as the same in
the same case, I will give you the same of the
same of the same I will forder the same rather
than to give for the same increase of
show. I will forder the same to the same of the
show from London the same of the same 1569.

Yours honours most faithfully
to command John Hawkins

HANDWRITING OF JOHN HAWKINS

This is part of the letter of March 6, 1569 (modern style), quoted on p. 218. It is all the autograph of Hawkins, although the subscription is in a different style from the body of the letter

he could about the recent voyage, its profits, and its shareholders, and then asked Hawkins to dine with him with a view to learning his further intentions. The two men met on equal terms—proof enough in itself that Philip's representative did not consider the Englishman a pirate—and either was courteous and seemingly frank, appearing to speak freely and lay all his cards upon the table, yet careful in effect to tell only what the other already knew. They parted with mutual civility, Hawkins to plan a repetition of his former enterprises, de Silva to write to his master: 'This needs decisive action. I could complain to the Queen, but would first like any information you may have from the places visited. . . . It may be best to dissemble so as to capture and castigate him on the next voyage.'¹ Clever as de Silva was, this dissembling policy was a mistake; for like most foreigners he seems to have believed that it was a game at which the English could not excel, whereas it suited Hawkins and his friends to a nicety.

Hawkins went back to Plymouth, but was again in London in February 1566. Once more he approached his friend de Silva, this time with a request for his good offices in recovering the property arrested in Spain in 1563. De Silva was cordial, for he wanted to see as much of Hawkins as possible. They dined together as before, and the ambassador said that in order to work for restitution he must see the trading licences which Hawkins claimed to have received from various West Indian governors. Hawkins duly showed the licences, protesting meanwhile that he would go no more to the west without the King's permission. De Silva smiled and disbelieved him. 'It seems advisable', he wrote to Philip, 'to get this man out of the country, so that he may not teach others, for they have good ships and are greedy folk with more liberty than is good for them'. Whether or not the idea was skilfully introduced by Hawkins, the

¹ *Spanish Calendar, 1558-67*, No. 330.

Spaniard proposed a scheme into which the Englishman entered with ardour. It was that Hawkins with his ships should serve Philip in the Mediterranean against the Turks. It is doubtful whether de Silva was sincere in this proposal, but it is easy to understand that Hawkins may have been; for above all things he desired recognition by Spain, and service in the Mediterranean would have been a good step towards the service in the Caribbean which alone would give him an authorized position there. Both men kept the negotiation alive until the summer of 1566 was well advanced. Although it ultimately failed, it was of good service to the main purposes of Hawkins, for it enabled him to arm and provision his ships on pretence that they were destined to serve the King, and to express deep disappointment as the summer passed and no commission arrived from Spain. Meanwhile, the ships were equally in readiness for a slaving venture, for which the best time of sailing was early autumn.

De Silva was taken in by the fruits of his own artifice.

'I misjudged Hawkins', he wrote in August, 'in doubting that he meant to serve Your Majesty this year and go to the Indies instead. He came to me yesterday and expressed sorrow that the plan had fallen through, and talked of it for next year. He proposed to serve Your Majesty in the Mediterranean until the weather got too bad for galleys and those of the Turks had to seek harbour, and then he would go to the Levant to cruise for prizes between Egypt and Constantinople. I praised the idea'.¹

For two months there is nothing further from de Silva, and then, on 12 October, there is a letter showing that he had taken the alarm: he has now sure information, he writes, that Hawkins's ships will go slaving again. He realized that he had been outwitted and that he might expect any day to hear that his quarry had

¹ All this is from *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 336, 337, 344, 347, 355, 357, 360, 372.

slipped off to Guinea and the Indies. However, he kept his temper and went to lay a complaint before the Queen.' She was more willing to argue the question of Caribbean voyages in general than to issue a prompt prohibition of the one now contemplated; but at length she told Cecil to summon the adventurers and examine them on their intentions. The proceeding was probably needless, for there is good reason to believe, from the analogy of the other slaving voyages, that Cecil was well acquainted with the details of the project. Although he told de Silva that he had refused to take a share in the previous enterprise, one cannot be too certain that he spoke the truth. Cecil was a high-minded man among sixteenth-century statesmen, but diplomatic morality did not count a lie dishonourable if spoken in one's country's interest.

So, with de Silva in a ferment of impatience, there was now played a comedy of officialdom, wherein divers authorities passed on from one to another the duty of restraining the ships in Plymouth, and finally, without any loss of correctitude, let them get out. This voyage of 1566-7 has nowhere been fully chronicled, but from various sources a good deal of circumstantial evidence about it can be collected. On 12 October the Privy Council considered de Silva's protest and decided to summon Hawkins to give an account of himself. Meanwhile the councillors haggled over the extent of the Spanish monopoly and asked de Silva to furnish a list of the prohibited ports. He replied, 'all the West Indies, continent and islands', to which they answered that it was too much, since Philip's subjects had freedom of trade in all the English dominions; but after some argument they yielded to his contention.¹ It seemed plain

¹ *Spanish Calendar, 1558-67*, Nos. 385, 386. Compare S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 40, No. 84, where the Admiralty judge complains that the forbidden places ought to be specified 'else how can a man provide to let them (the adventurers) unless they go not at all to the sea'.

to him that they were wasting time in order to give Hawkins a chance to get to sea before a decision should be reached, a suspicion that is strengthened by the fact that their summons to Hawkins was not even written until 17 October.¹ But Hawkins, in his dealings alike with foreigners and with his own government, was as careful as Sir Andrew Aguecheek to keep on the windy side of the law. He would not go without leave, and in due course the order arrived for the mayor of Plymouth to arrest his ship and send him up to London. By the end of the month he was there and had arranged everything with the Council. On the 30th that body informed Dr. David Lewes, the Judge of the Admiralty, that since Hawkins had denied any intention of going or sending to the West Indies, he might be released on giving bonds to that effect. Next day he signed a bond for £500 not to send his ship *Swallow*, bound for Guinea, nor any others of his ships, to the Spanish Indies.²

The affair had now been so fully ventilated that Hawkins could not decently lead the expedition in person. It was possible, in fact, that he had never meant to do so, for the squadron comprised no great ship of the Queen's, like the *Jesus* of the previous voyage. He may well have decided to let a subordinate keep the slaving business alive, whilst he himself worked for Philip's approval in the Mediterranean. However that may have been, he went back to Plymouth and presumably dispatched the *Swallow* on a voyage limited to the coast of Guinea. But the Plymouth port-books reveal that he did more. They contain entries showing that on 9 November 1566 the following ships sailed from Plymouth, laden by John Hawkins and bound in the first instance for Guinea: the *Powel* (or *Paul*), 200 tons, James Hampton master; the *Salamon*, 100 tons (*sic*), James Raunse master; and the *Pasco*, 40 tons, Robert

¹ *A. P. C.*, 1558-70, p. 314.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 314-15; *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 40, Nos. 99, 99 (1).

Bolton master.¹ The port-books give no names other than those of the master mariners and the owners of the cargo, but from other sources we learn that Captain John Lovell commanded the whole squadron, that Thomas Hampton accompanied it, and that Francis Drake, then about twenty-four years old, was also a member of one of the crews.²

There can be little doubt that John Hawkins was at least part-owner of these ships, and to that extent was committing an imposture upon the Spanish ambassador. There can be little doubt also that he had avoided imperilling his £500 security, for it would have been easy to arrange that his brother William should be their sole legal owner for the occasion. William Hawkins had given no bond, and the quibble was one of frequent occurrence; the records of the Admiralty Court are full of cases in which the defence turns upon this very point, the practical control of a vessel by one man and its legal ownership by another. Equally, it is fairly certain that Sir William Cecil, who knew the Hawkinses well, was cognizant of the whole affair and could have stopped it had he chosen to do so. One can hardly believe that he did not know these ships were fitting at Plymouth—few such matters escaped him—and their bills of lading would have revealed their destination, for slaves

¹ R. O. Port Books, Plymouth, 1010/18, 9 Nov. 1566. James Raunse was the Plymouth man who co-operated with Drake at Nombre de Dios in 1572-3.

² For Lovell and Drake, *Sir Francis Drake Reviv'd*, London, 1626, p. 2. This, as a late and doubtful authority, might be rejected were it not partially corroborated by the Portuguese complaint and by a contemporary account in Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii. The relevant passage from the latter is quoted below, p. 125. For Thomas Hampton's participation the circumstantial evidence is as follows: on 22 Apr. 1569, he deposed before the Admiralty Court that he had made three slaving voyages prior to that of 1567-9. Unless he took part in some expedition now entirely unknown, these voyages can only have been the ones which set forth in 1562, 1564, and 1566. The Plymouth customs ledgers show that Hampton did considerable business in that port.

required special provender, and to the Spanish colonies there were carried manufactured goods unsuitable for the Guinea trade. De Silva lacked these means of information. He was quite satisfied that the project had been scotched, and wrote as much to his master on 4 November. Six weeks later Philip II acknowledged his letter and instructed him to thank the Queen.¹

Lovell's squadron was away rather less than a year. It must have returned before the beginning of October 1567, for at that date Hawkins himself put to sea for the third time, and Drake, Hampton, and Raunse all accompanied him. Lovell went first to Guinea, where the Portuguese book of complaints describes his proceedings. Late in 1566, it says, John 'Cobel' came to Cape Verde with four ships and some pinnaces, and there took a Portuguese trader with many negroes and wax, ivory, and other stuff. In February 1567 he took another ship in sight of Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands, killed some of the crew, and set the rest on shore; her lading was of sugar and negroes, worth 15,000 ducats. At the same place he took also a Lisbon ship going to Brazil and worth 6,000 ducats. At the Isle of Maio he took yet another worth 2,000 ducats, and before leaving the vicinity he made a final capture worth 5,000.² Some comment on this is needed. In the first place, the editor of the *Calendar of Foreign State Papers* has read Cobel as meaning Cobham. It is much more reasonable to attribute the captures to John Lovell. The Portuguese document is not an original but a fair copy, in which a mistranscription like 'Cobel' for 'Lobel' is intelligible, while the substitution of 'b' for 'v' is in accordance with Portuguese pronunciation. Moreover, Thomas Cobham had been laid by the heels more than a year before, and all his known piracies took place in European waters. There is really no doubt that John Lovell was the person

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 388, 397.

² S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 99, ff. 6, 6 b.

intended. Another point worth notice is that some Portuguese are alleged to have been killed, a charge not hitherto made against Hawkins in person. Finally, the Portuguese speak of four ships, which implies that the *Swallow* accompanied the squadron to Guinea, although it is certain from later evidence that only three vessels crossed over to the West Indies. The *Swallow*, in fulfilment of the bond, must have returned to England from Guinea with the ivory and other commodities.

From the African coast the three ships with the negroes sailed to the Spanish Main. A Welsh seaman who sailed in this voyage and was afterwards taken by the Spaniards deposed to the Mexican Inquisitors that Lovell touched at Margarita, Borburata, and Curaçao. This man also stated that on this voyage he was converted to Protestant opinions by the conversation of Francis Drake.¹ At Rio de la Hacha, according to a narrative printed nearly sixty years afterwards, Lovell and Drake 'suffered wrong from the Spaniards'.² Confirmation is found in a letter written by John Hawkins to the treasurer of Rio de la Hacha in 1568, wherein he remarks:

'My ships which I sent hither the last year with negroes [and other] merchandise, you being the chief cause, came all in a [mis-carriage], which being reparted among divers venturers my loss [was the] more tolerable, and I cannot lay the fault so much [the less] upon you that I blame not much more the simpleness of my [deputies] who knew not how to handle these matters. The negroes they [left] here behind them I understand are sold and the money to the [King's] use, and therefore I will not demand it of you.'³

The passage is mutilated, but the sense is plain. It is that Lovell was simple enough to land negroes at Rio de la Hacha in 1567 and to be defrauded of payment for them.

¹ The *proceso* of Morgan Jillert, 1574, for the loan of a translation of which the author's thanks are due to Mr. G. R. G. Conway, whose researches are described below, pp. 254-5.

² *Sir Francis Drake Reviv'd*, p. 2.

³ Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii, f. 32.

The return of the expedition is mentioned in two records, although its date cannot be exactly established. In November 1567 and March 1568 certain persons brought a suit for debt in the Admiralty Court against one William Meredith, who was stated to have invested £275 in the ships *Paul*, *Salamon*, and *Pasco*, 'now lately returned from the Indies', and it was further said that the investment was 'sub tutela Johannis Hawkyns'.¹ This is useful as showing that the three ships named were those that went to the Caribbean on the errand referred to in Hawkins's letter quoted above. De Silva's correspondence yields an earlier mention. On 13 October 1567 he wrote to Philip that, having learned that last year's fleet had gone after all to the Indies, he had complained to the Queen about it.² The general inference, as already stated, is that the ships were home some time before the beginning of October.

The web of John Hawkins's affairs now demands mention of an Anglo-French adventure of 1566. In the summer of that year Peyrot de Monluc, son of a French noble, prepared a great expedition at Bordeaux. Its purpose is shrouded in some obscurity, for it was never fulfilled, but it would seem that Monluc intended to find and occupy a region on the coast of Africa, well to the southward of Portuguese Guinea, and believed to be rich in gold and other commodities. M. de la Roncière, the historian of the French Navy, believes that the promoters had got wind of the gold mines of the Transvaal and Rhodesia,³ but he does not explain how they could have done so, and the theory is hard to reconcile with their statement that the mines were only fifteen or twenty leagues from the coast. However that may be, there was undoubtedly a belief that in an unoccupied part of Africa gold was waiting to be picked up in quan-

¹ H. C. A., Libels, 3/39, Nos. 22, 101.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 445, 455.

³ *Hist. de la marine française*, iv. 83-91.

tities far exceeding those found in the Spanish Indies. In September, Monluc sailed from the Gironde with seven French and sixteen English ships. Our own records give no clue to the identity of any of the English adventurers, who were probably recruited from the pirates and freebooters infesting the Narrow Seas. On 3 October the fleet arrived at Madeira with peaceful intentions. It was, however, fired upon by the batteries of Funchal and by fourteen Portuguese ships riding there. Monluc captured these ships and then landed his men and stormed Funchal. He himself was killed in the action, and, so far as the majority of his followers knew, the secret of the destination perished with him. The invaders therefore, having sacked the town and desecrated its churches, did not know how to proceed. The whole expedition broke up, and its members returned to their respective French and English haunts.

There were in the fleet two Portuguese renegades, Antonio Luis and André Homem, the latter of whom sailed also under the name of Gaspar Caldeira. These men, de la Roncière thinks, had wormed their way into the secret of the gold mine, and were the only survivors of the Madeira raid who knew Monluc's intended destination. It seems, however, from an English document, that they had been offering to sell this knowledge the year before, and that they were rather the original inspirers and guides of Monluc. Still hoping to profit by the business, they came to England in the spring of 1567, and hawked their wares in various quarters. They applied first to William Winter, to whom they produced a paper which showed that in 1565 they had proposed to reveal their secret to Philip II. He had written them a safe-conduct to go to Spain and explain themselves more fully.¹ If they went it is likely that Philip was

¹ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 81, No. 83, a copy of Philip's letter, endorsed by Cecil: '1565, copy of a lr. of ye K. of Spaynes to Gasp. Caldeyra and Antoin Luys as a save conduct for Africa.' Luis is traceable as a mer-

distrustful, for they are next heard of as members of Monluc's expedition above described. For Winter's information they wrote down some details of the project. The country they knew of was on the mainland of Africa, 150 leagues in length and containing gold mines of fabulous wealth. There was a good harbour less than twenty leagues from the mines. The land was fertile, produced dyewoods, could grow sugar, and was fit for colonization. The output of gold would be not less than £300,000 a year. They, Luis and Homem (or Caldeira), desired to be placed in command of an expedition and to be guaranteed one-tenth of all the profits accruing.¹

At their request Winter communicated these particulars to the Queen. She refused to take the lead in dealing with the matter, which was then referred to the group of investors who had been financing the voyages of John Hawkins. The syndicate talked the thing over with Hawkins, and it was agreed that he should sail in search of the land of wealth, with the two Portuguese as his guides. The impression to be gathered from the surviving documents is that the merchants and courtiers, and possibly also Sir William Cecil, had a genuine belief in the feasibility of the scheme, but that Hawkins had not. He, there can be little doubt, never meant to go on a treasure-hunt under the auspices of two shady characters like these. At the same time the thing was very opportune for his own purpose, that of another slaving voyage. He could prepare his expedition openly without giving any ground of complaint to the Spanish ambassador, whose master's interests were not ostensibly involved. He could also gain the support of the syndicate of believers, some of whom might have grown chary of another West Indian venture after three successive defiances of Philip's authority, more especially

chant trading between Portugal and Guinea for several years prior to 1565 (S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 95, ff. 246, 261).

¹ Cotton MSS., Nero, B. i, f. 154.

as the result of the last one was as yet unknown. So Hawkins professed compliance, and the preparations began.

The exact composition of the syndicate which dispatched Hawkins on this, his most ambitious enterprise, is nowhere recorded. Proceedings in the Admiralty Court after his return were taken in the names of Sir William Garrard and Rowland Heyward only, their associates being unnamed.¹ The Hawkins brothers were themselves investors to the extent of £2,000;² it may be inferred from correspondence that William Winter was also an adventurer; and a letter of de Silva's adds the name of Sir Lionel Ducket.³ It is almost certain, however, that the list was longer than this. In Hawkins's second voyage, that of 1564-5, the chief adventurers had been Leicester, Pembroke, and Clinton, Sir William Chester, Gonson, and Edward Castlyn, in addition to Garrard and Winter named above, with the Queen in the background risking the *Jesus of Lubeck* at a valuation of £2,000. There is no reason to believe that these persons had been dissatisfied with their profits, and in the absence of direct evidence it is reasonable to regard the syndicate of 1567 as comprising the majority of their names. All the circumstances point to a strong court and political influence in favour of the voyage, and de Silva asserted that some members of the Privy Council held shares.⁴ Sir William Cecil took an active interest in the management, and the whole undertaking bore the aspect of a piece of state business. Whether Cecil, any more than Hawkins, believed in the renegades' tale must be left an open question.

The preparations came to the notice of de Silva at the end of May, when he reported that two of the Queen's ships were being fitted for Hawkins in the Medway anchorage. A month later some parts of the affair had

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 53.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 49, No. 36.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 423.

⁴ *Ibid.*

become common talk, and the Spaniard had been to the Queen for an assurance that the expedition was not bound for the West Indies. Both she and Cecil asserted that there was no intention of intruding in the Spanish colonies. The expedition, they said, was going to Elmina to retaliate for the destruction of Winter's ship the year before; and Elizabeth called the merchants before her and made them swear in her presence that Hawkins was not going to any prohibited places. Nevertheless de Silva was ill content. The two warships had now come round from Gillingham into the Thames; and he watched the issue of ordnance from the Tower, picked up rumours from this source and that, and suspected that a slaving venture was all the while intended. In mid-July he first heard the story of the two Portuguese and drew therefrom a little comfort, since it seemed to promise that the serious business was to be in Africa after all. But a week later he was again sure that Hawkins was going westwards, and again he went to the Queen. She denied any such purpose, and Cecil confirmed her words with a great oath; whilst the Spaniard knew, if they did not, that the ships were taking in quantities of beans, the usual food for slaves, and also fine cloths and linens, which would tempt the Spanish planter although they would be thrown away upon the blacks of the African coast. Then more details about the Portuguese leaked out, of their former offer to Philip, and of the wealth of their new mine; and in August and September de Silva was reassured and ceased to embarrass the court with his importunities.¹

Meanwhile what was the intention? Cecil and his mistress were positive enough, and so were the merchants, and, hard lying as all statecraft then was, there is yet no evidence to warrant us in disbelieving them. For at the outset the motive really was a treasure-hunt, and nothing had since appeared to indicate that it was

¹ All this is from de Silva's correspondence in the *Spanish Calendar*.

abandoned, except some details of lading that might be innocently explained. Hawkins indeed was not at one with the rest. He said afterwards that he had never had faith in the two Portuguese; but at this time he was keeping his doubts to himself and watching his chance to mould events. Persuasive talker as he could be when he liked, no man had a greater gift for silence when the occasion demanded it; and so he kept his purposes locked in his own breast. A paper of 24 June bears his signature: 'A proportion of ordnance, powder, armour, and munition for the fort in Guinea, if there shall be need of fortification.' The articles enumerated were worth about £400, and were to be provided from the Tower and reckoned as part of the Queen's investment.¹ A fort meant permanent occupation and was not needed for slaving as it was then practised. The sixteenth-century slavers roved along a large extent of coast and made their own captures; it was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the increased demand for slaves led the white men to establish themselves in depots on the seaboard and to organize gangs of native raiders who penetrated the interior. The fort project therefore indicates that the syndicate of 1567, even in documents meant for no eyes but their own, were working on the plan of the two Portuguese. Yet it is significant that John Hawkins adds, '*if* there shall be need of fortification'.

On 30 July the two warships left London for Plymouth, where they were to join the merchantmen of the expedition. They were the *Jesus of Lubeck*, which had served in the voyage of 1564, and the ancient *Minion*, the veteran of so many African ventures, now for the first time to sail under Hawkins's flag and to prove herself staunch for the hardest service. As they weighed from the Tower anchorage, their decks crowded with friends saying farewell, a pitiful accident occurred on

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 43, No. 12.

board the *Jesus*; some heavy gear broke loose and 'slew a maiden', an omen of an ill-starred voyage.¹

At Plymouth the Hawkins brothers' fleet had likewise been equipped; the *William and John*, of 150 tons, Thomas Bolton captain and James Raunse master; the *Swallow*, 100; the *Judith*, 50, and the *Angel*, 33. In the *Jesus*, as the squadron was finally organized, sailed Hawkins himself; and Robert Barrett, her master, acted as his second in command for the whole force in all matters of action, taking charge of most of the landing parties necessary in the course of the expedition. Drake was on board the *Jesus* with Hawkins;² he did not obtain a command until a later stage in the voyage. The captain of the *Minion* was Thomas Hampton. Amongst the others were William Clarke, a merchant representing the interests of the London investors; George Fitzwilliam, who had sailed with Hawkins in 1564 and was deep in his confidence; John Varney and ——— Fowler, gentlemen adventurers; and Captain Edward Dudley, a soldier destined to be the central figure of a melodramatic incident in the course of the voyage. Of the lading there is no full list, but it is known to have included linens, various kinds of woollen cloths, cottons and taffetas, tin, manilios or arm-rings, and swords.³

During the latter part of August and throughout September the fleet lay at Plymouth, anchored in the Catwater, completing its stores and crews. Hawkins knew of de Silva's suspicions and of the Spanish mistrust of his intentions. His slave-trading had now become an international complication, and he was on his guard against any stroke, from whatsoever quarter it might come, for the frustration of his purpose. One day towards the end of August, whilst bad weather was raging in the Channel, seven sail of warships entered Ply-

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii, f. 17.

² Morgan Jillert's *proceso*, *ut supra*.

³ H. C. A., Libels, 3/40, transcribed in S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 53.

mouth Sound. They carried Spanish flags, and struck neither them nor their topsails on entering the port and seeing the Queen's ships riding there. The omission was more than a discourtesy, it was a defiance, for the sea had a language of its own, independent of words, and every seaman understood it. To refuse the salute in an English port was only less hostile than actually to open fire. More than this, with all the haven of Plymouth to ride in, the strangers pressed on towards the Catwater with the evident intention of anchoring there cheek by jowl with the English ships.¹ The newcomers were an armed squadron from Philip's Netherland dominions commanded by the Flemish admiral Alphonse de Bourgogne, Baron de Wachen. Their declared purpose was to meet the King on a journey he was contemplating from Spain, and to escort him up the Channel to the Low Countries. It is doubtful if Philip really meant to make the voyage, and in fact he never did so.

John Hawkins was 'ware and waking', as he taught Francis Drake to be. Had he been slower to decide and act, his expedition might never have set sail. For it is at least possible that de Wachen meant mischief. What if he had found the English ships unready, their guns encumbered with gear, their men ashore, their commander irresolute? A brawl or a trumped-up quarrel, the salute affording an obvious occasion, musket-shots and a cannonade, the English ships burned at their anchors, their voyage ended ere it had begun; that might

¹ This affair is briefly and imperfectly recorded in *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, No. 422 (De Wachen to Philip II); *Foreign Calendar*, 1566-8, No. 1780 (De Wachen to de Silva); and *The Observations of Sir Richard Hawkins*, 1622, reprinted in the Hakluyt Society's *Hawkins Voyages*, 1878, pp. 118-20. Sir Richard Hawkins's account is detailed but very inaccurate. He relied upon a childish memory—'I being of tender years', &c.—and entirely missed the significance of the occurrence. But what an oyster old John Hawkins must have been, never to have discussed the matter with his son! A full contemporary account is now available in the Cotton MS. already cited, ff. 17-18.

have been the story of Plymouth Sound in 1567 had Hawkins been other than the great leader he was. But, Hawkins being what he was, the story was different. He would have no strange warships in Catwater. As they came on he fired at the insolent flag; again he fired, and lower, and again, hulling the leading Spaniard, six or seven shots in all, until the flags were struck and top-sails vailed, and the strangers luffed towards East Water, where they anchored and prepared to expostulate.¹

De Wachen first sent a messenger to the mayor of Plymouth, complaining of his ill-usage by the ships in Catwater and professing that he knew not what vessels they were. The probability is that he knew quite well what they were. He had just come from Flanders, where the authorities had heard all about Hawkins's expedition from de Silva, and he himself was an admiral of eighteen years' standing, who had often been in English ports before. Such a man could no more mistake the *Jesus* for anything but a Queen's ship than a modern officer could mistake a dreadnought for a mailboat, quite apart from the moral certainty that he was expecting to see her there. The *Minion* also was distinctively a warship, and larger than the average privately owned vessel of the time. De Wachen, in fact, having failed at bluff, was falling back on bluster, and that in a port where such tactics were less likely to succeed than in any other in England. The mayor referred the angry Fleming to John Hawkins, and in due course a messenger approached the *Jesus* and desired speech with her commander.

Hawkins received him in state, pacing to and fro in the waist of the ship before a guard armed with partisans. This, doubtless, was an occasion for the wearing

¹ The passage in the Cotton MS. dealing with this event is mutilated, but it appears to mean that de Wachen anchored under the lee of the island afterwards called Drake's Island, and that the East Water meant that part of the Sound between the island and the opening of the Catwater.

of that magnificent costume which he carried to sea with him for impressive functions, in character with his position as a high officer of the Queen of England. Drake in his day behaved in like fashion, and there can be little doubt whence he received his training. There has always been a tendency to regard Drake as self-taught, a pioneer, who owed nothing to any man; yet in this voyage he cannot have failed to learn a great deal from John Hawkins, and it is no derogation from Drake's merits to place the debt on record. De Wachen's emissary, awed into reverence, delivered his message, to the effect that the Fleming was greatly surprised at being fired upon in a friendly port which he had been driven by stress of weather to enter. Hawkins replied that, great as was the friendship between his people and the subjects of King Philip, those who entered an English port must be obedient to the known rules and authorities, and that he, as commander of the Queen's ships, had but done his duty in enforcing such obedience. Having given de Wachen an hour to digest this answer, Hawkins followed it up with a present of London beer, capons, chickens, and other delicacies, which evoked profuse thanks and apparent reconciliation. Nevertheless de Wachen complained bitterly to his sovereign of the whole affair, and set on de Silva to worry Cecil and the Queen about it. They did not think fit to appreciate Hawkins's point of view, and they reproved him sharply for getting himself and them into a scrape. He had to accept it as the penalty of his position. 'I had rather Her Highness found fault with me', he said, 'for keeping her ships and people to her honour, than to lose them to the glory of others.'¹

But after all, de Wachen had done better service than he knew. He had sought to berth by Hawkins and had been turned away by force of arms; and his adversary had been severely reprimanded for the feat. It was a

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 44, No. 13.

feat which Hawkins must never perform again, under penalty of the acute displeasure of his sovereign. And so, when a year later the situation repeated itself with exactness, his hands were tied, and he had to stand still whilst destruction enveloped him. The tragedy of San Juan de Ulua was predestined from the day which saw de Wachen brought to anchor by that brisk salvo in the Catwater.

There was to be yet more trouble ere Hawkins was rid of the Spaniards and Flemings. In Catwater there was riding a Biscay ship, not one of de Wachen's squadron, having on board certain Flemish prisoners condemned to the galleys. One afternoon when her crew were asleep shew as boarded by a gang of masked men who closed the hatches on the Spaniards and set the prisoners at liberty.¹ De Wachen at once charged Hawkins with this outrage, declaring that the raiders were a party from the *Jesus*. Hawkins denied knowing anything about the affair until the following day and suggested that the culprits were most likely some of the Flemings with whom the port was so unpleasantly pestered. De Wachen, once more bested, consoled himself with writing again to de Silva and stirring up as much odium as possible against his enemy in government circles in London. At length, some time before the end of September, the unwelcome guests at Plymouth took themselves off.

Whilst the *Jesus* and the *Minion* had sailed round to Plymouth, the merchants who were to accompany the expedition had come down from London by road, bringing with them the two Portuguese who were to guide them to the mysterious gold mines in Africa. These two men, living in the town with the merchants and by them well supplied with money, enjoyed themselves very thoroughly until the day of sailing drew near. Then, on 16 September, they suddenly disappeared, having escaped to Brittany in a small vessel of that country.

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii, f. 18.

Hawkins protested that he had used them well and that they had been enticed away by the Portuguese ambassador in France. He was glad to be quit of them, for he had never believed in their project; yet their flight, coupled with the other unfortunate incidents, increased the tension between himself and the government, which suspected that he had connived at the evasion. There is no evidence that he did so; but Cecil, whether sincerely or not, laid the blame on his shoulders and incensed the Queen's mind against him. The Lord Admiral took the same side and wrote to Cecil that he had mistrusted the amount of liberty allowed to the Portuguese before they left London, and had warned Hawkins to keep a stricter watch upon them.

However, they were gone, and it was impossible to keep up the pretence of ordering the voyage upon the original plan. Hawkins at once wrote the Queen a straightforward letter which is worth quoting in full:

‘My sovereign good Lady and Mistress,

Your Highness may be advertised that this day being the xvjth of September the Portingals who should have directed us this pretended enterprise have fled, and as I have certain understanding taken passage into France, having no cause, for that they had of me better entertainment than appertained to such mean persons, and an army prepared sufficient to do any reasonable enterprise; but it appeared that they could by no means perform their large promises, and so having gleaned a piece of money to our merchants are fled to deceive some other. And although this enterprise cannot take effect (which I think God hath provided for the best) I do ascertain Your Highness that I have provision sufficient and an able army to defend our charge and to bring home (with God's help) forty thousand marks gains without the offence of the least of any of Your Highness' allies or friends. It shall be no dishonour unto Your Highness that your own servant and subject shall in such an extremity convert such an enterprise and turn it both to Your Highness' honour and to the benefit of your whole realm. Which I will not enterprise without Your Highness' consent, but am ready to do what

service by Your Majesty shall be commanded; yet to show Your Highness the truth, I should be undone if Your Majesty should stay the voyage, whereunto I hope Your Highness will have some regard. The voyage I pretend is to lade negroes in Guinea and sell them in the West Indies in truck of gold, pearls and emeralds, whereof I doubt not but to bring home great abundance for the contentation of Your Highness and to the relief of a number of worthy servitors ready now for this pretended voyage, which otherwise would shortly be driven to great misery and ready to commit any folly. Thus I, having advertised Your Highness the state of this matter, do most humbly pray Your Highness to signify your pleasure by this bearer, which I shall most willingly accomplish.

From Plymouth the xvjth day of September, 1567,

Your Highness' most humble servant,

JOHN HAWKYNs.¹

The bearer was probably George Fitzwilliam, for on 22 September he returned from London to Plymouth with a letter from Cecil. The document has not been preserved, but its tenor can be deduced from Hawkins's reply to it.

First, however, it is necessary to be clear on one point: that both the Queen and her minister consented to the altered destination of the voyage. The Queen's consent has always been fairly obvious, since Hawkins, after his letter to her, could hardly have gone without it. The author of the Cotton MS. places it beyond doubt: 'The Queen's Majesty gave new commandments [that our general] should, seeing the Portugals were gone, make his v[oyage towards] Guinea, and there making slaves negroes with [them] to sail over from that coast to the West or Span[ish Indies], as he had heretofore done in other voyages.'² There has been, on the other hand, a tendency to doubt Cecil's complicity, on the assumption that he disapproved, both from principle and from policy, of giving offence to Spain and Portugal, and that it was necessary for the Queen and the adven-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 44, No. 7. ² Cotton MS., *ut supra*, f. 18 b.

turers to hoodwink him before these undertakings could succeed in getting to sea. The present writer doubts, from the whole tone and content of the surviving documents on the slave trade, the soundness of this view. It would seem rather that Cecil was quite willing to let Englishmen trespass upon the preserves of Spain and Portugal so long as it could be done without causing any serious diplomatic disturbance; but that for higher reasons of state he was anxious to appear in the eyes of Spain as an upholder of the ancient English friendship with that country, and therefore he made the most of every incident which would allow him to charge the adventurers with exceeding their instructions and would give him an excuse to disavow them if the need should arise. It is, however, unfair to charge Cecil with scurvy treatment of the sea pioneers. They played for their country's interest as well as their own, but so did he; and his stake was higher than theirs, nothing less than the security of Elizabeth's throne and the preservation of England from a ghastly war of religion. Hawkins must have understood this, and although he betrayed a momentary indignation, he accepted the position as a loyal man should; and when the crisis of his life came upon him he sacrificed himself to the paramount interest of the state. In the present instance there can be no doubt that Cecil agreed to let Hawkins go slaving again, for the Lord Admiral, in the letter already cited, remarks that now the Portuguese have fled he is glad that order is taken for the squadron to proceed on 'the other voyage' (i. e. Guinea and West Indies) that Cecil writes of, although it may not be so profitable as that first intended.¹

Having got his change of plan sanctioned, Hawkins wrote on 28 September a final justification to the minister of all he had done in the previous difficult weeks. The letter is long, and a summary of its contents will be

¹ *Calendar of Hatfield MSS.*, Pt. i, No. 1139, 30 Sept. 1567.

sufficient. First, he says, you accuse me of negligent keeping of the Portuguese. I answer that I never had charge of them; they were committed to three or four of the merchants' factors. The merchants gave them so much money that they used small temperance, and 'I always disliked from the beginning that they had made their Guinea voyage at home'. Secondly, Her Majesty is offended with me about de Wachen and his fleet. I assure you I was greatly in fear of them, for they were pushing into the Catwater and would have been proud neighbours. If they had offered to anchor at the other side of the haven I would never have annoyed them. Thirdly, in the matter of the Spaniards' galley slaves, I did not know until the next day that they had been released. The thing was done undoubtedly by friends of the condemned men, Flemings, of whom there are so many here. As for the Spaniards and the Flemings, 'I know they hate me, and yet without cause, for they are the better for me by great sums, and I the worse for them by 40,000 ducats, which is not unknown to the ambassador of Spain. I hope one day they will make me recompense of their own courtesy'. I hope, he continues, to sail with the next fair wind, not meaning to trouble the Queen or the Council with any more letters. Then, the accusations still rankling, he concludes:

'That I have always desired the name of an orderly person and have always hated folly, my doings before this have been a witness and now are, the which I refer to the voice of the people, wherein there hath been such care, diligence, husbandry and government used as I dare abide the worst report of mine ill-willers, if there be any.'¹

And so, on Monday, 2 October 1567, the wind at last coming fair, John Hawkins put all such cares behind him and sailed out of Plymouth Sound. With him in the six ships there went 408 persons,² of whom the most

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 44, No. 13.

² Cotton MS., *ut supra*, f. 18 b.

part looked their last that day upon the shores of England. Some were to die by poisoned arrows, some by tropical fevers, many in fight with Spaniards, many more by hunger and thirst and hardship, some even by the flames in Seville market-place; and of all the four hundred scarcely the fifth man was ever to come home to his native land again.

VII

THE THIRD SLAVING VOYAGE

§ 1. *The Guinea Coast and the Anglo-Portuguese Negotiations.*

THE third slaving expedition commanded by John Hawkins has been more variously chronicled than have either of its predecessors. There are available in England five accounts of the whole or the greater part of the voyage, whilst in the Archives of the Indies at Seville there exist depositions by Englishmen who were taken prisoners at or after the battle of San Juan de Ulua. These Spanish documents do not, however, so far as their contents are published, appear to modify the story related in the English sources, or to add important facts to it, although they should be very valuable in elucidating the adventures and fate of individual prisoners. A narrative based on them was published by Señor C. Sanz Arizmendi in *Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Americanistas*, Seville, 1913-14, p. 55. Of the English accounts the first is a chronological summary of the voyage, brief and inexact, in *Domestic State Papers*, vol. 49, no. 40 (i). It is of little value and has never been printed. In addition John Hawkins himself wrote what may be considered as the official narrative of the expedition. It was published in London in 1569 as *A True Declaration of the troublesome Voyage of Mr. John Hawkins to the Parts of Guinea and the West Indies in the years of our Lord 1567 and 1568*. Hakluyt reprinted it in his *Principal Navigations* under a slightly altered title. Like other narratives emanating from Hawkins, it is extremely reticent. Whilst refraining from direct mis-statements, it omits all mention of a number of important circumstances, and up to the time of the arrival at San Juan de Ulua it is a very meagre story indeed. It must be read chiefly as a piece of

propaganda, written with an eye to English relations with Spain and Portugal in the year of its publication.

Two humble members of the expedition, Miles Philips and Job Hortop, were among those who fell into the hands of the Spaniards after the disaster at San Juan. Both suffered many years' captivity, and both, after regaining their liberty, wrote narratives of their experiences. The *Discourse* of Philips, composed after 1583, is printed by Hakluyt. It may have been separately published, but no copy seems now to exist. For the voyage and battle of San Juan it is little more than a copy of Hawkins's own account, and for the captivity only is it a primary authority. *The Rare Travels of Job Hortop*, published in London in 1591, are also reprinted by Hakluyt. Hortop, a gunner of the *Jesus*, wrote from an excellent memory which preserved some vivid impressions of the voyage. The standpoint, however, is that of the lower deck, and the things recorded are often non-essentials. The chronology also is sometimes at fault. With all this, the story is the most informative of the three printed by Hakluyt.

Much more valuable than any of the above is the hitherto unused account of the voyage contained in Cotton MSS., Otho, E. viii, ff. 17-41 b. The MS., like so many others in this collection, suffered badly by the fire at the Cottonian Library in 1731. The upper lines of every page are burnt off, and about half the remainder are mutilated by the destruction of the edges of the paper. Even so, it contains a mass of important facts not included in the published accounts. It describes the transactions at Plymouth antecedent to the voyage, and the voyage itself to the arrival at San Juan de Ulua. There, three days before the battle, it breaks off abruptly in the middle of a page. Up to this point it tells the story in about 22,000 words, reckoning only the parts of the pages now remaining. Hawkins's narrative covers the same ground in 1,300 words; Philips's in the like

number; and Hortop's in 2,500. From this it may be seen how much fuller is the new authority than any of the others hitherto used by historians. Various considerations indicate that the MS. was written in the cabin of the *Jesus* in the course of the voyage, and that its author was perhaps George Fitzwilliam, or more probably Valentine Verde (Green?). Both these men were among the prisoners, and some phrases in the depositions of Verde are similar to phrases occurring in the Cotton MS. The frank accounts given in that document about various transactions are a sufficient reason for its non-publication in 1569.¹

Finally, for portions of the voyage there are additional authorities; for the proceedings in Guinea, the Portuguese books of complaint already cited in previous chapters; and for the events at San Juan de Ulua, the following pieces of evidence: (i) The allegations and evidence put in at an inquiry held in the High Court of Admiralty in March and April 1569. The original documents are H. C. A. 3/40 (File of Libels, Allegations, &c.) and H. C. A. Examinations, No. 16, *passim*. The whole of these papers were fair-copied in a MS. volume, now S. P. Domestic, Eliz., vol. 53, inscribed on the cover, 'Sir John Haukins Voyage 1568'. (ii) The account in Herrera's *Historia General del Rey Felipe II*, Pt. I, Bk. 15, Ch. 18, which, although inaccurate in detail, does not deny the main contentions of the story told from the English side. (iii) A Spanish official report, written early in 1569, and also agreeing in outline with the English evidence. This document is translated and printed, with one paragraph omitted, in Sir J. S. Corbett's *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, vol. i, pp. 417-20.²

¹ The MS. is printed as an Appendix to this volume. For a translation of Arizmendi's article, and for other valuable information and advice, the author's sincere thanks are due to Mr. G. R. G. Conway, of Mexico City.

² *The Fugger News Letters, 1568-1605*, 1st. ser., London, 1924, pp. 8-9, contains an account of the fight at San Juan de Ulua in a letter dated from Seville, 1 Jan. 1569. The account, whilst containing no-

John Hawkins sailed from Plymouth on 2 October 1567 with the *Jesus of Lubeck* and five other ships. On the third day out he issued his general orders for the first part of the voyage. If the ships should part company in foul weather, all were to assemble at Santa Cruz in Teneriffe, where he purposed in any event to call for water and perhaps also for conference with Pedro and Nicolas de Ponte.

No sooner had this precaution been taken than its wisdom was justified, for on the morrow, forty leagues north of Finisterre, a great gale came on and blew for four days. The *Angel* kept company with the *Jesus*, but the *Minion*, the *William and John*, and the *Swallow* were separated in a group together, while the *Judith* lost sight of all the rest. The *Minion* and the *Swallow* lost the great boats they were towing, each with two sailors in her; the *Jesus* also lost her boat, but 'by the general's industry' saved the men, which appears to indicate a feat of seamanship on the part of Hawkins. The *Jesus* had a narrow escape. Her excessive top weights, the high poop and forecastle and perhaps the guns in them, caused her to strain in the heavy seas and to leak in several places. In her stern she opened a seam so wide that fifteen pieces of baize had to be thrust in to stop it. Hawkins, when in after days he became the administrator of the Navy, was an advocate of low-built ships with the heavy metal carried near the waterline, and it may well be believed that his experience with the *Jesus* helped to form his opinion. He had commanded her in the voyage of 1564, and had brought her home in a fairly ruinous condition, if one may judge from the length of the repairs' bill. On this second occasion she nearly drowned him and all his men. As fast as one

thing previously unknown, exaggerates and distorts a good many of the established incidents. In this it is typical of many of these news-letters, whose value as evidence of fact is comparable to that of the war rumours so freely circulated a few years ago.

leak was stopped another broke out, and it was doubtful whether the ship or the storm would last the longer. In these straits Hawkins took a course in which the men of his age believed. He summoned all hands, told them they were but dead men, for the ship was sinking under them, and desired them to pray for God's mercy. Some, not knowing the *Jesus* as he knew her, were unprepared for this announcement, which made a deep impression upon all.

'His countenance never revealed his sorrow, but his words pierced the hearts of all his hearers, and it seemed unto them that death had summoned them when they heard him recite the aforesaid words; for they knew such words could not issue out from so invincible a mind without great cause. There was not one that could refrain his eyes from tears, the which when our general saw, he began to enter in prayer and besought them to pray with him, the while indeed he yet letted not with great travail to search the ship fore and aft for her leaks.'¹

The English of to-day are not the English of Shakespeare. The tears and most of the prayers have gone from their tradition, eliminated in turn by Puritanism and the reaction from it.

At midnight on 10 October the storm began to moderate, and in the morning the breeze was blowing fair out of the north. Hawkins assembled his crew, offered thanks to God, and told them that he would not now return to England, as he had previously determined, but would proceed on the voyage. So, with the *Angel* in company, he sailed on for the Canaries, picking up the *Judith* on the way.

On the 23rd the *Jesus* and her two little consorts arrived at Santa Cruz in Teneriffe, exchanging salutes, as they ran into the roadstead, with some Spanish ships bound for the West Indies. Hawkins sent in a letter to the governor to explain that he had come to collect his fleet and purchase necessities. He received a civil answer

¹ The Cotton account.

and an invitation to come ashore, which last he warily declined, alleging a command from the Queen to the contrary. Certain notables of the island, however, came on board the flagship to be feasted, and all seemed outwardly cordial.

Whilst they were lying at Santa Cruz a quarrel fell out between Edward Dudley, a land captain, and George Fitzwilliam, an officer who had been long in Hawkins's service, and they agreed to go ashore to fight. Dudley had already gone when Hawkins heard of the matter and sent for him. He tried to persuade him to forget the quarrel or to postpone it to some better occasion, rather than to pursue it 'in the midst of our enemies the Spaniards'. But Dudley was obstinate, and his manner provoked Hawkins to strike him. Dudley thereupon drew his rapier upon his commander, and the latter drew his in defence. Both were hurt, Dudley in the arm, and Hawkins above the right eye, before the bystanders separated them. So great was the indignation against Dudley that he would have been slain out of hand, but that Hawkins straitly commanded that no man should do him any harm. Hawkins then withdrew to have his eye looked to, and afterwards had the company mustered and Dudley brought before him in irons.

The delinquent fell on his knees and with tears confessed his utter shame at his offence, acknowledging himself worthy of death but beseeching the general to be good to him. Hawkins replied that he could pardon the personal injury with all his heart, 'but considering the place where they were, and the ships the Queen's, and so many men that Her Grace had given him charge of, that by his disobedience all might be put in danger, he must needs be punished therefor'; and then, after the fashion of the time, he went on to quote at length an historical instance of a mutiny and the penalty of death inflicted on the guilty. Dudley admitted that he knew this to be true and placed himself at the general's

mercy. Thereupon Hawkins commanded an arquebus to be loaded with two bullets, and Dudley to prepare himself to die. The piece was brought and primed, and the general took it in his own hands. Many of the company were now overcome with pity and weeping loudly. They threw themselves upon their knees and entreated mercy; but Hawkins spoke only to the condemned man, asking if he had said his prayers and were ready. He answered that he had done with the world and was prepared for his punishment. The bystanders renewed their lamentations, and then, when all were expecting the fatal shot, Hawkins laid aside the piece and ordered the prisoner's irons to be struck off. Yet more tears and protestations followed, and the episode ended in tender embraces between the two men and an assurance of oblivion for all that had passed.

A strange scene, showing how far for better or worse we have travelled since those days. As a pendant to it we may take this picture of the daily routine as described by a seaman of the *Jesus*:

‘During the *voyage* out of the said fleet, when night fell and the new watch began to come on deck and the hourglass was turned, everybody on board the ship would assemble round the mainmast, kneeling and bareheaded, and the quartermaster would begin praying, and every one would recite the Psalms of David, Our Father, and the Creed, in the English tongue.’

Another witness added that the quartermaster compelled attendance with a rope's end.¹

This Edward Dudley died a few weeks later in the voyage, on the passage from Guinea to the West Indies; and it is worth noting that not one of the three survivors who afterwards published their stories of the expedition—Hawkins himself, Miles Philips, and Job Hortop—makes the slightest reference to the affair at Teneriffe. Only the Cotton author has described the scene, and he did not write for public information.

¹ *Proceso* of Morgan Jillert, *ut supra*.

The governor of Teneriffe had been civil only that he might cover his real intention, which was the overthrow of the expedition. The English squadron was lying within gunshot of the castle of Santa Cruz, but masked by a number of Spanish ships that rode between it and the shore. On the evening of the fourth day, 'at the shutting of night', these Spaniards quietly shifted their position so as to allow free play to the castle's guns; and this was done, as the English believed, by the governor's orders, so that in the morning he might open fire and sink them before they could make sail and escape. Hawkins was not the man to be lulled into unsuspicion by banquets and fair speeches. He had never doubted that the governor was his enemy; and he grasped at once the meaning of the movement. We may suppose, indeed, that he had chosen his anchorage in the first place so as to have a screen between himself and the batteries. Again he acted without a moment's hesitation, and at daybreak his ships were two leagues distant from Santa Cruz, anchored once more, to all appearance blandly unsuspecting, and sending boats ashore for water. The disconcerted governor could only send a message protesting fair intentions and expressing surprise at the removal. Hawkins answered in the same civil tone, but he judged nevertheless that it was time to go, and made sail for Gomera on 28 October. Punctilious to the last, he exchanged salutes of half a dozen pieces as he passed the town for the last time; he must have been sorely tempted to load with ball. At Gomera he found the *Minion* and her two consorts, completed his watering, and thence sailed with the whole fleet for Africa on 4 November.

On the African coast the first point was Cape Blanco, and there they found some Portuguese caravels which frequented the place in pursuit of a long-established fishing industry. Only one of these craft had any men on board, and her master explained that the crews had

deserted the others and gone on shore after being plundered by a squadron of Frenchmen who had passed down the coast three weeks earlier. Hawkins determined to take the best caravel with him, having lost his own pinnace in the great storm. He told the Portuguese master that the ships, having been found abandoned at sea, were legally his, and that he meant to burn the others unless their owners appeared to claim them. The Portuguese went to the land to seek his fellow-countrymen, and returned with two of them. Hawkins repeated his claim to the ships and then restored them in consideration of a bill for 40 ducats payable in London some time after date. His insistence upon his legal right and his resignation of it for a nominal ransom are in keeping with what we have already observed of his character and policy. Throughout these adventures he was a stickler for the letter of the law, much as he might wrest its spirit to his purposes when occasion demanded; for the letter of the law was the dividing line between ocean trade and piracy. But withal he was generous to these poor fishermen as he had been to the Frenchmen in Florida.

The expedition had spent fifteen days at Cape Blanco, and now sailed southwards with the caravel in company. About 26 November¹ it reached Cape Verde, the first point in the negro country, where slaving might begin in earnest. Between Cape Verde and Sierra Leone it had to take its blacks, for slave raiding was not then practised on the more distant Gold Coast.

The Cape Verde negroes made more valuable slaves than any others, and Hawkins lost no time in trying for a full cargo. He anchored near the cape in the evening, and before dawn he was on shore with two hundred men, hoping to catch a village asleep. The negroes, however, were on the alert, rushed out of their huts, and fought

¹ The date given by the Cotton account. Hawkins and Philips say 18 Nov.; but the Cotton account must be correct, for the expedition had reached Cape Blanco on 10 Nov. and had stayed there a fortnight.

manfully as the English advanced upon them. The result of the action was that nine blacks were taken, and that Hawkins, Dudley, and twenty men were wounded with arrows. At first these wounds, trifling scratches with feeble little weapons, provoked more mirth than consternation among their recipients; but after a few days it became evident that the arrows had been poisoned, and eight of the men succumbed to a kind of lock-jaw. Hawkins and Dudley both escaped, probably because they had had the sense to wash their hurts as soon as the fight was over.¹

The alarm once given, it was of no use to linger, and the squadron pursued its course to the southward. In doing so it overtook six sail of Frenchmen who were trading with the negroes. The French hoisted sail, but were stopped and made to give an account of themselves, after which Hawkins bought some goods from them. They were the same party as had plundered the fishermen at Cape Blanco, and one French captain named Bland was now sailing in a good Portuguese caravel. By some application of the law of the sea, Hawkins decided that he had a right to impress Bland and his prize into the expedition. Accordingly the caravel joined the English squadron under the name of the *Gratia Dei*.² Drake was at first placed in command of her, but Bland was afterwards reinstated and did gallant service at San Juan de Ulua. As the English went on their way, another of the French traders voluntarily joined them,³ raising the total strength to nine sail—the original six English ships, the caravel brought by Hawkins from Cape Blanco, Bland's caravel, and the last joined Frenchman. The presence of the latter in the fleet has been

¹ All the accounts mention this affair, the Cotton MS. in greatest detail.

² Most of this is from the Cotton account, but some details from the others. The name of the ship is given by the H. C. A. documents. Hortop places this incident before the arrival at Cape Verde.

³ Cotton account, f. 23 b.

hitherto unknown. He remained in company across the Atlantic and all along the Spanish Main.

From this point the fleet went without further halt to Cape Roxo, not pausing to look into the Gambia by the way. Whilst waiting for a wind some leagues north of the cape, Hawkins sent in his boats, whose crews found some negroes and sought to beguile them with margaritas and other trifles; but just as the sailors were about to seize them 'they doubted and fled'. For what followed next the Cotton MS. is a dubious authority, being mutilated at the critical places, and we have to turn to the Portuguese complaint in the Record Office. According to this document, Hawkins lay with his large ships at Cape Roxo, and on 29 November sent three small craft into the River San Domingo. There the invaders took six sail of Portuguese laden with a variety of wares, including slaves, to a total of 27,000 ducats; and at about the same time they landed and burned a certain town called Cacheus, where they killed many Portuguese and plundered to the extent of 30,000 ducats.¹ The modern map shows a place called Cacheo on a river of the same name, lying somewhat farther to the southward than the San Domingo evidently did. The Cotton MS. gives an elaborate account of these transactions,² but seems to locate the first of them in the Rio Grande, another distinct estuary; and there is a difficulty in clearing up the confusion between these rivers and establishing an exact order of events. Hawkins's abstract log merely states that on 24 November they reached 'Cape Roxo alias St. Domingos', the next entry being 14 December, 'we saw the Idolos' (Los Islands). The Portuguese



¹ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 99, ff. 7-8 b. See also *Foreign Calendar*, 1566-8, No. 2702.

² The Cotton account, ff. 24, 24 b. Hortop's version, much the best for these events of the three hitherto known, describes the fight with the caravels and the burning of Cacheo. He places both transactions in the Rio Grande, but says they took place after the expedition had been to Sierra Leone.

The WEST AFRICAN COAST

from Cape Verde to Benin

Miles



complaint once more charges Hawkins with sheer piracy and adduces detailed evidence to that effect. The Cotton account puts a different complexion on his methods, although it must be confessed that it leaves their result much the same. But since he had last been on the coast the Winters' ship had been ruthlessly sunk, and another English crew had been captured and were still prisoners at Elmina. Both, according to the English view, had been trading in waters free to all the world. Their wrongs justified retaliation, and yet Hawkins with his 'orderly' disposition was forbearing enough to clothe his high-handed actions in some shreds of legality. According to the Cotton author, he sent Robert Barrett, the master of the *Jesus*, into the Rio Grande to seek trade with the Portuguese. They refused to listen to Barrett's overtures, and the caravels opened fire upon his flotilla. Upon this he made a dash at them and took them by boarding one after the other, the crews escaping to the shore; but even after this he offered to restore everything if they would come back and trade. It would seem, however, that they did not stop to listen, or that he did not explain himself so lucidly as does the narrator of the story.

The Cotton version of the attack upon Cacheo¹ makes that event take place on a different occasion and evidently in a different river. Robert Barrett was again in command, this time with 240 men. He went in to open trade with the Portuguese, but got nothing from them but 'opprobrious words'. He then landed his people in order to capture the town, which lay a mile from the waterside. The Portuguese had meanwhile collected a great force of negroes, six thousand at least, and had placed some of them in ambush between the town and the landing-place. The English entered the town and set fire to some of the huts, but were driven back by force of numbers, surprised by the ambush, set upon

¹ Ff. 24 b-25.

with clubs, hatchets, and poisoned arrows, and very roughly handled. Barrett retired with the loss of four men killed and many wounded, and had no slaves to show for it all. Hawkins reprimanded him for his ill handling of the affair and risking so many men, and told him his business was to seize the Portuguese ships higher up the river, and not to attack the enemy ashore. Some caravels were therefore seized and taken out beyond the bar, in the hope that the Portuguese would offer slaves in ransom. But no such result ensued, and the whole expedition passed on in very ill humour; what they did with the caravels is not stated. The Cacheo affair was evidently subsequent to that of the River San Domingo, for Hawkins and the large ships had left Cape Roxo and were lying not far from the scene of action. Most of these rivers lacked sufficient water for the *Jesus* and the *Minion*, and the small craft had to go in for the work at close quarters.

From the Cacheo river the fleet made for a group of islands close to the mainland, presumably the Bissagos. A renegade negro here gave some promising information about a chief and his tribe, but nothing seems to have come of it; at least the Cotton narrative continues after a short break without recording any large capture. From these islands Hawkins dispersed his smaller ships along the coast, some to one river, some to another, he himself with the *Jesus* working forward to Sierra Leone, where there was better riding for her draught. According to Hortop, the *Angel* with two pinnaces went into the River Calousa, where they took a caravel with some negroes but missed another.¹ In this river one of the pinnaces was sunk by a hippopotamus and two men lost, supposed to have been devoured by the monster. Other rivers visited were the Caceroes and the Maderabomba,

¹ Hortop, as has been shown, muddles the order of events. But he is useful as filling the *lacunae* in the Cotton MS., and he tells a good deal more than does Hawkins's official narrative.

both near Sierra Leone. No striking success is recorded in any of them, although there must have been a steady trickle of slaves, for Hawkins in his own story relates that he had collected a hundred and fifty when the whole fleet reunited at Sierra Leone. The Portuguese complaint mentions the capture of three other ships with negroes valued at 14,000 ducats, in addition to the six taken in the San Domingo. It states further that Hawkins used threats and actual torture to compel the masters of these ships to sign statements that they had voluntarily sold him the negroes. Knowing his respect for the law, we may believe that he was thus careful to have all in order, and that he made some sort of payment for his spoil.

Sierra Leone was the last haven short of Cape Palmas to which it was convenient to take the large ships, for the river mouths of the modern Liberia were all too shallow. At Sierra Leone, then, slaving ceased, and Hawkins, with his poor 150 negroes, had to consider whether it would be worth his while to cross over to the Caribbean. He was, by his own account, deliberating whether to do so or to push on to the Gold Coast, where he had never yet been, when a piece of good fortune thrust itself in his way. Messengers arrived from the two negro kings of Castros and Sierra Leone, asking for aid in their wars against two other kings. The operation in progress was the siege of a strong town named Conga on the River Tagarin, and the English were desired to go up the river and batter the place from the waterside, whilst their native allies were to attack from the land. Hawkins consented on condition that he should have all the prisoners, and sent up ninety men under Robert Barrett. They found the place strongly walled with logs interlaced with withes, defended by six thousand fighting men, and containing as well a great number of other men, women, and children. Here, evidently, was the chance to make the voyage at a stroke.

For two days Barrett did his best, but the besieged fought with spirit, and he had twenty men wounded. Then Hawkins went up in person with reinforcements, arranged for a grand combined assault at the sound of his trumpet, and pledged himself and his allies 'that they should go to it with stomach on both sides'. So, with effort and carnage, the place was stormed, the English charging over ditches and pitfalls, through loopholed defences breached by their guns, amid clouds of spears and arrows, forcing their way in at last and firing the town with blazing torches fixed to their pikes. The flames caused a panic amidst which the native allies broke in from the other side and completed the rout. Nine Englishmen had been killed or mortally wounded, almost every other had a hurt to show, and Hawkins himself had been in the forefront, displaying a courage worthy of a better cause. For after the victory he had to witness disgusting scenes of cannibalism and to look on while thousands of the vanquished were herded into the river and drowned. He had himself taken 160 prisoners, and on the next day his allies sent him some more, making up his total to 470; but he complained that he had been defrauded of the full fruits of the undertaking.¹

It is a commonplace with philanthropists to attribute the degradation of the West Coast negro to the intensive slaving of the eighteenth century. That, they say, made him what he was when decent government at length took him in hand. A perusal of details recorded by the Cotton author should give pause to the holders of this theory; for they show the unspoiled negro of Tudor days wallowing in every horror known to savage man. It is no wonder that the Elizabethans saw in slaving nothing but a hunting of wild beasts.

¹ The Cotton account, ff. 27-8 b, gives the fullest story, but Hawkins and Hortop add a detail or two. The date is uncertain, Hawkins's log making the capture of the town fall on 9 Jan. 1568; his published account says the siege began on 15 Jan; whilst the Cotton MS. says 27 Jan.

Discounting all losses and misfortunes, Hawkins had now a lading great enough to warrant the passage to the West Indies, for it must be remembered that slaves were not his only wares. He therefore made ready to leave the coast, where any further delay was inexpedient. His crews were growing sickly, and several men had already died; and if the voyage were unduly prolonged there was the danger of running into the hurricane season in the Caribbean. Had he known it, a Portuguese armed squadron was starting from Lisbon to bring him to account.¹ It numbered tenships and sailed in February, but must have been at least a month too late at Sierra Leone. Had it been in time, it would probably have encountered rough treatment from the *Jesus* and the *Minion* under a commander like John Hawkins. He was, however, destined to fight against a different adversary, and at the beginning of February 1568 he set sail for the west.

Before leaving the African shore of the Atlantic, whither we have now followed Hawkins for the last time, it is desirable to glance at another English adventure and at the progress of the diplomatic dispute with Portugal to which these transactions had given rise.

In the autumn of 1566, when the Judge of the Admiralty was inhibiting Hawkins from resort to the Spanish Indies, a similar process had been launched against George Fenner at Portsmouth. The vigilance of de Silva had detected him in the equipment of three ships at that place, and had denounced him to the Privy Council as a prospective trespasser in the west. The Council therefore instructed Dr. Lewes to take the same order with him as with Hawkins, and Fenner was obliged to give a bond of £500 not to resort to the King of Spain's forbidden colonies.²

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1566-8, No. 2182.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 40, Nos. 84, 95; *Spanish Calendar*, 1558-67, Nos. 386, 388.

Fenner was probably not much troubled by the prohibition, for he seems not to have intended anything but a gold-trading voyage to the Guinea coast. He moved his ships from Portsmouth to Plymouth, and sailed from that port on 10 December 1566, with the *Castle of Comfort*, the *Mayflower*, the *George*, and a pinnacle.

The *Castle of Comfort* was a ship of a new type, a private warship of larger size and heavier metal than the fifty-ton privateers which had hitherto carried on the work of commerce destruction and armed trade in disputed waters. Such small fry were already useless on the Guinea coast owing to Portuguese armaments, and, as we have seen, the adventurers had long been hiring heavier warships from the Navy. Privateering was now producing its result in the partial armament of almost every merchantman afloat, and the successful continuance of the attack was likewise demanding a larger type of privateer. Hence the appearance of the *Castle of Comfort*, which, though frequently mentioned in the maritime papers of the time, is never once found engaged in peaceful trade. There is no record of her burden, but it may be assumed to have been at least 150 tons, for her proper complement for a Guinea voyage was stated to be seventy men.¹ She was 'a tall and very good ship', heavily enough armed to be able to take care of herself in any bad company she might encounter on the seas, capturing other privateers upon occasion, and despoiling them of their prizes. It is a pity that no picture or full description of her can be found, for she must have represented the practical fighting man's ideal of a middle-sized warship, as compared with that of the official designers of the Queen's dockyards; and her unvaried success in action and in keeping the sea must have made her an influence in the fashioning of the up-to-date battleships of 1588. We shall meet with her again in the

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 18, 1 Apr. 1571.

wild days of the Sea Beggars and the Huguenot navy of the early fifteen-seventies.

Admiralty documents make it almost certain that the owners of the *Castle of Comfort* at the date of Fenner's voyage were a group of merchants named John Acheley, William Chelsham and Matthew Field.¹ Acheley was an alderman of London, and Field was also a Londoner engaged in the Barbary trade. George Fenner was a Chichester man, and his brother Edward accompanied him as captain of the *Mayflower*. The third vessel, the *George*, was a small craft of little fighting power, which by her name may have belonged to Fenner himself.

A fortnight or more after leaving Plymouth, the squadron reached the Canaries,² where it fell in with Edward Cooke of Southampton in command of an armed ship. He appears to have been cruising for prizes between the Azores and the Canaries, for there is no record of his going on to Guinea, and it is improbable that he was trading; his antecedents were those of a privateer or pirate. On 10 January 1567, Fenner quitted the Canaries and in due course reached Cape Verde. He and a large party went on shore to trade with the negroes, with whom they exchanged hostages in pledge of honest conduct. The negroes, however, tricked them, getting back their own hostages and keeping the Englishmen, the reason being that a short time before an English ship—perhaps Lovell's—had kidnapped some of their friends; and after a fight and loss by poisoned arrows, Fenner had to leave the locality. Next he sailed to the Cape Verde Islands, and spent a month in their neighbourhood. At Boa Vista the Portuguese were friendly but poor. At Santiago they attempted a treacherous attack after promising to trade, and at Fuego there was also no traffic to be had.

This was the end of the voyage as a trading effort, and

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 17, 6, 18 Mar., 13, 15 Apr. 1570.

² The voyage is narrated in Hakluyt, vi. 266-84.

it appears to have been a complete failure, so complete that it leaves us wondering if its narrator has told the whole truth. Why did not Fenner, with a well-armed ship under his feet, push on to the Gold Coast? No doubt he knew the Portuguese were too strong for him; but nothing is said in the narrative, which proceeds as though a mere visit of inspection to the Cape Verde group had been the sole object of the voyage. That accomplished, the squadron sailed for the Azores, and hung about the various islands from 23 March to 11 May. There cannot be much doubt that Fenner was now looking for a prize, but he did not find one. Instead he encountered a Portuguese armada consisting of a 400-ton ship and six large caravels. All were well gunned and reinforced with men from the islands. With these enemies Fenner carried on a straggling fight for three days. They sought repeatedly to board him, but the guns of the *Castle of Comfort* were too heavy for them, and her broadsides swept away every attack. At length, having inflicted many casualties, 'they forsook us with shame, as they came to us at first with pride'. In spite of the victory against odds, the English found the Azores station untenable, and made for home. They reached Southampton early in June 1567. The depressing story of this voyage indicates the decline of the once promising Guinea trade. Portugal had learned her lesson, and it was no doubt the armada stationed on the Gold Coast which had precluded any thought of traffic there. With even the Azores growing too hot for them, the English adventurers must have begun to ask themselves what enterprises were still open. They had but to wait a year or two for more than one answer to the question.

The last Portuguese ambassador had been sent brusquely away in 1564. The events of the subsequent years had provided ample material for fresh negotiations, and they accordingly recommenced in 1567. This time it

was not the Portuguese alone who had complaints to make; the English had begun to suffer damage also, and it was they who reopened the matter.

On 6 May 1567, Elizabeth addressed a formal letter to King Sebastian, demanding redress for three specific outrages: the destruction of the Winters' ship *Mary Fortune* at the River Sestos in 1565; the capture of a ship (probably the *John Baptist*) belonging to Sir William Garrard and Sir William Chester in February 1565, the vessel having been taken on the Gold Coast and her crew imprisoned at Elmina; and the capture of an English ship and crew whilst watering at the Azores in October 1566.¹ From another reference it appears that this ship also belonged to Garrard and Chester;² she may have been returning from one of the numerous Guinea voyages which have passed unrecorded by Hakluyt or the state papers.

The Queen's letter was intended to prepare the ground for an English ambassador, Dr. Thomas Wilson, who was to go to Lisbon to negotiate restitution. In June Sir William Cecil drafted Wilson's instructions, and in October he had arrived at the Portuguese court. In the event of his suit being met with argument, he was furnished with a general outline of what he was to say in reply. 'If the Pope's authority and gift be alleged, to answer that the same is unknown to us. If they allege prescription, possession must go before: the King of Portugal hath neither conquered Aethiopia nor keepeth possession, nor yet useth authority there or receiveth any tribute'. This was now the determined English doctrine, concisely stated in Cecil's pithy style. Wilson carried out his instructions, making before the King of Portugal a speech in Latin in which, amongst other gems of translation, he described the Winters' ship as unjustly 'depressa' by a Portuguese armada.³ But the

¹ Cotton MSS., Nero, B. i, f. 120.

² *Ibid.*, ff. 135-6.

³ *Ibid.*, ff. 125-6, 131-2.

Portuguese had at length been stung into a mood of aggression. The news of Hawkins's third sailing had caused the equipment of a fleet to intercept him, and English ships were now being arrested in Portugal itself. Wilson received the inevitable reply, and came empty away before the close of 1567.

This was no more than Cecil could have expected, and the embassy had been merely a manœuvre for position in anticipation of further developments. By the diplomatic practice of the time, justice refused might be countered by reprisals, but first it was necessary to demand justice and to elicit refusal in clear terms. That was what Wilson had done. Cecil, like Hawkins, was all for legality, and he would take no short cuts that might place him in the wrong. The Portuguese were equally wary, and no doubt foresaw that the next step would be the issue of letters of reprisal to the aggrieved parties. Hard upon the heels of the departing Wilson there came, therefore, a letter from King Sebastian to the Queen. It was dated December 1567, and introduced to Elizabeth an ambassador named Emanuel Alvarez, sent to expostulate upon the English intrusions in Africa.¹

In April 1568 Alvarez duly appeared in London, where he lodged in de Silva's house until he could find one for himself. De Silva reported to Philip one piece of news that is worth consideration, since it came from personal conference with the envoy. It was that although the Portuguese Government was firm for the stoppage of trespass in Guinea, it was nevertheless prepared to sell negroes to the English at certain specified places.² This might have opened up an interesting development had it been pursued, but no further reference to the proposal can be found. It is hard to believe that the specified places were in Africa; most likely they were in Portugal or the Azores. But even so, the ulti-

¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 116-17.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 13-15.

mate destination of the slaves could only have been the Spanish Indies, and Portugal would have been in effect allying herself with England to force an English slave-trade in the Caribbean. The ultimate results could have been no less than those which flowed from Cromwell's treaty with Portugal in 1654, that is, an English defence of Portugal against Spanish coercion, and her economic subjection to England. The thing sounds almost incredible, yet the authority for it is good.

When Alvarez came to lay his proposals before the Queen, he said nothing about the slaving concession. He brought with him the books of detailed complaint which have been so frequently cited in previous chapters, and he demanded that John Hawkins in particular should be tried and punished. He refused compensation for the *Mary Fortune*, but promised that her crew should be set at liberty. And on behalf of his countrymen he demanded fabulous sums of ducats for the damages wrought by the English. The Queen's reply (23 May 1568) repeated the former decisions about the claim to trade in Guinea, pressed hard for compensation to the Winters, and refused compensation to the Portuguese. As for John Hawkins, it added, no law, divine or human, would permit her to try or punish him in his absence.¹ This closed for the time the mission of Alvarez, but in December he was back again in London, with the old request for prohibition.² On 2 January 1569, Elizabeth once more answered that she saw no reason for prohibiting her subjects' navigations, or for altering the reply given years ago to Pereira d'Amtas.³ The ambassador complained unofficially that Cecil was his chief opponent and had always been adverse to the Portuguese. Nevertheless it would seem that the English were a little more courteous than in the past, a circumstance which caused

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1566-8, No. 2224; the negotiations can be followed in detail in Cotton MSS., Nero, B. i, ff. 137-43.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1566-8, No. 2703. ³ *Ibid.*, 1569-71, No. 7.

a cynical Frenchman to remark that the ambassador came to complain of the loss of two millions of gold and received in reply a protestation of perpetual amity.¹

In fact the whole international situation was changing as the year 1569 set in, and Cecil was beginning to foresee that it might be worth while to cultivate better relations with Portugal. That is a subject which will demand attention at a later stage. Meanwhile, the high-water mark of extremities was attained when the Winters were granted letters of reprisal at the close of 1568, a consummation towards which the past diplomatic moves had been elaborately designed. In December they seized three Portuguese ships in home waters,² and in March they made another capture at Falmouth. This last was an Antwerp ship with a Portuguese cargo, and the arrest aroused some odium among the captors' fellow-countrymen, since it turned out that the goods had been insured in London.³ Unofficial warfare had its inconveniences for both sides.

¹ La Popelinière, *Hist. de France*, i. 82.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 68.

³ H. C. A., Libels, 3/42, No. 106; 3/41, No. 122: Examinations, No. 17, 6 Apr. 1570, case of the *Flying Hart*.

VIII

THE THIRD SLAVING VOYAGE (*cont.*)

§ 2. *The Spanish Main and the Gulf of Mexico*

HAWKINS, meanwhile, unconscious of the progress of diplomacy, was making his way across the Atlantic. The voyage to the Caribbean, the middle passage in which the slavers of the eighteenth century commonly lost one-fifth of their cargoes, was on this occasion protracted to fifty-two days. It would be interesting to know what mortality it occasioned among the negroes, but none of the authorities refers to the matter. On 27 March the expedition made its landfall at Dominica, and thence pushed on to Margarita, a large island lying off the coast of Venezuela.

Margarita was worth visiting because it abounded in fresh provisions, although it was occupied at that time by no more than fifty Spaniards. They, on seeing the ships, fled out of their settlement, for they knew the ways of the French corsairs and did not realize that the newcomers were bent upon an honest trade. Hawkins sent in one of his small craft with a letter to the governor. It is translated by the writer of the Cotton MS. and embodied in his narrative. There is no reason to doubt its authenticity, and its terms are significant; for there is ground for believing that Hawkins had often made such overtures to West Indian officials, although not one of prior date has been preserved. It runs as follows:

‘Worshipful,

I have touched in your island only to the intent to refresh my men with fresh victuals, which for my money or wares you shall sell me, meaning to stay only but 5 or 6 days here at the furthest. In the which time you may assure yourself, and so all others, that by me or any of mine there shall no damage be done

to any man; the which also the Queen's Majesty of England, my mistress, at my departure out of England commanded me to have great care of, and to serve with my navy the King's Majesty of Spain, my old master, if in places where I came any of his stood in need.' ¹

'To serve with my navy the King's Majesty of Spain'—is it an empty flourish, or do the words mean what they say? On the answer to that question depends the acceptance of the view that Hawkins had a policy of giving the Spaniards a valuable return for their acquiescence in his trade. Remembering the background, so dim to us but so vivid to them, of a Caribbean pillaged from end to end by the corsairs, can it be asserted that the phrase had no meaning? Hawkins was a diplomatist, who weighed his words like any minister of state. In his other writings we find not a single loose or unguarded sentence; and the form of this letter was a stereotyped one, repeated on other occasions in the course of this voyage. The offer, indeed, was no longer hopeful, for the conditions inspiring it were passing away; even now Pero Menéndez was organizing the fighting galleons of the Indian guard and showing Philip how to defend his colonies himself.² But it would have been a reasonable offer in 1562-3 or even in 1564-5, and it is the loss of records which has deprived us of any but inferential evidence that it was made in those years. The Hawkins voyages are at least a single sequence of events, each of the same general plan as the others, and they had begun in a time of Anglo-Spanish amity, when Elizabeth owed her very throne to Philip's forbearance, and when Philip had held his hand, not from goodwill, but from a fear of seeing England's sea-power in the possession of a united Valois France, ruling Great Britain through its

¹ Cotton account, f. 29.

² Duro, *Armada española*, ii. 468, 'Título de Capitán general de la Armada de 12 galeones, dispuesta en Vizcaya para seguridad de las Indias, á favor de Pero Menéndez de Avilés' 3 Nov. 1567.

deputy the Queen of Scots. The amity was wearing thin now, and was soon to be blown asunder by the guns of San Juan de Ulua; but it was nevertheless the basis of Hawkins's adventure and the explanation of his conduct in the west. That other phrase of 'my old master', which now smacks of sycophantic humbug, was natural enough to the men of 1568, who knew nothing of the time to follow. Not ten years before, Philip had been King of England, and that in something more than name; and John Hawkins, who had been a freeman of Plymouth when the borough had feasted the bridegroom of Queen Mary in 1554, could honourably use the words still. Much woe would have been spared to Spain had its king but recognized the integrity and determination of his former subject.

After some distrust on the Spaniards' part, Hawkins got his letter taken to the governor and received an answer in flowery terms. It is too badly mutilated to be transcribed in full, but it contains references to the worthiness and prestige of Hawkins and to the beauty of his royal mistress, and a promise to serve him in every possible way. He went on shore well accompanied to banquet with the governor, after which he spent nine days in revictualling with sheep and oxen and parted with his host on cordial terms, having paid for his provisions with English wares. Hawkins's published account merely records this visit to Margarita without giving a single detail. Job Hortop says the landing was made 'in despite of the Spaniards', which is probably how the transaction appeared to the common man; to Hortop, after twenty years of slavery, a Spaniard was an enemy, were he civil or uncivil.

The fleet sailed from Margarita on 9 April, and reached Borburata on the 17th. Here the English had done good business on the previous voyage, and they had now a hope of selling a fair number of slaves, for the port was the nucleus of a colony extending far into the in-

terior. As before, Hawkins explained himself in a letter addressed to the governor of the whole province, who was then absent at the new settlement of Santiago de Leon :

‘Worshipful,

This voyage on the which I [am bound was ordered by] the Queen’s Majesty of England, my mistress, another [way and not intended for th]ese parts, and the charges being made in E[ngland, before I was ready to] set sail the pretence was forcibly overturned. [Nevertheless I was] commanded by the Queen’s Majesty my mistress to seek [some other] traffic with the wares which I already had and negroes [which I should] procure in Guinea to lighten the great charges h[azarded] in the setting out of this navy. I know the [King of] Spain your master, unto whom also I have been a servant, [and am] commanded by the Queen my mistress to serve with my navy [as need] requireth, hath forbidden that you shall give lice[nce to any] stranger to traffic. I will not therefore request any su[ch] thing at your hand, but that you will licence me to se[ll 60] negroes only and a parcel of my wares which in all is but little [for] the payment of the soldiers I have in my ships. In this you shall not break the commandment of your prince, but do him good service and avoid divers inconveniences which happen often times through being too precise in observing precepts without consideration. If you may, I most instantly desire you that you will take the pains to come hither that I might confer with you myself; truly it would be lieber to me than 10,000 ducats. If you come you should not find me ingrateful nor count your travail lo[st].’¹

Again we have the offer of armed service, repeated this time to a man of weight. It looks as though Hawkins was determined by mere reiteration to make his proposal penetrate to the King’s cabinet. For the rest, the thinly disguised offer of a bribe to the governor could not produce the immediate grant of a licence, for some time would necessarily elapse before an answer could be received. Nevertheless the Spaniards of Borburata were not actively hostile, and a party landed

¹ Cotton MS. account, f. 30. The *lacunae* are filled by conjecture, aided by comparison with similar letters written on later occasions.

from the ships and pursued various avocations on shore, keeping a good watch against a surprise.

Whilst waiting to hear from the governor, Hawkins sought to make interest in another direction. He had heard that there was a bishop at Valencia in the interior and, heretic though he was, made bold to address a letter to his reverence. The religion of John Hawkins, although afterwards definite enough, was at this time of a rather nebulous description. Some of his sayings have a Puritanical flavour, yet he contrived to make Spaniards, even at a later date than this, believe he was a Catholic. The truth is that most laymen who had lived under Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth concerned themselves little with dogma, and they were generally prepared to conform with the law of the moment; neither did they find this incompatible with the practice of a personal faith if such was the bent of their minds. Protestantism was not yet synonymous with patriotism, and the man of action was prone to treat religious observance as a part of his civic duty. This, in common with much else, was destined to be altered in the coming decade.

The letter to the bishop is as follows:

‘Right reverend father in God,

I arrived [hither] in this port of Borburata 4 days ago, where I have [heard] of your good fame, the which hath stirred me [to] write unto you and to desire you that I may have brought hither to the port 100 oxen to serve my turn while I am in this port, and I will pay for them and for the bringing of them hither as you shall appoint. I have to sell 60 negroes and a parcel of my wares to help lighten the charges of this voyage whereon I now am, and was not thought to have been made to any of these parts, but that things have happened contrary. I beseech you to be a mean to the governor all you may that my request to him may take effect, and anything that I may pleasure you in you shall command it, the which you shall have the better proof of if you would do me so much honour as to visit me in this port.’¹

¹ Cotton account, f. 30 b. The letter probably ended at this point,

The bishop returned a gracious answer, promising to do what he could to obtain the licence, but excusing himself on the plea of age and sickness from coming to Borburata. Hawkins sent him suitable presents and meanwhile awaited a reply from the governor of Venezuela. That officer wrote, presumably from Santiago de Leon, within fourteen days:

‘Right worshipful,

Your arrival here, seeing I cannot show you any pleasure, is unto me a great grief, considering your merits. I am sure you know what strait charge the King of Spain my master hath given that no stranger be licenced to traffic in no part of the India; the which if I should break before my eyes, I saw the governor my predecessor carried away prisoner into Spain for providing licence to the country to traffic with you at your last being here, an example for me that I fall not into the like or worse. I pray you therefore hold me excused, and think that as you would observe the commandment of your mistress the Queen of England, so I must not break one jot of that the King my master commandeth me, with the which the proverb agreeth well that saith, “Do thy master’s will and commandment and thou shalt sit with him at his table” . . . ’ (remainder of letter, if any, missing).¹

Hawkins was not deterred by the refusal. He knew that if the governor was afraid to do business his subjects were eager. Already, in anticipation of a licence, some Spanish traders were hovering about the port, trying to nerve themselves to buy the forbidden wares. At length, as the authorities continued obdurate, these Spaniards went back to Valencia, having privately given Hawkins to understand that if he would send an armed party thither he might seize them and compel them to pay for negroes; otherwise, they said, they dared not buy for fear of forfeiture. Hawkins accordingly sent sixty men under Robert Barrett to Valencia. Bad weather delayed the march and gave time to the justices to make which is at the bottom of a page, although the line is not written to the end. The top of the next page, as of all the others, is missing.

¹ Cotton account, f. 31.

up their minds to be loyal to authority. Barrett arrived to find neither men nor treasure in the town, every soul but a sick priest having left. The bishop, in spite of his good will, had gone with the rest, although he had left a stock of provisions in his house for the refreshment of the invaders. Thus, having done no good, Barrett returned to the ships. Job Hortop briefly mentions this expedition, miscalling the place Placencia, but he seems to have known nothing of the underlying intrigue. To his happy-go-lucky mind the chief point of interest of



the trip was that they saw 'a monstrous venomous worm with two heads, his body as big as a man's arm, and a yard long', which Barrett dispatched with his sword.

Even after this failure, Hawkins achieved his purpose. He sent his small ships forward along the coast, to Coro and the island of Curaçao, to spy out the land. With the larger ones he remained another month at Borburata, 'still selling every day some wares', the loyalty of the officials having at length yielded to his blandishments. At the beginning of June he sailed westwards himself, provided with letters of recommendation from the bishop to all and sundry on the Spanish Main. So was King Philip served by his lieges in the west.

Hawkins stayed only two days at Curaçao, and then

pushed on to Rio de la Hacha, whither two of his ships had been sent in advance. These were the *Judith* and the *Angel*, the former commanded by Drake. Hortop, who seems to have served at this period on board one of these vessels, gives a better account of their proceedings than does the Cotton MS. He says that at their first arrival they exchanged shots with the town, the truth being that Miguel de Castilianos, the treasurer of Rio de la Hacha, had an ill conscience, having defrauded Captain Lovell the year before. Drake had been one of the victims of the deceit, and was doubtless quite as ready to shoot at his adversary as to trade with him. So he put two balls through the treasurer's house and then anchored out of range, establishing a blockade until Hawkins should arrive. Soon afterwards a caravel of advice came along from San Domingo, and Drake took her within a musket shot of the shore under the fire of the garrison. This is the first occasion on which the capture of a Spanish ship is recorded in the course of these expeditions. Hawkins would not have acted thus, but Drake was always an exponent of the doctrine of reprisal in its extreme form. When, on 10 June, Hawkins appeared, he opened fire not with his culverins but with a letter to the treasurer. Its opening phrases, referring to the voyage of 1566-7, have been quoted in a previous chapter.¹ After expressing willingness to overlook the offence of the previous year, it concludes:

'This I desire, that you will give me licence to sell 60 negroes only, towards the payment of my soldiers, to help to lighten the charges of this voyage, which was appointed to be made otherwise and to none of these parts. If you see in the morning armed men aland let it nothing trouble you, for as you shall command they shall return aboard again. Shewing me this pleasure, you shall command any thing I have.'

The tone was flippant, but the writer knew his man, a peppery fellow whom it would be waste of time to

¹ See above, ch. vi, p. 125.

attempt to conciliate. The letter went in before night-fall and drew an immediate reply. The English soldiers, it said, had better remain unpaid than buy their wages so dear as they should if they came ashore at Rio de la Hacha. Hawkins nevertheless kept his word and landed next day with two hundred men. Castilianos likewise meant what he said and had made every preparation for defence. He had constructed fieldworks and had collected a hundred arquebusiers to man them as well as a body of horse whom he led in person. Hawkins sent forward an envoy to parley with the treasurer. This envoy, a Spaniard of Borburata who had attached himself to the expedition, testified to the honest conduct of the English, but in vain: the treasurer returned answer that he would never give any licence to trade. Hawkins therefore marched forward, the Spanish horse skirmishing round him, and saw before him ninety of the arquebusiers drawn up behind an entrenchment. The odds were not really in favour of the English, for the colonial horsemen, used to killing wild cattle with the lance, were a formidable enemy to infantry who might lose their cohesion. There were also with the Spaniards a great number of armed negroes and Indians; and ever since the casualties at Cape Verde the English had regarded all native arrows as poisoned and deadly. Hawkins and his men were, however, skilled in landing operations. They advanced with a rush that did the business. The arquebusiers fired their volley too soon and killed no more than two of them, after which all the defenders turned in flight, and both sides raced into the town together.¹

¹ In 1571 Hawkins received from Clarendieux Cooke an augmentation to his coat of arms in respect of his conduct on this occasion. The grant briefly describes the capture of the town, with the numbers of the combatants as given above, and with the additional detail that Hawkins captured and brought away with him the ensign of Miguel de Castilianos. The augmentation was: 'On a canton gold an escalope between two palmers staves sable.' College of Arms MSS., Old Grants of Arms ✕, f. 62; see also Prince, *Worthies of Devon*, p. 472.

The treasurer with his mounted troop had kept clear of the rout and now sent in a horseman with a white flag and a defiance. Though the English had taken the town, he said, they should never trade there, and he would die in the field before he would consent to it. Once again Hawkins sent out the Borburata Spaniard to threaten that he would burn the town unless he got licence to traffic, to which the treasurer retorted that he would see the whole Indies in flames before he would grant it. The English leader had as yet given no orders to carry out his threat, but his men took it upon themselves to fire some of the houses. Before the blaze had been put out the treasurer observed it and sent in to say that he cared nothing if the whole place should be destroyed, for the King would build its loyal inhabitants a better at his own cost. He was unwise enough to allow a number of his Spaniards to accompany the flag of truce in order to see what was happening to their property. Hawkins, a master player of this game, at once took advantage of the error. He spoke civilly to the Spaniards, telling them that their treasurer had an eye to his own profit in provoking the destruction of the town, for he would charge the King three times as much as he would spend on rebuilding it; and that, having removed his own goods to a safe place, he cared not a jot for the losses of others. For the houses already burnt Hawkins promised to pay compensation, and he declared that he would hunt the treasurer through the country 'and make him willing, or he had done, to grant him licence to traffic'. Having thus sowed a seed of dissension among his enemies, he had two falcons brought ashore on field carriages and sat down to possess Rio de la Hacha, whilst its lawful proprietors rambled disconsolate over the countryside.

Hawkins never missed seizing a gift of fortune, and he had now not long to wait for one. Within five days a negro came in, a runaway slave of the treasurer's, who

said that as the price of his liberty he would show where the wealth of the town had been deposited. That night an armed party set out with the negro and duly found the stuff in a hiding-place six miles away. They sent back word to Hawkins, together with a Spanish prisoner who confessed that his comrades were weary of the treasurer's conduct and desired in their hearts to trade. Hawkins went out to the place and had the booty laden in ox-carts, sending word to the treasurer that it would be taken to the ships, and further, 'that he would never leave till he would make the treasurer to take such pains to entreat him to take licence as he had to desire the treasurer to grant it'. This was the final turn of the screw. The owners of the property surrounded the treasurer and clamoured for him to treat with the Englishman. Desperate and furious, he broke out, 'There is not one of you that knoweth John Hawkins. He is such a man that any man talking with him hath no power to deny him anything he doth request. This hath made me hitherto to do right well to keep myself far from him, and not any villainy that I know in him, but great nobility. And so do not desire me to do no such thing, for therein ye shall be in danger to prefer his desire before the commandment of my master the King.'¹

Castilianos was a plucky man and had honestly meant to do his duty, but he was opposed to a stronger will than his own. For there were the carts creaking off towards the ships in the distance, and at the sight all the heart went out of the Spaniards of Rio de la Hacha. They insisted that their treasurer should negotiate, and they ended by breaking his determination not to do so. That afternoon he and Hawkins met alone in an open space, their followers looking on from a distance. The two men talked for an hour, and when they parted Hawkins took with him a secret licence for his trade.

¹ Cotton account, f. 35. The passage is defective, but the sense is as given above.

The trade of Rio de la Hacha was worth the pains of wooing it. The town was the principal mart for the pearls for which the Spanish Main was then noted, and pearls may very well have been among the property Hawkins had seized. A certain amount of gold was also obtained in the river courses of all this coast, and some of it, as there is evidence to show, found its way into the coffers of the *Jesus*. Altogether the expedition did more business here than at any other port, and after disposing of 250 slaves and various other goods it departed well pleased at the beginning of July.¹ Sixty of the slaves were left as compensation for the burnt houses.²

The proceedings at Rio de la Hacha, of which the full story is here available for the first time, illustrate the difference between Hawkins's trade by force of arms and the piracy of which his enemies falsely accused him. Had he been a French corsair he would have taken all the movables in the town and burnt the houses in default of ransom. Actually he paid fair prices for all he had, and compensated the owners of the property destroyed by his men. If the English in after years acted in the manner of the French they could at least plead that they had tried fair means first.

The next port of call was Santa Marta, a town of forty-five houses, too weak to offer resistance. Hawkins sent in the usual letter to the governor and received a reply which prompted him to go ashore in person for conference with that official. After courteous greetings they arranged a face-saving comedy, and Hawkins returned to stage his part of it. Soon he was seen leaving his ship, in full armour and at the head of a hundred and fifty men, whilst the fleet opened a harmless bombardment, taking care to shoot well over the houses. The storming party marched unhindered to the market-

¹ 29 June by the abstract of Hawkins's log, the dates in which, however, are found so inaccurate that the authority of the Cotton MS. is preferable.

² Arizmendi, *op. cit.*

place, whither the governor sent a flag of truce to say that he awaited 'his worship' at the town's end. At the parley, in presence of all the inhabitants, Hawkins told the old story about the necessity for trade in order to pay his men, and the governor, having discharged his duty by a show of reluctance, yielded to force and the request of his subjects and gave full licence to trade. Thereafter there was much banqueting and merry-making on the ships and on shore, and 'we had here fresh victuals, as beef, all the time we were here, and trafficked very friendly together, and sold about 110 negroes with certain other wares'. All which done, and parting gifts bestowed, the fleet set sail for Cartagena on 26 July and reached that city on 1 August.

Cartagena was intended as the last port of call in the voyage, at which sale was to be made of the sixty or so negroes yet remaining.¹ The fleet, an imposing array of nine sail with two English warships at its head, passed close by the town, a demonstration to Spanish eyes of the force that this man Hawkins could place upon the sea. As it defiled before the walls it fired a thunderous salute, and then turned into the mouth of the great basin of Cartagena, half a league beyond. The town batteries had returned the salute, and Hawkins now sent a letter to the governor demanding trade in terms similar to those already quoted. The governor at first declined to read the letter, but at length did so and replied with a firm refusal, giving orders at the same time that no more messengers were to be received from the ships. Hawkins had thus to consider the question of forcing a trade as he had done at Rio de la Hacha; but here the thing was impossible. In Cartagena there were 500 Spanish infantry besides horsemen and 6,000 armed

¹ The number given in the H. C. A. documents already cited. At Rio de la Hacha and Santa Marta 360 negroes had been sold. This, with the 60 remaining, leaves only 60 for casualties and the unknown number sold at Borburata. The casualties must have been few.

Indians, and he, with no more than 370 men,¹ English and French, saw it was mere folly. So he contented himself with exchanging shots with the town, to see if he could provoke the enemy to some unwise move; and then, having failed in that, he drew off and set his pinnaces to ransack the haven for the provisions of which he stood greatly in need. On an island the searchers found a spring of good water in a pleasure garden frequented by the wealthy of Cartagena. In the same place there were wines and other goods, and the Cotton MS. states that Hawkins would not have these touched, a fact which the caretakers of the place reported in the city. There follows a break in the MS. but from what comes after the inference is that the owners of the wine sent word to Hawkins to take it, and that he did so, leaving English cloth in its place, 'having also in all places ever since he came out of England paid every man for anything he took to his content to the uttermost, as also the custom to the King in all places of the India'.² And so, more in sorrow than in anger, he sailed out of Cartagena on 8 August.

The trading affairs of the voyage were now at an end, and it will here be convenient to combine what information we can on the business done. On this matter certain depositions were made in the Admiralty Court after Hawkins's return. To begin with, it was alleged that the fifty-seven negroes left in the ships were worth in Mexico £9,120, or £160 each. This is a fanciful figure, but it gives us a rate of exchange between English and

¹ The number given in the Cotton account, f. 37 b. This affords an interesting clue to the casualties of the voyage up to this date and to the number of men Hawkins had with him at San Juan de Ulua. He had left Plymouth with 408 persons, and had since been joined by two small French vessels. Fifty is the largest probable number to allow for the Frenchmen, which gives 320 Englishmen remaining, or about 90 dead since the beginning of the voyage. The latter is a maximum estimate, dependent on the Frenchmen having totalled as many as fifty.

² F. 38 b.

Spanish money; for William Clarke, one of the merchants, testifying to the same facts, said that the negroes would each have been worth 350 pesos of gold in Mexico. He was thus reckoning 350 pesos of gold as equal to £160 or, roughly, nine shillings to the peso. In the course of his evidence he had already stated that the expedition had obtained 29,743 pesos of gold in exchange for its wares, or, at the above rate, about £13,500. Of this amount three-quarters had been in actual gold, and the remainder in silver and pearls. For this treasure there had been given about 400 negroes and an unknown quantity of English goods; but the circumstances all imply that the negroes were the more important wares, without which the voyage would not have been worth while. Reckoning, for the sake of an estimate, that the 400 negroes produced about three-fourths of the total receipts, or £10,000, the price of each would have been £25 in addition to the customs and the bribes which Hawkins had doubtless been obliged to distribute. These would make the cost to the purchaser considerably higher, but even then it must have been less than that charged by the licensed monopolists.

It would seem that the total receipts, £13,500, would have yielded a moderate profit upon the voyage had all the ships returned in safety. The Admiralty Court evidence estimates the values of the ships and cargoes, as they left England, at £16,500, of which about half represented the ships and their permanent equipment. The cost of victuals and wages is not stated, but may be assessed at £3,000 for a year on the basis of ten shillings a month for the men and something more for the officers. There should thus have been a profit of about £2,000 on the outlay, or twelve per cent. But these figures are very incomplete and come from a tainted source, for the witnesses were exaggerating the value of the lost property in order to expand the bill of damages against Spain. Probably Hawkins was reckoning upon a good

deal more than twelve per cent. when he left Cartagena, for he seems to have been satisfied with the results attained. Yet, if he could have sold his remaining negroes in Mexico for double or treble prices, he would have been turning a moderate success into a brilliant one; and it has been freely asserted that he meant to go to Mexico, in spite of his statement to the contrary. But the circumstances are against this view. He must have known that the Gulf of Mexico was a dangerous piece of water, especially at that late season of the year. He had no pilot for it, and what that meant we have seen in the second voyage. And finally, the writer of the Cotton MS. says that his commander purposed to go straight home from Cartagena, without touching at any other place. His victuals were short, but might have served for a favourable passage.

On leaving Cartagena the fleet was becalmed for two days, during which time Hawkins took the goods and men out of the caravel acquired at Cape Blanco, and sank her. The Frenchman also, who had voluntarily joined him at Cape Verde, was now discharged at his own request, and with his ship and crew went off on a separate voyage. The other Frenchman, Captain Bland, with his caravel the *Gratia Dei*, remained in company. The fleet, reduced to seven sail, then steered northwards, intending to quit the Caribbean by way of the Yucatan and Florida Channels. Unhappily, the dangerous season had now set in, and off Cape S. Antonio, the western point of Cuba, a violent tempest struck the expedition. It was evidently blowing from the southwest, and in spite of the peril of wreck upon the Florida coast the ships had to run before it. Three days after the beginning of the storm the *William and John* parted company and was seen no more, but the others kept in touch with the flagship.

The *Jesus* was now in a woful state, her timbers loosening, her seams above water visibly opening and

closing at every roll, and great leaks bursting in below. But Hawkins achieved what all thought impossible and kept her afloat, stopping leaks with cloth, urging men to the pumps, and cutting away the straining upper works which were wrenching her asunder; and when the weather moderated he found himself in the shallows of the Florida coast, where he sought vainly for a haven for careening. The obvious course was to take the treasure and leave her; at best she could reach home only as a worthless wreck that would never go to sea again. But honour forbade, 'because that she was the Queen's Majesty's ship and that she should not perish under his hand'. There was more than the Queen's name in question; there was the Queen's purse also. For, by the terms of the charter-party, if the ship sank the loss was wholly the Queen's, but if she came home she must be repaired at the cost of the adventurers.¹ The world has judged Hawkins, on the report of his enemies, to have been a grasping trader of doubtful honesty. The Gulf of Mexico reveals him as a man of that chivalrous honour which inspired the poets of his age, himself an investor in the voyage, with money in pocket to say nothing of life saved if he would abandon his dying ship. He would not do it. In his own curt narrative he says no word of the temptation, content that the men who knew should judge him. And it is doubtful if his gracious mistress ever understood what manner of man he had proved himself in her service.

¹ The charter-party for this voyage, it is true, has not been preserved, but that for the hire of the *Minion* in 1564 is to the effect above stated (Lansdowne MSS. 113, ff. 9-17); a draft charter-party also exists for the *Minion* and the *Primrose* in 1562, in which it is laid down that the Queen is to 'bear the adventure' of the ships for the voyage (S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 26, No. 43). For Hawkins's voyage of 1564-5 the *Jesus* had evidently been chartered with a repairs clause as above stated, for on her return the adventurers agreed to pay the Queen £500 for making good the wear and tear she had sustained (S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 37, No. 61).

A new storm, this time from the north-east, drove them from Florida deep into the Gulf. On 11 September, being now in waters unknown to all, they stopped a Spanish vessel and inquired for a harbour of refuge. The Spaniards said they had ridden out the storm at Campeche, forty leagues to windward, and were bound for San Juan de Ulua, the best port in the Gulf. They declared further that at the end of the month the annual fleet of twenty sail was expected to arrive at San Juan from Spain. To Hawkins this was unwelcome news. In his then condition he had no desire to meet a Spanish fleet. He asked whether there was no other port to leeward, but they answered, none. So, with misgiving and 'seeing there was no remedy but he must forcibly (i. e. on compulsion) put with the same port of San Juan de Ulua', he made his way thither.¹ Before reaching it he fell in with two more Spanish craft and made all three accompany him, judging it best that none but himself should give the news of his approach.

¹ Cotton account, f. 39 b.

THE THIRD SLAVING VOYAGE (*cont.*)§ 3. *San Juan de Ulua*

ON 15 September the fleet sighted San Juan de Ulua and, whilst yet several miles off, saw a boat coming out from the land. Hawkins ordered all the crosses of St. George to be taken in, and substituted for them the royal standards of England 'which were so dim with their colours through the foul wearing in foul weather that they (the Spaniards) never perceived the lions and flower de luces till they were hard aboard the *Jesus*'.¹ The boat contained the treasurer and the *teniente* or deputy-governor of Vera Cruz, who had both come down to San Juan to meet the plate fleet. When they saw their mistake they would have turned back, but it was too late, and Hawkins ordered them aboard. He received them courteously but kept them with him, and the fleet stood in towards the port in line ahead, the *Jesus* leading and the rest strung out at considerable distances behind. Still with the faded standards flying he entered the anchorage, where the Spaniards likewise mistook him for the plate fleet until he was right in the midst of them. On his approach they had fired a salute as if to their own commander.

The port of San Juan de Ulua was formed by a low island, little more than a shingle bank, rising only three feet above high-water mark. It was at that time a bow-shot—say 200 yards—long, and stood at twice that distance from the main shore. Poor and cramped as it was, there was no other haven on this part of the Mexican seaboard; but reasons of health and inland communication had dictated the building of the port town of Vera Cruz fifteen miles north-westwards along the coast. At

¹ Cotton account, f. 40.

San Juan the only permanent buildings were a chapel, huts for a gang of negroes who worked on the preservation of the port, and a battery wherein were mounted about a dozen brass guns for defence, all these constructions being upon the island. So violent were the northerly gales that afflicted the place that anchoring in the narrow roadstead was not a sufficient safeguard for the ships. They had instead to make fast to iron chains secured upon the island itself and to lie with their beak-heads overhanging the shore, which was artificially scarped on the inner side to give sufficient depth of water for the purpose. Even with these precautions a tempest had been known to sweep everything away, and to wash ships, buildings, and inhabitants upon the mainland beach.¹ The business of this makeshift port was seasonal, depending upon the annual arrival of the fleet from Spain and its departure with the silver mined in Mexico. Unfortunately for Hawkins, the season of activity coincided with the time of his appearance.

As the English entered San Juan they saw eight Spanish ships already lying there unrigged, their crews at work upon the island. What ships they were is a mystery. Hawkins in his published account says they were treasure ships with bullion on board to the value of £200,000, and he takes credit for his honesty in leaving them untouched; the Cotton MS. mentions the ships, but not the treasure. The difficulty in believing Hawkins is that the main treasure fleet had not yet arrived, and that the silver would probably not have been moved from Vera Cruz until the shipping was ready for it. Yet it is to be noted that the local Spaniards talked of a fleet of about twenty ships, whereas thirteen appeared next day.

¹ Compare, in addition to the narratives of Hawkins's voyage, the descriptions by Robert Tomson and John Chilton in Hakluyt. Tomson was at San Juan in 1556, and Chilton the year after Hawkins's visit. It may be inferred from Chilton's details that the alarm consequent on the Hawkins affair had led to a strengthening of the port establishments.

It seems possible therefore that the fleet had become divided, and that some of its units had reached San Juan in advance of the main body. Some of these eight were no doubt coasters like those that Hawkins fell in with, but one at least is described as a hulk of some 700 tons, which looks as if she had come from Europe. If they were all local craft they may have been employed to bring the treasure from Vera Cruz in readiness. We may take it that Hawkins believed in the presence of the treasure. In his whole narrative up to this point he cannot be convicted of a deliberate fabrication. He misleads occasionally by large omissions of the truth, and he may sometimes have manipulated his dates and statistics; but the gratuitous invention of a circumstance like that of the treasure is foreign to his mentality.

As soon as it was realized that the newcomers were English, a panic broke out among the Spaniards on the island. They and the negroes were seen crowding into boats and escaping over to the mainland, whilst those on board the ships likewise abandoned them. All this justified the wisdom of Hawkins in detaining those who would have been able to give notice of his coming; for had the surprise been less complete he might have been greeted with chain-shot instead of blank from the island battery. As it was, he had produced an impression quite to his satisfaction, and he sent a soothing message to the Spaniards, promising to do them no harm and to take not a pennyworth of their goods; and having found the captain of the island, one Delgadillo, he explained his purposes and effected a pacification. He was in need, he said, of victuals and other things, for which he would pay in full, and he desired to have the position recognized by the authorities not only of Vera Cruz but of Mexico City. He now released all the Spaniards except the treasurer, and sent off Maldonado, the captain of the ship he had first encountered, to carry a letter to Mexico. But this Maldonado, professing willingness, played false

and suppressed the letter ; and the news went up to the capital from the Vera Cruz officials, who doubtless put their own colouring upon it.

These transactions occupied the 16th of September, the day after the place had been first sighted. All was so far of good promise. Hawkins was in command of the port and its occupants, with a prospect of repairing his flagship and buying a stock of victuals for the homeward voyage. Next day at sunrise the luck turned, for out at sea gleamed the sails of thirteen ships. Hawkins asked the treasurer what ships they might be, but he knew the answer only too well. They were the plate fleet from Seville.

He was now in as cruel a position as any commander could be, for he was beset with a combination of circumstances that compelled him to take a wrong course of action, and all the time he knew it to be wrong. Twelve months ago he had seen a fleet under Spanish colours sail arrogantly into Catwater, giving legitimate cause of offence by refusing the salute, insulting the Queen's flag in the Queen's own harbour. Without a moment's hesitation he had fired at them and brought them to submission, and he had been reviled and disavowed for so doing. Once more the need for the same action had arisen ; for if de Wachen in Plymouth could be suspected of meaning to act the 'proud neighbour', how much more proud would be the Spanish commander of a superior force, in a Spanish harbour on a coast where any Englishman was regarded as a pirate ? Once these Spaniards came in, there was little forbearance to be looked for at their hands. The alternative was to keep them out. But that would be an act of war, in fact as well as in name, for they would not go meekly away without a shot fired. And if they did not get into San Juan they had nowhere else to go, as Hawkins knew by experience ; the first northerly gale would drive them on a lee shore and destroy them. That would be his

ruin. The world would point to him as a manifest pirate; all his fine claims to an honest trade and his hopes for its recognition would be blown to the winds; the Queen, never able or willing to understand a sailor's problems, would be furious at the presumption of a plain esquire in daring to make war under her flag; Cecil, understanding well enough, would sacrifice him without scruple to the needs of the higher statecraft; confiscation, the Tower, perhaps a Spanish dungeon, certainly the end of six years' patient policy, would be the fruits of the course that reason demanded he should take. Cecil's letter of reproof, which he had answered from Plymouth as he set sail, lay yet in his cabin, and its harsh phrases pointed the dilemma: on the one hand, certain loss of his good name; on the other, nine chances in ten of present disaster to his ships, his men, and himself. The higher motive decided him, the governing condition of his enterprise, that, while his own stake was great, his country's was greater. Courage and mastery might after all bring him through; and he took the slender chance, 'fearing the Queen's indignation in so weighty a matter'. Character is destiny; a man's past moulds his present action. Legality at all costs had been his touchstone, and legality weighed the balance now. And this was the man whom some of his own countrymen have not hesitated to write down a pirate!

Heavy as his heart might be, he kept a good countenance, sending out Delgadillo to bring the newcomers to a stand, manning the island battery and establishing a new one to reinforce it, drawing his warships to the mouth of the haven. If the Spaniards came in they should first subscribe to terms, to break which would be black perfidy; perhaps they had over them some man as jealous of reputation as he was himself.

The plate fleet bore indeed the honour of Spain in the person of Don Martin Enriquez, the new Viceroy of Mexico, clothed with the authority of Philip himself in

the west. Angry at the humiliation, he took command over his admiral's head and declared that with his thousand men he would come in, let who would seek to stop him. Hawkins had little more than three hundred,¹ but his position and his batteries were a sufficient answer; and the Viceroy had to take second thought and negotiate. A long haggling ensued, the upshot of which was an agreement that either side should abstain from hostilities, that Hawkins should repair his ships and buy victuals, selling sufficient of his own wares for the purpose, that the Spaniards should enter the port but should not land armed men on the island, and that Hawkins should hold the island batteries as a guarantee of his security. He and Don Martin exchanged ten hostages in pledge, and each solemnly proclaimed the truce to his followers. Monday, 20 September, saw these terms concluded, but the Spaniards had to wait until next day for a fair wind to enter.

Don Martin Enriquez had already sent to Vera Cruz for all the soldiers that place could furnish, and these men came on board his ships under cover of darkness on the night of the 20th. Hawkins on his side had occupied the batteries and put their guns in fighting order. On Tuesday morning, 21 September, the Spanish fleet entered the port, where there was much laborious shuffling of the packs before both were berthed to their commanders' satisfaction. All the ships at length lay side by side, their bowsprits overhanging the island, a few yards only separating the innermost vessels of the two nationalities. Of the English the *Minion* occupied the inner flank, with the *Jesus* next to her, whilst the great hulk which had been in San Juan when Hawkins arrived was similarly the flanking ship of the Spaniards.

¹ At Cartagena Hawkins had had 370 men. Since then the *William* and *John* and one French ship had parted company, and it would be surprising if the hardships of the voyage had not still further reduced his numbers.

The Viceroy, as the Spanish report confesses, meant treachery from the outset. His excuse, that he believed that Hawkins meant to attack him, is hardly tenable; what would have been said if Hawkins had played false under a similar pretext? In these matters the world has one standard for Englishmen and another for their enemies. Don Martin therefore prepared for a massacre before the ink was dry on his signature. He filled the hulk with armed men, connected her secretly with the English moorings so that she could be swung rapidly aboard the nearest English ship, and cut new ports in the sides of his two warships so that their maximum gun-power could be brought to bear. To rush the batteries he reserved the soldiers from Vera Cruz, stationing them unobserved in the forecastles, from which they could jump ashore in an instant. The English afterwards said that he arranged also for Hawkins to be assassinated; but that was a mere suspicion, and the charge ought not to be accepted.

Hawkins, detecting some of these doings and guessing the rest, was wide awake. He warned Hampton of the *Minion* of what to expect, and sent Barrett to protest to Don Martin. No doubt he hoped that the Spanish preparations were not complete, and that if he showed that he had discovered them they might be abandoned. Only on the island seem precautions to have been neglected. There the English seamen, instead of standing within their batteries and forbidding outsiders to approach, are said to have been straggling in confusion and fraternizing with the Spaniards who began to stroll in increasing numbers upon the shore. The hope that the Viceroy could be hectored out of his determination proved false. It was on the morning of Thursday, 23 September, that Robert Barrett went to him, and his answer was to make the Englishman a prisoner and give the word for instant action.

In the cabin of the *Jesus*, Hawkins was at that moment

sitting at dinner, although it was only eight o'clock. At the sound of a trumpet from the direction of the Spanish admiral he looked up in alarm. A Spanish hostage who was present made a suspicious movement, and it was said that he meant to stab the English leader with a dagger concealed in his sleeve. Whether this was true there was no time to investigate; and he was locked up, whilst Hawkins ran on deck as a terrific uproar broke out.

The trumpet-call and the waving of a white flag had been the Viceroy's signal for the assault to begin. Without a moment's delay the soldiers in the prows of the Spanish ships leapt upon the island and charged the batteries, which they took at the first rush. All of their defenders were killed except three who escaped on board the *Jesus*. At the same time the hulk was hauled alongside the *Minion*, and its armed men swarmed over her bulwarks. They did not remain long, for Hawkins, shouting 'God and St. George! Upon those traitorous villains!' led his men down from the loftier *Jesus* and chased them overboard after a hand to hand fight. Next came the turn of the *Jesus* to be boarded by men from the hulk and two other vessels that had worked round her, but they were likewise beaten off.

What followed shows that Hawkins saw no hope of regaining the batteries, the key of the whole action, although he was still full of fight. For he cut the head cables of the *Jesus* and the *Minion* and hauled them off by the sternfasts which had been laid out in the haven to prevent the ships from swinging and colliding. Then, as soon as he was clear, he opened a heavy fire upon the Spanish ships. Two of them, the *capitana* or admiral and the *almiranta* or vice-admiral, were warships, but they were soon crushed by the English gunnery. The *almiranta* blew up, and her shattered timbers caught fire and burned to the water's edge. The *capitana* and another were, says Hawkins, 'supposed to be sunk', which

most likely means that they went down until they rested on the bottom without entirely disappearing. Within an hour the Spanish ships were beaten into silence. The *capitana* was so riddled with shot that her crew fled ashore, and the Viceroy was left almost alone beneath the flag which he would not strike; there was something admirable in Don Martin Enriquez, dishonoured though he must ever be by this day's work. Of Hawkins in like circumstances we have a glimpse through the journalistic eye of Job Hortop the gunner. The *Jesus*, he tells us, was being 'wonderfully pierced with shot', during which process, 'our general courageously cheered up his soldiers and gunners, and called to Samuel his page for a cup of beer, who brought it him in a silver cup, and he, drinking to all men, willed the gunners to stand by their ordnance lustily like men. He had no sooner set the cup out of his hand, but a demi-culverin shot struck away the cup and a cooper's plane that stood by the mainmast, and ran out on the other side of the ship; which nothing dismayed our general, for he ceased not to encourage us, saying "Fear nothing! for God, who hath preserved me from this shot, will also deliver us from these traitors and villains".'

It was not the Spanish ships that were now pounding the *Jesus*, but the guns on the island. Francisco de Luxan, admiral of the Spanish fleet, had taken command of one battery—a fact eloquent of the state of his ships—and Delgadillo, the original captain of the island, of the other.¹ Together they kept up a terrible fire upon the English fleet and snatched a victory out of disaster. It was impossible to recover the island in face of the large number of Spaniards now upon it, yet it may be inferred that its easy loss in the first place had been due to the carelessness of its garrison. Not one of the accounts mentions the name of the officer whom Hawkins had placed in command, and it is a fine instance of good

¹ Spanish official relation, printed in Corbett's *Drake*.

feeling that this should be so. Whoever he was, he paid with his life for his unwariness, and none of the survivors made any allusion to his shortcomings. The hint that his men were out of hand comes from a Spanish source. The fire from the island crippled the *Jesus* and rendered her immovable, sank the *Angel*, and drove the men out of the *Swallow*. The *Minion*, less damaged, withdrew out of range for a time, as did also the *Judith*, Drake's ship, which was too small to be of fighting value. Such was the position in the afternoon, when the conflict had already endured for some hours.

Captain Bland, the Frenchman, with his ex-Portuguese caravel, remains to be accounted for. He, seeing the fate of the other small craft, determined that his men should die with credit. He left his moorings with the intention of firing his ship in the midst of the Spanish fleet; but a chain-shot brought down his mainmast, and he had to leave her where she was and take his men on board the *Jesus*.¹

Hawkins now took stock of the situation and decided upon his course of action. The *Jesus*, with rigging destroyed and hull unseaworthy, lay in the midst of the haven, a target for every gun upon the island. All around were burning or sinking wrecks. Out of range hovered the *Minion* and the *Judith*, withdrawn most likely by his orders, for they would have served no good purpose by remaining. He saw that he could never bring the *Jesus* away, but he could yet make shift to save her treasure and her remaining victuals. He therefore ordered in the *Minion* and the *Judith* to take off the men and the goods. The *Judith* did her part and went off to wait outside. The *Minion* stayed longer, lying close to the *Jesus* and sheltered by her from the enemy's fire.

¹ This incident is given on the authority of Hortop. The H. C. A. depositions merely state that the *Gratia Dei* was taken with the *Swallow*, they lying close aboard one another, with their anchors fast upon the island. Mr. Conway has evidence that Bland's real name was Planes.

Whilst they so lay it is almost certain that the greater part of the treasure was transferred, but the reasons for this belief must be left to later consideration. The Spanish commanders, knowing that rich booty was slipping from their grasp, now shot their last bolt. They fired two of their ships and set them to drift upon the English. It was a manœuvre which seldom inflicted material damage but seldom failed to inspire terror, and in this instance it took its calculated effect. As the flames approached, the discipline of these long-tried men broke down. A tumult of shouts and cries drowned the officers' voices; the *Minion's* crew, without orders from their captain, cut loose her sails and cast off the warps; and as she was seen to draw ahead a stampede cleared the flagship's deck, each man jumping for his life, some jumping short and drowning in the widening gulf between. A few, cooler or less nimble, followed in a boat, and some were left to the Spaniards' mercy. What happened to the wounded no one says; one may hope they had been already removed with the treasure, but in the sixteenth century it does not do to be too sure.

In the final collapse Hawkins jumped with the rest. The commander's rank in those days carried no obligation to be the last to leave; that was a tradition of later growth. Tudor England held it right that the man of quality should take precedence over meaner clay in this as in all other things: Sir Philip Sidney became a pattern to mankind because he founded, not followed, a nobler example. Hawkins himself thus narrated his action in the Admiralty Court: 'This deponent', he said, 'perceiving the sudden fear of his men and the imminent danger that they stood in, for safeguard of themselves leapt into the *Minion* out of the said *Jesus*, whereinto he was very hardly received, for in that instant was she under sail and departing from of board the *Jesus*'. Jean Turren, the French trumpeter, deposed: 'the said John Hawkins, the captain and general, tarried so long upon

board the said *Jesus*, for the better defence and safety thereof, that he was almost left behind, and hardly came to the *Minion*, which was then in shifting to loose and withdraw herself'. No man or officer was expected to do more.

So ended the battle of San Juan de Ulua, whose significance was hardly apparent to contemporaries, but which can now be descried as the parting of the ways that led England respectively to a narrowly European and to a widely oceanic policy. Hitherto the Spanish alliance, dating from the time of Henry VII and Ferdinand of Aragon, had been England's stand-by, assuring the country's safety in a revolutionary age whilst limiting at the same time its field of oceanic enterprise. Until Hawkins began his expeditions the desire for oceanic expansion had satisfied itself in northern discovery and in trespass upon the Portuguese border of the Atlantic. Hawkins had extended the field to tropical America, but he had hoped to do so without breaking peace with Spain; and here, in six years, was the outcome. It caused no immediate war with Spain. It was overshadowed, indeed, by a noisier quarrel which broke out simultaneously at home, the detention of Alva's treasure by Elizabeth at the close of 1568. But that was an ordinary piece of sharp practice of an almost recognized type, and the dispute would have adjusted itself as soon as some common interest drove the disputants together again. The wounds of San Juan, on the contrary, were never healed. They rankled on, year upon year, begetting trickery, reprisals, piracy, and war unlimited. Cecil might strive to keep the peace, Elizabeth might hesitate, blowing now hot now cold; but Don Martin Enriquez, with his sovereign's approbation, had done a mortal injury to the master spirits of the age, to Hawkins and Drake, to the London financiers, and to the rank and file of the Devon ports, who held life cheap but vengeance dear. Thenceforward, to the men who moved

the springs of English action Spain was the enemy, and the quarrel with feeble Portugal sank into oblivion.

It was between three and four in the afternoon that the *Minion* withdrew from the fight. She did not go far, but anchored just beyond effective range, two bowshots from the Spanish ships. Hawkins, Philips, and Hortop are all at one upon this point, and agree also that she remained in that position until the next morning. During the night Drake in the *Judith* made off and was seen no more by his commander until they met in England in the following year. Hawkins refrained, more generally than any other leader of his time, from censuring his subordinates, but on this occasion he spoke his mind in half a dozen words: 'so with the *Minion* only and the *Judith* (a small bark of 50 tons) we escaped, which bark the same night forsook us in our great misery'. That was all, but from his pen it meant much; and it was written after he had had an opportunity of hearing Drake's defence. Sir J. S. Corbett in his *Life of Drake* palliates the matter, on the ground that it is unfair to condemn without knowing the full circumstances. It is true, we do not know them; but Hawkins did. Drake was twenty-six years old, and not yet the great leader he afterwards became. There was no body of naval history and tradition to form the background of his mind and steady his raw character; it was to be his task as much as any man's to create that tradition as a light to future ages. 'Each for himself' had been too often the watchword of the time in which he grew to manhood, and it is his true fame that out of the disaster of the voyage he found himself and helped to make England a better land than he had known it.¹

¹ The charge against Drake was remembered and thrown in his face twenty years afterwards. In 1587 he accused William Borough of mutiny and desertion in the course of the Cadiz expedition. Borough, in making his defence, remarked: 'Sir Francis Drake . . . doth altogether forget how he demeaned himself towards his master and admiral, Mr.

Left to himself, Hawkins could count his losses. At the opening of the fight there had been not more than 320 men under his command, perhaps not more than 300. At its close, he tells us he was left with 200 men on board the *Minion*. The unknown quantity is the number taken off in the 50-ton *Judith*. We may therefore estimate that roughly from seventy to a hundred of the whole company had been killed or taken at San Juan, the majority Englishmen, although Bland's Frenchmen must not be forgotten. The prisoners included the ten English hostages, George Fitzwilliam among them, delivered to Don Martin before the fight; they were sent to Spain next year, and further reference to their fortunes will be made in a later chapter. Of the Spanish losses the witnesses' estimates are fanciful and not worth quoting, but there were probably more Spaniards killed than Englishmen. Apart from the firing and sinking of the Spanish ships there was the long duel with the batteries, in which the shooting was by no means all in one direction. The yard-high shingle island can have afforded but poor cover to the crowd of Spaniards who held it; almost every inch of it must have been overlooked from the English decks. Of his ships Hawkins had lost the *Jesus*, worthless in any event, the *Swallow*, of 100 tons and new, the *Gratia Dei* (the Portuguese prize), and the tiny *Angel*. For these vessels and their contents the syndicate claimed a damage of £27,924, a ridiculous total inflated by such items as £5,000 for the hull and

John Hawkins, at the port of San Juan de Ulua in the West Indies, when contrary to his said admiral's command he came away and left his said master in great extremity, whereupon he was forced to set at shore in that country 100 of his men to seek their adventures; which matter if it had been so followed against him (for that he could no ways excuse it) might justly have procured that to himself which now most unjustly, bloodily, and maliciously, by all devices whatsoever, he hath sought and still seeketh against me.' (Lansdowne MS. 52, No. 39, printed in Corbett's *Papers relating to the Navy during the Spanish War*, Navy Rec. Soc., 1898, p. 152).

tackle of the *Jesus*, £2,000 for her guns, and £9,120 for 57 negroes 'optimi generis et staturae'.¹ The *Jesus*, with guns complete, had been valued at £2,000 in 1564, and her loss at San Juan was a gain to the adventurers, who would have been faced with a heavy bill for repairs had she come home.

In this connexion the most interesting point is that of the treasure. As has been stated, the trade on the Spanish Main had yielded £13,500, three-fourths of it in gold, the rest in pearls and silver. Hawkins, in describing how the *Minion* lay by the *Jesus* until the fire-ships approached, says nothing about these valuables; by his account the purpose then frustrated was 'to take such relief of victual and other necessities from the *Jesus* as the time would suffer us, and to leave her'. His silences often cover much, and do so here, for the merchant William Clarke fills the gap by his evidence in the Admiralty Court. He sailed in the *William and John*, which made a separate voyage home after parting company off the Florida coast.¹ Besides giving the figure quoted above, he says that the treasure was in gold bars, gold pesos, silver pesos, wrought silver plate, pearls, and a small quantity of other coin. All of it was kept on board the *Jesus*, the gold being placed in little chests and bags. He, not having been at San Juan, could not say of his own knowledge whether all this was lost, and the detailed schedule of damages shows plainly that most of it was not, for the only treasure it enumerates is as follows: gold and silver in the *Jesus*, £2,400; silver plate, £200; silver called *coriente*, £500; total, £3,100. That sum is certainly not an understatement, and the conclusion is unavoidable that the bulk of the treasure was saved. The weight of £10,000 worth of gold would not have exceeded two hundredweight, including the chests. Again on 30 January 1569, Cecil wrote to Sir Henry Norris in France: 'Hawkins is arrived at Mount's

¹ H. C. A. documents, *ut supra*.

Bay with the Queen's ship the *Minion*, having in her the treasure which he hath gotten by his trade in the Indies'.¹ And the Spanish ambassador in London, writing a fortnight later, says: 'Hawkins has come from the Indies and entered here with four horses loaded with gold and silver that he brings, which, however, I believe will not pay the costs.'² That may well have been true, but the financial disaster was not so great as has been supposed.

The true disaster of the voyage was the loss of life, and the worst of that was yet to come. The survivors of the expedition (apart from prisoners) came home in three ships, the *William and John*, the *Judith*, and the *Minion*. The *William and John*, with Thomas Bolton in command and James Raunse as master, lost sight of the fleet in the August hurricane and made the best of her way home. Her voyage was prolonged and full of hardship, for it was not until February 1569, that she struggled into an Irish port. The details of the passage are unknown, although a letter written to Cecil by a Spaniard, Don Juan de Mendoza, casts a faint light on the affair. Mendoza, by his own account, fell in with the *William and John* at sea. He found her out of her course and short of food, and befriended her crew at his own risk, sailing with them towards Europe. At the Azores he again assisted them by telling a false story to the inhabitants, without which supplies would not have been had. Between the Azores and Ireland his own ship was lost, and he was now penniless and craving Cecil's aid to return to his own country.³ The casual-

¹ *Cabala sive Scrinia Sacra*, 2nd ed., London, 1691, a collection of state papers containing some letters of Cecil's not elsewhere preserved, p. 148, Cecil to Sir Henry Norris, 30 Jan. 1569.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 78, 14 Feb. 1569.

³ *Calendar of Hatfield MSS.*, i, No. 1311, Mendoza to Cecil, Dublin, 1 July 1569. Mendoza does not mention the *William and John* by name, but Guerau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador, supplies the connecting link by a statement that Mendoza had been captured by one of

ties in the *William and John* are unknown, but were probably considerable. It is also fairly evident that Mendoza, although he does not say as much to Cecil, was compelled to accompany the English ship.

Drake in the *Judith* also made a long passage. He left San Juan de Ulua on 23 September and reached Plymouth on 20 January. William Hawkins, in reporting his return to Cecil, mentioned that the *Judith* was a particularly fast sailer. Yet she had taken four months for a voyage sometimes accomplished in one. What was Drake doing in all this time? There is not a hint discoverable, but it is possible that a story worth hearing may one day come to light. The Admiralty Court evidence contains no single mention of Drake's name or of that of his ship. He himself was not examined, and his movements are untraceable for some time after his return. Hawkins's brief reference to his desertion does not mention him by name, nor indeed does he appear in any part of Hawkins's narrative. It looks almost as if there was some good reason in 1569 for dissociating him from the expedition. If so, that reason will be found only in his unknown proceedings between San Juan and Plymouth Sound. Knowing Drake, we may guess what he would have done if he had seen his chance.

Of the *Minion* with her two hundred men we know more. She was overcrowded, but lack of victuals was the real cause of her tragedy. The whole fleet had been short of food at San Juan, and the fireships had deprived Hawkins of his chance of taking what remained in the *Jesus* before he left her. For two days he lingered off the port, and then he beat northwards up the Mexican coast for a fortnight until hunger forced him to seek the land. Already cats, dogs, rats, and parrots were being sold and eaten on board, and some were stewing the hides obtained in trade. The season of northerly Hawkins's fleet (*Span. Cal.*, No. 90). The *William and John* was the only one that returned to Ireland.

winds had now set in, and a long voyage was in prospect. In these straits some were for going back to surrender to the Spaniards, some for taking their chance with the native tribes, and some for staying by the ship. On the shore they found neither people, food, nor a place to careen the ship and repair her battle injuries. At best they could land from a boat with much wading and peril of drowning. John Hawkins had come to his darkest hour.

It was plain that all or some must abandon hope of making England in the *Minion*. Many were eager to leave her, and when he mustered the company and called for their choice the numbers were equally divided, a hundred to stay, a hundred to go.¹ So it was decided, and the boats were got out. When all were ashore Hawkins went to them, took friendly leave of every man, and promised that if he came safe home he would do his utmost to obtain their liberty; 'and', says Hortop, 'so he did'. He gave each of them six yards of cloth for barter with the Indians, and money also to those that asked it; and so they tramped off to diverse fates. Few ever saw England again, but Hawkins at least kept faith, as Philip was yet to learn to his cost. There was some criticism afterwards at negroes having been kept on board whilst white men were landed; but it is plain that those who went on shore thought they were making the better choice, and the few negroes would have bought food for the rest had the *Minion* reached a Spanish settlement.

The hundred who stayed by the ship suffered terribly. Hawkins was a week on the coast before he could finish his watering. For three days of that time he and fifty men were isolated on the shore by a storm in which the ship had a narrow escape of being wrecked. At length they got away, but it was not until the middle of November that the *Minion* passed out through the Florida Channel into the open Atlantic. By the end of Decem-

¹ So Hawkins; Hortop says 96 landed, and Philips, 114.

ber she was nearing Europe, losing men by hunger every day. Adverse winds put her to the southward of her course, and with scarcely a hand fit for duty she anchored at Ponte Vedra in Vigo Bay. There Hawkins obtained victuals, but excess of fresh meat proved as fatal as starvation on chewed ox-hides, and forty-five men died in sight of land.¹ He then moved the *Minion* to the town of Vigo, where he obtained twelve new hands from an English ship. With them he sailed for England on 20 January.

Phillip II was much annoyed that there had been no attempt to arrest the English at Vigo, and he ordered an inquiry to be held. From the statements of the witnesses we may gather how firmly Hawkins bore up under misfortune. He is described as a courteous man, erect and well proportioned, looking younger than he really was. One deponent saw him dressed in crimson velvet breeches, knitted stockings, and a scarlet leather jacket trimmed with silver braid. On another occasion he wore a silk cloak and a long gold chain.² None could have suspected that he was almost dying of hunger.

On 25 January 1569, a countryman working in the fields above Mount's Bay saw a battered ship approach the land and anchor. A boat put off from her, and a gaunt man stepped ashore. To the landsman's question he answered that the ship was the *Minion* and that the handful on board were, for all he knew, the only survivors of John Hawkins's great expedition to the Indies. The countryman made haste to Plymouth with the news, and William Hawkins had to send a fresh crew before the ship could be brought into Plymouth Sound. The Spanish ambassador reported that of the original hundred there were not more than fifteen survivors, and his statement cannot have been far from the truth.

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 42. The phrasing is ambiguous, but the above is probably its meaning.

² Arizmendi, *op. cit.*

BOOK II

THE PROTESTANTS AND THE
COUNTER-REFORMATION

I

THE PROTESTANT WAR

WHEN John Hawkins, with empty belly and burning heart, was struggling homewards in the winter darkness of 1568, the northerly gales that killed his starving men were symbolic of the change that had swept over the aspect of Europe since his departure the year before. Indeed, had he known in September what he was to learn in January, he might well have made a different decision at San Juan de Ulua, and have judged that the Queen's interest did not demand the sacrifice he had offered it when he admitted Don Martin Enriquez to that haven of disaster.

Before he had sailed from Plymouth in October 1567, there had been signs of the coming storm, but they had been signs of doubtful portent, such as no contemporary, not even Cecil, Coligny, or Philip II, could interpret with confidence. The Netherlands, for years boiling with sedition, had already broken into riot and mob-violence, but they had as yet shown no promise of an organized war of independence. Perhaps the last news Hawkins had heard of them had been that of the arrival of the Duke of Alva with his Spanish veterans from Italy; and Alva had not been more confident that any of the onlookers when he had declared that he would easily tame 'these men of butter'. France also had been uneasily quiet since the end of the first civil war, and there had as yet been no special indication that her Huguenots were to embark upon a struggle for their faith with more determination than they had shown in the tepid rising of 1562. To all appearance the situation of England in 1567 had been essentially the same as at the opening of Elizabeth's reign: the Queen, her throne most likely to be assailed from France and Scotland,

bound in consequence to political friendship with Philip II; her subjects likewise bound by commercial ties to his Spain and his Netherlands, whither the bulk of English exports were still directed; and the English Protestants, living at peace with their Catholic fellows, not at all disposed to precipitate a conflict by throwing in their lot with the more radical Calvinists of the continent. The signs that this stability was crumbling were yet doubtful. Perhaps the clearest of them had been the capture and imprisonment of Mary Stuart by her Protestant nobles in the summer of 1567; but the outcome of that could not have been apparent at Plymouth in October. So Hawkins conducted his voyage and suffered his overthrow on the assumption that his country's interests were such as he had left them.

In fact the change had been rapid and profound. Whatever may have been really agreed upon at the Bayonne conference of 1564, there had been in effect since that date a re-alignment of European forces. The initiative had been with Philip II, and he, as ever, was tardy and secretive, so that for years suspicion had to take the place of certainty in the minds of his victims. But the hidden springs were working and the disclosure of the new scene began in 1567. Catherine de Medici, shifty and untrustworthy, was yet ready in the main to co-operate. Not even the Florida massacre, carefully placarded as 'not of Frenchmen but of heretics', could stir up another Hapsburg-Valois conflict. The French envoy at Madrid might fume and rave as he liked,¹ but all knew that his mistress would not fight in such a cause. Alva therefore instituted his Council of Blood, slew Egmont and Horn and thousands more, and drove the stout-hearted minority into revolt. In 1568 William of Orange fought the first campaign of the War of Independence.

¹ Célestin Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, Paris, 1896, consisting of the letters of the French envoy at Madrid, 1566-8, contains in its earlier entries much matter on the Florida business.

He raised mercenaries beyond the border and invaded the Netherlands. But Alva's men routed him at Jemmingen, and he had to retire into exile. William himself was discredited, he had shown no military talent, and the people had been too cowed to rise in his support. Nevertheless the torch had been lighted, never to be quite put out. These despairing Dutchmen did not at first see where their true hope lay—on the waters of the narrow seas which formed the link between Spain and the Netherlands; that lesson was to be demonstrated from another quarter.

In France the autumn of 1567 saw the beginning of the second civil war, a feeble scuffle in which Frenchmen thought more of enlisting foreign mercenaries than of fighting themselves for their beliefs. It ended with an unsatisfactory peace in March 1568. One innovation sprang from it, the adhesion of Rochelle to the Huguenot cause. In the first war Coligny and his fellows had seen the advantage of possessing seaports, and had seized Dieppe, Havre, and Rouen. But those places, although their mariners and townsmen were Protestants, lay in an essentially Catholic part of France in which the crown's resources were strong, and so they had not long held out. England also had made a mistake by sending garrisons to occupy Havre and Rouen, a proceeding which had aroused patriotic suspicions and made it hard for good Frenchmen to take the Huguenot side. Rochelle was a much better naval base. It was remote from Paris, in a semi-Huguenot country, well fortified, and on a coast where hostile naval forces would find a blockade a more difficult task than in the Channel. Profiting by experience, England never made any move to occupy Rochelle, although she relieved it more than once when it was hard pressed. Rochelle became the citadel of the Huguenot revolt, a rival capital to Paris, gorged with plunder, proud of its mariners, never taken while the wars endured.

The second war gave Rochelle little chance to show its value, but the third was not long delayed. Rochelle, indeed, was almost its originator, refusing to admit a Catholic garrison after the peace of March, and occupying the summer in equipping a fleet. In September 1568, the Prince of Condé, Admiral Coligny, his brother d'Andelot, Jeanne, Queen of Navarre, and her son Henry, then aged fifteen, were all there, preparing for a determined fight and alive to the possibilities of the sea as well as of the land. Huguenot troops flocked to join them, and winter gave a respite for organization before the Catholic onslaught could develop. Condé and the Queen of Navarre assumed the right to issue letters of marque against all Catholic shipping, Spanish and Flemish as well as French; and the Huguenot Cardinal Châtillon, another of Coligny's brothers, came over to England to sue for aid and to distribute these commissions to English adventurers. So, just as Protestantism was beaten down in the Netherlands, it flamed up fiercely in France and on the seas, and the Prince of Orange made ready to serve the cause in the new theatre of war since he could for the present do no more in the old.

Rochelle lost no time in getting its fleet to sea. In October eleven ships sailed under Chastelier Pourtaut de Latour, and ere long they were bringing prizes into Plymouth.¹ There they found a welcome from Sir Arthur Champernowne, vice-admiral of Devon and an ardent Protestant, and from William Hawkins, as keen a watcher of international affairs as his absent brother. Hawkins at once joined the movement, and before the close of the year Jacques de Sores was afloat in command of his ship *Paul*.² Champernowne sent out two ships; Martin Frobisher, a hardened pirate achieving respectability as a privateer, equipped three; and in two months the cruisers under Condé's flag numbered more than fifty,

¹ La Popelinière, i. 81.

² H. C. A. Exemplifications, 7/9, Nos. 102, 153.

of whom thirty-one were English.¹ In December, William Winter, convoying the annual English wine-fleet to Bordeaux, threw into Rochelle as a present from Elizabeth six guns, 300 barrels of powder, 4,000 of ball, and £7,000 in cash,² the reasons for which partisanship will shortly be considered. Coligny and Rochelle had discovered a truth that William of Orange had not yet perceived, that for rebels the sea is the best road to international recognition, and that in the actual circumstances it was the most favourable field of action for the Protestant cause.

Sir William Cecil, observing the trend of events, realized that the time for action had arrived. His task was to preserve the throne of Elizabeth as the sovereign of a tolerantly Protestant England. He saw that the hunt was up, that the Counter-Reformation would never rest content with a merely continental triumph, but that a crusade against England would inevitably follow. The semi-independent Netherlands, barely held in check by Margaret of Parma, had been no threat to England; but the Netherlands under the iron hand of Alva, their fortresses garrisoned by his Spanish veterans, their ports full of shipping ready for use as transports, were another matter. It was vital to keep the continental Protestants in the field, and Cecil was for giving them generous assistance, perhaps even formal alliance. But Cecil was not a modern prime minister. He could offer advice, but he could not dictate, to a sovereign less wise than himself; and in the Privy Council he was but one among a dozen powerful men who were in nowise bound to his control and who were already resentful enough at the magnitude of his influence with the Queen. He had to plead rather than command, and his difficulties were increased by the events of this year in Scotland, whence Mary Stuart, again defeated by her subjects, had fled into

¹ La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, Paris, 1838, i. 178, 214.

² *Ibid.*, i. 153-4.

northern England to demand Elizabeth's aid in her restoration. For good reasons that aid could not be given, and Mary remained under guard in the north, a focus for the disaffection not only of the Catholics but of the old conservative nobility, who resented the decline of their order before the rise of the mercantile and maritime interests the new age was begetting. A less resolute man would have temporized and done nothing. Cecil staked all on the true interests of his country, braved the disloyalty of some and the conservatism of others, and went as far as he was allowed along the path of defiance to the Catholic powers.¹ In his mind a new grouping of England and her neighbours was arising, of the Protestant nations in a self-sufficing combination, the cloth export passing through a German entrepôt in place of Antwerp, the French trade through Rochelle, and perhaps the Peninsular trade through Lisbon, whose government would be only too glad to bury the hatchet if the English would but respect their monopoly of the Guinea coast. This is the general clue to the proceedings of the next few years.

With the Huguenot privateers swarming in the Channel, the Spanish Government now did an incredibly silly thing. For the payment of Alva's troops Philip had raised a great loan from the Italian bankers, and this wealth, all in coined money, was dispatched up Channel for the Netherlands in the latter part of November. No escort was provided, and the ships employed were destitute of any means of self-defence. They were an unarmed merchantman and some small pinnaces—half a dozen lambs sent forth to make their way through a pack of hungry wolves. The wolves were not slow to scent their prey. The ship, with fifty-nine chests of specie, fled into Southampton with three French and three English privateers at her heels; and her captain

¹ J. A. Froude, *Reign of Elizabeth*, Everyman ed., vol. iii, pp. 1-6, an appreciation of the situation, based upon a document of Cecil's composition.

was half bullied, half persuaded into agreeing that the money was not safe even under the guns of the town walls. He gave a reluctant consent for it to be unladen and carried within.¹ Three or four of the pinnaces put into Plymouth, Fowey, and Falmouth, with ninety-five boxes of money between them; and two were rumoured actually to have got through to Antwerp. The treasure in the western ports was hotly beset, and the pinnaces were probably saved from being cut out as they lay by the fact that Winter's Rochelle and Bordeaux fleet delayed its voyage to protect them. Winter could not stay indefinitely, and when he moved off these cargoes of specie were also landed, under the joyful supervision of Sir Arthur Champernowne and William Hawkins.²

At this stage the Queen's expressed intention was to provide an escort by sea, or to transport the treasure through England and forward it from London to the Netherlands, the understanding as yet being that it was legally Philip's property. Meanwhile, another anxiety was growing insistent. What had become of John Hawkins? His former expeditions had been home by the end of September, but this year, as October and November passed without a word of him, the uneasiness of the Queen and the adventurers grew into a foreboding of disaster. The Spaniards of the treasure pinnaces were questioned, and one of them, lately returned from the Indies, told a tale that was one part true and three parts false. Hawkins, he said, had made a wonderfully prosperous voyage along the Main, had taken a treasure-ship and spoiled a city, and now, finding the season too far advanced to return, was wintering at a West Indian island and would be back in May, 'further, the worst boy in those ships, if God send them home in safety, may be a captain for riches, and he [the Spaniard] wished to God that he had been one of his men'.³ This was

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 3.

² *Ibid.*, No. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 48, No. 49.

fine enough, but on 3 December William Hawkins, in a letter to Cecil, had a different tale to tell. Winter, fresh from London, had told him that Benedict Spinola had a letter from Spain giving news of the death of John Hawkins, with details showing how he had been obliged to travel far inland in search of trade and had been entrapped and slain by a great force of Spaniards.¹ This Benedict Spinola was the London agent of the lenders of Philip's treasure, and William Hawkins went on to suggest that he should be questioned, and that if the tale were true the treasure should be seized forthwith.

To Cecil, bent upon war of some sort, open or disguised, this was no unwelcome advice, for he must have held it folly to hand over to Alva the wherewithal for an invasion of England. Others in London were pressing the same course, the Cardinal Châtillon and his English adherents, and the Lord Admiral, eager for spoil at sea. Spinola was doubtless examined, although there is no record of it, and he or another, in fear of confiscation of the treasure, let out a hitherto undisclosed fact which Cecil immediately turned to advantage. It was that the money was not yet Philip's property, but remained that of the lenders until it should actually be delivered at Antwerp. Here then was the pretext, and Elizabeth, who as late as 12 December had promised safe conduct, now reconsidered the matter and declared that nothing should be done until the question of ownership had been investigated. By the 21st the Spanish ambassador was certain she meant to seize the treasure to her own use. That, in fact, was gradually seen to be the truth, and after due delay it was announced that the Queen had herself arranged with the Italians that they should lend her their money.²

In considering this affair it is well to face the facts and to pause before moralizing upon the dishonesty of Cecil and his mistress. The first fact is that Philip's in-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 48, No. 50.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 62, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71 A, 71 B.

competent servants had lost him this money before ever an Englishman had set eyes on it. Had there been no English ships and guns to intervene, every ducat would have been gladdening the hearts of Coligny and the Rochellois before November was out. Next it should be remembered that the doctrines of marine insurance, average, and salvage were as well developed then as now, as there is many an Admiralty trial to prove. Even in our own tender age, the salvor of goods from certain loss at sea may be awarded one-third of their value; and Elizabeth, had she forwarded the specie, would have been entitled by established rules to retain a substantial proportion of it. Finally, the spirit of the age, as we have noticed more than once, distinguished legality from equity, and once Spinola had made his avowal legality was on the side of the Queen. The money was not Philip's, and he had no valid grievance; he had not been treated generously, but he had been treated lawfully, and in the circumstances of the time he could hardly have expected generosity.

Spain was at this juncture unfortunate in her representative at the English court. In the summer of 1568 the suave and capable de Silva had been recalled, and in September there had arrived in his place Don Guerau de Spes, a man whose faults were as great as de Silva's merits. De Spes was far less subtle and intelligent than his predecessor, and so transparent in his double dealing that he speedily became as an open book to his English hosts. He was arrogant, bad-tempered, bigoted, and contemptuous, and his dislike of the English nation crystallized rapidly into a violent personal hatred of Sir William Cecil. Above all, as his early letters and his handling of the treasure dispute bear witness, he was ignorant of his duty, having studied neither the treaties regulating the relations of England with Spain, nor the controversial questions of the past few years. He seems, for example, scarcely to have heard the name of John Hawkins, and he certainly did not know the details of

his expeditions.¹ So passionate were his prejudices that they impelled him to write falsely coloured reports to his master and the Duke of Alva, and to receive with childish credulity any schemer who came to tell him what it pleased him to hear. The three years of his mission are a story of folly and humiliation, ending with his well-justified expulsion from the country. The ineptitude of Philip in choosing such an envoy is comparable to that shown in the dispatch of the treasure-ships without protection.

On 21 December de Spes wrote to Alva that the money at Southampton had been landed and that he thought similar orders had been sent to the western ports. This was quite true, in fact the news was a little stale; but the ambassador went on to say that all English ships and goods ought forthwith to be seized in the Netherlands and the like course to be taken in Spain as soon as possible. Next day he reiterated the advice, and again in a third letter a week later. Alva complied, proclaiming the arrest in his jurisdiction on 29 December. Up to this point de Spes had nothing definite to go upon, framing his policy, by his own confession, on mere moral-certainty and hearsay. Not until 8 January could he report that the Queen had formally taken possession of the money.² By that time her opponents, by the blunder of the arrest, had put her completely in the right even on the assumption that the treasure really belonged to Philip. For the *Magnus Intercursus* of 1495, to which they themselves appealed in the course of the dispute, laid it down that no general arrest of goods should be made until formal complaint of grievance had been lodged and redress denied. One arrest, however, justified another, and Elizabeth at once retaliated by seizing all Spanish and Flemish goods in England and gaining con-

¹ As appears from his request to Philip in Sept. 1568, to be informed whether Hawkins has traded in the West Indies since 1563.

² *Spanish Calendar*, references as above.

siderably the better of the exchange; for Antwerp, as it happened, had been fairly empty of English merchandise. In Spain things moved more slowly, and the general arrest was not proclaimed in Andalusia until 7 February, nor in North Spain until the 19th.¹ This delay gave time for an English wine-fleet to come away untouched.² Elizabeth's initiative, in fact, had placed the enemy in a cleft stick. If they arrested promptly, without due process, they put themselves out of court in the treasure dispute; if they complied with the rules, they found nothing to arrest. It was the misfortune of Spain to take both courses and so to give England the maximum advantage. On 6 January the English Government issued a proclamation that all trade with the Netherlands and Spain should cease until further notice, the reason being that Alva had seized English property without previous negotiation, and had done so, moreover, on the very day on which de Spes had had an audience of the Queen to request safe-conduct for the treasure. This request she had not denied, but had promised to consider, and therefore she left it to the public to judge if she was to blame in the matter.³

In the midst of these contentions John Hawkins at last arrived, and it must have been bitter to him to learn that if he had come home with the news that he had sunk Don Martin Enriquez and all his fleet no great fuss would have been made of it. Five days before his appearance Drake had come into Plymouth Sound with the *Judith*, with the full story of San Juan de Ulua, but knowing nothing of his commander's fate. William Hawkins at once sent on Drake to tell his tale to Cecil, praying at the same time for compensation from the Spanish property at Plymouth, and stating that he was ready to send four privateers to sea at once. He had already, he

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 17, 22 June 1569.

² *Cabala sive Scrinia Sacra*, p. 148.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 71 A.

said, commissions for them from Châtillon, but feared to proceed without English authority.¹ His assumption of caution must have made Cecil smile, for he was already in trouble in the Admiralty Court on account of the depredations of de Sores in the *Paul*.²

Scarcely had Drake reached London when, on 25 January 1569, John Hawkins anchored in Mount's Bay and dispatched the following letter to Cecil:

'Right Honourable,

My duty most humbly considered, it may please your honour to be advertised that the 25th day of January (thanks be to God) we arrived in a place in Cornwall called Mount's Bay, only with the *Minion* which is left us of all our fleet; and because I would not in my letters be prolix after what manner we came to our disgrace, I have sent your honour here enclosed some part of the circumstance, and although not all our miseries that hath passed, yet the greatest matters worthy of noting; but if I should write of all our calamities, I am sure a volume as great as the Bible will scanty suffice. All which things I most humbly beseech your honour to advertise the Queen's Majesty and the rest of her Council, such as ye shall think meet. Our voyage was, although very hardly, well achieved and brought to reasonable pass, but now a great part of our treasure, merchandise, shipping and men devoured by the treason of the Spaniards. I have not much or anything more to advertise your honour nor the rest, because all our business hath had infelicity, misfortune and an unhappy end, and therefore will [not] trouble the Queen's Majesty nor the rest of my good lords with such ill news, but even pray your honour eftsoons to import to each as ye shall think meet the sequel of our business. I mind with God's grace to make all expedition to London myself, at what time I shall declare more of our estate that is here omitted.

Thus praying to God for your honour's prosperous estate, I take my leave; from the *Minion* the 25th day of January, 1568,

Yours most humbly to command,

John Hawkyns.³

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 36.

² H. C. A. Exemplifications, 7/9, Nos. 160, 161.

³ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 40. The document now placed with

A letter written in such circumstances cannot but reveal something of the personality of the writer. This one is at least manly and straightforward, stating the facts without excuse or railing, exaggerating and minimizing nothing; and, sick as Hawkins must have been, the only discernible effect of his sufferings upon the clearness of his mind is the fact that he repeats himself in one particular. Yet no man can emerge without a scar from such an experience as his, and we are conscious henceforward that the days of his youth are over, that he is a sadder and wiser although not an embittered man. He was now thirty-six years old.

With aid from his brother he brought the *Minion* into Plymouth, unladed the treasure, and set forth for London by road. The *Minion* herself lay at Plymouth until 17 April, and then sailed for the Thames.¹ With that notice, the veteran passes out of history, having achieved a record of hard and tragic service such as fell to the lot of few other ships of the Royal Navy. What became of her may be guessed; she was nearly as old as her commander and can have been fit for little but breaking up.

John Hawkins was in London early in February. The story of his voyage was not at first made public, and it was said that he had left the majority of his men as colonists in Florida.² This, however, was mere rumour, and soon the real facts came out. He himself wrote for the press the account of the voyage that Hakluyt has reprinted, and in March the syndicate opened in the Admiralty Court the proceedings which have already been quoted as evidence for the trading profits and the fighting at San Juan. This process was of the type called a *querela*, that is, a formal statement of damage, backed

it as an enclosure is the abstract from Hawkins's log, a mere list of places and dates, which seems hardly to correspond with the description in the letter.

¹ Port Books, Plymouth, 1011/12, 17 Apr. 1569.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 78.

by the evidence of witnesses. Its purpose was to place the facts on record rather than to secure a judgement, for by the nature of the case the defendants could not be cited. It might be, although in this case it was not, the preliminary to the issue of letters of reprisal. The Portuguese used the same process; their books of complaint about the Guinea depredations are in a precisely similar form, an illustration of the fact that the procedure of the English Court of Admiralty was, until quite modern times, of continental origin and method.

Don Guerau de Spes watched the transaction, although he took no part in it. He had no complaint to make about the late expedition. The Portuguese ambassador, on the other hand, lost no time in demanding redress for the African proceedings. In February he asked Cecil that he and Hawkins might be confronted with each other before the Council; but nothing seems to have come of it. Cecil was in sympathy with Hawkins,¹ although the latter, remembering past passages, was a little sensitive about what might be said of him. On 6 March he wrote to the minister, begging him not to listen to evil-speakers, who 'speak the worst in everything and find many faults, where if they had been present peradventure would have done worse'. In the same letter he threw out a broad hint about letters of reprisal, saying that if Cecil would further his recompence as others had had it in such cases, he (Hawkins) would give him a fourth part of what should be obtained.² This is, incidentally, a side-light upon Cecil, for Hawkins knew well the man he was writing to. However, he got no formal sanction for reprisals. The time was threatening and the state had need of him; and if he liked to try his hand at privateering he could always get his commission from Condé or Coligny, for whose doings the English Government could disclaim responsibility.

In the privateering of 1569 it is the name of Wil-

¹ *Cabala*, p. 148.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 57.

liam Hawkins that is the more prominent,¹ John being occupied—so far as can be ascertained—in more regular government employment. William Hawkins, a man of nearly fifty, was a landsman-shipowner who managed his fleet from his Plymouth base. There is no record in these years of his being personally at sea, but he knew how to attract into partnership some of the ablest captains of the time—Jacques de Sores, Richard Grenville, and, if he may be mentioned in such company, Thomas Stukeley. De Sores took the *Paul* to sea before the close of 1568, and was back almost immediately with two Flemish prizes. This was before the arrest and was done under Condé's letters of marque. The Flemings took action in the Admiralty Court, and Hawkins was summoned to London. But he was at the moment busy with the Spanish treasure, and Sir Arthur Champernowne, a privateer partner of his, found him indispensable and took it upon himself to order him not to go. Hawkins, he said handsomely, was 'for his wisdom, honesty, credit, and zeal not inferior to any of his calling in this country', and those who were troubling him at law were 'ill disposed persons'.² So William Hawkins stayed at Plymouth, and the action against him appears to have failed. Some time in 1569 the *New Bark*, jointly owned by Champernowne, Hawkins, and Philip Budocushyde (pronounced, and by the illiterate spelt, Budshed), took a cargo belonging to Fernando de Quintanadoine, merchant of Rouen, and brought the goods into Plymouth.³ Quintanadoine will be recognized as a hereditary foe, evidently a relation of the Quintana Dueñas who had got old William Hawkins into prison in the days of Henry VIII. The *New Bark* likewise took in February 950 ducats at sea from an Emden shipmaster, on suspicion that he was a Fleming. But this man proved his

¹ The file of H. C. A. Exemplifications, No. 7/9, contains several documents relating to his captures.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 49, No. 2.

³ H. C. A., 7/9, No. 161.

nationality and was then offered half the money to cry quits, upon which he appealed to the Privy Council and got an order for full restitution.¹ Other Admiralty papers show that Plymouth was in this year a regular emporium for goods taken at sea, most of them on the account of Hawkins and his partners.

Latour, the Huguenot admiral, in like manner used the Solent as his base throughout the winter, and in March returned to Rochelle enriched with plunder.² A month later the Queen's own ships took part in the business. Four of them, commanded by one of the Winters, sailing to the rendezvous of a second Rochelle relief expedition, came upon fourteen Spanish and Portuguese hulks near Dunkirk. These vessels were a convoy laden with spices for the Antwerp market. In spite of their numbers, Winter attacked them. The Spaniards fought stoutly and inflicted many casualties, but the English took eight of them and brought them into port.³ Guerau de Spes made a furious protest, but could only grow more convinced than ever that Cecil was bent on war. He had already accused the minister of personally taking a share of the spoil;⁴ and, whether that was true or not, it is difficult to see how this last exploit could be covered merely by the arrest.

Many other English privateers were reaping their harvest under the Huguenot flag. Among them the *Castle of Comfort* took a prominent place. At the beginning of 1569 she was lying at Plymouth, and was there sold to Sir Henry Compton by the syndicate which had sent her to Guinea under Fenner. Her new owner, after purchasing stores and ordnance from William Hawkins, sent her to sea after Easter under the command of Thomas Jones, a gentleman of Lynn. Jones was provided with a Condé commission obtained from the Cardinal Châtill-

¹ H. C. A., 7/9, Nos. 198, 277, 279, 281. ² La Popelinière, i. 82.

³ La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, i. 296, 351-2.

⁴ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 90.

lon 'to pass unto the seas in warlike sort to apprehend and take all the enemies of God, otherwise called papists'.¹ Off the coast of Brittany he fell in with a Frenchman laden with sugar from Barbary. Conveniently discovering that the goods were Spanish-owned, he brought them into the Solent and sold them to merchants of Southampton.² He then steered the *Castle of Comfort* for his native North Sea and passed the rest of the year spoiling Flemings and Germans.³ The *Castle of Comfort*, as has been shown, was a stronger ship than was common in her trade, and her long run of successes is probably responsible for her prominence in the Admiralty records.

In the summer the Huguenot operations took on a more regular aspect with the appointment of Jacques de Sores as commander-in-chief in succession to Latour. The latter had joined the land forces and had been killed at Jarnac in March. Sores kept a nucleus of good fighting ships with his own flag and employed them for strategic objects, instead of allowing all to rove indiscriminately as before.⁴ He tried to blockade the Gironde, so as to divert the trade of Bordeaux to Rochelle; but the Catholics brought a force of galleys round from the Mediterranean and reopened the navigation. Thereafter he based himself on Portsmouth and held the up-Channel passage, taking every 'papist' vessel that came his way.⁵ In December 1569 he captured two great Venetian carracks near the Isle of Wight, and one of them he rearmed as *La Grande Huguenotte*, the most powerful warship under his flag.⁶

The Huguenots alone were probably equal to holding

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 17, 6, 18 Mar., 13, 15 Apr. 1570; No. 18, 12 Sept., 13, 16 Oct. 1570; 18 Jan. 1571.

² H. C. A., Oyer & Terminer, 1/39, 25 Nov. 1569.

³ H. C. A. Exemplifications, 7/9, No. 195.

⁴ La Popelinière, i. 97. ⁵ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 159.

⁶ La Roncière, iv. 110-11, 114.

the Channel, with English connivance, against any fleet that Spain could send against them; although it should be remembered that most of their craft were mere small rovers, unable to stand up to a regular warship. But in the latter part of 1569 a movement began which rendered the Catholic cause finally hopeless at sea, the equipment of a privateer squadron by the Dutch and Flemish rebels under licence of William of Orange. In August or September the Lord of Dolhain took the sea with a modest eighteen sail, making the Netherland coast and the Straits of Dover the especial scene of his operations. In spite of the fact that Philip II had a naval administration and certainly some available warships in the Netherland ports, nothing was done to check these Sea Beggars, whose depredations ere long eclipsed those of the Rochellois. By the spring of the following year they had nearly a hundred ships and had taken three hundred prizes. Cosmopolitan adventurers joined them, including many Englishmen, but for their first three years they laboured under the disadvantage of having no native base of their own and of being obliged to depend upon English hospitality. But Cecil and his mistress as yet saw no reason to deny them full facilities; they meant to keep the Protestant fire alight upon the continent and to prove to Philip and Alva that there was no real chance for an invasion of England on behalf of the Queen of Scots. Dolhain was therefore permitted to use Dover and the Solent, and even the port of London itself. We may take as an illustration the story of Michael Cox of Nelston in Leicestershire. In September 1569 he joined a ship of Dolhain's in the Thames, and his company took so many prizes on the Flemish coast that they merely levied ransom and released them. Cox returned to London to spend his winnings after the winter's cruise, but in 1570 he went again to sea and passed a further year taking prizes in the Channel and the Straits. These were disposed of in English ports, although occasionally

the Court of Admiralty intervened to enforce restitution. Cox mentions that it did so in the case of a fly-boat captured by 'one Hawkins', although in most instances the rightful owners compounded for their property.¹

Records of this sort emphasize the sordid motives of the rovers. Yet it must not be forgotten that the great men who loosed them upon the seas were actuated by genuine religious and patriotic zeal, and that behind this orgy of haphazard violence there lay a strategic purpose. That purpose was in the end achieved, the preservation of the religion in France, the nurture into vigorous life of the spirit of Dutch independence, and the defence of Elizabeth's throne, the keystone of the whole. That is the justification of Cecil and Coligny and Orange for what their enemies have described as a course of criminal adventure unworthy of statesmen; and modern freedom, which owes them its existence, cannot decently decry them.

Before this amorphous background certain definite operations stand out more clearly. The breach with the Netherlands would have been very serious for the English cloth industry had not Cecil foreseen it and taken measures to provide an alternative port to Antwerp. His agents had been preparing the ground for months before the crisis, with the result that in 1569 Hamburg was found willing to act as the distributing centre of English cloth for German consumption, just as Antwerp had done for a century past. In March, accordingly, the cloth fleet began to gather in the Thames, and the Merchants Adventurers to make up their cargoes, not only with English manufactures but with the spices, sugars, and dyestuffs taken by the rovers and sold cheap in English ports. With captured property on board, the fleet ran a risk of Spanish reprisals, and Alva was re-

¹ Cox tells his own story in *H. C. A.*, Oyer & Terminer, 1/39, 7 Sept. 1571.

ported to be organizing an attack as it crossed the North Sea. But the government detailed seven warships as an escort and the experienced William Winter to command the whole, and these measures resulted in a peaceful transit. Winter left Harwich on 19 May, reached Hamburg four days later, and was back with five of the Queen's ships on 1 June, leaving the other two to bring home the merchantmen. So successful had been the undertaking that in September a second convoy crossed to Hamburg, richer than the first; and the lucrative nature of the business did much to reconcile the mercantile interest to the disorders in the Channel and the loss of the Flemish trade.¹

The Merchants Adventurers continued to use Hamburg for several years; then they moved successively to Emden and Stade. When Dutch independence was assured they shifted their depot to Middelburg; but in the Stuart period they again resorted to Hamburg and continued to do so until the ancient system was broken down by Napoleon's conquest of Germany. The Adventurers themselves were in consequence dissolved in 1808.

A more delicate affair was the necessity of dispatching a fleet to Rochelle, partly on a mercantile errand, partly to convey succours to the Huguenot armies. Those armies knew that they would have to fight hard in 1569, for the Catholic forces had been gathering all the winter to fall upon them. Alva also might well have lent aid to the Valois cause, but that the loss of the Italian treasure had crippled him. On the other side, William of Orange and his brothers Louis and Henry of Nassau, in alliance with the Duke of Zweibrücken and a mercenary force, made ready to invade France from the east and co-operate with the leaders at Rochelle. The campaign opened early and unfavourably for the Hugue-

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 106; La Mothe Fénelon, i. 270-1, 339, ii. 153-4, 192; *Cabala*, pp. 151-2.

nots. On 13 March they were defeated in the action of Jarnac which, although not a serious reverse in the military sense, was of some political consequence; for the Prince of Condé was killed, and the importance of the defeat was overrated by friend and foe alike. It frightened Elizabeth and encouraged those elements in England which were denouncing Cecil's policy as unsound. The Queen, however, at length determined to let her minister and the maritime interest have their way. Coligny soon rallied his party, and was more fully the master of it now that its titular head had perished; and in April-May, Zweibrücken and the Orange princes crossed France and joined him on the Loire.

On the score of trade the Rochelle voyage was a necessity in order to obtain salt for the fisheries. In addition, the English wine-cellars needed replenishment, there was sea-borne plunder to be had at bargain prices, and the government was ready to take as much popish bell-metal as the churches of France could be made to yield for conversion into great ordnance. On her side, Elizabeth was ready to furnish money, arms, and gunpowder.

English state papers nowhere record the name of the commander of the expedition which sailed for these purposes. But, on various considerations, it may be believed that it was John Hawkins. La Mothe Fénelon, the French ambassador in London, gives the name as 'Sir John Basin'.¹ Such a person is otherwise unknown, and there was certainly no naval officer of that name of sufficient standing to command an important enterprise. It seems likely that La Mothe or the editors of his correspondence have written 'Basin' for 'Haquin', the usual French form for Hawkins's name. Again, John Prince the antiquary, writing two centuries ago, described the grants of arms made to John Hawkins in 1565 and 1571. Prince related from these grants certain details of the slaving voyages, and added that in 1567 Hawkins went

¹ *Correspondance*, i. 351-2.

to the relief of the distressed Huguenots at Rochelle. But Rochelle was not distressed in that year, neither could Hawkins have gone to its relief, for his movements are otherwise accounted for. The actual date is more likely 1569, misread by Prince. Manuscripts at the College of Arms confirm that author's slaving details but contain no mention of Rochelle, for which the antiquary must have had another authority, not now traceable. But the corroboration in the other matters entitles his statement to respect.¹ Finally, William Hawkins and the Plymouth men bore an active part in equipping the force, and it is implied by a French authority that William accompanied it.² He may have done so, but it was not his usual practice to go to sea in person, and here again is a possibility that he has been confused with John. If John Hawkins was really the commander, the silence of official documents, coupled with this series of unofficial errors, is certainly curious; but the maritime history of the sixteenth century is to a great extent based upon unsatisfactory fragments, and we have, with due scepticism, to make the best of the material as we find it.

In April the Rochelle fleet gathered in the Thames, consisting of thirty or more London ships and twelve or fifteen from Colchester and the neighbouring ports. On the 23rd all left the Thames, to the number of forty-nine sail, and went down Channel to Portsmouth. There or at sea they were joined by the western members of the expedition, eight ships equipped by William Hawkins, and others making up the total to over sixty. The Hawkins squadron carried from Plymouth a quantity of grain and 500 salted carcasses of cattle, a supply as acceptable to Coligny as the arms and powder from the Tower. Among the passengers were fifty English engineers

¹ College of Arms MSS., Harvey's grants, I. C. B., No. 101, f. 109; and Old Grants of Arms ✕, f. 62. Prince, *Worthies of Devon*, 1810 edn., pp. 472 seqq.

² La Roncière, iv, 110.

skilled in making batteries, mines, and trenches; and work was ready to their hands on the fortifications of Rochelle. The fleet reached its destination by the middle of May, transacted its business satisfactorily, and was back in the Thames on 6 July. As with the Hamburg expedition, the absence of fighting was due to good organization and leadership, for by this time there were many Catholic cruisers at sea, basing their operations on the Norman and Breton ports. The work at Rochelle also was of the kind for which John Hawkins was peculiarly fitted; much of the trade was on government account and needed the supervision of the commander-in-chief, and there was doubtless a good deal of confidential business with the Huguenot leaders.¹

La Mothe naturally protested in the name of Charles IX against the whole proceeding. He claimed that Rochelle was under blockade; but international law in such matters had not then established a doctrine, and in any case the blockade was not effective. Cecil treated the business as purely mercantile and instructed Sir William Garrard to discuss it with the Frenchman. The merchants declared that they must have trade with Rochelle, for salt could not be obtained elsewhere;² and the Valois government put up with the affront because, like Philip II, it judged the endurance of semi-hostility preferable to driving England to extremities.

The Devon adventurers committed a further breach of neutrality. In the autumn of 1569 Henry Champernowne, son of Sir Arthur, led a cornet of English horse

¹ The story of the Rochelle expedition is gathered from: A. Héron, *Deux Chroniques de Rouen*, Rouen, 1900, pp. 357-8; La Roncière, *ut supra*; La Popelinière, i, 97, 142; La Mothe Fénelon, i, 336-9, ii, 80. In spite of the assertion of one of the authorities, the navy accounts for the year give no indication that any of the Queen's ships were employed. Had they been, we should have the name of the commander; the ships and officers of the Hamburg fleet are given. Exchequer, L.T.R., Declared Accounts, No. 2205.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1569-71, No. 445; *Cabala*, 151-2.

to serve with Coligny in the field. The device on its standard was a corpse with a severed head on a black ground and the words *Det mihi virtus finem*. These Englishmen arrived too late to fight at Moncontour, meeting the fugitives from that disaster as they were making their own way to the front. They kept the field until the midsummer of 1570, when their number was said to be reduced to a dozen.¹ Walter Raleigh, then aged seventeen, served with this squadron, and in his few remarks on the subject gives credit to Louis of Nassau for saving the remains of the Protestant army after Moncontour.² The latter defeat was a much more serious blow to Coligny than Jarnac had been. It threw him on the defensive and would have crushed a less determined leader. Nevertheless he recovered much of his ground and was able in August 1570 to obtain a fairly favourable peace, by which Rochelle remained in full possession of the Huguenots. The retention of Rochelle enabled Louis of Nassau to use its harbour for the purposes of the Sea Beggars, whilst William of Orange had gone back to the east to organize a new Dutch revolt on land. This alternation of France and the Netherlands as the fields of the Protestant war was partly due to Cecil's skilful handling of English diplomacy, and accounts for the continued postponement of the invasion of England itself.

After his probable command of the Rochelle relief, we lose sight of Hawkins until the following year. There is, however, a possibility that he had another state employment in the latter part of 1569. In November the Catholic and conservative nobles broke out in the rebel-

¹ This forgotten adventure appears to have left no trace in English records. The above details are from the contemporary Frenchman, La Popelinière, *Hist. de France*, i, 140, 177.

² *History of the World*, Bk. V, Ch. II, §§ 3, 8. Raleigh did not claim, as some of his biographers have stated, to have been at Jarnac. All he said was that he remembered some contemporary talk on the subject.

lion known as the Rising of the North. Its object was to restore Catholicism and place Mary Stuart on the throne, but it was ill-supported, for many who would have joined a movement to overthrow Cecil would not go to the length of deposing the Queen. If the rebels were poor in numbers and zeal, still more so were the government forces, militia levies hastily raised from half-disloyal counties, clamorous for pay and disinclined to fight. With them the Earl of Sussex had no great hope of success, although ultimately the revolt subsided of itself, killed by the faintheartedness of its leaders. Between these Falstaffian opponents a couple of thousand Spanish regulars would have made all the difference; and one of the few sound things the rebels did was to possess themselves of Hartlepool and send word to the Netherlands that a port was open. Alva had neither money nor time for an invasion in form—had he been long absent the Netherlands would have risen behind his back; but he was prepared to risk a raid if assured that success would be rapid. The rebels, however, failed to achieve the condition he laid down as indispensable—the rescue of Mary Stuart from captivity—and so in the end he refused to stir. The English government was alive to the danger, and the Queen's ships in the Medway were sent to sea, some to watch the Flemish coast and some to lie off Hartlepool.

It would be strange if John Hawkins bore no part in this defensive scheme, unless he was engaged in more important business of which no hint has survived.¹ Here it may be explained that the only persons who then bore the permanent rank of admiral were rather civil admini-

¹ *The Fugger News-Letters*, 2nd series, London, 1926, p. 7, contain a Seville report dated 7 Dec. 1569, to the effect that Hawkins had recently been seen off Cape St. Vincent with 25 ships, bound for the West Indies. The details give ground for suspicion, especially some allusions to Drake as if he were already the well-known figure he became ten years later. It looks almost as if two documents of different dates had been mixed.

strators than sea commanders: the Lord High Admiral, who never went to sea save with the whole marine of England under his flag, as in the Armada campaign; and the vice-admirals of the maritime counties, who raised ships and men and carried on the local jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, but were likewise land officials rather than seamen. The small squadrons which performed from time to time the duties that have received mention in this chapter were usually commanded by those subordinate officers of the Lord Admiral's staff who happened to be seamen, such as William Winter, the Master of the Ordnance, and William Holstocke, the Comptroller of the Navy. John Hawkins was on the fringe of this category, for in 1567 he had secured the reversion of the post of Clerk of the Queen's Ships.¹ It was an office which he never actually assumed, for before it fell vacant he had obtained higher preferment.

Sir William Cecil, when inaugurating an anti-Spanish policy at the close of 1568, foresaw that the changed circumstances would be of some duration. One of their chief disadvantages was the interruption of trade, and that, in its most important aspect, he had provided against by opening a cloth-mart at Hamburg in place of Antwerp. But the English trade with Andalusia was also considerable, and the Spanish arrest must have been a severe blow to some of the merchants who were his chief supporters. To a certain extent the plunder brought in by the Channel privateers helped to fill the gap. It was nevertheless desirable to secure some gate of entry into the Peninsula, and so we find from 1569 a changed attitude towards Portugal, not an abandonment of the English doctrine of effective occupation in Guinea, but certainly a disposition to be less relentless in its application.

In the first part of the year, indeed, matters were at their worst, owing to the Winters' seizures under their

¹ Patent Roll, 9 Eliz., part 9.

letters of reprisal; and in June some English goods were arrested in Portugal.¹ But two months later de Spes reported that England was seeking to patch up the dispute, and that Cecil and the merchants had a plan to get the northern spice entrepôt transferred from Antwerp to London.² During the winter he heard nevertheless that a number of ships had gone to Guinea, and that some of them meant to carry slaves thence to the Indies.³ The two affairs continued side by side, the English adventurers being allowed to show what they could still do in Guinea, and the government evincing a somewhat lukewarm willingness to negotiate. The advantage hoped from an accommodation with Portugal was an indirect trade through Lisbon with Seville. In June 1570 a Portuguese named Antonio Fogaza was proposing terms to Cecil, but it is doubtful whether he had any authority to do so and certain that his status was not that of an ambassador.⁴ Cecil, however, thought it well to make an advance and issued orders for a Guinea voyage projected by one William Curtes and Hector Nuñez, a Portuguese physician long settled in London, to be stopped. These two men and several others were again inhibited in March 1571;⁵ yet at the same time government servants like John Hawkins and William Winter were able to dispatch seven or eight ships for the usual slaving voyage.⁶ It may well have been the Hawkins influence that secured the prohibition of the less favoured, for too much competition was obviously undesirable. The details of these voyages have been lost. Hawkins could doubtless have told Hakluyt something about them, but his habitual reticence on past adventures closed his lips. Portugal, still resentful, again

¹ *Cabala*, p. 152.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 130, 131, 140.

³ *Ibid.*, Nos. 161, 180.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 190.

⁵ *Cotton MSS.*, Galba, C. iv, f. 22; *Acts of the Privy Council*, 1571-5, p. 20.

⁶ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 238, 242.

arrested English shipping in 1571. In 1571-2 two draft treaties were evolved by the negotiators in London. One, evidently from the Portuguese side, proposed the usual prohibition of English voyages to Africa; the other, the recognition of English trade with Madeira, the Azores, and all Africa north of Cape Verde, but not with Guinea.¹ Neither was completed, and it was not until 1576 that any conclusion was reached. The treaty signed in that year merely provided for a cessation of hostilities and for the appointment of commissioners to determine the main dispute.² There is no evidence that they did so, or even that they ever met. Cecil's leanings towards amity with Portugal therefore bore little fruit, for the African trade was too lucrative to be sacrificed. A paper of 1576 shows that the Barbary traffic alone was more valuable than that with Portugal.³

John Hawkins himself took no personal part in the later Guinea and West Indian expeditions. He had bigger game in view, although it was not his fortune to put his plans into action. On 4 June 1570 he wrote to the Earl of Leicester explaining how the homeward-bound plate fleet might be attacked. It was expected this year to be at the Azores by the middle of August, with a lading worth £6,000,000 of English money. 'This whole fleet (with God's grace) shall be intercepted and taken within these three months, for the extreme injuries offered unto this realm; which wrongs being satisfied with the costs, the great mass shall be at the courtesy of the Queen's Highness to restore or keep.' The third part (i.e. two millions), he continued, would satisfy the losses. He himself would furnish ten warships at his own cost, and he requested the Earl to borrow the *Bonaventure* and the *Bull* of the Queen. Arms and powder, for which

¹ *Foreign Calendar*, 1569-71, No. 2191; 1572-4, No. 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1575-7, No. 986.

³ Cited in V. M. Shillington and A. B. W. Chapman, *Commercial Relations of England and Portugal*, London, 1907, p. 143.

Hawkins would pay, would be needed from the Tower. Nothing else was necessary but the Queen's consent.¹

Hawkins had said as little as he could about his wrongs, and that little had been temperately worded; but here was what he really meant, and we may depend upon it that there was good prospect of doing it.

The plan evidently gained the approval of Leicester and the Queen, although perhaps not that of Cecil, who was on bad terms with the Earl. Some at least in the Council were opposed to it, not caring to strip the home defences of so great a force.² But some kind of sanction was given, and John Hawkins went down to Plymouth to fit his ships; for he had no time to lose. Seven years afterwards, in a list of claims against the government, he mentioned these ten ships as being kept ready for two years in the hope that a worthy piece of service might be done, but he did not desire to make any charge for their upkeep, 'which I will not value.'³ They never took a plate fleet, but he did make them a scourge to Philip in another manner, as will appear in its place.

The further history of the scheme must be viewed chiefly through the eyes of Guerau de Spes. His letters show that in the middle of June Hawkins came to London for a brief conference, and then posted back to Plymouth. The Spaniard at first underestimated the force in preparation and failed to hit upon the true intention. He suspected that Hawkins meant to co-operate with de Sores in planting a naval base in Florida. At the beginning of August he was sure of this, and had sent a man to Plymouth to obtain details. His spy reported that the fleet was now of twelve sail and carried 1,500 men with all requisites for colonization. The first idea had been to settle the Straits of Magellan, then Florida, now it was to be the Rio del Oro 'near New Spain', now again San Juan

¹ H. M. C., *Pepys MSS.*, at *Magdalene Coll.*, p. 173.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 190.

³ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. III, No. 33.

de Ulua, to master the treasure trade.¹ Hawkins would have grinned had he read these letters, for there is no doubt that he had supplied the fantasies so greedily sucked in.

But all his craft was in vain. In early August the blow fell, and he was told that he must not sail.² The sky was again threatening; Coligny was making peace with the Catholics; Thomas Stukeley was now in Spain, a traitor confessed, urging Philip to invade Ireland; and the Netherlands, still quiet under Alva, were busy with the equipment of a fleet of ninety sail for the conveyance of a new Austrian Queen of Spain to her expectant bridegroom at the Escorial. Such was the advertised intention, but this fleet might have other uses. In May the Pope's bull of excommunication and deposition against Elizabeth had been nailed on the Bishop of London's door; and none knew whether the Catholic powers, relieved of continental enemies, meant or did not mean to put the bull in execution. Already in July the order had been given to stay all shipping throughout the realm for the Queen's service.³ Now the Council decided that until the Netherland menace had been seen down Channel the plate fleet enterprise must be postponed. And postponement meant cancellation, for the time was running out; the treasure would not wait to be captured.

Hawkins submitted. Once again had come a test of character and principle, and both rang true. Drake in his place might have put to sea, gambled on the plate fleet, and been acclaimed as a heaven-born strategist had he won. Hawkins played for his team and bowed to discipline, and said never a word about it all. It was the more remarkable in an age of individualists, many of whom were, to put it mildly, selfish. The Flemish fleet passed innocently down the Channel in the autumn, the Lord Admiral himself taking the sea to pay it due courtesy; the English marine was then demobilized, and

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 198, 199, 200, 204.

² *Ibid.*, Nos. 204, 211.

³ *A. P. C.*, 1558-70, pp. 376-7.

peace reigned outwardly for the rest of the year. But who shall say what might not have happened if the southern shores had not been guarded?

The Rochellois had entertained a similar plan to that of Hawkins, and Jacques de Sores had actually sailed to intercept the plate fleet. But he wasted time on minor captures and missed his main stroke, as so many others were to do in after years. The plate fleets were now better protected than their enemies realized, not so much by armed escorts as by an excellent system of dispatch-boats, which conveyed warning of hostile plans and frustrated many a promising scheme. Not until half a century later, in 1627, was any foe of Spain destined to capture the whole or even the greater part of a treasure fleet.

In spite of the peace of August, the Huguenot chiefs remained in correspondence with the English government, and the last notice we have of Hawkins in 1570 relates to a piece of secret service connected with this business. On 4 October the Privy Council sent orders to him and his brother to use the *New Bark* for the 'wafting over' of Cardinal Châtillon to France.¹ It was perhaps for this service that John Hawkins afterwards claimed £235, the costs of the *New Bark* and a hundred men for eleven weeks, employed in transporting the Cardinal at a date not stated.² This visit of Châtillon to France seems not to be otherwise recorded, and was probably kept secret. He died in England in the spring of 1571. It is possible, however, that Hawkins's undated claim referred to an earlier occasion, for in February 1570, he had received a commission to impress men for the *New Bark*, wherewith he was to do the Queen 'a certain service', not otherwise described.³ In that case the secret passage of Châtillon would be in February, and nothing but an intention, perhaps unfulfilled, would remain for October.

¹ *A. P. C.*, 1558-70, p. 389. ² *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 111, No. 33.

³ *H. C. A. Exemplifications*, 7/9, Nos. 99, 100.

THE PRISONERS OF SAN JUAN DE ULUA AND THE RIDOLFI PLOT

THE prisoners of San Juan de Ulua had yet a part to play in history. They consisted of the following groups: the ten gentlemen given to the Viceroy as hostages before the battle; Robert Barrett and his boat's crew, seized just as the battle began; a few men captured alive in the fight itself; and the majority of those set ashore by Hawkins a fortnight afterwards.

Of the ten hostages we have the names of only three; George Fitzwilliam, John Varney, and one Fowler.¹ They were all sent up to Mexico, together with Barrett and the other prisoners of the fight, shortly after the close of it, and remained in the capital until the following year.²

The men who left the *Minion* on 8 October 1568, in latitude 23° N., numbered, according to Hortop, 96, but by the account of Miles Philips, 114. Philips makes some attempt to give a detailed reckoning of their various fates, which Hortop does not, so the former's figure is on the whole to be preferred. The day after landing they set out to march southwards along the coast in search of a Spanish settlement. Almost at once they fell in with a band of Indians who took them for Spaniards and attacked them. Enfeebled by hunger and almost weaponless, the Englishmen parleyed with these Indians and yielded themselves into their hands. The savages robbed them of all their coloured clothes and then pointed the way to the nearest habitation of the Spaniards. Eight Englishmen had been killed in the first encounter. The party now divided into two, half

¹ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 110, ff. 162-3.

² Miles Philips, in Hakluyt.

deciding to march northwards away from civilization, and half going on in the original direction. But shortly afterwards the northward body, having had three men killed by Indians, again divided, some of them retracing their steps and overtaking the south-bound party, and the remaining twenty-three continuing northward into the unknown. Three of these men soon reached England, but nothing was ever learned of the fate of the rest. There were now reunited in the main body seventy-eight men under the command of Anthony Goddard, whom they chose as their leader. The reckoning up to this point is as follows:

Left the *Minion*, 8 October, 1568, 114.

Drowned in landing	2
Killed by Indians, 9 Oct.	8
In the north-bound party killed by Indians	3
Of the north-bound party came to England	3
Continued northwards and not heard of	20
Reunited under Goddard	78

114

The three men of the north-bound party who got home were David Ingram, Richard Browne and Richard Twide. How they escaped has ever since remained a mystery, but the fact is clear that they were all in England before the close of 1569. Years afterwards David Ingram related an incredible tale which Hakluyt printed, of how they marched the whole length of North America until they came within sixty leagues of Cape Breton and were taken off by the ship *Gargarine* of Havre, commanded by M. Champaigne. The yarn is padded with imaginary descriptions of native life and customs, and contains no details of the actual journey.¹ It has been generally supposed that Ingram was romancing; Hakluyt evidently thought so, for he did not reprint the account

¹ Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations*, 1589 edn., pp. 557-62. Modern texts, taken from the second edition, omit the story.

in his second edition of 1599-1600. Yet the three men did come home. Perhaps they were taken on board some French corsair which had strayed into Mexican waters.

The main body under Goddard travelled on for ten or twelve days, sometimes scattering in search of food and having men killed by ambushed Indians. At length they came to the Tampico Viejo, met some Spaniards, and surrendered to them. Their captors took all their money and sent them under guard to Mexico. During this stage they were marched hard and ill fed, so that several died after arrival; but neither Philips nor Hortop says how many. The only clue we have to the subsequent numbers is Philips's statement that seventy-one men were sentenced at the *auto de fe* held in 1574. That total obviously includes other Englishmen who had not been landed from the *Minion* and perhaps had not belonged to Hawkins's expedition at all. At Mexico the survivors were kindly treated by the inhabitants, and many must have owed their lives to that circumstance, for they were in a deplorable state when they arrived. Hortop says that the Viceroy wanted to hang them all, but that some Spaniards of quality intervened and prevailed upon him to await the King's decision. Thus the majority of them remained strictly imprisoned until about a year after the battle of San Juan. They were then distributed as servants to various Spaniards, some being sent to the mines as overseers of native labour and contriving to grow comfortably off in the course of their employment. Their luck turned with the establishment of the Inquisition in 1571. That body naturally began work with the Englishmen. They were imprisoned, questioned, and tortured to make them incriminate themselves or one another; and after a prolonged trial two were burnt and the remainder sentenced to the galleys, flogging or other punishments. Out of all this number Miles Philips is the only one recorded to have come home to England; and he was a mere boy when captured.

Meanwhile, the ten hostages and certain of the other prisoners had been differently disposed of. The returning plate fleet of 1569, the same which had fought Hawkins, carried with it the hostages, nineteen other Englishmen (including Goddard), and two of Bland's Frenchmen;¹ and the fleet of 1570 took away Robert Barrett, Job Hortop and five more.² These men were all imprisoned at Seville, although the party of 1569 seems not to have met that of 1570. The latter had the worse fortune. Barrett and another were burnt at Seville by the Inquisition. Their companions were hardly treated in various ways, and Hortop alone made his escape as late as 1590, when the ship in which he was serving was taken by an English warship.

The 1569 party, thirty-one strong at the outset, had collectively the best luck, although their lot was hard enough. They reached Seville in the latter part of the year and were cast into an insanitary cell, where they lay without clothing or food sufficient to keep them alive. George Fitzwilliam was one of these men, and the letter which describes their plight is signed by him and by Fowler and John Varney on behalf of the rest. It is dated 25 February 1570, and states that four of the hostages are already dead and six more of the general company at the point of death. All would have perished but that Hugh Tipton, an English merchant long resident in Seville, had relieved them.³ Tipton did more than this, going to court to plead their cause and finally getting proper maintenance allowed them. In this charitable work the Duchess of Feria helped him. She herself was an Englishwoman, the daughter of Sir William Dormer and sister of Lady Hungerford;⁴ Feria had married her when he was in England in the train of Philip II

¹ Document in Duro, *Armada española*, ii, 468.

² Job Hortop, in Hakluyt.

³ S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 110, ff. 162-3.

⁴ H. M. C., *Pepys MSS.*, at *Magdalene Coll.*, pp. 77-8, 144.

Having secured the preservation of the prisoners' lives, Tipton came to England with the above letter from them to Sir William Cecil.

Another circumstance here needs mention for its bearing on subsequent events. George Fitzwilliam was a kinsman of the Duchess of Feria,¹ and it is to this connexion undoubtedly that he owed the favourable treatment which he personally received. For at some time before the spring of 1571 he was released and came home, although the others remained in prison. He is first mentioned as being at liberty in April of that year,² but the context of the statement shows that his release must have taken place some months before. The story of the Seville prisoners now becomes merged in that of the Ridolfi conspiracy of 1571 and of the part which John Hawkins played in confounding the plans of a widespread combination of Elizabeth's enemies.

The northern rebellion of 1569 had been not the end but the beginning of a permanent conspiracy against the English throne. Although its details varied, its essentials long remained the same: a Catholic rising to liberate Mary Stuart and to seize a port, followed by a Spanish invasion to clinch the victory. This had been the plan of 1569, but all had gone wrong, and the Catholics were grumbling that they had not been supported by their friends abroad. In the spring of 1570 Pius V removed his share of the reproach by excommunicating Elizabeth and absolving her subjects of their allegiance. Throughout the remainder of that year the conspirators were busy throwing dust in the Queen's eyes by means of fair protestations from Mary, dividing the Privy Council by setting Leicester against Cecil, and trying hard to enlist the Duke of Norfolk, whom they held indispensable because he was the senior member and natural leader of the English nobility. Don Guerau

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, p. 317, editor's foot-note.

² Simancas MS. quoted by Froude, Everyman edn., iii, 314 foot-note.

de Spes was privy to the scheme, but so also to a great extent was Cecil, and the latter's hand was stayed only by the lack of conclusive evidence without which he could not persuade his mistress to believe evil of Mary Stuart and Norfolk. Nevertheless, the opening of 1571 saw the conspiracy in a languishing condition, the conspirators uneasily conscious of Cecil's surveillance and not very hopeful of ever carrying out their plan.

At this stage there entered upon the scene Roberto Ridolfi, an Italian financier who had before resided in England, and who now returned for the ostensible purpose of negotiating the termination of the general arrests between England and the Netherlands. In reality he was the accredited agent of the Pope to the English Catholics, and he was secretly empowered to revivify the conspiracy against the Queen. He came well recommended by Francis Walsingham, then serving Elizabeth in Paris, and it was some months ere Cecil himself penetrated the truth of his mission. The minister was at this juncture created Lord Burghley, and will henceforward be referred to by that title. In two months Ridolfi worked wonders. He put fresh courage into the original conspirators, drew in the Duke of Norfolk by the promise of Mary's hand when she should mount the English throne, instructed Mary, her London spokesman the Bishop of Ross, and Guerau de Spes on the parts they were to play, and departed in April to the Netherlands to arrange for Alva to launch his troops as soon as Norfolk should take the field. Alva, as before, was not enthusiastic. His first duty was to hold down the Netherlands, he had no admiration for the fighting qualities of the English Catholics, and he had perhaps a scruple about assisting rebels against established authority. At length, however, he gave a grudging consent on condition that Elizabeth should be captured or assassinated as a preliminary to the whole undertaking. Ridolfi, travelling on to Spain by way of Rome, met

with the same doubts at Madrid, and these also were resolved by the incorporation of the assassination clause into the plan.¹ As the matter stood then (in July), it was resolved that action should be taken in the autumn, when the Queen's customary progress through the country would afford an opportunity for her dispatch.

Burghley, sensitive to side-winds and observant of faint clues, suspected what was going on, but he had no certainty about Norfolk or any of the other conspirators. An autocrat might have arrested on suspicion, but that was not within Burghley's power. Had he taken a single step which he could not justify by proof he would have had the Council against him; for in that body were some of the guilty parties, and others whose conservatism had been wounded by his policy. Moreover, the Queen was not by any means in his hands. She kept rather the final decisions in her own, and she was loath to believe in disaffection among her nobility. In particular she was difficult about Norfolk, allowing that shifty character far more scope than he deserved; and nothing enraged her more than to be confronted with indications of Mary's hatred towards herself, for she conceived that one sovereign ought to stand by another, poorly as Mary reciprocated the feeling. Burghley therefore passed through an anxious time in the first half of 1571, expecting a blow, yet powerless to avert it. Whilst waiting, he played the obvious card of France against Spain, and promoted negotiations for the marriage of Elizabeth to the Duke of Anjou, the brother of Charles IX. On the French side the proposal was furthered by the Huguenot chiefs, who hoped thereby to strengthen the Protestant interest in their country.

John Hawkins had early intelligence of the imprisonment of his men in Mexico and of the transfer of some

¹ Froude, iii. 309-10, prints the text of a Simancas MS. proving the assassination project. The document was not included in the subsequent *Spanish Calendar* for the period.

of them to Seville in 1569. In February 1570 he visited Guerau de Spes in London and sought his intercession for their liberation.¹ Nothing came of it at the time, but in August he repeated the request and spoke in seditious fashion about the English Government. The Spaniard listened with delight, and wrote to Alva to suggest that Hawkins might be made useful.² So far there is no proof, other than the record of his life, that Hawkins was but playing with the ambassador; and it is open to his detractors to believe that he was really disloyal. But subsequent transactions throw a different light upon the affair.

By March 1571 Hawkins was again busy with de Spes, offering the use of his fleet for the furtherance of Spanish plans.³ It is almost certain that he was doing so with Burghley's knowledge, although the proof of their collusion does not occur until a month or so later. Hawkins's personal object was still the release of the prisoners at Seville; that of Burghley was to countermine the conspiracy which he knew to exist and of which he guessed de Spes to be a member. Hawkins professed himself a Catholic and was so reported to Philip, who became satisfied, although less easily than the ambassador, that the profession was genuine.

Meanwhile, George Fitzwilliam had come home from his Spanish prison, and in April he was sent to Madrid to enter into details. He had an interview with Philip, in which he demanded the release of the prisoners and offered Hawkins's services in the enthronement of the Queen of Scots and the restoration of the Catholic religion.⁴ At this time the conspiracy was by no means complete. Ridolfi had brought Mary, Norfolk, Ross, and de Spes into line, but he was still in Brussels working for Alva's consent, and Philip probably did not yet

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 180.

² Froude, iii. 312, Simancas MS. not in *Spanish Calendar*.

³ Froude, iii. 313, similar MS.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

know the detailed plans. Thus the King saw no need for haste. He told Fitzwilliam that he must bring warrant from the Queen of Scots for belief in Hawkins's integrity, and he declined to release any of the prisoners until the scheme should take more definite shape. So far went Philip in person; but the Duke of Feria, with or without his master's leave, went further. He and the King's secretary put the general outline into writing, 'in a blank paper which was not to be read before it came to the fire'; and with this paper Fitzwilliam was charged to deliver to the Queen of Scots a ring from Philip and another from de Feria. Each ring contained a posy; the former, *Numeros complera omnes*, and the latter, *Presentibus fruor meliora spero*.¹

At this point it became necessary to tell de Spes that Burghley knew of the intrigue; for the Spaniard knew that no access was to be had to Mary Stuart without the minister's leave. On 13 May Hawkins wrote to Burghley for the desired permission,² and then declared to de Spes that Burghley was allowing Fitzwilliam to see the captive merely to forward the liberation of the Seville prisoners and without any suspicion of the treasonable plans. Hawkins was skating on very thin ice, but he had correctly judged his man. De Spes believed what he wanted to believe and cast all doubts aside. He wrote to the King that both Hawkins and Fitzwilliam were dealing honestly and that the latter was coming back to Spain with Elizabeth's consent to complete the plot for her overthrow.³

Elizabeth had indeed consented, but to more than the Spaniard knew. Fitzwilliam duly saw Mary Stuart, got from her a recommendation in favour of the prisoners, and impressed her with the value of Hawkins as a

¹ Hawkins's summary of his practice with Philip II, Cotton MSS. Galba C. v, ff. 263-4.

² Letter printed in full, Froude, iii. 315.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 258.

recruit to the cause. She entrusted Fitzwilliam with a letter to Philip and with a gold-bound service-book for the Duchess of Feria.¹ Still there was no revelation of the details Burghley so ardently desired, no mention of Norfolk or the other English plotters such as would have justified him in laying them by the heels. But this much had been gained, that Mary now vouched for the sincerity of Hawkins. So entangled had the web become that the conspirators were now deceiving themselves as well as each other. Philip accepted Mary's guarantee, although a little clear thought would have shown him that she had no more ground for her belief than he had himself. Only Hawkins and Burghley kept their heads. They had the advantage of personal conference, whilst Mary, de Spes, and Philip were all physically separated from one another.

The extent of Burghley's knowledge at midsummer, 1571, may here be reviewed. An agent of Ridolfi's, bearing that individual's letters from Brussels to the Bishop of Ross, had been captured in the spring. The letters were in cipher, and had not been fully deciphered by the minister. But their bearer had confessed on the rack that Ridolfi was the mainspring of the conspiracy. Burghley therefore knew from various sources that Alva and the King of Spain had a general purpose of invading England, that Mary Stuart expected their coming and was to profit by it, that Elizabeth was to be deposed, and that an unknown body of the English nobility were to give the signal by rising in revolt. The conspirators themselves knew that Burghley had this knowledge, yet they judged that they could nevertheless proceed. For the known members of the plot were for various reasons untouchable: Ridolfi overseas; de Spes immune as an ambassador; Mary Stuart already as strictly guarded as conservative opinion would allow, yet contriving to hold communication with the others; Ross indeed imprison-

¹ Froude, iii. 316; and Hawkins's summary *ut supra*.

ed, yet preserved, by Elizabeth's order, from the rack. Norfolk was the key to the whole secret. Burghley was morally sure of Norfolk's guilt, but he had no proof, and he was forbidden to twist the information out of those who had. And Norfolk at liberty could fire the train at any moment.¹ Fortunately for England he had not the pluck to do so; he waited for someone else to begin.

Such was the position when Fitzwilliam went again to Madrid early in July.² Philip, on seeing the letters he brought, decided to close with Hawkins's offer. Ridolfi had just been examined before the royal council, and his plan had evolved into a double invasion of England, on the east by Alva from the Netherlands, on the west by the Duke of Medina Celi from Spain. Spain could furnish few armed ships, and Medina Celi's movement would hardly have been feasible in face of Hawkins's squadron at Plymouth. So it was now arranged that Hawkins should desert his post, leaving the Channel open, and should sail with his fleet to the Netherlands, whence he would convey Alva across the North Sea. The undertaking was timed for September or October, the first move, as before, being the outbreak of the English rebellion under Norfolk and the simultaneous attempt on Elizabeth's life: without an English rising neither Philip nor Alva would do anything.

It remained to pay Hawkins his price. The prisoners at Seville—those, that is to say, who had come from Mexico in 1569—were all released, given money as compensation for their sufferings, and sent home in merchant ships. The 1570 batch, Barrett, Hortop, and their comrades, were not included in the bargain; why, it is hard to say, except that Hawkins appears not to have

¹ Norfolk was under an order confining him to his London house; but there was no guard to watch him, his friends resorted to him freely, and he might have ridden out of reach whenever he had pleased.

² Hawkins afterwards claimed £150 for the expenses of Fitzwilliam's two journeys. *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 111, No. 33.

known of their presence in Spain. Fitzwilliam, on behalf of Hawkins, then signed an indenture with the Duke of Feria, whereby Hawkins, for the service he was to perform, was granted a patent of nobility, a pardon for his transgressions in the Indies, and a promise of a sum of money sufficient to maintain twelve ships and 1,600 men for two months.¹ With these tidings and with friendly letters to Hawkins from Feria and his wife and son, Fitzwilliam arrived at Plymouth on 4 September.

Hawkins had thus made himself the pivot of the invasion. Without his assistance it could have little chance of success. For, as 1569 had shown, the Chatham dockyard could furnish a force strong enough to hold off Alva, and due vigilance would give sufficient notice of Alva's embarkation for that force to get to sea; whilst Hawkins's own western squadron could easily counter any move from Spain. When Fitzwilliam told Hawkins his news they must both have longed for the thing to be tried. A Spanish army in defenceless transports would have been savoury meat to these men who had seen so many comrades shot down at San Juan; and one can imagine what Medina Celi's fate would have been, and Alva's too, had the gods been kind. That it did not come to that was due only to the triumph of Burghley's detective work in London. Whilst Fitzwilliam had been away the minister had at last solved his problem. A blunder by Norfolk's secretary and the public spirit of an obscure cloth-merchant had placed in his hands a letter that proved the duke to be conspiring with the Queen of Scots. Elizabeth was convinced and allowed her minister to do what badly needed doing. He sent Norfolk to the Tower and arrested his chief confederates; and the rack tore out of Norfolk's servants the last buried threads of the great conspiracy. Fitzwilliam

¹ Froude, iii. 318, and Hawkins's letter to Burghley, printed below: Froude's notes and transcripts of the original documents are to be found in Add. MS. 26056 B, ff. 241, &c.

travelled on to London to learn that the whole thing was at an end, that there would be no English rising, and by consequence no Spanish invasion.

By the hand of his trusty follower Hawkins sent the following letter to Burghley:

‘My very good Lord,

It may please your honour to be advertised that Fitzwilliams is returned from the court of Spain, where his message was acceptably received, both by the King himself, the Duke of Feria, and others of his privy council. His despatch and answer was with great expedition and with great countenance and favour of the King.

The articles [i. e. the agreement just signed in Spain] are sent to the ambassador, with order also for the money to be paid to me by him for the enterprise to proceed with all diligence.

The pretence is that my power should join with the Duke of Alva’s power which he doth shortly provide in Flanders, as well as with the power which cometh with the Duke of Medina out of Spain, and so all together to invade this realm and set up the Queen of Scots.

They have practised with us for the burning of Her Majesty’s ships, therefore there would be some good care had of them, but not as it may appear that anything is discovered, as your lordship’s consideration can well provide.

The King hath sent a ruby of good price to the Queen of Scots, with letters also, which in my judgment were good to be delivered. The letters be of no importance, but his message by word is to comfort her and say that he hath now none other care than to place her in her own. It were good also that the ambassador did make request unto your lordship that Fitzwilliams may have access to the Queen of Scots, to render thanks for the delivery of our prisoners which are now at liberty; it will be a very good colour for your lordship to confer with him [Fitzwilliams] more largely.

I have sent your lordship the copy of my pardon from the King of Spain in the very order and manner I have it. Also the Duke of Medina and the Duke of Alva have every of them one of the same pardons, more amplified, to present unto me (although this be large enough), with very great titles and honours from the King, from which God deliver me.

I send your lordship also the copy of my letter from the Duke of Feria in the very manner as it was written, with his wife and son's hand in the end.¹

Their practices be very mischievous, and they be never idle, but God, I hope, will confound them and turn their devices upon their own necks.

I will put my business in some order and give mine attendance upon Her Majesty, to do her that service that by your lordship shall be thought most convenient in this case.

I am not tedious with your lordship because Fitzwilliams cometh himself, and I mind not to be long after him, and thus I trouble your good lordship no further.

From Plymouth, the 4th day of September, 1571,
Your good lordship's most faithfully to my power,
John Hawkyns.²

The reference to 'burning Her Majesty's ships' points to a by-plot which has left little other trace. The idea was perhaps inspired by Thomas Stukeley, who had fled from Ireland to Spain in 1570 and was now submitting megalomaniac plans for Philip's consideration. Philip could at least put a just estimate upon such a man, and he told him nothing of the Hawkins undertaking. So in 1571 we find Stukeley asking to be equipped with four ships, a foist (a small galley), and two barks, together with 3,000 foot and 500 horse. With these he undertakes to sail from Santander, burn and take Hawkins's fleet at Plymouth, and then take Cork and Waterford and conquer all Ireland for Spain; and not content with that, to burn all the Queen's ships in the Thames.³ Needless to say, he never sailed from Spain on any such errand.

¹ The letter from the Ferias is in S. P. For. Eliz., vol. 119, ff. 87-8, dated 11 Aug. 1571. The Duke writes in Spanish, and his son's added message is in quaint English. The whole is in flattering language, but contains no material information; addressed, 'Al muy magnifico señor, al señor Zu. Haquins'. It appears to be the original, not the copy mentioned by Hawkins.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 81, No. 7.

³ *Calendar of State Papers, Rome, 1558-71*, Nos. 744, 745.

Another point needs some elucidation. Froude states that Philip actually paid Hawkins forty or fifty thousand pounds as the price of his treason, the money being handed over by Spanish agents in England; and this has been generally taken as correct. Froude saw at Simancas documents which are not available to students in England, and these were no doubt the basis of his assertion. But it is impossible not to believe that in this matter he was mistaken. In the first place, the sum is incredibly large. The wages and victuals of 1,600 men for two months, for which Hawkins stipulated, would not have cost more than £3,500, although the hire of the ships and the personal reward to Hawkins himself are unknown quantities.¹ Moreover, the evidence now available points, not to actual payment, but only to an intention to pay. As late as January 1572, for example, de Spes, then in the Netherlands, wrote that he had given an account to Alva of the advantage to be gained from Hawkins and his ships. Alva considered it a very costly project, whereupon de Spes answered that Hawkins could be dealt with by other means; but the Duke deferred consideration of it. Again in April de Spes pressed the same undertaking, and Alva again replied that he thought the price was very heavy. De Spes then said that Hawkins might perhaps be utilized on some service of less onerous cost.² These documents imply clearly enough that no money had been paid by the spring of 1572, and that being so it is improbable that it was ever paid at all. De Spes, in fact, furious at the miscarriage of his own calculations, was hot for the invasion even though the English plot had failed. Alva and the King knew better, and simply dropped the whole business on hearing of Norfolk's arrest. Alva had never been keen for it, and Philip was only momentarily

¹ One of Froude's Simancas transcripts speaks of a proposed payment of 44,872 ducats, equivalent to about £11,000—Add. MS. 26056 B, f. 251.

² *Spanish Calendar, 1568-79*, Nos. 301, 315, 316.

so, under the influence of Ridolfi's spell in July. Hawkins, in his own account of the 'practice', says merely that the King set his men at liberty and gave them money freely, but has no word of any payment to himself. But Hawkins's silences, it must be admitted, are not evidence.

Another small misconception may lurk in Froude's remark that Spanish historians, using only their own archives, have believed that Hawkins's treason was genuinely intended, since 'the King did not care to leave on record an account of the trick by which he had been taken in'. On this one may ask, did he ever know he had been taken in? For all that appears to the contrary, he may have believed to his dying day that Hawkins in 1571 was ready to be his faithful servitor. It was certainly not the business of Hawkins or Burghley to enlighten him, for the trick might have been worked again had occasion served.

The moral bearings of the transactions above related are such as to be fairly clear to most minds and to need no comment. Yet Froude imputes a sordid motive to Hawkins and reserves for his hero Burghley all his commendations for patriotic endeavour.¹ But why cannot the sailor's motives be regarded as favourably as the statesman's? Undoubtedly it appears that Hawkins's personal designs first brought him into the business, and that his service of the national interest grew out of them. Yet the personal design was not greed of gain, but the relief of suffering friends; that is uppermost in all the evidence. The prisoners had been vilely treated for no fault of their own, and some had been done to death. The very captivity of some of them—the hostages given to Enriquez—was a breach of public faith which put the Spanish Government as much beyond the pale of honourable treatment as a modern blackmailer or kidnapper.

¹ Sir J. K. Laughton, in the *Dict. of Nat. Biography*, went further, and stigmatized the whole proceeding as 'dirty'.

To any mind basing its thoughts upon reality and not upon abstractions, Hawkins was bound in honour to do his utmost to deliver these men, and he was not in the least bound to respect the interests of their tormentors. On those grounds he acted and on no others but his country's service: the King's pardon and the patent of nobility and the promise of money were mere incidentals necessary to the success of the plan.

The story of 1571 ends with the tragi-comedy of Don Guerau de Spes. When all was really lost he clung to the scheme of invasion and to the covenant with Hawkins, which he regarded with pride as his own contribution to the cause. On 15 October he wrote to the King:

'The more I see of Hawkins and the closer I watch him, the more convinced I am of his faithfulness to Your Majesty's interests. . . . Hawkins and Fitzwilliam are anxiously awaiting the decision of Your Majesty, they having already incurred great expense in fitting out their fleet, which is now nearly ready.' Again on 20 November he urged: 'Hawkins has now twelve ships ready and is waiting most anxiously to signalize himself in Your Majesty's service. I am sure that in this and other things he is proceeding straightforwardly, and it would be very desirable to let him have a prompt decision.'¹

Three weeks later he reported that Fitzwilliam was eager to make a third journey to Spain to learn Philip's wishes. The offer met with no encouragement, a fact which must have served as a fair indication to Burghley that the invasion was postponed.

Meanwhile the Spaniard had not omitted to signalize himself in the cause. At some time in the autumn he got into touch with two English desperadoes who professed willingness to murder the Queen. De Spes preferred that the victim should be Burghley, as both an easier mark and one better worth hitting; for in his brooding wrath he had come to regard Burghley as the

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 284, 290. The above quotations are from the summaries in the *Calendar*, not from the originals.

author of all evil and to rate his talents high enough to survive even the death of Elizabeth. So Burghley, it was decided, should fall to the pistols of the assassins, who were to lurk nightly in his garden until they saw their chance.

Before the plan could come to execution de Spes himself received a blow for which his pride was unprepared. Norfolk had confessed a little, and the Bishop of Ross everything, the latter intent on saving his skin at the expense of the Queen of Scots and all the rest of the conspirators. The Privy Council therefore summoned the Spaniard, told him his part in the Ridolfi plot was discovered, and ordered him to leave the country forthwith. This was in the middle of December. In spite of the sharpness of the dismissal, de Spes was tardy in obeying it. He left London, but found excuse to delay for some weeks at Canterbury, hoping that the news of Burghley's death might make a longer journey needless. That hope failed early in January, when the minister's detectives got wind of the two assassins and clapped them in the Tower. After that there was nothing left but to go.

John Hawkins clung to his dupe to the last. The Council entrusted him with the duty of seeing de Spes out of the country, and for five weeks the two were together, with Fitzwilliam also in attendance.¹ De Spes said nothing of the intended assassination, but he still talked hopefully of the invasion and of Hawkins's share in it, and when they parted on the shore of the Channel the Englishman gave his friend a cipher by whose means future communication might be maintained.

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 301, 305; *Foreign Calendar*, 1572-4, No. 11; S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 111, No. 33, in which Hawkins claimed £50 for attending on de Spes.

NOTE

A Nephew of John Hawkins

VERY full information on the trials of the English prisoners by the Mexican Inquisition has been collected by Mr. G. R. G. Conway, M.Inst.C.E., in the Mexican National Archives and elsewhere. He has been so kind as to furnish me with summaries of these *procesos*, of which the most interesting is that of 'Pablo Haquines de la Cruz, Ingles de los que vinieron en la armada de Jo. Haquines'. This Paul Hawkins declared to the Inquisitors that he was the nephew of John Hawkins and that his father was Robert Hawkins, paymaster of the Queen's Navy, who would thus be an otherwise unknown brother of John. Mr. Conway suggests that the boy (he was only thirteen in 1568) was the same person as Miles Philips mentions under the name of Paul Horsewell. The identification is supported by the statement of Philips that Paul Horsewell was condemned to serve in a monastery and to wear a *san benito*, and that after his release he married a Mexican woman and settled in the country, whilst the *proceso* records the same facts of Paul Hawkins. We may take it then that the boy whom Philips knew as Paul Horsewell described himself to the Spanish authorities as Paul Hawkins. The question then arises, was his name really Hawkins, and had John Hawkins a brother named Robert? The answer, in the present writer's opinion, must be in the negative. A fairly extensive acquaintance with the Navy records of the period has revealed no trace of any official named Robert Hawkins, and no other document hitherto brought to light suggests that John Hawkins had any other brother but William. Moreover, if we may believe Philips, this young man Paul made a different statement some five years afterwards. His trial by the Inquisition took place in 1573-4. In 1579, when Drake was raiding the coast of Peru, 'then was Paul Horsewell and I, Miles Philips, sent for before the Viceroy, and were examined if we did know an Englishman named Francis Drake, which was brother to Captain Hawkins: to which we answered that Captain Hawkins had not any brother but one, which was a man of the age of threescore years or thereabouts, and was now governor of Plymouth in England'. This evidently refers to William Hawkins, three times Mayor of Plymouth, and not to the alleged paymaster Robert. The con-

clusion seems to be that Paul's father was one Robert Horsewell, perhaps a son of the James Horsewell who had been so firm an ally of old William Hawkins in the days of Henry VIII. This Robert Horsewell may very likely have married a sister of John Hawkins, and Paul may therefore have spoken the truth in claiming to be the latter's nephew. It was also in accordance with contemporary usage for him to describe his father as John Hawkins's brother. The word was often used for 'brother-in-law'; John Hawkins himself refers in one instance to his brother-in-law Edward Fenton as 'my brother'. But Paul's claim to the name of Hawkins must be rejected. It is intelligible that he should have made it. Spanish officials respected rank even in their enemies, and the boy probably received favoured treatment as a close kinsman of the great Juan Haquines; he certainly got off lightly from the Inquisition. Alternatively, it is quite possible that he did not intentionally deceive the Inquisitors. The clerk who wrote down his statement may simply have assumed that his name was Hawkins because of his relationship. His fellow prisoners knew him indifferently as Hawkins and Horsewell, and there are plenty of instances to prove that in the sixteenth century there was not the same strictness in using surnames as is customary to-day. He never returned to England, and Mr. Conway has discovered further documents showing that his descendants were living in Mexico at the end of the seventeenth century. An extract from the *proceso* was contributed by Mr. Conway to *Notes and Queries*, vol. cxlvii, pp. 149-50 (1924).

III

BRILLE AND ROCHELLE

WHEN Charles V had divided his empire he had, with France as the enemy in his mind, added to his son Philip's kingdom of Spain the apanage of the Netherlands, which had hitherto been, as 'the Emperor's Low Countries', an effective part of the Holy Roman Empire. From the point of view of land warfare the arrangement had its merits, but only on condition that free communication between Spain and the Netherlands should be maintained. To ensure that condition the retiring Emperor married his son to Mary of England, confident that the allied sea-power of Spain, England, and the Netherlands would keep that of France in check as effectively in the future as it had more than once done in the past. The combination seemed the more hopeful to those who made it, since it rested upon more than a marriage; the three countries were closely bound by their trading interests, and the Spanish match of Mary Tudor appeared to set a permanent ratification upon an alliance already dating from the close of the fifteenth century.

Within a few years the whole arrangement was shaken into ruin by a series of events, any of which must have seemed possible to Charles V, but whose joint occurrence he must have reckoned outside the bounds of probability. Mary Tudor died childless, and her successor refused to marry her widower. England turned officially Protestant and successfully maintained that attitude, since neither of the Catholic combinations, France-Scotland or Spain-Netherlands, dared to interfere with her under penalty of seeing her ally herself with the other. Protestantism next raised its head in Scotland, France, and the Netherlands, causing England's attachment to

the faith to grow militant as Burghley came to realize that it must be all or none, that England could not live unscathed if she allowed Protestantism to be beaten down in the surrounding countries. And finally, this political necessity proved stronger than the economic necessity; England broke with her best customers in Spain and the Low Countries, and sought new mercantile connexions to fill their places. This last would have seemed to Charles V the most unlooked-for stroke of all; without it the other adverse factors would have been ineffective and his combination would still have held good.


As things had turned out, the old Emperor's well-drawn plan had dissolved into futility in the hands of his son. What that had already meant we have seen in the seizure of the treasure, the unrest in the Netherlands, and the emergence of Rochelle as the stronghold of continental Protestantism. What it was further to mean we have to consider in this chapter.

The Sea Beggars, with the help of England, had imitated the example of the Rochellois in the autumn of 1569. Before a year was out they had grown more powerful and injurious than their exemplars, dominating the Straits of Dover, infesting the whole coast-line of the Netherlands, penetrating creeks and havens, robbing on land as well as on sea, keeping every maritime province in a ferment, and teaching the neutral majority of the population that it might be politic as well as heroic to join in resisting the Spanish yoke. The first duty of a government is to defend its subjects; Philip's government in the maritime Low Countries was not doing so; and the people of the coast inevitably began to lose their respect for it. The Sea Beggars were preparing the way for the general revolt.

Our own interest lies in the part which England played, the story of which is not so well known as it should be. Froude has described how Dover became an entrepôt

of plundered property, rich cargoes taken at sea and church plate seized on shore being sold at auction to the agents of London merchants, and even prisoners of rank knocked down to the highest bidder like blacks in a slave market, for the sake of the ransoms they could be made to pay. The details are drawn from the complaints of Guerau de Spes, and he described what came most prominently beneath his own observation. But Dover was not the only, or even the principal, mart for this purpose. It was a poor harbour, sometimes choked with shingle, and although fortified it was exposed to a stroke from overseas, a sudden raid by which Alva might have made a stern example of its exploiters. There can be little doubt that if Dover had stood alone he would have bestirred himself to abate the nuisance. The freebooters knew that and made their chief base farther to the west.

In the land-locked waters of the Solent there was in those days an anchorage known as the Mede Hole. Few parts of the coast have undergone greater modification by natural forces than the northern shores of the Isle of Wight. The tides, scouring in a confined channel, have eaten away the soft cliffs and alluvial flats and have in three centuries greatly altered their outline. So much we can see by a comparison of the early maps, inaccurate as they may be, with our own. The Mede Hole is one of the lost features, but its position is shown on the maps as late as the Stuart period. It lay to seaward of the present Osborne pier, and it was protected from westerly winds and currents by a greater extension of the East Cowes promontory than now exists; erosion has since destroyed the protection of the anchorage, and the resulting debris has probably diminished the depth of its waters. At this spot the privateers made their head-quarters, secure from bad weather, fairly remote from authority, and provided with a line of retreat either way, east or west, as occasion might demand. Altogether it had greater advantages than Dover, and it



THE ISLE OF WIGHT, CONTEMPORARY MAP SHOWING THE MEDE HOLE

could moreover be common ground to the Frenchmen and the Dutch. The records show it to have been the strategic centre of the Channel blockade.

In the summer of 1570 William of Orange replaced the Lord of Dolhain as commander of the Sea Beggars by Gillain de Fiennes, Seigneur de Lumbres. The new chief was instructed to preserve better order among the privateers and to see that a share of the spoil came to the hands of Orange, who badly needed money for his land projects. For these purposes de Lumbres kept a formed nucleus of the fleet under his own control, and was himself generally to be found near the Solent anchorage, where he could be equally in touch with Rochelle, Plymouth, and London. In June, de Spes sent an agent down to see what was going on in the Isle of Wight. The man reported that in a town called Medol (presumably Newport) there was a great fair of spices, wines, wool, saffron, oil, soap, woad, and other goods stolen from Spanish, French, and Portuguese ships.¹ Four months later de Lumbres himself was there with fifteen ships, expecting to be joined by the like number from Rochelle; and the English Government was sending him artillery from the Tower.² In February 1571, de Lumbres in his flagship the *Flying Hart* was again at Mede Hole, gutting a rich Antwerp prize. Round her clustered a swarm of English merchants, some from Southampton, some from London, buying the spoil and taking it into their own ports, some of it doubtless for re-export to Germany by way of Hamburg; and among their names appears that of John Hawkins.³ The transaction was typical of many, for witnesses stated that the Mede Hole was a common resort for this purpose; and lest it should appear surprising that Hawkins, a man of position and a government servant, should be found engaging in the business, it may be mentioned that the

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 189.

² *Ibid.*, No. 223.

³ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 18, 22 July 1571.

Privy Council authorized such purchases in written documents.¹

Burghley, indeed, as the year 1571 wore on and the Ridolfi plot grew threatening, whilst France also began to be seriously aggrieved, found it expedient to dissociate the Crown from too obvious complicity. In September the Council addressed letters to the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports (which included Dover) and to Edward Horsey, Captain of the Wight, ordering them not to permit the Orange privateers to have supplies in their ports, and to arrest them if they continued to intrude.² But there is good reason to believe that the prohibition was not sincere, for a year previously a similar order had been made against the Rochelle cruisers. On that occasion Horsey had replied that he was denying them any facilities, but he had enclosed his letter in another explaining that the first was written merely to be shown to the Spanish ambassador.³ It was not in fact possible, for domestic reasons, to drive off the privateers in permanence, because, so long as the Spanish and Flemish arrests continued, the goods brought in by the freebooters were a necessity to English trade. Dover and the Medway were substitutes for Seville and Antwerp.

The end of the third French civil war in August 1570 made little difference to the bellicose courses pursued by Rochelle. The events of the last months of the war had indeed strengthened the city's position. In March, de Sores took Sables d'Olonne, a base of the attempted Catholic blockade. The Rochellois next occupied the Isle of Oléron, and in July they captured Brouage, the last remaining Catholic port in the vicinity;⁴ so that when peace was signed, Rochelle, remaining legitimately

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 19, 29 Mar., 23 June 1572.

² *A. P. C.*, 1571-5, p. 44.

³ *S. P. Dom. Eliz.*, vol. 69, Nos. 22, 23.

⁴ *La Roncière*, iv. 112-15.

in the possession of the Huguenot garrison, was freed of all impediments to its further operations.

An incident of this obscure fighting is worthy of record. In March 1570 a fleet of fourteen Flemish merchantmen bound for Bordeaux was overhauled by a Huguenot squadron and ordered to put into Rochelle instead. The Huguenot commander placed the Flemings under the guard of a little English rover of thirty tons. As the latter drew near the port five Catholic galleys attacked. The Englishman lost his convoy, which made off in the confusion, but his gunfire completely smashed one of the galleys and inflicted heavy loss upon the others 'tellement que tous n'avoyent occasion de s'en contenter'. The Englishman lost ten men and his masts in the action, and ran aground just outside Rochelle. The ship became a total wreck, but the survivors of the crew were rescued by the townsmen. The names of this gallant captain and of his ship have been lost, the story of his exploit being preserved only in the work of a contemporary French historian.¹

At the close of the war de Sores made a cruise to Madeira and the Canaries. He took a number of Portuguese ships and murdered forty Jesuits whom he found among his prisoners, but he delayed so long over these matters that he missed his projected stroke against the plate fleet. Next year, 1571, Jean Capdeville, a lieutenant of his, was also at the Canaries, and with him the ubiquitous *Castle of Comfort* and an English crew. They took some prizes and brought some of their booty to Vigo, which was a common resort of the ocean privateers. The *Castle of Comfort* then returned to the Solent, where she was arrested at the instance of the Portuguese agent in London. He did not, however, expect to obtain any satisfaction.² The ship herself was afterwards in the joint possession of William Hawkins and Sir Richard

¹ La Popelinière, i. 165.

² La Roncière, iv. 119; *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 291.

Grenville, who may have been her owners at the time of this cruise.

In France the cessation of the religious war entailed rather an increase than a set-back to the power of the Huguenot chiefs. Catherine de Medici was not essentially anti-Protestant; she worked with an eye to the preservation of her sons' inheritance. The Huguenots had proved themselves unconquerable, nourished as they were by the power of the sea. On the other side were the Guises, no friends of the Valois monarchy, and intriguing for Spanish intervention in French affairs. Between the extremists had grown up the party of the *Politiques*, patriotic Frenchmen ashamed of the degradation into which their country was falling. All this drew Catherine towards a new policy, of co-operation between Huguenots and moderate Catholics, and of a healing of domestic wounds by aggrandizement at the expense of Philip's disordered Netherlands. For two years, in spite of temporary shifts of purpose, the new policy developed. The Huguenot leaders were delighted with the prospect; they grew influential at court, promoted the marriage of Elizabeth with Henry, Duke of Anjou, and when that failed secured at least a treaty of defensive alliance with England in the spring of 1572. Coligny himself, after resting a year as 'King of Rochelle', went also to Court and was reconciled to Charles IX and his mother. The plan for a Netherland war went forward, and an unofficial beginning was made with a Huguenot incursion in the summer of 1572; and to cap the reunion of France, the marriage was covenanted of Henry of Navarre and the King's sister, Marguerite de Valois.

In these circumstances there was little thought of curbing the activities of Rochelle. In September 1570, de Spes, not yet a full believer in John Hawkins, reported that the latter was sending naval stores to the Huguenot port and intended to make it a base for molestation of

the Indies. Six weeks later he repeated that Rochelle was the focus of all mischief and that Spain ought to send some good spies there.¹ Count Louis of Nassau, who had fought at Moncontour, remained with the Huguenots when the Prince of Orange returned to Germany, and collaborated with Coligny in the effort to unite the Sea Beggars, the Rochellois, and the English adventurers as one sea power. In May 1571 Nassau was in Paris with the other Protestant chiefs, and asked Walsingham to get Hawkins licensed to serve him with his ships. Hawkins and his ships, however, were doing valuable work elsewhere, tempting Philip to yield up his secret thoughts on the invasion of England, and the request was not granted. Again in August the Count repeated it, evidently in innocence of the 'practice' which Hawkins was then bringing to success; and Walsingham, to judge from his letter, was equally in the dark about what was really going on.²

Meanwhile, Alva's hold upon the Netherlands began to show signs of decay. The loss of the treasure had weakened his army and compelled him to adopt unsound measures of taxation. Many who had been untroubled on the score of religion grew discontented under economic oppression. Seditious intrigue became active in the latter part of 1570 and increased throughout the following year. The depredations of the Beggars had unsettled the coastal population of the Dutch provinces; the prominence of Louis of Nassau and the Huguenots in the councils of France aroused hopes of foreign aid; and William of Orange watched unceasingly from the German frontier, striving to collect resources for the day of action which he saw must come.

The new revolt of the Netherlands opened in the spring of 1572, and its impulse came from Burghley and Elizabeth. They took their measures so craftily that

¹ *Spanish Calendar, 1568-79*, Nos. 216, 223.

² *Foreign Calendar, 1569-71*, Nos. 1729, 1920.

their stroke bore the guise of an action friendly to Spain, yet there can be little doubt that they designed it for Spain's embarrassment. Already in 1571 the English court, as we have seen, had issued an order that the Sea Beggars were no longer to use the English ports, and had acquiesced in its violation. De Lumbres, in fact, without strong action on the part of the English authorities, was unable to coerce his own followers and had no choice but to see them carry on their operations as before.

In March 1572 the strong action was at length applied. Early in the month a commission was issued to John Hawkins and George Winter to repair to the coasts of Kent, Sussex, Southampton, and the Isle of Wight and to order all the rovers 'commonly called freebooters' to avoid the havens of the realm on pain of forfeiture of ships and goods. The commissioners were to enjoin upon the Queen's subjects, on pain of death, not to supply the rovers with food or munitions, nor to have any traffic with them, and were empowered to imprison the responsible persons in towns where the order was disregarded. Further, all Englishmen were to leave the service of the freebooters, and English pirates, man and ship, were to be arrested. Finally, it was expressly directed that the Count de la Marck, then lying at Dover, should be 'presently commanded to depart'.¹

This was not mere window-dressing, designed to be shown with conscious rectitude to any agent of Spain who cared to see it, although that no doubt was a subsidiary purpose. Apart from that, the government really was in earnest, determined that the Beggars should withdraw. The appointment of Hawkins for the duty was a stroke of genius. He still ranked in Philip's eyes as a faithful servant of Spain, and here he was enabled to prove his devotion by taking stern measures against Spain's worst enemies. We cannot doubt that he exert-

¹ Lansdowne MS., 13, ff. 129-30; S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 85, No. 57.

ed himself to the utmost in the execution of his commission—neither can we doubt that he had some confidential talk with de Lumbres, de la Marck, and the other commanders. For the sequel was to show that it was in their interest that their wild followers were being warned off the English coast; and indeed, they may have been the instigators of the whole design.

The Beggars, seeing no help for it, duly made sail. De la Marck and those at Dover moved eastwards to their own coast, taking some rich prizes by the way. They were joined by those from the Isle of Wight under de Lumbres himself, and the whole force made for the estuary of the Meuse. There, on 1 April 1572, a landing-party under the Lord of Treslong took the fortified town of Brille by assault, and their leader, as if struck by a sudden idea, suggested that instead of plundering and decamping as on previous occasions they should hold the place in permanence and make it the naval base they so badly needed. The whole transaction, including the placing of the command in the hands of a subordinate, bore an unpremeditated aspect, and that was long considered its true nature. Yet few of the decisive events of history, closely examined, have been as accidental as this appeared to be, and modern students have inclined to the view that from the outset it was a passage of connected policy.¹ The evidence is indeed purely circumstantial, but it is strong. Burghley is hardly likely to have expelled the Beggars from English harbours without speculating on their probable course of action; for a harbour they must have, and Rochelle was too far away from their especial cruising ground to be of much use to them. The choice of John Hawkins for the duty of expulsion was also, if there was no ulterior motive, a strange one. However much he might have befooled Philip and de Spes, he was in reality an enemy of Spain, and as such was known to the Beggars. De Lumbres was a man of

¹ Cf. Prof. A. F. Pollard, *Polit. Hist. of England*, vi. 331-2.

rank and no mere plunderer. He had been in London and conferred with the men of the ruling circle, and he knew that Hawkins spoke with the authority of the Privy Council. Is it conceivable that Hawkins merely told him to pack and go, without a word of sympathy or encouragement? The commission implies it, but it may be doubted whether Hawkins would have undertaken such a task, and still more, whether the Council would have entrusted him with it when there were plenty of Spanish sympathizers available. George Winter, the other commissioner, was no less a foe of Spain; at that very time he and his brother were sending slavers and privateers to the Caribbean.¹

The outcome shows how well calculated was the Beggars' stroke, and how the English Government was prepared to follow it up. Three years of hammering from the sea and of Alva's tyranny on land had rendered the Dutch coast ripe for revolt. Within a month of the fall of Brille, Flushing followed its example, the citizens combining with the Beggars to destroy the Spanish garrison. Thence, as the summer advanced, the revolution spread northwards through all the Dutch provinces. Town after town proclaimed the Prince of Orange as its stadt-holder and defied the power of Spain. They were to pay dearly for their choice, but they were never to be wholly crushed; and some of them were destined never to fly the Spanish flag again. In 1568 the Netherlanders had refused to rise even when the Prince had appeared with an army in their midst. In 1572 they rose spontaneously and called upon him to come and lead them. It was largely an effect of sea power, nourished by *the* sea power. William of Orange and Louis of Nassau, with their eyes rather on French intervention and a land campaign, thought the movement premature, but they were obliged

¹ H. C. A. Oyer & Terminer, 1/39, 27 Oct. 1572, voyage of the *Edward*; the *Spanish Calendar* also contains several notices of the Winters' ships.

to countenance it. Protestant filibusters from France roused the inland Flemish border. Nassau himself seized Mons and stood a siege by Alva's troops. William, equipped by English, Dutch, and German subscriptions, invaded from Germany in July and pushed across country to his brother's assistance.

Burghley and Elizabeth thought of England first. For them the war was one of defence against a possible invasion of their country, a preventive campaign with a limited object. With Alva spending his men and money upon the extinction of a fire that had taken thorough hold, that object was achieved; it remained only to keep the flames judiciously fed. England's abiding interest through the ages has been to prevent any strong military power from occupying the Rhine delta, and so, as the situation of 1572 developed, the English Government grew cool towards the expected French invasion of the Netherlands and took a line of its own to discount the results of a French success; Alva battling for his life was a more congenial neighbour than France triumphant would have been. Walsingham in Paris, it is true, thought differently. For him Spain was a mortal enemy, to be struck without limit whenever and however it could be done. He held this view quite logically, because he believed that Spain held the same view of England. The truth, as we can now see, is that Spanish policy fluctuated; sometimes Philip was as Walsingham saw him, more often he turned to thoughts of accommodation. Like all the other statesmen of his age, he was the creature of circumstance more than its director. He could not control the hurricanes that tore the world; he could but trim his sails to them. Elizabeth and Burghley admitted that that was their own position. Walsingham and the ultra-Protestants sought unduly to simplify a problem that was essentially complex. If they had had their way the outcome would have been different, but it may be doubted whether it would have seen England

in as strong a position as that in which Elizabeth and Burghley left her.¹

The English Government therefore made an intervention of its own in the Netherlands. After the news of Brille and Flushing it allowed the Walloon refugees in England to go over and bear their part in the revolt. In July it sent Sir Humphrey Gilbert with some thousands of English volunteers. Ostensibly they were mere adventurers, disavowed by the Queen and holding no commissions from her. Gilbert nevertheless received precise instructions. He was to take possession of the ports, such as Flushing and Middelburg, and keep the French out of them. On no account was he to adventure inland. As regarded Spain, the object at this time was not to evict her, but to force her to a compromise whereby Protestantism and civic liberty would be preserved and the way prepared for the return of English trade. A Spanish report from London stated that in July some twenty-five ships and 10,000 men were going over. John Hawkins had been going, but was stopped by the Council, and was afterwards reported at Plymouth preparing a west-country expedition for the same destination.²

Into the midst of all these plans there burst the thunderbolt of the St. Bartholomew massacre. Catherine de Medici, like Elizabeth, was no simplifier of the complex. She thought of French interests, still more of her dynasty's interests, and more than all, of her personal ascendancy. She viewed with alarm the admiration of her son for the veteran Coligny, perhaps the only man of sterling character with whom the unhappy Charles IX had ever been intimate. Like Elizabeth again, she was no determined

¹ Cf. Conyers Read, *Sir Francis Walsingham*, Oxford, 1925, i, esp. ch. iii and iv. The general effect of this very complete and learned work is to magnify Walsingham's influence and to push Burghley into the background. No doubt Walsingham has in the past been undervalued, but the present writer must respectfully deprecate a similar treatment of Burghley.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 339, 347.

enemy of Spain; certainly she had no mind to be involved in a formal war in co-operation with allies so uncertain as those across the Channel. She decided that that course had led her far enough and must be changed. In August the Huguenot leaders and thousands of their followers were in Paris for the wedding of Henry of Navarre. On the 22nd an assassin shot at Coligny and wounded him. Next day Catherine conferred secretly with the Catholic chiefs. Early in the morning of the 24th the massacre began. It is unnecessary to retell the details. Coligny and most of his friends were killed, only Henry of Navarre, the Comte de Montgomery, and the Vidame de Chartres escaping. Of the rank and file thousands fell, and the slaughter extended throughout France. Some have held that the thing was long premeditated, others that it was the inspiration of a momentary panic. Most probably Catherine meant to dispose of no more than the leading Huguenots and perhaps then to get rid of their Guisard murderers, but the Paris mob got out of hand and made the crime one of unforeseen magnitude.

The effects of the massacre were considerable. William of Orange, who was basing his land campaign upon the promise of French co-operation, was brought to a standstill. Louis of Nassau had to surrender at Mons in default of relief from his brother or from France. Only the Dutch coast towns held out, and Alva prepared for their reconquest in what was to prove the most terrible series of sieges in the history of war. In France the surviving Huguenots took up arms in the fourth religious war, and ere long the triumphant Catholics were closing round Rochelle, with the determination this time to check the city's career for good and all. In England it seemed at first as if the long-dreaded combination of Spain and France was about to issue in invasion. Only gradually did it appear that Protestantism was not dead either in France or in the Netherlands, and that the

general situation, although worse than before the massacre, was by no means desperate. Catherine de Medici was no more anti-English than anti-Spanish. She sought to continue her balancing game as before the massacre, not realizing how those heaps of corpses in her palace courtyard stood for ever between her and the clasp of a friendly hand, even the hand of so insensitive a person as Elizabeth.

Before these points in the situation grew clear the English Government prepared for the worst. More men went over to Gilbert in the isle of Walcheren, and money to the despairing Prince of Orange; and lest these could not hold the gate closed upon the issue of an invading army from the Scheldt, the English Navy was again mobilized as in 1570, the Medway providing a squadron to watch the Flemish coast, whilst Hawkins equipped a western guard at Plymouth.

In speaking of these measures Froude makes a statement about Hawkins which requires examination. 'Sir John Hawkins', he says, 'with twenty ships equipped with Philip's money, and manned in part with the crews whom he had duped Philip into releasing from the Seville dungeons, sailed for the Azores to lie in wait for the Mexican gold fleet.' In other words, the English Government, in a crisis which the author himself describes as 'desperate', sent off its best admiral and the pick of the country's private warships to lose themselves for some months in the Atlantic, having two years before prohibited the same movement in a crisis not nearly so desperate. This is strange reading of the strategy of Burghley and his mistress, on all other occasions cautious to excess. Froude's embellishments do not inspire confidence in his accuracy. The money, as we have seen, is unlikely ever to have been in English hands; and as for the men released from Seville, they numbered not thirty all told. The authorities cited for the statement are five letters preserved at Simancas. Four of them can be rea-

sonably identified in the subsequently published *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79; and not one of the four, as summarized in that volume, contains the slightest reference to any design against the plate fleet. Only one mentions Hawkins at all, and that one, dated 16 September, says merely that he is at Plymouth preparing seventeen ships for the Netherlands.¹ We are thus left to base our trust in Froude upon one Simancas document, seen by him but otherwise unknown. In fairness to Froude it must be stated that no proof has been found of the presence of Hawkins in England between 16 September and the following 7 January; so that there is, on present knowledge, no impossibility that he can have made the Atlantic voyage. The plate fleet, also, made an exceptionally late return that year, not reaching Seville until 20 November,² and it may be presumed that the English authorities had some information of its movements. But on the whole the story of the Hawkins expedition remains improbable. It has left no trace in English archives, not even in Hawkins's summary, written in 1577, of his services in the preceding years.

The blank in Hawkins's record, from September 1572 to January 1573, may perhaps cover some employment in the Netherlands, as indicated in the above-mentioned letter. But in default of definite information it is more reasonable to suppose that he spent this period in command of the western Channel guard, his usual post in these years in times of uncertainty. The English Netherlands campaign soon came to an end as the situation eased. Gilbert was recalled at the close of the year, and those of his followers who remained must have done so as purely private adventurers. The Government, in fact, seeing

¹ Froude, iii, references on p. 421; *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 344, 345, 346, 347. One of Froude's transcripts, however, in Add. MS. 26056 B, f. 291, shows that ships were leaving Plymouth for Guinea and the West Indies and that Hawkins owned them.

² Duro, ii. 470-1.

that after all there was no likelihood of an invasion, began for various reasons to change its attitude towards Spain, and to substitute a strictly limited friendship for its previous limited hostility. The eviction of the Sea Beggars from English ports, having achieved its object, had early been allowed to become a dead letter. By the autumn of 1572 the Channel was again swarming with English, French, and Flemish cruisers carrying licences from the Prince of Orange; but the Privy Council, after three years of pillage, was said to be taking legal opinion whether the Orange commissions were valid or not.¹ It was a foreshadowing of the new policy.

At the opening of 1573 the English Government began to follow a dual course which must have been perplexing to friend and foe alike, but which is quite intelligible from the English point of view. Alva's military power, having its work cut out in the reduction of the Dutch towns, might be safely left to pursue that object; it would have for some time no surplus energy to devote to an attack upon England. Economy of effort therefore dictated that no further English stimulus to the Netherlands revolt was at present necessary; to overdo that activity might indeed be dangerous, for Spain might in desperation turn upon England first and postpone the conquest of her own rebels. That, as the next thirty years were to show, would have been Spain's best policy. Philip was too little of a gambler to adopt it; yet it cannot be denied that the Great Armada would have had much better chances of success in 1574-5 than it had in 1587-8. The abandonment of direct provocation to Spain opened up the further question, whether it would be worth while to come to such terms as would end the mutual embargoes upon trade and restore normal conditions in the Channel. The English Government answered this in the affirmative, and achieved both those objects in the course of the year. Here the Lon-

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 356.

don mercantile interest was on the side of peace. Hamburg had proved a fair substitute for Antwerp, but it would obviously be a good thing to reopen Antwerp and Seville as well; many of the merchants hankered after these time-honoured connexions. Channel privateering also was degenerating into a serious nuisance. At first it had poured a stream of rich goods into English warehouses; by now, it must have seriously curtailed the flow of trade, for the waste and destruction could not go on indefinitely. So we find in 1573 a real effort to clean up the Channel in the interests of all orderly powers alike.

The above represents one side of the new policy. The other concerned the Huguenots by land. They were in desperate straits after the massacre, driven to arms to avert extermination, and faced with the prospect of losing their citadel of Rochelle. England could not afford to see French Protestantism stamped out, and so this year witnessed a large expedition for the relief of Rochelle, an apparent inconsistency with the cessation of aid to the Netherland rebels. The whole appears very cold and heartless. Elizabeth was in fact heartless towards any people but her own. Burghley was somewhat less so, yet he never allowed his sentiments to overcome his intellect. Walsingham, who in this year became Secretary of State, was a bellicose Protestant, putting the faith before the material interest of his country, ardent for a league against Antichrist, without paltering or finessing. But his was not at this time the directing mind, although sometimes he influenced a doubtful decision.¹

We may begin with the Channel clearance. On 30 January the writer of a letter to Alva reported that three of the Queen's ships were being got ready in haste, although he could only guess at their purpose. Actually there were two ships, and William Holstocke, the Comp-

¹ For Walsingham at this time see, in general, Conyers Read, i, ch. v, vi.

troller of the Navy, was placed in command. His quarry was the privateers, the Dutch, Rochellois, and allied Englishmen, who were indistinguishably mingled in the business. In December 1572, for example, there was in the Solent a French captain, Jean Varlet, in command of a ship named the *Primrose*, with a Cornish master and a Southampton boatswain;¹ and the combination was typical of many. During this winter the Rochellois were active against all papists, and 'few ships escaped their long fingers'.² By the French account they had occasioned an almost complete stoppage of trade, and Elizabeth's action was due to her merchants' complaints. Holstocke went to sea early in February, his two warships so heavily gunned that they could dominate anything they met without resort to boarding. In the Downs he met six rovers crammed with booty, and he was alleged to have invited their captains on board and made them all prisoners. He then continued his course along the coast, taking twenty sail of the privateers and 800 of their men.³ The Huguenot historian, who describes all this as sheer robbery, estimates that the Admiralty officials made two million livres out of the proceeding, which is certainly a gross exaggeration; Burghley and the Queen would have seen to that.

By the middle of the month Holstocke had earned a special commendation from the Privy Council. The seaport jails were so expensively crowded with his prisoners that order had to be taken for their speedy disposal. The most notable, especially the Englishmen among them, were sent up to London for trial, whilst the majority were turned loose on giving some kind of surety for good behaviour.⁴ Holstocke's raid was a very different transaction from Hawkins's warning-off of the Dutchmen before the Brille episode. Hawkins appar-

¹ H. C. A., Oyer & Terminer, 1/39, 1 Feb. 1573.

² La Popelinière, ii. 146.

³ *Ibid.*, 146-7.

⁴ Lansdowne MS., 16, ff. 11-13.

ently proceeded by land—at least there is no record of his shipping, and he claimed only £100 for his expenses—and the strong instructions he received were allowed to become a dead-letter when they had achieved their hidden purpose. Holstocke went out on serious business and effected his object. The Admiralty records show that the lesson was salutary, and that the Channel quieted down for some time afterwards; most of the succeeding cases that came before the court related to North Sea robberies.¹

Complementary to this stroke, and doubtless facilitated by it, was the improvement of relations with Spain. Alva had already sent more than one representative to treat about the arrests, but nothing had hitherto been accomplished; whilst an English envoy to Spain on the same business had been brusquely driven out of the country shortly before Ridolfi's arrival there in 1571. Times had now changed, and both sides were prepared to be more civil. In April 1573, English proclamations announced the resumption of trade with the Netherlands and Spain. Next year the Convention of Bristol adjusted the outstanding financial claims.²

The rounding-up of the privateers was not allowed to prejudice the equipment of a force in the Solent for the relief of Rochelle; it may, in fact, have aided the preparation by driving the independent rovers to attach themselves to a semi-regular command which Holstocke evidently had instructions to spare. This force was of diverse origins and was some months in gathering to its full strength. The threat to Rochelle from the land side began to grow serious in November 1572, and in that month the inhabitants wrote to Elizabeth imploring her aid against enemies who had combined to wage a war of extermination upon those of the reformed religion.³ The

¹ As appears from the examinations of pirates in the Oyer & Terminer volume for the period. ² Pollard, *Pol. Hist. of Eng.*, vi. 339.

³ *Foreign Calendar, 1572-4*, No. 640.

appeal placed the Queen in a difficulty; she could not let Rochelle perish, yet she was bound to Charles IX by a treaty of alliance signed before the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and she had no desire to break with him. The dilemma explains the weakness of her subsequent proceedings.

The ablest men of the older Huguenot party, Coligny and Châtillon, were now dead, and the leader of the future, Henry of Navarre, had yet to prove his capacity. In the interim the Comte de Montgomery took the command at sea and the office of negotiating with Elizabeth. He had escaped from the massacre by hard riding, and had reached first Jersey and then England at the close of 1572. He had formed a connexion with the Devon adventurers by marrying a daughter of Sir Arthur Champernowne. In London he received some promise of aid or countenance from the Queen, but found in the end that she would do nothing officially for the cause. As soon as there appeared any likelihood of that, La Mothe Fénelon entered a strong protest, making much of the fact that John Hawkins was preparing a squadron to act against the King of France. Elizabeth answered haltingly that Hawkins had no enmity towards France and that she had forbidden him to give cause of offence. But La Mothe returned to the charge a fortnight later with details of Hawkins's doings, showing that he really was in league with the Rochellois under Montgomery's direction.¹ The outcome was that the Queen abandoned her half-formed purpose of a regular expedition and allowed the design to go forward as a private enterprise on the part of her subjects.

The English adventurers showed no lack of enthusiasm, for the massacre had stirred them far more deeply than it had moved their sovereign. Money was freely subscribed in London and the outports, large stocks of arms

¹ La Mothe Fénelon, *Corresp.*, v. 247-9; *Foreign Calendar*, 1572-4, No. 779; *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 378.

were purchased, and men and ships enrolled. It was the first manifestation on a large scale of a generous and partly disinterested action by the English public on behalf of the oppressed in other lands. It is notable that the two most prominent examples of the same impulse in the next century, the subscriptions for the Vaudois under Cromwell and for the Huguenot exiles after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, were alike inspired by the oppression of Protestants by France; modern altruism flourished upon ancient enmity.

The details of the enterprise rest chiefly upon the work of a contemporary French historian.¹ It is full and apparently accurate in its facts, but it makes a sad mess of English proper names and leaves some uncertainty about the persons who actually took part. In other sources brief notices only are to be found. Montgomery had in February 1573 gathered twenty Rochelle corsairs in the Solent. With these he moved down Channel to Plymouth and there raised his numbers to fifty or sixtysail. The Hawkins brothers contributed eight ships, other English owners a few more, and the Queen sold, for the occasion, the *Primrose* of 300 tons to an English merchant. He may have been William Hawkins, and there are hints also that other vessels of the Navy took part on similar terms.² The fleet finally comprised about a dozen powerful warships, the remainder being for the most part 50-ton Rochellers. Montgomery himself sailed in the *Primrose* as commander-in-chief, and Henry Champernowne, his brother-in-law, as vice-admiral in a ship of 250 tons. With them went George and Edward Fenner, the former in a strong 100-ton ship of his own, Edward 'Equieus' (possibly Cook of Southampton), the young Winter (perhaps the John Winter of Drake's circumnavigation), Captains Paget and Morgan, and the younger 'Pouluretot', whose identity remains unknown. Twelve more English gentlemen followed Champer-

¹ La Popelinière, ii. 147-59.

² La Mothe Fénelon, v. 317.

nowne, and among the French captains was Jacques de Sores. The men numbered 800 French sailors and 800 French musketeers with 'mousquets à fourchette' bought in London, 400 English pikemen and archers, and an unspecified force of English mariners. One other point about the armament is worth mention. The Queen, we read, for the sake of her amity with Charles IX, would not issue any bronze ordnance, and so the ships went armed only with inferior iron guns. The quibble is characteristic of Elizabeth. Two years later her conscience boggled at lending 150,000 crowns to the Elector Palatine to fight on land for the Huguenots, but she thought she might let him have 50,000 without breach of neutrality.¹ The strange thing is that the opinion of the period did not regard these moral gymnastics as altogether ridiculous; it allowed a real distinction between a twenty per cent. and a sixty per cent. breach of faith.

The task before the expedition was serious. Early in the year the Duke of Anjou, afterwards Henry III, had taken command of the siege of Rochelle. Anjou passed for a good general; he never took the field without an adequate force, and he had one now. By the middle of April he had drawn his lines very tight about the town and had delivered an assault which came near to success. Across the channel of the haven he had thrown a boom of sunken ships and chains, with batteries to play upon any who might approach it. His naval force was considerable, although not so strong as that of Montgomery; it comprised nine good sailing ships and six galleys.

On 16 April the relieving expedition cleared from Fal-mouth, and on the 19th it approached Rochelle. After a cannonade the fifteen Catholic ships withdrew out of range, and Montgomery and Champernowne entered the port with a score of their best vessels, the remainder anchoring outside. The boom proved too strong to be

¹ Conyers Read, i. 290.

forced, the batteries kept up a heavy fire, and when the tide ebbed the invaders were obliged to withdraw. For two days they lay off Rochelle, discussing means of breaking the boom. Fenner, 'Pouluretot', and a Frenchman distinguished themselves in fights with the galleys, and then Montgomery decided that the relief was hopeless and all must depart. The narrator of the story declares that this caused much disgust among the English, who were still willing to fight. The retirement nevertheless took place, and as some consolation the expedition captured Belle Isle, after which it broke up to cruise against commerce.

Montgomery remained to hold Belle Isle in the hope of aid from England. It appears that four ships did sail from Jersey to his assistance, but were attacked by the Bretons near St. Malo and forced to surrender after a stubborn fight.¹ Elizabeth would do nothing further. She had no sympathy with men who failed, and she was enraged by a report that Montgomery had gone into action under the Cross of St. George, a flag he had no leave to fly. At the end of May, therefore, he was obliged to evacuate Belle Isle and return to England.

Rochelle was saved after all by a political development. In May the Duke of Anjou was elected King of Poland, on the understanding that he should be tolerant in matters of religion. As an earnest of his good intentions he found it politic to break off the siege, which had already cost the assailants thousands of lives. France was once more sick of bloodshed, and in June another hollow reconciliation put an end to the fourth civil war.

Meanwhile, what of John Hawkins? In January and February he had been reported as certainly going to Rochelle—La Mothe had made a special protest about him. His ships were prominent in the expedition, and his Devon friends also. Yet from first to last there is

¹ La Roncière, iv. 150, on the authority of a MS. in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

not a word of him in the actual campaign. The clue to his absence is probably to be found in the nature of Elizabeth's scruples on neutrality, as illustrated by the tale of the bronze and iron guns. She would let her subjects subscribe their money to fight the King of France, she would let most of those who desired it fight in person, she would even lend her warships under colour of a childish subterfuge; but she grew very angry when the adventurers hoisted her flag. So it was with John Hawkins. He was now a bronze gun, a symbol of official action. If he served against the French, the fiction of neutrality was worn very thin; and so the Queen held him back. That is the most likely explanation. He paid the penalty of his eminence; and Rochelle nearly paid also. For it can hardly be doubted that Hawkins would have made a better success of the task than did the soldier commanders, Montgomery and Champernowne, who seem to have kept their sailor associates, Fenner and de Sores and the rest, very much in the background of the management.

IV

PERSONAL AFFAIRS

FOR several years after 1573 English policy continued to take a course similar to that which has already been described. Its objects were, in general to watch over continental Protestantism and to take care that it was not completely crushed, and in particular to see that the Netherlands should not be so strongly held by any power as to be capable of developing a military threat against England. The Dutch revolt, on this policy, needed to be supported against Spain, but only if it was plainly in extremity and would die in default of help. Still greater was the need to prevent France from intervening in the struggle and constituting herself the protector of the rebels. France, to the English view, would be a more dangerous Netherland neighbour even than Spain, for French and Flemish territory were contiguous, and there was a likelihood that the greater would incorporate and assimilate the less. Elizabeth's ideal settlement was therefore a negotiated peace between Philip II and William of Orange, whereby Spain should keep the sovereignty but should send away her garrison and allow a large measure of autonomy to the Netherland people. So would the military threat to London be neutralized and a certain amount of religious toleration achieved. To this end the Queen was never tired of offering her services as a mediator. Meanwhile she had reopened trade with Antwerp, and so long as the rebels could keep up the struggle without her aid she was disposed to be on friendly terms with their oppressors.

These circumstances reacted upon the career of John Hawkins, and they explain his lack of prominence in great affairs during the six years after the Ridolfi Plot and the taking of Brille. The Queen successfully pur-

sued her tortuous way, generally with the approval of Burghley, but sometimes with such shifts as to plunge even him into despair. In the end, whether by luck or by judgement, she came through; the Netherlands remained as she desired to see them, not French and not fully Spanish; and every year of peace added to the wealth, loyalty, and resisting power of the English people. As has been said before, it was ungenerous, for the price of success was the long martyrdom of the Dutch. But Elizabeth could not conceive that she owed any duty to them; she even disliked them as rebels against their lawful sovereign. The preservation of peace meant that there was no employment for the regular navy, no command for John Hawkins such as he would have had in war. Yet he could not return to his old ventures across the ocean. He had always to stand by in case the policy should fail and war ensue. For he was now recognized as the chief and well-nigh the only sea commander whom England possessed. He could control fleets, he understood landing operations; above all, he could manage men. In his hands the conduct of some heterogeneous combination of English, Huguenots, and Dutch would have been safe; no other English leader had yet shown the tact or achieved the prestige requisite for such a task. It is interesting to note how, when Drake was setting the Indies in a turmoil in 1578-9 and the Spanish authorities were collecting information about him, document after document describes him as a kinsman of John Hawkins, as if that established his position. The name of Hawkins was a terror to all possible enemies, and so, while the Queen pursued peace amid perils of war, he had to stand in reserve. Not until he was growing old did the conflict come, and by that time Drake, the individualist, had achieved a position rivalling his own. The career of Hawkins as a fighting admiral was sacrificed to duty.

For these reasons, personal affairs and minor public

services will form the subject-matter of the present chapter.

In the autumn of 1573 Hawkins had a narrow escape from death. The crimes in the Netherlands and the St. Bartholomew massacre had given a vicious turn to some unbalanced minds among the Puritans, a party rapidly increasing in importance in the English state. One of the fanatics of the sect was a certain Peter Burchet, a gentleman of the Middle Temple, who persuaded himself that it was lawful to assassinate any who might be bringing papist influence to bear upon the Queen. The especial object of his hatred was the new favourite Sir Christopher Hatton, who was reckoned to be a Catholic in all but the name. On the morning of 11 October Burchet attended a Puritan sermon, and on coming out was heard to mutter, 'Shall I do it? What, shall I do it? Why then, I will do it!' He went to his lodging for his dagger and then walked out into the Strand, where he had evident knowledge that Hatton might be expected to pass by. At that moment John Hawkins came along, riding in company with Sir William Winter and another of his friends. Burchet mistook Hawkins for the courtier, sprang suddenly forward, and stabbed him.¹

The wound was dangerous and recovery for some days uncertain. On the 15th Sir Thomas Smith wrote to Burghley, who was then out of town, 'Her Majesty taketh heavily the hurting of Hawkins and has sent her own surgeons to him, and Mr. Grey to visit and comfort him. It will soon appear whether he can escape or no'.² Hawkins made his will, but he was a tough man and ultimately pulled through. The Queen was so incensed that she talked of executing Burchet forthwith, but the Council dissuaded her, for it seemed probable that the culprit was not so mad as he professed to be and

¹ John Stow, *Annales*, 1615 ed., p. 677; and John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation*, 1824 ed., ii, pt. i, p. 427; *Life of Archbishop Parker*, 1821 ed., ii. 327.

² Harleian MS., 6991, f. 69.

that there might be a conspiracy to be unravelled. Justice, however, was not long delayed. Burchet was sent to the Lollards' Tower and was tried by the Bishop of London for holding heretical opinions. These he recanted on threat of death on 4 November. The civil law then took charge of him, but before it had made any progress with his case he murdered his jailer in the Tower with a billet snatched from the fire in his room. That was enough. A Westminster jury condemned him next day, and on 12 November he was hanged near the spot where he had wounded Hawkins. His confusing his victim with Sir Christopher Hatton, one of the greatest dandies of the time, is a suggestive sidelight on Hawkins's personal appearance.

About this time—to use a phrase that is detestable, but here unavoidable—Hawkins was involved in a semi-public adventure of some importance, although the extent of his participation is unknown. In his later summary of services and claims upon the government he included the following item: 'I adventured with the Earl of Essex by sea and by land, that the charge amounted to £950 by the Earl's consent and satisfaction; the which Her Majesty took into her hand, without any recompense hitherto—£950.'¹ That is the only piece of evidence to connect Hawkins with one of the tragic Irish undertakings of the period. Walter Devereux, Earl of Essex, planned in the spring of 1573 to subdue and colonize Ulster, then the most disorderly part of Ireland. With the Queen's countenance and the assistance of Lord Rich, Sir Peter Carew, Sir Arthur Champernowne, and others, Essex gathered an expedition of 1,200 men, with whom he sailed from Liverpool on 19 July. Storms scattered the fleet and delayed the landing, and thereafter everything went wrong. By November fighting, sickness, and debt had reduced the expedition to extremity, not alleviated by the attitude of the Lord Deputy,

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 111, No. 33.

who remained contemptuously aloof at Dublin. The unhappy Essex complained bitterly of the Devon rank and file, 'mutinous in camp and cowardly in the field. . . . The gentlemen have sent me only such as they were glad to rid their country of.' He persisted through the next year, but by the spring of 1575 could do nothing more. In September 1576 he died, still in Ireland, of a violent fever, perhaps more truly of broken hope.¹ John Hawkins evidently provided men and shipping for the affair, but whether he went himself is not clear. The word 'adventured' is of vague meaning in this respect, being used indifferently of a contribution of purse or of person. None of the Irish state papers appears to mention him.

The local records of Plymouth show some public work by the Hawkinse on behalf of their native place. In 1567-8 William Hawkins served as mayor for the first time, and during his administration the town council enacted some new and thorough-going rules for the preservation and cleanliness of the port.² In the following year William is recorded to have built 'the new conduit', for ensuring a better water-supply.³ It was a work whose necessity is suggested by frequent records of pestilence in the town, and it may be reasonably supposed that John Hawkins, who held original views on sanitation at sea, may have had some share in inspiring it. Drake, who belonged also to the same school, is well known to have carried on the good work at Plymouth in later years. Tudor England, in fact, produced plenty of men who realized that dirt and disease were connected evils and not passively to be regarded as a dispensation of providence; their handicap lay not only in public indifference but in the scantiness of the capital which effective reform demanded. A thousand pounds, even

¹ *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*, art. Walter Devereux; Froude iv. 52-60.

² Worth, *Plymouth Calendar*, pp. 52-4.

³ *Ibid.*, 15-21.

in those days, would not go very far in cleansing a fair-sized town, but it was a sum which no corporation could expend, and which even the national government would not find for anything but a court function or military defence. Thus private munificence had, very inadequately, to supply the deficiency.

In the Parliaments of 1571 and 1572 John Hawkins was elected as one of the members for Plymouth.¹ He was in England during both sessions and probably took his seat. But there is no record of his personal activities in the Commons, and it was not a sphere congenial to his temperament.

Another Plymouth transaction took place in 1573. In that year William and John Hawkins undertook the farm of the town mills, bought a house in which to weigh the corn before milling, and provided a man and horse to fetch the sacks from the houses of the inhabitants.² The details illustrate the fact that the townsmen of those days were largely agricultural in their pursuits, and point to the existence of small holders growing corn for their own consumption; for had the mills worked chiefly for the benefit of regular tradesmen there would have been no need to organize transport.

William Hawkins was again mayor in 1578-9, and for the third time in 1587-8, the Armada year. The defences of the port were to some extent a family interest. Old William Hawkins had been much concerned with them. His elder son concluded a bargain between the town and the Queen's Government on a matter which had been outstanding for a generation. In April 1580 he and another were authorized to affix the town seal to any deeds that might be arranged with the Queen about the fortifications of St. Nicholas's Island in the Sound. Five years afterwards letters patent were issued permitting the mayor and inhabitants to retain £39 10s.

¹ Mary W. S. Hawkins, *Plymouth Armada Heroes*, Plymouth, 1888, p. 39.

² *Plymouth Calendar*, p. 54.

annually from the customs of the port, the money to be used for the payment of four permanent gunners for the island battery.¹ Thus economically was coast defence provided for in the days when every able-bodied man was capable of serving against an invader and was legally bound to do so.

The service of the state under Elizabeth was never lucrative to those who gave it of their best. All the plums fell to courtiers like Hatton and Leicester. Walsingham died in office a poorer man than he had entered it. Burghley had made his fortune in the days of Edward VI, and declared that his long service of Elizabeth had added not a penny to his possessions. Men like Hawkins found it hard to extract from the treasury their mere out-of-pocket expenses. Consequently for John Hawkins the shipping business, commercial and other, formed a continuous background to his public career. Without it he could not have lived, yet the mixture of private and public activities has given cause for suspicions of the honesty of his conduct. That is inevitable from the nature of the conditions. He must sometimes have been hard put to it to analyse his own motives, supposing that he ever cared to do so. At least it should be borne in mind that like causes produced like effects in every other public man who had not a great inherited fortune at his back, and that Hawkins comes out of an inquiry with cleaner hands than most. Some legal cases arising out of channel privateering will illustrate these remarks if it is remembered, for the sake of proportion, that they represent exceptional transactions standing forth from a great body of normal and therefore unrecorded business.

First, it may be well to arrive at some idea of the amount of shipping owned by John and his brother. Some information is derivable from a list of July 1570, compiled with a view to the naval mobilization of that

¹ *Plymouth Calendar*, pp. I, 196.

summer.¹ Under the heading, 'Hawkyens of Plymouth', it gives the following vessels, here rearranged in order of tonnage: the *Christopher*, 500 tons, *James* 350, *New Bark* 200, *William* 200, *Paul* 150, *Angel* 140, *John* 100, *Swallow* 100, *Antelope* 100, *Pasco* 70, *Judith* 60, *John* 60, *Cleare* 60; totals, 13 ships, 2,090 tons. But the list is not exhaustive. It obviously omits vessels of less than 60 tons; and the port books reveal that the Hawkinses owned a number of light craft ranging from 20 to 50 tons and frequently making voyages as far as the Canaries. The *William* and *John* which returned from John Hawkins's third slaving voyage, is not mentioned unless under an altered name, and the names of two vessels lost at San Juan de Ulua, the *Angel* and the *Swallow*, have been transferred to surviving craft. The *Christopher*, by her tonnage, is likely to have been a Hanse or Flemish prize, for it was not then customary to build English merchantmen so large. The list does not indicate whether William or John Hawkins is to be regarded as the owner of these ships; probably some belonged to one and some to the other, or the brothers may have done business as a firm. Nine of the ships are shown as being actually in Plymouth, and four at sea. Similarly, the Devon ports are stated to contain 1,263 mariners at home, whilst 311 were daily expected. It was at this time that John Hawkins was preparing for his plate-fleet cruise, subsequently abandoned owing to national necessity. The document gives only three other Plymouth ships not belonging to the Hawkinses.

A more imposing fleet is revealed in a Spanish document giving an account of the force with which John Hawkins offered to serve Philip II in 1571.² It is best shown in tabular form:

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 71, No. 75.

² Add. MS. 26056 B, f. 251 (Froude's Simancas Transcripts). The names are given in Spanish, but their English equivalents have been substituted in the table.

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Men.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>
Christopher . . .	500	250	50
Saviour . . .	500	250	50
New Bark . . .	300	150	40
James . . .	350	175	40
Edward . . .	250	125	30
William . . .	180	90	25
Unicorn . . .	180	90	25
Paul . . .	160	80	25
Great John . . .	150	75	20
Angel . . .	140	70	20
Swallow . . .	120	60	20
Antelope . . .	100	50	15
Pasco . . .	80	40	12
Judith . . .	60	30	12
Little John . . .	60	30	12
Cleare . . .	40	20	10
Totals, 16.	3,170	1,585	406

It is not certain, of course, that all the above ships belonged to the Hawkinses; two or three may have been hired. On the other hand, the 1570 list already given may omit such vessels as were absent on long voyages, for its object was to show what force was immediately available for national service.

Another list, of February 1577, names ships of 100 tons or over in home ports, without mentioning their owners.¹ For Plymouth the number is five: the *Salomon* 300, *William* 140, *John* 120, *Paul* 130, and *Pelican* 110. The first four were Hawkins ships. The tonnage, it will be seen from a comparison with the other two papers, was merely guessed. The *Pelican* is possibly the vessel with which Drake set out on his circumnavigation at the close of this year. It would be interesting to know if she also belonged to the Hawkins brothers.

In November 1573 two Londoners, Richard May and Arnold Miles, took action against John Hawkins in the Admiralty Court. They were the agents or insurers of a Portuguese merchant named Sebastian de Salvago.

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 111, No. 30.

Their story was that Salvago had dispatched some cargoes from Viana in Portugal to Rouen, but that the ships concerned were taken by English pirates and brought into Devon harbours. John and William Hawkins had there bought the goods from the pirates, and John was still in possession of them. May and Miles claimed restitution. The detailed evidence in this suit has not been traced, but the decision is practically a vindication of Hawkins. The goods were worth £1,150, and of this sum the Court awarded him £938 for his necessary expenses and ordered him to restore £212.¹ Hawkins's defence, if available, would probably throw a different light on this charge of receiving stolen goods; we shall see his side of the matter in a somewhat similar case occurring in the following year. The High Court of Admiralty, it should be said, was by no means a tribunal which showed partiality to the rovers. So far as an estimate of its work is now possible, it seems to have given fair decisions in accordance with the evidence. But the principles on which it had to work were not always clearly established, as in the question of the validity of the Orange letters of marque; and to carry its decisions into effect was often a more difficult matter than to obtain them.

At the same time, December 1573, John Hawkins was the defendant in another case brought before the Court by Jeronimus Lopez and others, Spanish merchants. According to their allegations, Hawkins had 'redeemed' from pirates and kept to his own use goods worth £675. This time the Court ordered him to hand over £520, keeping only £155 for his expenses.²

The explanation of this 'redeeming' is found in an action before another tribunal, the Court of Requests, in February 1574. Here John Hawkins was the plaintiff, and the defendants were George Stoderd and eight other London men who formed an underwriting syndicate.

¹ H. C. A. Libels, 3/45, Nos. 110, 137.

² *Ibid.*, No. 111.

It appeared that the conditions of the time had led to a practice by which the owners of goods passing through the Channel insured them in London, and the underwriters then contracted with men influential in the sea-ports to ransom at a price below their value such prizes as were brought in. Two parties, the privateer and the intermediary, thus made a profit on every capture, the merchants paid a regular toll in the shape of premiums, and the underwriter lost part but not all of the sum insured unless the ship got safely to her destination. The intermediary exploited his local influence, which enabled him to bring pressure to bear on the privateers to accept low ransoms for their prizes. In this case John Hawkins stated in his bill of complaint that about a year previously he had made a verbal agreement with Stoderd & Co. at the Royal Exchange, whereby he undertook to redeem any ships in which they were interested on guarantee of his expenses and a reasonable profit. In the summer of 1573 one Captain Valeton, a French rover, brought into Plymouth the *Esperance* of Havre, belonging to Fernando de Quintanadoine, the Rouen merchant whom we have met with already. The ship was laden with Barbary sugar and had been insured with Stoderd & Co. for £200. Hawkins, knowing this, redeemed her from Valeton at a cost of £65. He then delivered ship and goods to the factor of Quintanadoine, and so saved the defendants their £200. The defendants thereafter refused to pay anything to Hawkins, who accordingly prayed for redress.

Stoderd & Co., in their answer, did not deny that they were liable if the facts were as Hawkins stated them. But they declared that he was in collusion with the rovers—pirates, as they called them—encouraging them to enter Plymouth and ‘promising them safe return at their pleasure’. The implication evidently was that Hawkins ought to have recovered the prize by force, without paying anything. Further, they stated that

Hawkins had not restored the ship to Quintanadoine at his first demand, but had been compelled to do so by an order from the Privy Council. Meanwhile Hawkins or the rovers had partially spoiled the ship before she was given up, and they, Stoderd & Co., had been adjudged by arbitrators to pay 28 per cent. of the sum assured, or £56. They therefore denied that they owed Hawkins anything.¹

The upshot of this case does not appear. It is to be remarked, however, that Hawkins was undoubtedly on friendly terms with the Huguenot rovers, and that Fernando de Quintanadoine was his hereditary enemy. It should be noted also that he chose to proceed in the Court of Requests with a case which by its nature seemed more appropriate for the High Court of Admiralty. The Court of Requests was a kind of junior Star Chamber, originally instituted as a means by which poor suitors could obtain justice speedily and cheaply. By the reign of Elizabeth it had developed another side to its character, having become a court particularly favoured by government officials and semi-official persons for process against their opponents.² Like those of the Star Chamber, its decisions were suspected of being none too pure, and it lacked the prestige of the Courts of Admiralty and Chancery, on whose jurisdictions it was often a trespasser. The lawyers of the Courts of Requests and Star Chamber lived by competing for business with the more regular tribunals, and it was inevitable that they should incur the suspicion of unduly favouring the plaintiffs with whom lay the initiative in choosing the field of action. On the whole, there is a flavour of oppressiveness in the conduct of Hawkins in this affair.

There were kicks to be had as well as halfpence in the maritime rough-and-tumble of the period, and the

¹ Court of Requests, Eliz., Bundle 134, No. 41.

² See Selden Society, *Select Cases in the Court of Requests*, Introduction, 1898. The Court was abolished during the period 1640-9.

Hawkins brothers occasionally appear in the character of the despoiled in these transactions. In 1572 William Hawkins freighted a ship from Plymouth for Hamburg, and lost her to French rovers in the Downs.¹ Again, in February 1575, he brought a suit in the Admiralty Court against the goods of Nicholas Brewnes, on the ground that Brewnes (Brunes?), a Frenchman, had caused his ship the *Angel* to be arrested without cause at Rochelle and detained there for two whole years. Hawkins claimed £500, to be obtained by seizing the goods of Brewnes to that amount.² There would seem to have been two ships of this name, for the port books show an *Angel* of Plymouth entering that place from London, laden by John Hawkins, on 19 August 1571, in the midst of the period of the alleged detention. The duplication and frequent alteration of ships' names are a trap to the unwary researcher, and render the tracing of their movements uncertain.

William Hawkins and Richard Grenville were joint owners of the *Castle of Comfort* in 1575, and had been for some years previously. In the year mentioned she was reported to be cruising in the Channel in association with the Orange privateers from Flushing. Whilst so engaged she took the ship *Sauveur* of St. Malo belonging to Guillaume Le Fer and others. The owners complained to the English Privy Council, made out a strong case, and procured the summoning of Hawkins and Grenville to London to answer the charge. Grenville attended in May 1576 to speak for himself and his partner, and the Council committed the matter to the Judge of the Admiralty. In that court Grenville admitted that he had been until recently the owner of the *Castle of Comfort*, and that he and Hawkins had fitted her for a lawful voyage to Newfoundland, in which he, Grenville, was to command. But when she had already

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 19, 30 June 1572.

² H. C. A. Libels, 3/46, No. 57.

her crew on board he had sold her to the French captain Jolis, who had a licence from the Prince of Condé. Whilst under Jolis she had been attacked by the *Sauveur*, and had captured her assailant, brought her into an English port, and disposed of her cargo.¹ Whether Grenville came off successfully with this plausible story is not apparent. It is a useful illustration of the difficulty of pinning offenders by sea; for by his own admission the crew as well as the ship were English, the only Frenchman concerned in her being the captain with his Condé commission. One is left to wonder whether the sale was a genuine transaction. Another interesting question is of the nature of the Newfoundland voyage which Grenville had contemplated. It is not likely that a man of his position would have gone out as a fishing skipper, nor was the *Castle* with her heavy armament quite a suitable vessel for the employment. It looks rather as if he was anticipating the plan of Sir Humphrey Gilbert three years later, of an onslaught upon the foreign fishing fleets for the sake of plunder. Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Portuguese took part in the Newfoundland fishery, and valuable booty could have been obtained by a raid upon their fleets.

In 1575-6 there was a great deal of maritime outrage being committed between the English and the French, each side accusing the other of being the aggressor. An Admiralty examination of the latter year contains a long story of the capture of the *Antelope* of London by a Frenchman of Havre. The ship was homeward bound from Barbary, and the French wished the crew to admit that the cargo was Portuguese. Not obtaining a voluntary statement to that effect, they hanged the purser, whereupon the others, in fear of death, made the required admission.²

¹ H. C. A. Examinations, No. 22, 19 July 1576; *Foreign Calendar*, 1575-7, No. 529; *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 433; *A. P. C.*, 1575-7, pp. 111, 132.

² H. C. A. Examinations, No. 22, 1 Sept. 1576.

A purely civil case brought John and William Hawkins into contact with a public matter illustrating the grip of great capitalists upon the commerce of the period. In July 1577 four of their ships, the *William*, *Salomon*, *John*, and *Paul*, were chartered by Horatio Palavicini to bring cargoes of alum from Genoa to London. They arrived in October somewhat the worse for weather, and Palavicini refused to take delivery on the ground that the alum was spoilt. The claims and counterclaims were argued in the Admiralty and Chancery Courts successively in 1578-9.¹ Alum, a necessary material for the cloth manufacture, was at that time obtained solely from mines owned by the Pope, and was exported from Civita Vecchia to all parts of Europe. The father of Horatio Palavicini had farmed the output for many years, but his contract had now expired, and the Pope had granted the monopoly to others. Foreseeing this, the Palavicini had accumulated at Genoa an enormous stock of alum, sufficient to last for five or six years, and they now sought the sole right of importing it into England for that period. Their object was to ruin the Pope's new farmers by denying them their greatest market. Although the Palavicini offered to employ English shipping exclusively, the English Mediterranean traders objected, and the ultimate decision was against the projected interference with freedom of trade.² The dispute with the Hawkinses shows incidentally that they were by no means confining themselves to privateering, as might be supposed from the previous cases described in this chapter. The port books also indicate a good deal of peaceful commerce on their account.

English intrusions in the West Indies in the fifteen-sixties had been solely for purposes of trade. Those of

¹ Chancery Proc. Eliz., Pp 10, No. 53; H. C. A. Libels, 3/48, No. 64.

² A number of papers on the alum question are to be found in Lansdowne MS., 26, ff. 37-50, and in *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, pp. 616-77, *passim*.

the seventies were chiefly for plunder; and the dividing line between the two categories falls in 1568, the year of San Juan de Ulua. After that date, it is true, there are hints of further slave-trading expeditions, but in the main it was piracy or privateering which was the prevailing motive. Drake was in the Caribbean in 1570 and 1571, and in 1572-3 he carried out his famous raid on the Isthmus of Panama, in which he attacked Nombre de Dios and subsequently captured a treasure train on the isthmus. The details of that adventure are celebrated, and have had the effect of giving a false proportion to the whole story of the time. For it is certain, from the correspondence of Spanish representatives in England, that Drake was one among many, and there are indications that the others may have been fairly successful. Some reports by Guerau de Spes in 1569-71 have already been mentioned as showing that Hawkins and the Winters and a Portuguese renegade named Bartholomew Bayon were sending out ships in those years. Further hints occur in the period now under consideration. The details, save in one surprising instance, have been lost, for which we have in great measure to blame the taciturnity of John Hawkins. It is a great pity that Hakluyt did not prove himself more successful in the art of interviewing those who had the secrets that he longed to hear.

The expulsion of Guerau de Spes caused a curtailment of the Spanish reports from London, for it was some years before a regular ambassador was sent in his place. In the meantime Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish merchant, officiated as *chargé d'affaires*, but his sources of secret information were scanty as compared with those of his predecessors. Not until 1575 do we obtain anything from his pen on the subject of oceanic adventures. In March of that year the Queen spoke to him about one Collins of Gravesend who had been captured in the Indies in one of Hawkins's ships and had been brought

a prisoner to Spain.¹ The allusion is amplified by the Mexican *procesos* collected by Mr. Conway. One of them shows that William Collins was a seaman of the *Jesus of Lubeck* and was sentenced by the Inquisition to ten years in the galleys. The Queen's interest in his fate was undoubtedly prompted by Hawkins and is creditable to both. In May, Guaras reported that three London ships were preparing to join three from Plymouth in an Indies voyage, the squadron being secretly equipped by Hawkins and partly owned by Hatton.² Two months later the news was that eight of Hawkins's vessels had sailed for the Caribbean, and that three or four other English craft had also gone to those parts. Guaras added that an Englishman had recently come home to Plymouth very rich with the proceeds of a raid committed in company with the Cimaroons between Nombre de Dios and Panama.³ At first sight this looks like a belated notice of Drake's arrival in 1573, but it is more probably an incorrect version of an adventure of 1574-5, whose details have come to light among the records of the Admiralty Court.

According to this story, a small vessel named the *John*, of only eighteen tons, sailed from Plymouth for the Caribbean in November 1574. Her owner was a certain John Tipkin of London, her captain Gilbert Horseley, and her master Philip Roche. The crew numbered twenty-five men. With victuals for five months—as much as the ship could carry—and with an armament of three cast-iron guns (a 3-pounder and two 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ -pounders), ten bases throwing half-pound shot, and a barrel and a half of powder, they made first for the Barbary coast, where they took two fifty-ton Spaniards laden with salted fish. They sent away all the prisoners in one of them, and manned the other from the *John*, which, with five-and-twenty men, must have been unpleasantly crowded.

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 409.

² *Ibid.*, No. 410.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 417, 25 July 1575.

With the Spanish prize and the *John* the adventurers now crossed the Atlantic and came to a place called 'Sabusses', the context indicating that it was on or near the Isthmus of Darien.¹ There they landed and got into touch with the 'Sem Rownes' (Cimaroons). At this juncture a Spanish ship of superior force arrived on the coast and recaptured the prize brought from Barbary, with eight Englishmen in her. The witness speaks with indignation of this proceeding: 'she was violently taken from them by the Spaniards.' Reduced now to seventeen men, the English crew pushed on westwards and fell in with a small Spaniard of ten tons, carrying gold and silver bars worth £850 and four jewels of gold set with pearls. They set some of the Spaniards ashore and kept the others with them, and so sailed back towards Cartagena. Off that place they took two small craft laden with victuals, and with this supply they again turned westwards towards the Honduras. There they met a Spanish pinnace of ten tons with four bags of gold dust and nuggets, which stuff they took and let her go, and in the Bay of Honduras they made a final prize of a twenty-ton caravel laden with Canary wines and oil and some coined money. They let this ship go with half her wine, reserving the rest to cheer the homeward voyage.

Captain Horseley, now passably rich, steered for England and arrived at Plymouth with fifteen of his men in June 1575. His difficulties were not yet surmounted, for the expedition, like those of Drake, had been piratical from start to finish. At Plymouth, Horseley paid £10 to the Lord Admiral's officer for conniving at the voyage, and sent a man to London to advise the owner, John Tipkin, of their return. He then sailed up Channel to Arundel, where Tipkin came down to meet them; the treasure was landed and apparently conveyed away without interference; and after that the High Court of

¹ Probably the Cabeças, east of Nombre de Dios.

Admiralty arrested every one it could catch and investigated the whole affair. Its decision is not ascertainable, but it is fairly safe to assume that no one was hanged and that very little restitution was ever made to Spain. The crew, it may be noted, did not receive a percentage of the spoil, but their wages were paid on a high scale, two or three times as much as the normal ten shillings a month, and they had probably had pickings from the plunder when the prizes were taken.¹

The above voyage, which by its success and the scantiness of the means employed equals anything in Drake's record, may have been the reverse of exceptional; we know so little about most of the others of the same period. In February 1576 Guaras wrote that two armed ships were leaving Plymouth for the West Indies, dispatched by a person in high authority; and a little later he declared that ten more were gathering at Falmouth for the same destination.² In June the ships *Ragged Staff* and *Bear* set forth under Andrew Barker of Bristol, a merchant whose goods and factor had been seized by the Inquisition in the Canary Islands. The story of his voyage has been narrated by Hakluyt and need only be summarized here. Barker gained some plunder as he passed along the coast of the Main, but the expedition was wrecked by quarrels between himself and his two shipmasters. One of them was the Philip Roche of the 1574 adventure, and he died in the course of this voyage. Off the coast of Honduras the dissensions grew into open mutiny, Barker was thrust ashore by his own men and killed by Spaniards, the *Ragged Staff* was lost, many of the company perished by various misadventures, and the survivors came home in the smaller vessel in the summer of 1578. The ringleaders in the mutiny were tried by order of the Privy Council and were punished

¹ H. C. A. Oyer & Terminer, 1/39, evidence of Thos. Wytheridge and Morgan Lea, 29 Oct., and 17 Nov. 1575.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 440, 443.

with terms of imprisonment.¹ The years 1575-6 witnessed also another well-known tragedy in the voyage of John Oxenham to Panama, a story whose main features are faithfully told, with some fictitious details added, in Kingsley's *Westward Ho!* In sum, it is evident that these were years of great activity in the Caribbean, the English adventurers transferring their operations thither from the older hunting-ground of the Guinea coast. The indications are that John Hawkins bore a considerable part in the promotion of these undertakings.

Although an uneasy peace prevailed with Spain, the English had, as a result of their own actions, some ground for distrust of Spanish intentions. When therefore a fleet with reinforcements for the Netherlands was expected to pass up Channel in July 1574, William Hawkins was ordered, as a precaution, to send out a bark to watch near Cape Ushant and to bring speedy information of the Spaniards' approach.² Behind this there were the usual naval preparations and musters of the militia, but the threat passed harmlessly by, as others had done.

In November 1575, perhaps in view of the negotiations then proceeding with Portugal, John Hawkins commenced in the Admiralty Court a *querela* on the subject of the detention of his cargo from Hispaniola, carried into Lisbon in 1563. The facts have been given in the chapter dealing with his first slaving voyage, but the present documents show that no redress had yet been obtained. To this old complaint he added a new one. In 1575 he had a ship named the *White Lion* of 300 tons homeward bound from Italy. A fleet of the King of Portugal captured her on the high seas, took from her goods worth £260, and released her after twenty days' detention.³ Hawkins hoped no doubt to get these claims

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, Nos. 508, 510, and the account in Hakluyt.

² Add. MS., 5754, f. 138.

³ H. C. A. Libels, 3/47, No. 155; Examinations, No. 21, 23, 24 Nov., 7 Dec. 1575.

allowed when England and Portugal should come to terms. But the treaty of 1576, as has been shown, was a mere truce which left all the old disputes unsettled.

As the years passed, with Protestantism barely holding its ground and making no headway either in France or the Netherlands, the balancing policy of Burghley and the Queen became increasingly distasteful to the forward party in English counsels. Walsingham and Leicester, the latter now an ardent Protestant, were the chief exponents of the view that war with Spain was inevitable and had best be commenced as soon as possible. Hatton, although more a Catholic than a Protestant, threw his influence on the same side; and between them they fostered a movement which ultimately forced the Queen's hand and brought on the war. In the autumn of 1577 Drake sailed to gain touch with the Spice Islands through the Straits of Magellan and also to raid the coast of Peru by the way. A year later, Gilbert collected a much stronger expedition at Plymouth for offence against Spain, and only his mismanagement and the quarrels among his gentlemen adventurers prevented him from doing what might have led to an immediate conflict. As it was, his fleet had almost dissolved before it left port, and Walsingham was disappointed, for that time, of his war. John Hawkins, it is evident, sympathized with the war-party, but was not prepared to go the length of defying Burghley's authority. In January 1577 he renewed his proposition for an attack upon the plate fleet. He would try it, he said, with three good ships of the Queen's, five 120-ton merchantmen, six pinnaces, and 750 men. The total cost would be £3,750, and the estimated booty £2,000,000 at least.¹ But Burghley and his mistress held back, and nothing came of it, and Hawkins was too good a subject to act without their consent.

Another sphere of service, a hard and joyless one, was

¹ Cotton MSS., Galba, c. v, f. 264.

about to claim him. His father-in-law, Benjamin Gonson, for twenty-eight years Treasurer of the Navy, was growing old. Hawkins had probably been assisting him for some time, and in November 1577 a patent was issued associating the younger man with the older in the office and granting the reversion to the survivor.¹ It was the first step to a complete transference, and Gonson died shortly afterwards. He had told his son-in-law, in passing on the Treasurership, 'I shall pluck out a thorn from my foot and put it in yours'; and the warning justified itself in the years to come.

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho E. ix, ff. 125-8.

BOOK III
THE QUEEN'S NAVY

THE NAVY TO 1577

THE administration of the Navy by John Hawkins coincided with the completion of an important change in its nature and functions, the transformation of a force intended solely for action in home waters into one capable of sending out squadrons to sail the ocean for months together and to strike heavy blows on the other side of the Atlantic. Hawkins bore his part in effecting this change, nay, it may be reasonably proved that he was a chief promoter of it; but to understand his work it is necessary not merely to study his record but to form some idea of what had been done in the times preceding his own. A brief survey of some features in English naval development is therefore attempted in this chapter.¹

The need for a national fleet originated in the Middle Ages. It is a common idea that the chief and original duty of the Navy was to guard our shores from invasion. But there was always more in its functions than that, and indeed coast defence was not in early times the most prominent among them: Harold had a naval force in 1066, which failed to interfere with the Norman invasion, and none of the contemporary chroniclers writes as if that achievement might have been expected of it. For the early fleets had no organized administra-

¹ The subject is one in which deep research has been accomplished by the modern school of naval historians. Among their works the following have been found especially valuable in the compilation of this chapter: M. Oppenheim, *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy*, London, 1896, and *The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson*, esp. the Introduction to Book I, Navy Records Society, 1902; Sir J. S. Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, London, 1898; Sir J. K. Laughton, *State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, Introduction, Navy Rec. Soc., 1895; Sir J. S. Corbett, *Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816*, Navy Rec. Soc., 1905.

tion behind them; they were obliged, by lack of pay, victuals, and stores, to disperse after a few weeks' service; their ships were not of a design suitable for cruising; and so they could not be trusted to stop an invasion by permanently watching the coast. The more important uses of the medieval Navy were: first, to transport military expeditions across the Channel to France; second, to exploit the geographical advantage of England's position in relation to the trade-routes of northern Europe, whereby her long southern coast lay parallel to the line of traffic between the North Sea and the western lands of the Continent; and third, when strategy had somewhat developed, to check invasions by the offensive method of raiding the enemy's shipping in its ports of departure before his preparations should be complete. All these purposes could be accomplished in short periods of service followed by dispersal of the force employed. Of the first the instances are so numerous and so obvious that citation is unnecessary. Of the second the principles were well understood, and are set forth at length in the *Libel of English Policy* of 1436; as examples, Edward III's battle of *Les Espagnols sur Mer*, off Winchelsea, and the Earl of Warwick's molestation of the traffic of the Hanseatic League when he was Captain of Calais under Henry VI, may be quoted. Of the third, the prevention of invasion by offensive raids, good instances are the battle of Damme in 1213, and that of Sluys in 1340.

For these duties the Norman and early Plantagenet kings maintained a few royal ships, but for at least two centuries after the Conquest the work was mainly done by a navy raised by contract. The Cinque Ports—seven head-ports and over thirty of lower rank, from Seaford round to the Thames estuary—undertook, in return for certain privileges, to serve the Crown with fifty-seven ships for forty days every year free of charge. The agreement was frequently in operation, and the fleet was often kept out on payment for periods in excess of the contract

time. It was an arrangement beneficial both to the national exchequer and to the prosperity of the ports, and it might have lasted much longer than it did but for a change in the governing circumstances. The Cinque Ports were for the most part shallow havens, tending rather to silt up than to improve as time went on, and medieval shipping belonging to deep-water harbours grew steadily larger until the little vessels of the Ports, unable to increase their draught, became outclassed and sank into the second or third rank. These effects are visible in the record of the French wars of the fourteenth century, when Edward III drew from the country at large a fleet containing ships of 100, 200, and even 300 tons. These, however, were hired merchantmen, and Edward did little to create a royal navy in place of the declining Cinque Ports fleet. He overworked the merchant service, continually impressing ships and neglecting to pay for them, until he ended by ruining the ship-owners and leaving the country devoid of maritime defence; the closing years of his reign witnessed the penalty in the shape of extensive ravaging of the coastline by French and Spanish expeditions.

Richard II and Henry IV did nothing to remedy these conditions, but Henry V in his short reign of nine years created a royal navy of unprecedented strength. His list contains thirty-eight ships, of which nine were of 400 tons and over. With these he destroyed the French fleet, secured command of the Channel, and was thereby enabled to conquer the north of France and to bring under his own flag the only seaports from which a French navy could again have arisen. Had he lived longer, further consequences would have showed themselves, and English commerce in the North Sea—then an area much more busy than the western waters—would have emerged from the state of subordination in which Flemish, Danish and Hanse competition had kept it.

All these prospects faded with the accession of the

infant Henry VI. Relying perhaps upon the military occupation of the French coast, his Council sold off the Royal Navy as unnecessary, and resorted to a feeble system of contracts with civilian shipowners for occasional services. The results were disastrous. The English mercantile marine was reduced to a low ebb by its North Sea rivals, the traders were pressed out of the Baltic, the German ports, and the Iceland fishery, and the reconquest of Normandy by Charles VII in the middle of the fifteenth century threatened a revival of French power in the Channel. The mercantile and town-dwelling part of the population could feel no loyalty towards such a government, and raised no objection to its overthrow by the Yorkist revolt. The function of sea-power in deciding the Wars of the Roses was positive as well as negative; for when Edward IV landed at Ravenspur to conquer at Barnet and Tewkesbury he did so from shipping provided by his Hanseatic and Flemish allies. Without their help he could scarcely have regained the throne; and his reinstatement was in effect a successful German invasion of England, as was apparent in the great commercial privileges he had to accord to the Hanseatic League in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1474.

Edward IV, like Edward III, has achieved a posthumous reputation as a patron of commerce; but neither of them could have been so regarded by their own subjects, since it was foreign rather than native merchants who benefited by their measures. For the first real example of a royal policy directed to the advancement of English trade as distinguished from trade with England, we have to wait until the reign of Henry VII. He not only fostered his subjects' business by commercial treaties and diplomatic pressure, but also sought to revive the mercantile marine by the first effective Navigation Act in our history and by paying bounties¹ on the build-

¹ The bounty system had been applied fitfully at earlier dates; but the Tudors practised it with regularity, a necessary condition of success.

ing or acquisition of large ships. In addition to this, he developed on a modest scale the rudiments of a royal navy which he had inherited from his Yorkist predecessors. He did not, it is true, increase its numbers, but he built two new warships of over 500 tons, armed with a large number of little pieces called serpentines.

One circumstance of the renascence of English shipping under the Tudors has often been noted and furnishes a puzzle. If the tonnage measurements were even approximately calculated by the same rules, which seems to have been the fact, the ships of the Tudor period were generally smaller than those of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. This is to a certain extent true of the warships, comparing those of Henry VIII with those of Henry V, and among the merchantmen and the navy vessels bought from merchants the discrepancy is more strongly marked. In all matters but that of size the craft of shipbuilding was making steady progress, and it may perhaps be suggested that therein lay the explanation of the diminished tonnage. The medieval sailing ship of northern Europe was simple in rig, with a single mast and a great square sail. The only effective limits to her size were the depth of harbours and the nature of the building material, and these, it is evident, permitted merchantmen of several hundred tons to be used. But the sailing powers of such vessels were restricted; they could only drive along before a favourable wind, lacking which they had to wait long periods in port consuming wages and stores. Then, in the fifteenth century, the three-masted ship appeared, with lateen sails on the mizen and topsails above the courses and improved lines in the hull. The causes and origins of the change have never been properly traced; but it was comparatively rapid, for the new type was able to sail to a destination under conditions prohibitive to the old, and so was economically superior. But the more complicated rigging and handling demanded, for

large ships, a great number of mariners, and smaller vessels of the new type were for a long time more attractive to those who had to work them. Thus the modern sailing-ship, dating from the fifteenth century, had to begin again the progression from small to large, and in the early Tudor period it had scarcely attained the average tonnage of the medieval great ship.

Henry VII's revival of trade was not the only factor demanding an increase of naval power. Whilst the old lines of commerce were showing fresh activity, a new one was being opened up—that of intercourse with Italy, the Greek islands, Egypt, and Syria. This Mediterranean trade was first frequented by Englishmen in Henry's reign, and its dangers rendered the employment of war-ships almost essential. The Tudor sovereigns often leased the ships of the Navy for this purpose to the merchants, who were likewise encouraged to build powerful vessels of their own. When, under Elizabeth, the trade was consolidated in the hands of the Levant Company,¹ the ships of that body formed a fighting squadron second only to the Navy in its warlike qualities. The acquisition by the French Crown of the duchy of Brittany, hitherto virtually independent and inclined to alliance with England, greatly strengthened the sea-power of our nearest potential enemy; whilst the North Sea continued to be dominated by the Hanseatic League, and even Scotland constructed in the closing years of Henry VII's reign a royal fleet containing some formidable units. These considerations show that Tudor England, if it was to be no longer the helpless England of the fifteenth century, exposed to endless revolutions fomented from abroad, was obliged to re-create the service which had died with Henry V. The first Tudor responded mildly to the stimulus; his son, Henry VIII, did so with sustained energy, and by so doing saved his country from foreign

¹ The Levant Company was at first known as the Turkey Company; it obtained its later name after amalgamation with the Venice Company.

conquest, not only in his lifetime but also in the half-century following his death.

In the first ten years of his reign Henry VIII built, captured, or bought no less than thirty royal ships in fulfilment of the needs outlined above; and with this fleet he was enabled to command the Channel in his first French war and to invade the soil of France at his pleasure. In the ensuing period the need for naval strength became still greater. The King of Spain, already from 1516 the ruler of the Low Countries, became the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1519, with the military resources of Germany at his disposal in addition to the shipping of the Netherlands. Francis I, who became King of France in 1515, showed appreciation of the value of sea-power and from the beginning of his reign expended much care upon the development of Havre de Grâce as a fortified dockyard.¹ The two great Continental powers were mutually hostile, but England's security by that circumstance was precarious, and Henry VIII found it necessary to maintain a fleet stronger than either of theirs; on two occasions in his later years, in 1539 and 1545, they were within measurable distance of combining against him. Henry, therefore, never relaxed his naval vigilance. With part of the proceeds from the dissolution of the monasteries he fortified the port towns and rebuilt the whole Navy, a fact which ought to have taken as strong a hold upon popular imagination as the current idea that he wasted the whole of the spoil in endowing a new nobility. When he died in 1547 he possessed fifty-three ships, for the most part new and of superior model to those of 1509.

Henry's estrangements from Charles V were momentary and exceptional. In general the arrangement of

¹ Havre is the 'Newhaven' of most English sixteenth-century documents. The Sussex Newhaven did not come into being until Elizabeth's reign, as a consequence of a change in the course of the River Ouse. It was 'new' in relation to the ancient port of Seaford, which it superseded.

the powers in his time was in two groups—France and Scotland on the one side, and England, Spain, and the Empire on the other. Charles V had no love for England, particularly after the breach with Rome and the divorce of Katherine of Aragon, but he knew that with England hostile his empire must fall, for its communications passed through the bottle-neck of the Channel. Henry VIII realized the strength of his position, and proved the reverse of a docile ally; but mutual interest always ended by keeping the two sovereigns together. On the accession of Mary Tudor in 1553 the opportunity for the Hapsburg control of England arrived. The Queen was Catholic and half-Spanish, and was ready to marry forthwith the Emperor's son Philip, bartering her country's independence for the advantage of her faith. It was no empty form that described the subsequent reign as that of Philip and Mary, for Philip was the effective ruler of England's foreign relations; and Charles V, having, as it seemed, converted the Anglo-Hapsburg alliance into a union, retired into his monastery and left Philip to dominate western Europe with the united seapower of the Netherlands, England, Spain, and the Italian possessions.

The Valois monarchy with its hold upon Scotland still resisted, but was outmatched in the war of 1557-9, and but for the death of his wife Philip would have been left in an unassailable position. In reality the death of Mary without issue was the beginning of the end of Hapsburg predominance, just as the death of Henry II of France sealed the fate of the Valois. The simultaneous weakening of the two Catholic monarchies permitted the Protestant revolt to begin in the territories of both. But for ten years these results were slow to reveal all their implications, and, as has been emphasized in earlier chapters, the husk of the Anglo-Spanish alliance held together even though the life was going out of it. When the new grouping of Europe, not as of Hapsburg



A HIGH-CHARGED SHIP, c. 1560

From a picture by P. Bruegel the elder

against Valois, but as of Catholic against Protestant, stood forth in unmistakable outline, England's need of a navy was as great as ever, as great as her need of the diplomacy of Elizabeth and Burghley. For she was in the Protestant camp, and the Protestants were on the defensive. They were so, indeed, largely because they did not realize the strength of their resources, for in the end it was their sea-power that was to save the Reformation. But the statesmen of the sixteenth century, not having had the advantage of reading the history that lay ahead of them, did not know that. Coligny had an inkling of it, but fate made him a soldier instead of the sea-king he had it in him to be. Elizabeth and Burghley saw salvation on the land, and even in their Spanish war spent four times as much money on armies in France and the Netherlands as on fleets in the Atlantic. At the same time they did fully understand that in default of naval defence the war would not be decided in the Netherlands, but more painfully on English battlefields.

The Navy of Henry VIII deserves a fuller consideration than has been given it above, for it was in an accurate sense the parent of the force which Hawkins took over in 1578. On the material side, the chief innovations of Henry's reign were the adoption of the great gun as the primary weapon and the differentiation of the larger ships into two types, the one high-built and majestic, the other low in the water and in some instances flush-decked. Before Henry's reforms, sea-fights had resolved themselves into duels between ships lying grappled and motionless, with the issue decided by small arms and boarding. The little serpentes so profusely mounted on the decks were really small arms, and all weapons were designed for directly killing the enemy's men without much idea of sinking his ship. Sea warfare was soldiers' warfare, as it had been from the days of Greece and Rome, and a fleet was quite correctly designated an 'army by sea', for such was its fundamental

nature. In keeping with this conception, admirals and captains were all men who had been trained in land fighting, soldiers formed the majority of those on board, and the master and his mariners were intended merely to put the vessel into a position in which the soldiers could fight. In the course of the Tudor period England changed all this, and evolved a navy with recognizable similarities to those of Blake and Nelson; but Spain did not, and in a certain sense the Armada campaign was a contest between the fifteenth century and the sixteenth—the defeat of an anachronism by an up-to-date force.

The last of the medieval sea-fights, so far as England was concerned, occurred off Brest in 1512 in the course of Henry's first French war. In this action the *Regent* and the *Cordelière* grappled and fought it out side by side, hundreds of men were killed, and both ships took fire and were lost. Perhaps it was that calamity that set Henry thinking¹ whether there was not some more scientific attack available. At least it is certain that shortly afterwards he began to place heavy guns in his ships, guns that threw timber-smashing projectiles and provided a chance of sinking the enemy from a distance without coming to hand strokes at all. The new armament took firm hold and became ever more prominent as the century progressed. Spanish observers told Philip II, early in his reign, that the English would fight with their great guns and be very hard to board; and the Frenchman La Popelinière, writing before 1580, says that the English never board, as if it were an axiom well known and irrefutable.

The great gun was the beginning of all the other changes that made the modern English Navy. For the gun, once it was trusted, made possible a reduction in the enormous crowd of men considered necessary for

¹ The available evidence warrants the belief that Henry VIII was personally the director of naval policy, and that the innovations of the reign proceeded from his initiative.

the old way of fighting, and that in its turn extended the range of fleets, which could now venture farther from their home ports without risk of starvation. Moreover, gunnery put a premium upon skilful sailing; there were positions, soon recognized, whose attainment gave one's own guns their maximum effect and rendered those of the enemy useless. Consequently the seaman became more important than the soldier, and sailor-captains and admirals began slowly to oust the landsmen from command. The army by sea became a navy; it is significant that John Hawkins, in the documents we have quoted concerning his third slaving voyage, always referred to his squadron as his navy, whereas a man of his father's generation would inevitably have called it an army.

Henry VIII, pioneer as he was, never realized the full consequences of the great gun. He continued to place more soldiers than sailors in his ships and to appoint land officers to command them. He shipped also numbers of the little man-killing weapons which his own great ordnance was to render obsolete. His fighting instructions, so far as they can be interpreted, remained in the military tradition. His ships were to go into action in line abreast like soldiers on land, a formation in which the guns could not come into use until his own line was interlocked with that of the enemy. The great gun, in fact, although introduced, was not yet trusted; it had the tradition of centuries to overcome first. So it fell out that Henry's Navy did not in his time fulfil its potentialities. It continued, like the navies of the past, to be a force for home waters only; its oceanic period had not begun. The new light which dispelled the tradition was to come from those short-handed pioneers in the tropics, who had no men for soldiers' tactics and whose guns were their only salvation. Some of it came also, without a doubt, from the privateers of the fifteen-forties and fifties, who found that heavy guns and few men increased their dividends to a satisfying extent.

In the model of his ships Henry showed again the conflict of old and new influences in his mind. He built his largest vessels, to the end of his reign, of the high-charged type, with towering poops and forecastles to be crowded with soldiers and little guns for defence against boarding and for victory by that means. His fighting instructions, had they ever been carried out, implied the necessity of high-built ships, for such orders could only have resulted in a *mêlée*. Actually, in spite of the occurrence of two more wars, in 1522-5 and 1544-6, the French and English fleets never once committed themselves to close action from the Brest fight of 1512 until Henry's death. However, the action might have been fought in any of those years and could hardly have failed to be decisive, so perhaps Henry was justified of his infighting ships. At the same time he evolved a squadron of ships of the second size, designed to keep their distance and beat the enemy with their great guns alone. These craft were long and comparatively low-built, without the great superstructures of the first-rates, and without accommodation, by consequence, for their companies of hand-to-hand fighters. The new models were called galleasses, although the word was not used with the technical strictness it had attained among the Venetians; and, whilst primarily sailing-ships, they were supplied with oars for special occasions. Whilst the great ships at the end of the reign reached in the *Great Harry* a size of 1,000 tons¹, the largest of the galleasses were of 450. The fighting instructions indicate that they were intended to work as a separate squadron and to lie to windward of the *mêlée* of great ships, thence pounding the enemy as occasion offered.

The personnel of Henry's Navy was divided into mari-

¹ The first *Great Harry*, completed in 1514, was of 1,500 tons. She was broken up at Portsmouth, and the second *Great Harry*, of the same type but of 1,000 tons, was built there between 1536 and 1540. She was accidentally burnt at Woolwich in 1553.

ners, gunners and soldiers, with their appropriate officers. The soldiers were the most numerous, and their commander was nearly always the captain of the ship. The gunners show the trend of the time. They were originally landmen, but became more and more frequently recruited from among the seamen as the spread of privateering provided a reserve of men with the necessary qualifications. It is not possible to give complete statistics on these points, but the following figures will illustrate some of them.

A list of ships of 1513 shows that in a fleet of twenty-four sail, large and small, the soldiers formed 55 per cent. of the crews, and the mariners 45 per cent. The total tonnage amounted to 8,460, and the officers and men to 6,480, or a proportion of one man to $1\frac{1}{3}$ tons.¹ Three lists of 1544 give virtually the same proportion,² and a table of the fleet at the date of Henry's death shows that the 53 ships then existing amounted to 11,268 tons and required 7,780 men to mobilize them for war.³ This is approximately one man to $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of shipping. Such numbers were a check upon the use of the fleet in distant waters, for there was no stowage room for the vast quantities of food and drink that would have been required. A comparison with the figures of John Hawkins's ocean expedition of 1567 is instructive. His tonnage amounted to about 1,330, and his men to 408, or one man to $3\frac{1}{4}$ tons; and even then he was short of food when he reached the Spanish Main six months after sailing from England. But Hawkins did not expect to fight with any force as strong as his own. An instance of an Atlantic voyage for a warlike purpose is that of Drake in 1585. He took about 3,600 tons of shipping and about 2,300 men, according to the rather untrustworthy figures available. The proportion works out at one man

¹ A. Spont, *The War with France, 1512-13*, Navy Rec. Soc., 1897, p. 79.

² *Letters and Papers*, xix, pt. ii, No. 502.

³ *Archaeologia*, vi. 218.

to just over $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons, a retrogression to earlier practice, and Monson says that 'the want of victuals and other necessities' was especially felt. The death-roll from disease and hardship was in fact enormous. In one matter Drake's figures show a marked difference from those of Henry VIII's fleets: the proportion of mariners was 83 per cent. and of soldiers 17.¹ The further development of this matter will be considered in a later chapter.

The difficulty of victualling large numbers for ocean voyages seems in practice to have produced two distinct policies. Drake and his school realized that huge casualties were probable and shipped an excessive number of men in order to provide against the loss. Hawkins approached the matter more intelligently and started with fewer men; and in all his ocean voyages before the return from San Juan de Ulua he lost very few hands from disease or starvation. Victualling was not the only difficulty attendant upon large numbers; overcrowding and consequent uncleanness killed even more than did hunger.

It is in the sphere of administration that Henry's most enduring work is to be found. The titular head of the service had been, from the fifteenth century, the Great Admiral or, as he was called in Tudor days, the Lord Admiral. This officer's duties had not, before Henry's time, been very onerous, the most important being to pocket the fees arising from the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty, where the work was performed by a judge who ranked as the Lord Admiral's deputy. Henry VIII made his Lords Admirals fighting commanders who took personal charge of the fleet in time of war. The first so appointed, Sir Edward Howard, was killed in action with the French in 1513. But still the Admiral had little to do with administration in war, and nothing in peace. Henry was to all intents and purposes his own

¹ Figures combined from Corbett's *Spanish War*, pp. ix-xii and Oppenheim's *Monson's Tracts*, i. 121-5.

minister of marine, and the routine work was performed by the Clerk of the Ships, who supervised the accounts, building, repairs, stores, and every other department of the Navy's upkeep. Perhaps by reason of its simplicity the system worked well, the more so as Henry was lucky enough to secure in succession two excellent Clerks of the Ships, Robert Brygandine, who held office from the time of Henry VII until 1523, and William Gonson, who acted from 1524 until 1545. Under them were various temporary officials appointed for special duties as need arose.

This system came to an end with the death of William Gonson in 1545. The Navy was now outgrowing the control of one man, however able; the future promised to be warlike; and it was obviously unsafe to entrust everything to the Clerk, since his loss at a critical moment would cause confusion. In the spring of 1545, therefore, Henry created the body subsequently known as the Navy Board.¹ At its head stood a new officer, the Lieutenant of the Admiralty, intended to be the deputy of the Lord Admiral and so to bring that highly placed person at least indirectly into contact with the administration. Next in order came the Treasurer of Marine Causes (or of the Navy), the Comptroller of the Ships, and the Surveyor of the Ships, performing between them the work hitherto done by Brygandine or Gonson alone. The supply of arms and munitions, hitherto a common service for land and sea forces, now received a separate naval organization under the Master of the Ordnance for the Ships. The Clerk of the Ships completed the Board as its junior member, acting as secretary and keeper of records. Here was an excellent administration for

¹ For all these matters the chief authority is Oppenheim's *Administration of the Royal Navy*, *passim*, and especially pp. 83-7. But for the date of the Navy Board, compare a paper by Mr. E. S. de Beer, *The Lord Admiral and the Administration of the Navy*, in *Mariner's Mirror*, xiii, No. 1.


the needs of a fleet of fifty sail, small enough to be efficient, large enough to be unaffected by ordinary casualties; for, although the officers were answerable for their several departments, the Board acted as a whole, and the head of one department could always take over the work of another in case of need. This was constantly done as a matter of practice. The various officers went to sea for months at a time in charge of squadrons, leaving their administrative duties to the rest of the Board; and the confusion so caused must have been outbalanced by the knowledge which the administration thus gained of actual service conditions and of the effects of their measures upon men and ships afloat. The Navy Board seems to have been the fruit of the common sense of Henry VIII. He certainly did not copy it from his foreign rivals, who long remained without any parallel organization.

In another matter the King showed himself alive to the fact that war efficiency depended upon pre-war organization. Henry VII had laid the foundations of a naval dockyard at Portsmouth, where storehouses were built and where, in 1495, Brygandine had made the first dry-dock recorded in England—a primitive affair from which the water was excluded by a clay mound sandwiched between two wooden barriers. Henry VIII developed and fortified Portsmouth as a base for a fleet working in the Channel. But Portsmouth had its disadvantages. It was a long journey from the seat of government and from the supplies which could be most conveniently bought in the capital. It was also open to destruction if the French should gain command of the sea; in 1545 they made a serious effort to capture it. Thus it seemed both convenient and prudent to create other establishments in the Thames. Their supervision would be easier, and the navigation of the estuary was reckoned to be so dangerous as to baffle any foreign enemy if the beacons and buoys were removed.

De Conſt der Zee-vaerdt/

begrypende ſeer nootwendighe ſaecten voor aller
hande Zee-vaerders / als Schippers / Stuerlieden / Piloten/
Doort-volk ende Coop-lieden.

Van nieuws door den Authoor overſien en verbeterd , midſgaders een bequaem
Hydrographical diſcours, om door 5. verſcheyden wegen na Cathaia en
China te ſeylen; Beſchreven door den ſeer ervarenen
Willem Bourne, Enghelſman,



Amſtelredam by Cornelis Claesz. op't Water/in't Schipf-boeck. An. 1599.

A LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SHIP OF WAR

From a Dutch title-page, 1599

Early in the reign, in or before 1517, dockyard establishments were formed at Woolwich and Deptford, and their accumulations of stores and building appliances soon rivalled those existing at Portsmouth. Such yards depended for their vitality upon mercantile operations in the neighbourhood, for government work was intermittent, and staffs could not be kept in pay unless there was work in hand. In this matter the Thames yards had the advantage. London was the country's greatest seaport, with a population of shipwrights and other craftsmen ready for the government's service. Portsmouth had no trade of its own. For its labour supply it depended upon Southampton, a port whose business declined in an alarming fashion during the early sixteenth century. After 1545 Portsmouth rapidly lost the first place among the dockyards and degenerated into a privateers' lurking-hole.

There is no reason to believe that Henry VIII contemplated, at the time of his death, any reduction of the Navy. His new administration points, on the contrary, to a projected expansion. Nevertheless, the next two reigns, those of Edward VI and Mary, witnessed some decrease in the tonnage of the fleet and a very marked decline in its condition and readiness for service. As Mr. Oppenheim has pointed out, the decrease in ships, often urged against the administrations of these eleven years, is more apparent than real, for it was mainly the small craft that were disposed of. Yet it will not be true to go to the other extreme and hold Edward VI and Mary blameless, for several important vessels on their books were allowed to decay into worthlessness; an outstanding example is the *Grand Mistress*, 450 tons, new in 1545, and sold in 1555 for £35. Moreover, the final statistics for Mary's reign are those of the winter of 1558-9, when a belated burst of activity was bearing fruit. It had been occasioned by the loss of Calais, due to neglect of the forces, and the figures of 1557, if fully

available, would undoubtedly place the naval record of the reign in a more unfavourable light.

A point worth notice in this period is that in spite of the political revolutions occurring in its course, there was fair continuity in the administration of the fleet. In the main it was the officials trained by Henry VIII who continued in control, although there were changes in the tenure of the various posts. There was no reversal of policy on the King's death, but there was a gradual falling-off in the quality of the public service given by these men as the tradition of his rule grew dim. They can hardly be blamed for it, for in 1547 the government of England fell into the hands of as greedy a set of rascals as have ever disgraced our history, and subordinate services inevitably take their tone from the head of the state.

In one respect the spirit of Henry VIII marched on for a year or two into the new period. His development of the naval administration had omitted to take account of the victualling department. The supply of victuals to the fleet had broken down in the war of 1512-13, and again in 1522-3. In 1544-6 there were fewer complaints on this head, possibly because Henry himself worked harder at the end of his life than he had done at the beginning; and Wolsey, whose responsibility for administration had in the early period been considerable, did not shine in dealing with this matter. Yet the victualling was to the end unsatisfactory, since it depended upon a faulty system. There was no permanent department to supervise it, and the supplies were obtained by hand-to-mouth contracts with private merchants, who sometimes gave unwilling service because prices were arbitrarily reduced under the royal right of purveyance. Just before his death Henry had contemplated a reform and had found in one Edward Baeshe a man with the requisite ability for the task. In 1547 the Council appointed Baeshe surveyor of the victuals purchased in

London. In 1550 he became a regular officer of the naval service and was created General Surveyor of the Victuals for the Seas. He fulfilled the duty for close upon forty years, controlling a staff of subordinates in the various ports, and filling by his own credit the intervals between the payments fitfully extorted from the Treasury. Under the new system the victualling was certainly improved, and if it broke down during the Armada campaign the fault was less with the department than with the holders of the national purse-strings.

At the same time (1550) the Council of Edward VI laid the foundations of the yard at Gillingham¹ in the Medway, which became the principal centre for the laying-up and repair of the ships. It was defensible, fairly close to London, and offered greater facilities for putting ships aground than did the Thames yards. These, however, still remained in use, particularly for the building of new ships. In 1551 orders were given for the making of a fort at Sheerness to protect the Medway anchorage.

When Elizabeth came to the throne the naval administration, although remaining in principle as Henry had designed it, had undergone certain modifications. The frequency of wars since 1544 had gradually made the Lord Admiral into a real naval officer, not only in war but in the intervals of peace as well. It was perhaps for this reason that the office of Lieutenant of the Admiralty had been allowed to lapse; it was vacated by Sir William Woodhouse in the reign of Mary, and no successor was appointed. Lord Clinton became Lord Admiral in 1557 and held office until his death in 1585; we have already met with him as an investor in Hawkins's slaving voyages. In July 1549 Benjamin Gonson, second son of William Gonson, had been made Treasurer of the Navy, and he continued to hold that office after the accession of Elizabeth. There is no record of his having had sea experi-

¹ Subsequently known as the Chatham dockyard.

ence, nor did he go to sea after his appointment, as did the other officers. He seems to have been a competent official, but his lack of service was probably a handicap in any attempt to control his colleagues. William Winter, having filled minor offices, became Master of the Ordnance and also Surveyor of the Ships in 1557, holding both these posts until 1589.¹ It is evident from documents to be described in the next chapter that Winter rather than Gonson held the reins of administration prior to the advent of Hawkins in 1578. He was knighted in 1573. His brother George Winter became Clerk of the Ships in 1560 and so remained until 1580. The Winters, although able men, were a questionable influence in the administration. Between them they had too much power, the service was full of their younger relatives, and Sir William showed in later years such jealousy and malice against John Hawkins as to suggest that the latter's intrusion was a disturbance of a snug family monopoly. Another veteran official was William Holstocke, who rose to be Comptroller of the Ships in 1561 and continued in that office until 1589. Edward Baeshe remained Surveyor of the Victuals until he died, worn out and poor, in 1587. Throughout his long service he had been industrious and honest, and his virtues were left to be their own reward.

It does not appear that the Surveyor of the Victuals was a recognized member of the Board, although he must often have been called into council. Other permanent officials of the second grade were the Master Shipwrights, Peter Pett, who rose in the days of Henry VIII and continued working until 1589; Matthew Baker, appointed in 1572; and Richard Chapman, in 1587. The two latter survived into the reign of James I. Elizabeth's

¹ Oppenheim's view; but there is some indication that the separate ordnance department for the Navy was abolished in 1569, and that thenceforward Winter was Surveyor only. There was no further appointment of a Master of the Ordnance for the Seas after his death in 1589.

partiality for tried servants has often been noted, and the Navy officials were no exception, for most of the above-named men remained in office until they died. The advantage of such continuity is obvious, but they formed a difficult team for Hawkins to manage when he took charge in 1578, especially as a Devon man in those days was very much of a foreigner among a band of Londoners. It is true that he had taken pains to naturalize himself, but his connexion with the brotherhood was only by way of his marriage with Katherine Gonson.

Not the least important influence upon the Navy was that of Lord Burghley, although ostensibly he had no connexion with it. Both as Secretary of State until 1571 and as Lord Treasurer thereafter, he kept a watchful eye upon the service, reading all the documents concerning it, and undoubtedly approving of appointments. To his supervision must be ascribed what recovery there was in the early years of Elizabeth from the outrageous jobbery that can be discerned beneath the surface of the two previous reigns.

Whether it was the Queen or whether it was Burghley who was the real author of the national policy of the reign is a question which has often been debated, and has been complicated by advocates of the pretensions of Walsingham and even of Leicester. It is one upon which those only are entitled to be heard who have a wide acquaintance with the actual documents on state affairs, the original papers which with their endorsements, corrections, and marginal annotations tell the student so much more than any printed summaries can do. The present writer claims no such acquaintance with the state papers at large, for those that form the material of this book are but a tiny fraction of the whole. Yet from that small group the impression emerges that in the early and middle periods of the reign it was Burghley who was the real director at least of naval and maritime policy, and that the Queen bore but a small part even in

those transactions in which her name was involved. Later, perhaps, in the time of the Spanish war, Walsingham's influence grew larger, and the Queen apparently threw her weight into questions of naval policy upon the other side to thwart the ardour of the forward party. But even then it may be questioned whether Burghley had not generally the deciding word. He was the moderator of extremes. He had the comprehensive view, unclouded by pique or avarice or enthusiasm, of policy as a whole, balancing its various aspects, foreign and domestic, naval, military, economic, financial and personal, in a manner exhibited by no other mind of his age. He had also the knowledge of naval detail which Walsingham lacked by reason of his training, and the Queen by want of sympathy and by her feminine mentality. Burghley, it must be urged, was the responsible minister of marine, making his views prevail, though often hampered by factious opposition and the royal caprice. If his performance appears sometimes feeble, it must be remembered that he was not minister of marine alone, but of finance and much else besides.

To Burghley, then, acting in accordance with professional advice and his own knowledge of ways and means, must be credited the material strength at which the fleet was maintained. It did not come up to the standard of Henry VIII. Elizabeth's minister found the Navy depleted by neglect, corruption and financial stringency. The disgrace of Calais evoked an outburst of new construction which bore fruit in the completion in the first years of the new reign of three large warships, the *Elizabeth Jonas*, the *Triumph* and the *Hope*, and of two or three minor craft, and in the purchase of the *Victory* and one or two more from merchants. These early large ships, of 600 tons and over, were of the high-charged build of which the *Great Harry* is best visualized as the prototype. They gave little actual service during their careers, since they were so expensive in repairs and run-

ning costs that they were never commissioned unless the full strength of the Navy was called forth. They were, on the whole, a bad investment. Yet they had the weight of tradition behind them, and as late as the reign of James I Sir Richard Hawkins could still be found to advocate the merits of their type. In the following years until 1577 one more such monster, the *White Bear*, was built, and half a dozen handier vessels of from 200 to 500 tons were added to the list; and these latter were much more often sent to sea. On the whole, the new construction did no more than replace ships condemned to be sold or broken up. The effective strength of all craft, large and small, remained at from twenty-five to thirty, or little more than half of Henry's figure. As against this it must be remembered that Burghley's finance was solvent, whilst Henry had died in debt, a condition from which the governments of Edward VI and Mary had not been able to emerge. Henry also had built what was virtually his second Navy from the proceeds of the Church confiscations, and Burghley had no such resource to draw upon. The fact that he cut the naval expenditure is to his credit, for the fleet did after all prove equal to the demands that national policy made upon it in the period 1559-77.

The employment of this force was, in the above-named period, solely in home waters; the Channel was the focus of activity, and there were no expeditions more distant than those to Hamburg and Rochelle.

Meanwhile the private and semi-private adventurers were ranging the Atlantic and the Caribbean, obtaining the experience they were to bring to the expansion of the naval sphere when its time came. Burghley, as we have seen, kept a general control over these movements and backed them on occasion with his diplomacy. He knew what the ocean men were worth, and when the crisis of the age approached he was ready to welcome them to the service of the state. An early foreshadow-

ing of the transition from semi-peace to acknowledged war, from home-waters to oceanic employment of the Navy, was the appointment of John Hawkins as its Treasurer in the very days that saw Francis Drake sailing southwards to thread the Straits of Magellan and burst upon the Spanish monopoly of the Mar del Sur.

Hawkins's appointment had the approval of Burghley; Drake's voyage, according to the accepted view, had not. But the evidence on the latter point is far from conclusive, and it may well have been that Burghley was not in principle so antagonistic to the war party as many have supposed. If he had really wished to keep the peace until Spain had conquered the Netherlands he could probably have done so, for the Queen would have been on his side; and probably also he would have destroyed Protestantism as a consequence. Such was not the goal of his career, and his apparent reluctance to offend Spain upon the ocean was more likely a subtle device to blind the enemy to his true intentions until the time should be ripe. During the twelve complicated years from 1573 to 1585 he continually impressed upon Spanish statesmen that he desired their friendship; yet during all that time, although he remained the Queen's most powerful minister, he did not succeed in checkmating a single one of the offensive undertakings he professed to deplore. Such apparent incapacity calls for a less simple explanation than it had hitherto received.

II

THE NAVY UNDER HAWKINS: THE FIRST BARGAIN

JOHN HAWKINS performed the full duties of Treasurer of the Navy from 1 January 1578. It is probable that he had been assisting his father-in-law for some time previously, but the extent of his participation cannot be determined. Benjamin Gonson himself retired from active work and died in the course of the year.

It has been said by modern commentators that Hawkins's appointment was a family job, and that Sir William Winter had, by service and seniority, a much better claim to the post. There is, however, a strong case against this view, depending partly upon broad considerations of national policy, and still more closely upon some details of Winter's previous proceedings which have not hitherto been brought to light.

From a review of such facts as are already well established we may find it possible to assign a creditable reason for the new appointment. The precarious amity with Spain was in 1577 quite obviously breaking down. A conclusion in the Netherlands, satisfactory to England, seemed farther off than ever. The seminary at Douai was training young Englishmen as enemies of their country's liberty, and sending them home to spy and plot and preach sedition. The English moneyed interest, strengthened by years of peace whilst its rivals had been broken by war, was showing many signs of an uncontrollable impulse towards oceanic expansion. The political party which favoured war, led at Court by Leicester and in the Council by Walsingham, was threatening to break out of control. Ireland was more unsettled than ever and a constant temptation to a foreign invader. Above all, Burghley knew with what object

Drake was sailing southward, and knew, moreover, that Drake was the kind of man to make his purpose good. These things pointed to an early war with Spain.

Such a war might be fought on land in the Low Countries. It might even be won there, but only with extraordinary luck. To end it by invading Spain itself would be out of the question, as every one acknowledged. On the sea, if the Navy limited its operations to home waters as always in the past, it might help the decision in the Netherlands, but otherwise could only defend England passively against invasion. Yet the sea had other possibilities, as Hawkins had long ago pointed out. An ocean-going navy might strangle Spain by cutting off her treasure fleets from Seville. It would not even be necessary to capture them; their mere stoppage would suffice. The financial magnates, in England and abroad, firmly believed in this result, and Hawkins and Drake and the ocean school of seamen believed no less firmly that the means could be organized for procuring it. And so the conclusion presented itself that the Navy must be made fit for ocean war, and that a man with ocean experience could best accomplish the task.

Where was there such a man, if it was not to be Hawkins? Frobisher, Fenner, Gilbert, even Drake, their names occur but to be dismissed. They were hard fighters all, but no administrators. Not one of them had the requisite business experience. In the Navy Office and the shipyards they would have been as children in the hands of the clannish, self-willed old fellows on the various staffs. Sir William Winter himself represented the old school that must now give place to the new. All his sea-service had been in home waters. All his office service had been with men like himself, their horizon bounded by the coastline from Bordeaux to Hamburg. Since 1558, under Burghley's eye, they had carried on the administration with moderate efficiency for the limited ends in view, but not, as will be shown, without suspi-



SIR JOHN HAWKINS, AGED 58

From the picture in the possession of Miss Stuart Hawkins.

cion on the score of honesty. Upon these general considerations it did not need a mind so keen as Burghley's to come to the conclusion that new blood was desirable in the Navy Office, and the appointment of Hawkins would have been natural had there been no other reason for it.

But there was something more, and that of the gravest import. For at this time Burghley had in his possession some information which must have caused him anxiety. A copy of the document containing it still rests in his collection of state papers, now forming part of the Lansdowne MSS. in the British Museum. It is endorsed: 'Abuses in the Admiralty touching Her Majesty's Navy, exhibited by Mr. Hawkins.'¹ It bears no date, but may be assigned on internal evidence to 1578 or to the last months of 1577. It is therefore a report made by Hawkins just after assuming office, but its general outline had undoubtedly been discussed with Burghley before, as may be inferred from passages in the document itself and in Hawkins's later correspondence. In support of this interpretation it may be noted also that an opponent of his asserted ten years later that he had obtained his place 'by way of accusation',² an evident reference to this report. We may take it, therefore, that its substance was of prior date to Hawkins's appointment and that its acceptance was one of the reasons for that choice.

Before proceeding further, it should be stated that in 1571 a new system of account-keeping had been introduced, whereby the expenditure upon the ships when not serving at sea had been divided into 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary'. The former comprised the cost of moorings, repairs carried out whilst ships were afloat or grounded, upkeep of wharves and storehouses, wages of ship-keepers and dockyard staffs, and all victuals and materials incident to those services. The latter covered the cost

¹ Lansdowne MS., 113, ff. 45-7.

² *Ibid.*, 52, Art. 43.

of rebuildings and such heavy repairs as necessitated putting the ships into dry-dock. New ships represented an additional charge not included in either of the above. So also did all expenses of mobilization and sea-service, the stores, munitions, and wages of officers and men being defrayed from the Treasury by special payments; but all the above disbursements were on the requisition and under the supervision of the Navy Board. The armament charges were the business of a separate department, the Ordnance Office at the Tower, which issued heavy guns and small arms as required. As already indicated, there appears to be some doubt whether, after 1569, this department remained subdivided into military and naval sections as it had been since 1545; but the point is of no great importance to the question of naval administration in general. The victualling of fleets at sea was likewise under the separate department of the Surveyor General of the Victuals.

The above premises are necessary to an understanding of Hawkins's report. The document begins with broad considerations for economy. First, it states, the ordinary for keeping and repairing ships in harbour costs nearly £6,000 a year. It may be done for £4,000, far better than it is now, the number of shipkeepers augmented rather than diminished, and all things better performed. The heavy repairs under the extraordinary heading are done in great disorder, and the Queen is monstrously overcharged. The last repair of six ships and their boats may serve as an example. A warrant was granted for £4,845, which would have done the work royally and left something over. Instead of that, Her Majesty is already £600¹ in debt, and another £1,000 will not finish the task, 'which proceeds of the wilful covetousness of one man, and to set forth his glory'. (The man alluded to, as will appear below, is Sir William Winter.) In the same way the cost of building new ships

¹ 'Near 1,000 marks.'

has been unwarrantably enhanced, so that vessels that ought to have cost £2,200 have amounted to £4,000, and in general the Queen has paid for 900 loads of timber where 500 would have sufficed. In the matter of stores the good practice has been dropped whereby the ships' boatswains had to indent for tackle and cordage, and the indents were filed in the Navy Office. Now the Surveyor (Winter) keeps all such business in his private books, and the Office knows nothing of what is supplied to the ships.

In the purchase and disposal of timber and plank, the report proceeds, the greatest abuses prevail. Since 1570 the Queen has paid £9,000 for these materials, and not £4,000 worth has been used in her service. The purveyors of timber, using the royal prerogative of compulsory purchase at fixed prices, make great profits, for they resell the best of the stuff for private use and make the state pay extremely for the refuse. When the quality is considered, the Queen does not get one-third of the value she pays for. The master-shipwrights corroborate these statements, which have already been discussed at length with Lord Burghley and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Although this fraud is done in the name of another, 'we say that it is for Sir William Winter's commodity'.

Then follow some detailed complaints headed, 'Matters that touch Sir William Winter particularly'. The *Mary Fortune*, a ship of his,¹ was built in great part with the Queen's stuff. The *Edward*, another of his ships, was built entirely of royal timber. The timber for the *Foresight* (a Queen's ship constructed in 1570) was already for the most part in Her Majesty's possession, yet she has paid for it all again, as Matthew Baker the shipwright will prove. Many of the ships are worn and decayed and not repaired. Winter builds wharves for private use with the Queen's timber. The ship which Francis

¹ Sunk by the Portuguese on the Guinea coast in 1565.

Drake had was built with much of the Queen's timber, and so also were his four pinnaces made at Her Majesty's charge, but Winter took of him £120 for them.¹ Again, he sold to Mr. Frobisher two pinnaces for £24, but they were built of the Queen's stuff and at her charge.² Masts are sold, but nothing is paid into the Treasury. All the decayed great cables are likewise sold for the benefit of Winter and his confederates.³ Thirty loads of knees (shipbuilding details) were entered in the books and paid for by the Queen, but none of them came to her use. She paid £45 for a specified consignment of timber which was already her own, and £209 for plank not worth £50. The fittings of the *Jennett*, a worn-out ship, were wholly taken away, although they would have served for other new ships of 300 tons. Brass sheaves are removed from the blocks and iron ones substituted. Many of the clerks are paid double wages and then have unreasonably great allowances. All the boatswains, gunners and pursers are appointed by Winter, 'and so all reduced to his profit'.

That these charges were in the main true is highly probable. We, indeed, have no good means of testing them, but the Queen's ministers had, and it is out of the question that Burghley could have allowed them to pass without investigation. The result of that investigation was that he appointed the accuser Treasurer of the Navy, and a year later endued him with powers exceeding those

¹ These references to Drake's shipping fix the date of the document as subsequent to that of his sailing in October, 1577; for on the voyage of circumnavigation he took with him four new pinnaces stowed in pieces in the holds of his larger ships.

² Frobisher made his first north-west voyage in 1576 with two 25-ton pinnaces. The same two were used in the second voyage in 1577.

³ These references to Baltic stores may provide a clue to some of the accusations afterwards made against Hawkins. Thomas Allen, one of his most virulent accusers, had been Queen's Merchant for the purchase of naval supplies at Danzig. It is possible that he was a participant in the frauds alleged against Winter, and that his animosity arose from Hawkins's stoppage of them. Hawkins on his part claimed to have halved the expenditure under this head and to have saved £1,000 a year.

of any previous holder of the office. A sort of test is still available in the declared accounts of Navy expenditure in the Exchequer. For five years of the seven from 1571 to 1577 the ordinary expenditure is separately recorded, and the average of those five years is £5,822. This supports Hawkins's allegation of 'nearly £6,000 a year'. Similarly, for four years of the period 1579-84, that of Hawkins's 'first bargain' to be presently described, the same figures are available, and their average is £3,908.¹ But of course the apparent economy is not necessarily a real one, for Hawkins's opponents were quick to declare that the work was much worse done in his time than it had been in theirs, and that he juggled the items between the ordinary and extraordinary accounts. That is a matter for later consideration.

Apart from the truth of Hawkins's report, its motives are of interest. They may bear one of two interpretations. Either he denounced a gang of rogues with the purpose of ousting them and carrying on the roguery for his own benefit, or he was actuated by zeal for the public service and by a consciousness that he was the man best fitted for reforming the naval administration at a time when the war-clouds were rolling black above the horizon. His own correspondence, to be quoted in these pages, precludes the neutral view that he was like so many men partly corrupt and partly patriotic. It leaves no third choice between the conclusions that he was either a hypocrite or a devoted public servant. On that the reader will have to form his own judgement with the aid of material to be set forth as impartially as the present writer can effect it.

Hawkins undertook the office with a considerable handicap. Although the government must have believed in the malpractices of the principal officers, it did not remove one of them. Such was not the Elizabethan practice. The Queen continued in her Privy Council

¹ Table in Oppenheim's *Administration*, p. 161.

men whom she knew to have been unfaithful in the past ; and by persistently trusting them in spite of all, and by expecting them to do their duty, she at length won them into doing it. The policy was risky, but success justified it. So, on the lower scale, the navy officers were retained to work under the man who had exposed them. For some years they gave him an infinity of trouble, but in the end, curiously enough, the result was the same as with the noblemen. Sir William Winter therefore continued as Surveyor, his brother George as Clerk of the Ships, and William Holstocke as Comptroller. Pett and Baker remained as master shipwrights, and with more justice, since the Hawkins report had not implicated them. About George Winter little is known. He died in 1580, and William Borough, an elderly sea officer of much North Sea and Baltic experience, was then brought in as Clerk of the Ships. William Holstocke is also an unknown quantity. Were it not that his signature as Comptroller appears regularly upon the documents, he might never have existed so far as any influence of his can now be traced. He was certainly successful in steering clear of contentions, and may be presumed to have minded his own business and nothing more.

After looking round him for a year, Hawkins came to the conclusion that with the existing organization he could not accomplish the work he had taken in hand to do. The Treasurership carried with it no formal authority over the other officers. Its holder was merely one among equals, who were responsible, not to him, but in theory to the Lord Admiral. Gonson as a landsman had not been able to improve this position, and it is evident that his strength had been failing for some time before he resigned. He had been aware of the abuses but had been unable to stop them, and Hawkins in 1578 probably found himself equally powerless. His remedy was original and bold. He proposed to Burghley to convert most of the regular work of the dockyards—Woolwich,

Deptford, Chatham, and Portsmouth—into a contract, which he and the master shipwrights would perform for an agreed sum annually. The other officers would remain as salaried supervisors of their departments, but would have no finger in finance. To accept this proposal meant to entrust much of the collective responsibility of the Navy Board to one man. And Burghley, certainly a fair judge of men, consented. The arrangement came to be known as ‘the first bargain’.

This first bargain must be set forth in detail. It is embodied in two agreements, dated 10 October 1579, the first between the Queen and John Hawkins, and the second between the Queen on the one side and Peter Pett and Matthew Baker on the other.¹ In the first, Hawkins undertook to provide at his own cost all cables necessary for mooring the ships, reserve cables of specified number and size, hawsers for grounding the ships and drawing them off again, and various specified kinds of cordage and similar gear. Old moorings and junk were to be used by Hawkins for making tackle and rope yarn, the stock of 1578 being bought by him at an agreed price. For this service he was to receive £1,200 yearly without being under any obligation to account for its expenditure. The check upon him was simply that the moorings, &c., were to be efficiently performed, and to that end the Surveyor, Comptroller, and Clerk of the Ships were empowered jointly and severally to survey and oversee his proceedings and to report upon them to Burghley and the Lord Admiral. In addition, a commission consisting of two persons named by those ministers and two named by Hawkins was to make an annual

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 132, Nos. 41, 42. A document in vol. 208, No. 17, is wrongly endorsed as the Hawkins bargain of 1579; in reality it is the later one of 1585. It is printed in full in Laughton's *Defeat of the Armada*, i. 34, and some misconception has arisen owing to its misleading endorsement. That, however, is not the editor's mistake, but an error by some contemporary official.

survey and report. The bargain was to commence from Michaelmas, 1579, and to be terminable by the Queen at any subsequent Michaelmas on six months' notice having been given.

The agreement with Pett and Baker was in similar form, but dealt with the carpentry and repair of the ships. They undertook to ground the five largest vessels at least once in three years, and more often if leaks developed; and every year to 'cast them over' and renew three or four strakes on each side below the waterline, or, as it is quaintly put, 'the swimming mark'. The next five ships in order of size were to be grounded every two years, and the remainder every year, with the same provision about casting over and renewing strakes. All the ships were once a year to be ransacked, caulked, and perfected above water within board and without. Pett and Baker were to provide at their own cost all the masts and spars necessary for the ships whilst in harbour, except that trees for the lower masts and yards of the large ships from the *Aid* (200 tons) upwards were to be supplied free from the Queen's storehouse at Chatham. In addition they were to find wages, victuals and lodging for their workmen and all necessities for their work; to repair all boats, cocks and skiffs; and to supply specified carpentry stores to ships ordered to sea. For all this they were to receive £1,000 a year and the use of all storehouses rent free. Their performance was to be supervised by the Treasurer (Hawkins) and the other three principal officers, with the same conditions of an annual commission and report and of the termination of the contract as in the Hawkins bargain.

By these means £2,200 of the ordinary annual expenditure was placed on contract. The ordinary services still remaining to be accounted for in detail included the wages of shipkeepers, clerks, and watchmen, and of the gunners at Upnor Castle; and the repair and upkeep of storehouses and wharves. But it will be noted

that the departments most susceptible to fraud had been placed financially out of the reach of Winter and his fellows, although they had been given the duty of criticizing the work of Hawkins and the master shipwrights. The extraordinary, i.e. the dry-docking and heavy repairs, remained outside either contract, and was to go on as before with requisitions and payments as need should arise.

Not the least interesting point in these documents is the specification of the Queen's ships included in the bargain. They are as follows: the five greatest ships, *Triumph*, *Elizabeth Jonas*, *White Bear*, *Victory*, and *Mary Rose*; five middle-sized ships, *Hope*, *Philip and Mary*, *Elizabeth Bonaventure*, *Lion* (otherwise called the *Golden Lion*), and *Revenge*; and fifteen ships from about 400 tons downwards, *Dreadnought*, *Swiftsure*, *Antelope*, *Swallow*, *Foresight*, *Aid*, *Bull*, *Tiger*, *Scout*, *Achates*, *Handmaid*, a small bark unnamed (probably the *Merlin*), *Galley Elenor*, *George Hoy*, and a great lighter. Omitting the last three, for the galley was of no practical use in the English service, the Queen possessed, nine years before the advent of the Armada, but twenty-two fighting craft large and small. It certainly behoved her to take in hand that they should be in an efficient state, and to that end to employ a man who would not be easy-going and popular with a demoralized dockyard staff.

Hawkins had now a free hand to go forward with his economies and reforms, his declared purpose being to have the dockyard work performed at a cost within the compass of the national purse, 'so that Her Majesty should not be discouraged thereby to maintain so necessary a defence for her royal state and country'.¹ These words were addressed to Burghley, and their implied estimate of the Queen's limitation of outlook is amusing, although without doubt unconsciously so. To the end above indicated he made a definite promise to save £4,000

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 170, No. 57.

every year.¹ The money, of course, had to come out of somebody's pockets, or rather, to be prevented from going into them; and the method of effecting that soon aroused the disgust of all the leading individuals on the staff, including the master shipwrights. If, as Hawkins's allies in ending the Winter régime, they supposed that they were going to enjoy better pickings under its successor, they found themselves mistaken. They were soon complaining that Hawkins demanded all their perquisites for himself, which may mean only that he insisted on their performing their contract to the hilt. Sir William Winter may be imagined as boiling with indignation. He was given a change of air in 1580, in command of a squadron on the Irish coast.² There he lay for long months watching for the papal filibusters who had already made one landing in the previous year. It was a station offering no hope of prize-money, and his temper on his return was by no means mollified.

The improvement in the design of English warships during the twenty years prior to the Armada has been generally attributed to Hawkins. It may well have been so, but unfortunately there is a lack of clear proof upon the point. The new influence is to be seen at work from 1569 onwards, and no trace of it can be discerned before that date. Now, there was in or about 1569 no change in the official composition of the Navy Board. From 1560 to 1577 the list of the principal officers remained the same—Gonson, W. Winter, Holstocke, and G. Winter—and Clinton was Lord Admiral throughout the period. Yet in 1569 warships of a new sort began to be built, and the building of the older sort was discontinued. It certainly looks as though a new mind was bringing its influence to bear, and that being so, all the circumstances point to its having been the mind of John Hawkins. We

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 170, No. 57.

² His flagship was the *Revenge*, and there were nine other ships. He drew pay for 197 days—Exchequer, L.T.R., Declared Accounts, 2216.

know that from 1569 until the supremacy of Drake after 1580, Hawkins was looked upon as the chief sea-commander of the country, that in various times of crisis he was stationed at Plymouth in charge of the western squadron designed to ward off a stroke from Spain, and that in the event of war he would probably have commanded the whole English marine under the Lord Admiral. We know also that Hawkins advocated an oceanic offensive against Spain, the cutting off of her western treasure by fleets cruising about the Azores; and further, that his experiences with the *Jesus of Lubeck* had shown him how useless and dangerous was the old type of warship for ocean work. He must have talked to Burghley and Clinton about these things, no less than to his father-in-law Benjamin Gonson and to Sir William Winter, his old associate of the slaving syndicates. Putting all together, there is therefore a strong case for the Hawkins influence in the shipyards from 1569; but the proof is not final, and on present information Winter and the old navy men must be credited with the new policy. At least, if they did not originate it, they had the sense to adopt it.

The new policy consisted in the discontinuance of building the floating fortresses of the largest size, from 600 up to 1,000 tons, with their towering superstructures and excessive beam and depth, unweatherly and unhandy in manœuvre, and unable to keep the sea for any length of time by reason of strains and leaks developed in rough weather; and in the substitution for them of galleon-built ships¹ of the middle size, from 300 to 600 tons,

¹ After the work of Sir J. S. Corbett and Mr. Oppenheim some thirty years ago, it should hardly be necessary at this date to labour the point that the galleon represented the new and not the antiquated type of vessel. The essential of the galleon was a proportion between length of keel and beam of about 3 to 1. The older great ships had been much shorter than this. Galleasses, as the word was used by English ship-builders, tended to be even longer than galleons, but their essential characteristic was rather the cutting down of the superstructures, so

longer, narrower and shallower in hold, with moderate superstructures, and with heavy, cast-metal guns as their chief armament. Henry VIII had built such ships in his later years, but after his death there had been a reaction, and the chief additions to the navy in the first ten years of Elizabeth had been of the more ancient type to which he had clung side by side with his new experiments. The first-fruit of the reformed Elizabethan policy was the *Foresight* of 300 tons, built in 1570 and so probably designed in the previous year, the first true galleon of the reign. Next (omitting rebuildings and minor craft) came the *Swiftsure* and *Dreadnought* of 1573, of about 350 and 400 tons respectively, but with their length falling rather short of the galleon proportion.¹ After them followed the *Revenge*, 450 tons, of 1575-7, regarded by Drake as the perfect galleon-warship of his time. Henceforward the new rule was established, and there was no looking back. We may regard the ships of 1573 as representing a last reactionary movement, and the *Revenge* as the triumph of the ocean men's ideas. It would be interesting to have some record of the discussions surrounding their design, but no trace has survived.

When Hawkins at length achieved formal control he pursued the new policy with vigour. During the period of the first bargain there was no money for additional new ships of the first class, but as the older ones became due for rebuilding they received drastic treatment. The *Antelope*, 350 tons, the *Golden Lion*, 450, and the *Nonpareil*, 350, were reconstructed in 1581-4. In their original form they dated from before 1558, the *Nonpareil* being the *Philip and Mary* renamed. Their earlier dimensions have not been preserved, but from the analogy

that it was possible to speak of 'a galleon in the form of a galleasse'. Merchants, for peaceful trade in short voyages, still preferred the old short and deep ship, although without the superstructures.

¹ The dimensions are in a table in Oppenheim's *Administration*, p. 124.

of known cases there is little doubt that Hawkins lengthened them,¹ after which there are figures to show that they were true galleons of the standard type. Elizabethan 'new-building' is in fact a deceptive term. If any of the large timbers of an old ship were included in a new one the name was retained, and the vessel was described as rebuilt although she was virtually a new ship. The aim during the years before the Spanish War was to maintain the Navy at a fixed strength, merely replacing old ships as they wore out; and it was obviously more economical to do this before their timbers had become so rotten as to be useless. Hence the misleading continuity of the ships' names, and the retention of the phrase 'new-building' of such and such a vessel for what was really the construction of a quite different one.

Besides rebuilding some of the old ships with new dimensions, Hawkins treated others less radically but in accordance with the reformed policy. It was made an accusation against him by his critics that he had cut down 'the romthes and commodious fights' in the great ships and so transformed them into the likeness of galleasses.² The expense of so doing would be short of that involved in 'new-building', and it was included in the general account for repairs. It is therefore not possible to say to what extent it was done; but it was probably considerable. The rather unsatisfactory drawings that have come down to us in illustration of the Armada campaign do not give much indication of the appearance of the English ships, but the chroniclers of the period emphasize the towering forms of the Spaniards in comparison with their opponents, and this is hardly consistent with the presence of a number of very highly charged units in the English fleet. Yet the five monsters of Elizabeth's early years, the *Elizabeth Jonas*, the *Hope*,

¹ The accounts of 1585, for example, mention the lengthening of the *Achates*—Exchequer, L.T.R., Declared Accounts, 2221.

² Lansdowne MS. 113, ff. 74-5 (1585).

the *Victory*, the *Triumph*, and the *White Bear* had remained until this date without formal new-building, and so it is likely that Hawkins had at least pruned them down to what in his view was a more seemly appearance.¹ The suggestion is strengthened by the fact that he himself commanded the *Victory*, and it may be presumed that he was allotted a ship to his liking. In 1584 the *Bull*, *Tiger*, and *Hope* are described as having been 'reformed'. The word should probably be interpreted in its literal sense of 'made into a new form', since it is added of the *Hope* that she has been converted into a galleasse.²

The Chatham dockyard, although much safer than Portsmouth from an enemy's attack, was not regarded as invulnerable, and its defences were strengthened as war drew nearer. The captain and garrison of Upnor Castle had long been under the orders of the Navy Board, and their wages had been defrayed from the navy account. This fort looked across the Medway at the point immediately below where the moorings of the great ships began. From Upnor the vessels were distributed all the way upstream to Chatham and round the bend to within half a mile of Rochester Bridge.³ But something more than the Upnor defence was necessary, and in 1579 the Council ordered Hawkins to impress men and material for the reconstruction of the fort at Sheerness,⁴ where the Medway debouched into the Thames estuary; and this work was duly carried out. In 1585 further precautions were taken. A channel called St. Mary's Creek gave a possible access to the Medway above Upnor Castle, and this was blocked with piles. At Up-


¹ The *Mary Rose*, one of the pre-Elizabethan great ships, was reconstructed at Woolwich in 1580. Pett and Baker were granted £600 for the work, additional to their contract money, 'by agreement of all the officers'.—Declared Accounts, *ut supra*, 2216.

² Declared Accounts, 2220.

³ Contemporary map reproduced in Oppenheim, *fcg.* p. 150.

⁴ *Domestic Calendar*, 1547–80, p. 627.

nor itself, opposite the castle, the main river was provided with a great iron chain, to be drawn across from bank to bank. It had to be removable to allow the Queen's ships to pass in and out, and for that purpose it was secured to piles at one end and led over two great wheels in a winding-house at the other. The chain was



made in London at a cost, including transport, of £250. The wheels and timber work, with necessary lighters and their moorings for supporting the chain, cost a further £360, and the whole of the extraordinary precautions of the year amounted to £1,470.¹

Other operations show that the possibility of Spain attempting an invasion was being seriously considered. Henry VIII had seen the strategical value of Dover as a base for the Channel fleet, and he had spent a good deal of money on its harbour and fortifications. But the east-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 196, No. 44.

ward drift of the shingle before the furious tides in the Straits constituted a ceaseless attack upon any harbour at this point, an attack which has never to this day been permanently overcome. The slightest relaxation of effort in Tudor times resulted in the choking of the entrance by masses of beach, and the comparative neglect of the period 1550-80 left Dover harbour in a precarious condition, inaccessible for months at a time to any but the smallest craft. The engineers of the fifteen-eighties devised what they hoped would prove a cure for the trouble, a pent or reservoir wherein the water of the Dover river should be accumulated and then released with a rush to scour the obstructive matter from the harbour entrance. The effort was partly local and partly national. The town and the gentry of the neighbourhood provided the labour, whilst Pett and Baker designed and constructed the sluices for the new pent, the work being done at Chatham at the Queen's expense. By the summer of 1584 the task was completed, and Hawkins made an inspection and report. His opinion was that the pent-walls were of bad workmanship, although the sluices were well made.¹ But for the time being the desired effect had been attained, and another report a few months later declared that the harbour was now fit for the largest of the Queen's ships to enter.² Whether they might safely lie there was another matter, for they must have grounded at every low tide. But Dover was required only for the use of the minor warships employed to patrol the Straits.

Burghley could hardly have expected that the arrangement whereby Hawkins was subjected to the criticism of the men whose malpractices he had curtailed would work harmoniously. But some such arrangement was probably inevitable. Winter, no doubt, had powerful friends, and it was contrary to the tradition of the time for the State to dismiss experienced servants for speculation; often enough they survived the guilt of treason.

¹ *Domestic Calendar*, 1581-90, pp. 182-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

It was also considered the natural course to deny unlimited responsibility to any one man, however much trusted. Even a commander at sea was expected to submit all important decisions to the opinion of his officers. It may well have been that Hawkins himself advocated the arrangement under which he was working, foreseeing that the inevitable attacks it would produce would be less dangerous than if they had been made against a man endued with absolute control, such as would be certain to engender suspicion in the minds of his superiors. However that may have been, the attack was not slow to develop.

Of its methods in the first period we have no details; none of the officers' early reports upon Hawkins's work have been preserved, nor have any of the proceedings of the annual commissions provided for in the bargain. But it can be gathered from Hawkins's comments that the campaign against him was bitter and unceasing. He alleged that his fellow-officers' policy was 'to weary Hawkins of his bargain', and he even declared that they purposely contrived to have things ill done in order to make matters of complaint against him. By the autumn of 1583 the volume of denunciation had swelled to such an extent that the Privy Council decided to appoint a strong commission to inquire into the state of the Navy.

The principal commissioners were five in number, Burghley, the Lord Admiral, the Lord Chamberlain (Lord Hunsdon), Walsingham, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Walter Mildmay). Of these, any three were to act, and it may be inferred from later allusions that the Lord Chamberlain took the chair, with the Admiral and another to assist him. The principal commissioners were to select sub-commissioners from a list comprising the names of Sir Thomas Cotton (an old sea-officer), Sir William Gorges, Sir Francis Drake, Richard Bingham, Martin Frobisher, Fulke Greville, Carew Raleigh, Henry Palmer, Walter Raleigh, George

Beeston, and Thomas Ellis. Drake, Frobisher, and the Raleighs are sufficiently well known; the others, except perhaps Ellis, are all traceable as navy captains in command of large ships during the various mobilizations of this period. Altogether, the commission was strong in prestige and ability, representing the great officers of state and the cream of the country's nautical talent. Whatever selection emerged from it was certain to command respect for its conclusions.

There are two extant copies of the instructions for this commission, and they differ in a significant manner. The first is a sketch drawn up before the names of the commissioners had been decided, and it is worded in such a way as to secure a full inquiry into the work done since Hawkins had taken charge, and to rule out any investigation into abuses prior to 1579.¹ But this draft was not proceeded with, and the final document embodied a much wider set of instructions.² A preamble states that whereas we (the Queen) are informed by rumour that our ships have grown into so great decay that few of them are able to serve if required, it is necessary that a perfect view and survey shall be taken. You (the commissioners) are therefore to make such a survey, with the assistance of the masters, the shipwrights and the four principal officers of the Navy; and you are to furnish us a true certificate of their condition and of the number serviceable. You are further to inquire into the following particular matters: (1) We have been given to understand that frauds and deceits have been committed, *since our coming to the Crown*, by the officers of our Admiralty, in embezzling timber and plank and conveying it away out of our storehouses; (2) It is alleged that three of our ships, the *Hope*, *Philip* and *Mary*, and *Antelope*, were dry-docked at Deptford in 1578, for the repair of which our allowances were very great, yet we are

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 186, No. 47, no date.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 162, No. 50, dated 1583, without month.

informed that little was spent on them; (3) The charges of building our ships the *Revenge* and the *Scout* in 1575 amounted to £4,400, and it is said that they were built of unseasoned plank of no continuance and could have been built of the best material for £2,600. You are to find out the truth of these abuses and by whom they were committed, and to devise rules for preventing them in future. Finally you are to survey the wharves, store-houses, and stores, and to report what new building has been done to them, and to what value, since 1579. You are to deliver your report in writing to us or our Council.

It must be said that the final instructions were much fairer to Hawkins than those outlined in the first draft. His work in four years could not justly be assessed without reference to what had gone before; he had to build upon the foundations he took over from others, and perfection could not grow in so short a time out of the state of affairs he alleged to have prevailed at his accession to office. The charge against him is indicated in the opening general instruction; it was that the ships were now unserviceable, and it could easily be tried by the experts engaged. The emphasis of the ensuing particular charges is undoubtedly against the Winter régime. The third relates wholly to it; the first mainly; and of the second it is hard to say whether it represented an accusation by Winter against Hawkins or by Hawkins against Winter, for we cannot tell who was in effective control of repairs before the beginning of the bargain. It may be guessed that the widening of the scope of the investigation was due to Burghley's influence. He had a judicial mind, and he was no enemy of Hawkins.

The proceedings and report of this commission are almost entirely unrecorded. Of the former there remain only a set of questions put to Pett and Baker, without any indication of their replies; of the latter we can judge only by inference, and by a casual remark, that it was favourable to Hawkins.

The questions to the master shipwrights are as follows: Have you received the £1,000 yearly from Hawkins as agreed by the bargain of 1579? Have you spent it on repair of the ships? When the bargain was made, did you think £1,000 sufficient, and if not, why did you undertake it? Have you any partners in this bargain, and what part have they in it? Has any part of the £1,000 been retained by you and not spent on the ships? Has any work on the ships been left undone when it ought to have been done? How many of the ships are now fit for six months' service at sea? When you have been called upon to rebuild or repair a ship in dry dock, have you honestly done it?¹ The trend of some of these questions implies, as may be judged from other documents, that Pett and Baker repented of their bargain and considered that Hawkins interpreted it in a harsh manner. It must be remembered that they, like the officers, received fixed salaries and allowances, small but regularly paid, and that in theory they had no claim to any further perquisites, although in practice they had long regarded such pickings as a right. Hawkins was cutting down all these irregular profits, for the Queen's benefit as he alleged, for the increase of his own emoluments as his opponents declared; and this was the cause of the opposition to his rule. In his attitude he was in advance of his time, which condoned a certain amount of speculation by government servants. It is hardly possible for us to judge whether the salaries were so low as to justify some illicit profit-taking. But we may be pretty sure they were not over-generous, for that was never a characteristic of the Queen's administration; she expected most of her servants to draw their recompense in part from the honour and prestige of being employed by the State. That certainly made its appeal to men of the social rank of Winter and Hawkins, but it may be doubted whether Pett and Baker could appreciate it.

¹ Lansdowne MS., 37, f. 204.

The report of the commission was undoubtedly favourable to Hawkins. Not merely was he retained in office—that would have been consistent with an adverse finding—but a year or so later the first bargains gave place to another which greatly increased his powers and showed that the government believed him to be the honest public servant he claimed to be. In 1585 also he referred casually to ‘my Lord Chamberlain’s survey’ as having declared the ships to be in an efficient state;¹ and that can only be an allusion to the report of 1583.

A long letter from Hawkins to Burghley, endorsed ‘1584, April’, is preserved in the state papers, and will throw light upon the attitude of both of them towards these controversies:

‘My duty in right humble manner remembered unto your good Lordship,

After it had pleased Her Majesty to commit this office of Treasurer of the Navy unto me, I have endeavoured with all fidelity and painful travail to reduce the whole course of this office into such order as the same might be safe, sure, and bountifully provided, and performed with an easy and convenient charge, so that Her Majesty thereby should not be discouraged to maintain so necessary a defence for her royal state and country, considering that the force and puissance of these small number of ships are a bridle to daunt the malice of the adversaries of Christ’s church, Her Majesty, and our country.

It pleased your Lordship about five years past to take consideration for the reforming of the ordinary, which by your lordship’s singular judgment at the second hearing was with great facility set in order, and so after that time your lordship proceeded to other of the extraordinary points,² which hath greatly availed [i. e. profited] Her Majesty.

In the passing of these great things the adversaries of the work have continually opposed themselves against me and the service so far as they durst be seen in it, so that among a number of trifling crossings and slanders the very walls of the realm³ have

¹ Letter to Burghley, printed below, pp. 357–9.

² The details of these reforms have not been preserved.

³ ‘The wooden walls of England,’ evidently an older phrase than has

been brought in question; and their slander hath gone very far and general, to the encouragement of the enemies of God and our country, only to be avenged of me and this service, which doth discover the corruption and ignorance of the time past.

Considering, my very good lord, what a froward and untoward company I have been matched with (even as a sheep among wolves), the business which I have brought about hath been doubled in tediousness and very cumbersome for me to accomplish. Yet much more had been done if I had had a quiet passage in the business; and although by their contrary and politic dealings some trifles have been brought behindhand, whereby they have taken occasion to raise slanders, the same have been of so small moment that our Lord God hath made it a special mean to make my service the better known and to open the unprofitable and careless order of the time past, which otherwise might have passed in silence; so as always our good God doth never forsake nor leave his children destitute, but causeth the pit prepared by the adversaries that themselves fall into it.

I did your lordship lately a book which doth plainly shew that £3,000 yearly is availed to Her Majesty, beside the lessening of the charge of cordage and canvas, which was before the reformation *communibus annis* £2,000, and is now and may be hereafter done for £1,000 yearly. So that now I have performed that which I promised to your lordship at the passage of my first account at Greenwich, which was that Her Majesty was availed yearly £4,000 by this service.

I have set down in a note which I send herewith¹ the particulars of such services as have been overcome since the reformation determined by your lordship.

It may please your lordship to remember that lately in your chamber amongst other of the Council there was urged a dubbing and other reformation of the ships, whereof Peter Pett was willed by your lordship to make an estimate, which amounted to £1,480, all which is now performed (saving the dubbing of the four great ships), which shall be likewise done as their time of grounding cometh on; the *Bull* and the *Tiger* being parcel of that demand, which are now made strong and perfect ships for six or seven years, also finished, and the service very well per-

been supposed. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives 1642 as the date of the first printed instance of it.

¹ Not found.

formed; yet the charge is diminished, as it will be under £500 extra ordinary. So far as I doubt not but your lordship will have good liking of the service and commend the same as no doubt it deserveth; for now I thank God the Navy (before Bartholomew-tide next) will be in that state that the very adversaries shall be afraid to find a fault in any of the ships.

I have been bold to be a little tedious to your lordship, for although some of mine adversaries have given out that your lordship had an ill opinion of me I have always seen the singular understanding wherewith God hath indued your lordship, with your continual integrity of life and your dexterity in justice, so that I was always glad and ever desirous to come before such a judge.

Now I do most humbly pray your good lordship to take knowledge of this my careful and painful service, and finding at your lordship's leisure some understanding that you have good liking of the same, which exceptacye [*sic*] of your lordship I shall not only take as a great recompence of my pains, but thereby be greatly encouraged to travail both carefully and uprightly in the said service.

If your lordship have liking in that last course (whereof I did a book and your lordship perused it) there would fall a great benefit and quietness to the service and avoid occasion of strife. The Navy would always be in most ready order and very perfectly built, and Her Majesty never troubled with warrants extra ordinary.

When your honour's good pleasure shall be, I will give mine attendance, &c.'¹

This, the first of Hawkins's letters after an interval of several years, indicates a certain change in the man himself. He has now become definitely a Puritan, with the traits characteristic of that attitude of mind—the habit of introducing allusions to personal faith into mundane matters, and the complacency which to the sophisticated modern is sometimes rather irritating. We shall find these features becoming more marked as his old age

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 170, No. 57. Copy, no subscription or signature. The spelling and punctuation have been modernized, but the division into paragraphs is Hawkins's own.

draws on. The Puritanical habit invites doubts of a man's sincerity; it has been the cloak of so many scoundrels. It makes it as easy for the sceptic to set Hawkins down as a hypocrite as it was for Oliver Cromwell's enemies to do the like; and the charge has probably as much justice in the one case as in the other. The resemblance to Cromwell suggested in these letters is marked, although Hawkins was a better educated man than the Protector. They are alike in identifying their duty to man with their duty to God, and in smiting their own and their country's enemies as without doubt the enemies of God. In that simplicity lay the secret of great deeds.

The last paragraph is an allusion to a further change in the administration, which Hawkins was evidently the first to propose. It was ultimately embodied in the second bargain, concluded in the following year, and it completed the concentration of power in the Navy Treasurer's hands. As usual, Burghley took his time to ponder before concluding, and the opposition were able to get wind of the proposal and to make a last effort to shake their rival's credit. For this purpose they put forward William Borough, the Clerk of the Ships. His appointment to the Navy Board dated only from 1580, and he was therefore not implicated in the scandals of the preceding period. Hawkins himself had written of him as 'a man of great virtue and judgement', but, as his public actions in quite another connexion were destined to show, his good qualities were limited by stupidity and an incapacity to move with the times. It certainly looks as though he may have acted in all honesty as Winter's tool.

Borough launched his attack in a memorial to Burghley, dated February 1585.¹ The Queen, he says, has lost, not gained, by the bargain made with Hawkins, Pett, and Baker in 1579. Hawkins carries matters with

¹ Lansdowne MS., 43, ff. 74-5, endorsed, 'A dutiful declaration'.

a high hand, and says openly that he relies upon the influence of powerful friends to cover his ill-deeds and maintain him in his place. He spends far more than his salary and fees of £300 a year; his housekeeping alone costs him £800, besides other lavish expenditure. A good deal of wordy bile is next poured forth by the memorialist without any very definite statement except that Pett is dishonest, presumably with the connivance of Hawkins, but that Baker is far more upright. Then follows the complaint of alteration in the design of the ships. They have their superstructures cut down until they look like merchantmen, which 'must be accounted a transforming them to galleasses'. It is not right that everything should be at the discretion of one officer only. All things should be done jointly by the whole Board. Hawkins ought to specify the faults he found in 1579 and to show how he himself has avoided them.

Altogether the attack makes a poor showing, and the last item suggests that Borough was completely ignorant of the circumstances in which Hawkins had assumed office. Hawkins never showed any malice against Borough, with whom he was afterwards on very good terms. Far other was the worthy Clerk's experience with Sir Francis Drake. In 1587 he went to sea as Drake's vice-admiral in the Cadiz expedition. On this occasion too he protested against Drake's deciding everything himself, and declared that a formal council of war was the lawful authority for the government of a fleet. When Drake entered Cadiz harbour in face of a squadron of Spanish galleys, Borough regarded the act as so insane that he initiated a retreat on his own responsibility, and Drake after taming the galleys put him on his trial for mutiny; and there is no doubt that Drake meant to have his life, but that the case was quashed by the home authorities. Poor Borough had an essentially medieval mind, and in the Armada year some humourist found him a congenially medieval job. He was placed in com-

mand of the only galley on the navy list and set to guard the Thames estuary against the enemy who never reached it. There we can imagine him as happily training his rowers and perfecting his command in the disciplines of the wars.

In March 1585, as may be inferred from Hawkins's next letter, Burghley had an important meeting with the Navy Board, at which the new proposal was discussed. Neither Winter nor Hawkins afterwards felt satisfied that he had spoken his full mind in the presence of the other persons, and each subsequently wrote at length to the minister upon the subject. Winter's letter was dated 8 April; it has been printed in full in a modern work,¹ so that a reasonably complete digest of it will here be sufficient. Hawkins's new offer of a bargain, it says, makes a show of good and acceptable service, 'but I am sorry to speak it (as I desire comfort at God's hands), there is nothing in it but cunning and craft to maintain his pride and ambition, and for the better filling of his purse, and to keep back from discovering the faults that are left in Her Majesty's ships at this day, which should have been perfected by the bargain made between Her Majesty and the two shipwrights Pett and Baker (wherein Hawkins was an invisible partner)'. Although the Queen has disbursed in the clouds the sum of £1,500 a year over and above the £1,000 allowed for the ordinary repairs, yet the faults remaining will show themselves if plain dealing be not suppressed. Your lordship, I perceive, withstands this Hawkins as much as possible, but he has charmed the Queen, your equals, and your inferiors, 'for he careth not to whom he speaketh, nor what he saith; blush he will not'. You heard both him and Pett at the late meeting swear that there were now no rotten timbers in the *Hope*. Well, I and others were at Deptford yesterday to confer with Hawkins about

¹ Corbett's *Spanish War, 1585-7* pp. 207-10, from Add. MS. 6294, f. 60.

the chain at Upnor, which chain, I think, will be costly and useless. Whilst waiting for him I went aboard the *Hope*, found much rotten dust, and made a carpenter pull off the covering he had put over the bad place; and there were three timbers rotten, which were seen by Mr. Borough and others as well. I do this, not of malice, but in discharge of my duty to the Queen. I am tired of these quarrels, yet, but for me, Her Majesty would have had few ships fit for service at this day. 'Written from East Smithfield, being not very well, the 8th of April, 1585. Your honourable lordship's to command, W. Wynter.'

Hawkins was undoubtedly caught over the *Hope's* timbers; yet three rotten timbers do not constitute a rotten fleet, and had there been any more there can be no doubt that Winter would have mentioned them. This paucity of detailed accusation, capable of being proved or disproved by reference to concrete facts, is characteristic of the attacks upon Hawkins, and is in contrast with his own attack upon Winter described earlier in this chapter. It is also but fair to Hawkins to read the incident of the rotten timbers in connexion with the passage in his letter of 1584, in which he says that his opponents have purposely procured the committing of faults in order to find matter of slander against him. Certainly Winter's inspection of the *Hope* came very opportunely for his complaint to Burghley, which contains absolutely nothing else but malicious generalities.

On the same day, and perhaps at the same hour, Hawkins was also writing to the minister about the late meeting, the new proposal, and the state of the Navy in general:

'My duty humbly remembered unto your good lordship,

At our late being before your lordship, the confusion of speeches and the short time would suffer no perfect reasons to be made to satisfy your lordship concerning the state of the ships. Therefore I have thought it my bounden duty in respect of Her

Majesty's honest and profitable service briefly and compendiously to make reasons by this my letter to show how the faults alleged ought to have been prevented and who ought to have borne the blame: yet be they not such as have been reported, or any cause in them to disable the ships, contrary to my Lord Chamberlain's survey.¹

The officers have had the ordinary of £5,714, which was a sum sufficient to have kept the Navy in sufficient and serviceable state, and build new ships as the other decayed, without any extra demand; they have consumed it and left many of the ships in ruin when I took care of them.

They have had in the time of Her Majesty's reign near £4,000 yearly extra money to build new ships and repair the old, besides the ordinary abovesaid, all which is consumed and a great part of the Navy left in great decay as aforesaid.

In this small time wherein I have taken care, all the building and reparations, ordinary and extraordinary, have not consumed the small ordinary of £5,714 yearly; yet these number of extraordinary services have been performed which I note to your lordship in the end of this letter, and the ships at this time in very good order for service, I thank God.

The faults which these men labour so hardly to blaze abroad of the four great ships, they cannot be under fifteen years old, which no man can take from the officers themselves; they have had money double and treble to cure and perfect these ships, and have done little or nothing for it. And seeing they cannot be contented themselves with a competent charge to keep the Navy in order, nor suffer others that would serve Her Majesty both sufficiently and profitably to do it, let them be compelled to show a reason of the foul and negligent consumption of Her Majesty's treasure; for surely, my very good lord, I am persuaded that God in justice doth harden their hearts to that end as he did Pharaoh's, who never left the resisting of God until he was drowned in the Red Sea.

If your lordship will vouchsafe to hear me with some leisure, I doubt not but to content your understanding as with some small circumstance and patience I will bring all my reasons with- in your lordship's understanding.

¹ i. e. the survey by the Commission of 1583, to whose report this is the only allusion discoverable.

Matthew Baker doth take the charge one quarter at Chatham, and Peter Pett the other quarter, and because Peter Pett and I have found fault with the idle expense in those quarters of Matthew Baker's, whereof at large I can inform your lordship, he hath laboured with the rest of that idle company to return to their old vomit; and they have thought it the best mean, with the original device of a greater drift, to make the slander of the Navy to be the pathway to their purpose. But God, the righteous Judge, shall prevent them.

And thus, wishing your lordship all happiness, I humbly take my leave, from Deptford the 8th of April, 1585,

Your honourable lordship's most bounden

[John Hawkyns].¹

On the other side of the leaf is copied the note of 'extraordinary reparations since anno 1579; extraordinary services in dry docks', which Hawkins claimed to have carried out within the compass of the £5,714 formerly allowed for the ordinary expenses alone. The particulars are:

	£
The <i>Bear</i> finished with riders, &c.	240
The <i>Mary Rose</i> new built	660 ²
The <i>Bonaventure</i> new built and sheathed	1,200 ²
The <i>Foresight</i> new built	600 ²
The <i>Galley Ellynor</i> new made and sheathed	600
The <i>Golden Lion</i> new built	1,340 ²
The <i>Jennett</i> and the <i>George</i> repaired	150
Boats, pinnaces, cocks, and lighters, new	480
The <i>Nonpareil</i> new built	1,600
Other extraordinary repairs, 'as in the books are allowed'	1,600
Total	8,470
Annual average, for 5½ years,	1,540

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 178, No. 12. Copy, no signature.

² The final accounts, compiled some years in arrear, give these figures with slight differences: The *Mary Rose*, £600; the *Bonaventure* and *Foresight* together, 'being in great decay' (1581), £1,614; the *Golden Lion*, £1,440; but the totals of these four items are nearly the same, in Hawkins's note £3,800, in the accounts £3,654. Declared Accounts, 2216, 2217, 2218.

Here were details whose financial aspect, at any rate, Burghley could verify from the accounts. They substantiate Hawkins's claim to have saved £4,000 a year. The question whether the work was efficiently done was still perhaps open to controversy, and was not to receive its final answer until 1588. Meanwhile Burghley pronounced his own opinion by concluding the 'second bargain', whose fortunes will be dealt with in the next chapter.

III

THE NAVY UNDER HAWKINS: THE SECOND BARGAIN

THE second bargain between Hawkins and the Queen was concluded in the summer of 1585, but was antedated in the accounts to 1 January of that year. It was terminated at Christmas 1587, and so was in effective operation for about two years and a half.

There appears to be no surviving copy of the exact terms of the agreement, as there is for that of 1579, and in consequence there is some uncertainty about one important condition. The declared accounts of 1585 recite as a preamble what purports to be a summary of the new bargain. According to this document, Hawkins undertook for £4,000 a year to do the whole of the ordinary: repairing ships afloat or grounded; paying all ship-keepers, clerks, watchmen, and gunners belonging to the harbour services; paying the garrison of Upnor Castle; finding all moorings for the ships in harbour; repairing wharves and storehouses at Portsmouth, Deptford, Woolwich, and Chatham; and finding all materials, wages, victuals, and lodgings incident to the above services. At the same time he undertook for £1,714 2s. 2d. a year to do the extraordinary, that is, the heavy repairs of ships in dry dock, and the finding of material, wages, &c. incident thereto.¹ Thus the whole maintenance of the existing Navy was at length reduced to one contract and placed in his hands, to be effected for £5,714 2s. 2d. annually, the sum fixed in Gonson's time for the ordinary alone. During that period, it will be remembered, Hawkins had alleged that the extraordinary had been extravagantly charged, and the partial figures he had given in his memorial of 1578 certainly convey the impression

¹ Exchequer, L.T.R., Declared Accounts, No. 2221.

that it had cost far more than the £1,700 for which he now undertook to do it.

The above description, it should be repeated, is merely a summary of the actual indenture, which must have gone into greater detail. In January 1588 Pett and Baker were required to report upon the way in which the bargain had been performed, and they prefaced their remarks by a summary of the bargain. They gave its terms very much as they are given above, but with the addition to the extraordinary that 'if any ship be decayed, another [is] to be put new in her place, of like length and breadth, sufficiently builded', and that in the event of such a replacement Hawkins was entitled to sell the old ship for his own benefit.¹ The shipwrights' summary gives the impression that it was a fairly close rendering of the original, and so it is probable that the last-mentioned conditions were actually included in the agreement; but from other allusions it may be guessed that there was some limitation of the expenditure to be claimed from him under that head, which they did not think fit to reproduce.

The accusations against Hawkins in the period of the first bargain had related, not to his £1,200 mooring contract, but to the £1,000 repairs contract with Pett and Baker, carried out under his supervision. They themselves had been dissatisfied, and they were now relieved of the responsibility, which the second bargain placed directly in Hawkins's hands. It could only be expected, however, that they should feel a little sore at their supersession, a point which will have its bearing upon some later transactions.

A 'Book of the whole Navy' of December 1585 enumerates twenty-one ships varying from 1,000 to 50 tons, including the galley, and in addition ten pinnaces below the 50-ton limit. It was drawn up by Hawkins for pur-

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 208, No. 17, printed in full in Laughton's *Defeat of the Armada*, i. 34-7.

poses of immediate mobilization, and omits the *Elizabeth Bonaventure* and the *Aid*, which were serving in the West Indies with Drake. As compared with the list of 1579, the *Handmaid*, an old pinnace, has dropped out, and the *George*, formerly a hoy, is now described as a 100-ton ship, having been rebuilt in the interval. The effective fighting strength is therefore on paper almost unchanged, but the ten pinnaces, mostly new, formed a useful accessory to the handling of the fleet.¹ War with Spain was now begun although not formally declared, and there was henceforward more activity in expanding instead of merely maintaining the Navy. Three of the pinnaces in the above list had been built in 1585, and in the next two years seven more were added of about fifty tons each, together with the *Charles* of seventy. Larger vessels were also laid down and completed. Richard Chapman, a Deptford shipbuilder, was appointed one of the Queen's master-shipwrights in 1587. In the previous year he had delivered the *Tremontana* of 150 tons. He had also built for Sir Walter Raleigh a fine galleon of 600 tons, the *Ark Raleigh*. This ship was bought into the Navy in 1587 and as the *Ark Royal* served as Lord Howard's flagship in the Armada campaign. In 1587 Baker and Pett respectively built the *Vanguard*, 500, and the *Rainbow*, 400, two galleons modelled upon the design of the *Revenge*; they cost £2,600 each,² but the charge included that of two pinnaces, such as it now became customary to build in the same contract with each great ship. There was doubtless some economy in the arrangement. The final result of these activities is expressed in a paper by Hawkins dated December 1587,

¹ The work of research for this chapter has been much lightened by the labours of Sir J. S. Corbett, who printed *in extenso* many of the important documents in his *Papers relating to the Spanish War, 1585-7*, Navy Rec. Soc., 1898. The above list is given on his pp. 270-2 from S. P. Dom., vol. 185, No. 33.

² These details are collected from Oppenheim's *Administration*, pp. 120-9.

in which he enumerates twenty-five fighting ships of 100 tons and over, and eighteen unnamed ocean-going pinnaces.¹ The list of the ships omits the *George* and the *Merlin*, which had swelled the 1585 total to twenty-three and were now evidently classed among the pinnaces.

The armament of these ships was one of the points in which, on the day of action, they were found superior to those of the Spaniards. It was not part of Hawkins's business, and the credit for it is due, on present evidence, to Sir William Winter, who maintained the advance in great ordnance which Henry VIII had initiated. In 1569 Winter had laid down a 'proportion' of guns of various sizes for the Queen's ships, and documents of 1585-7 show that this proportion was still being worked to. A report of December 1585 shows that most of the ships were then far short of it, and since some of them had been built later than 1569 it is evident that Winter's proportion was a rule of general application based on tonnage and design, and not a mere arbitrary fixing of armament for the vessels existing at that date. The general plan was to provide a ship with heavy guns, of cast metal and muzzle-loading, for her main attack upon the enemy, and with lighter pieces, often breech-loading, for repelling boarders or preparing the enemy for boarding. The former were carried low and used to destroy the enemy's ship; the latter were mounted in the superstructures and used to kill his men. The heavy guns commonly placed in the large ships were the demi-cannon, throwing a shot of about 30 lb. weight; the cannon-perier, 24 lb.; the culverin, 18 lb.; and the demi-culverin, 10 lb. Besides these there were smaller long-range guns, sakers, minions, and falcons, mounted in the smaller ships and perhaps available for the boats of the larger. The short-range guns, throwing hail-shot or dice-shot, were of many kinds, the commonest being called port-pieces, fowlers, and bases. The breech-mechanism

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 206, No. 61, appended schedules.

consisted of a removable chamber, loaded with the powder-charge and wedged in position within a stirrup attached to the barrel of the gun. Each piece was usually supplied with two such chambers. The culverins and demi-culverins, although of smaller bore, were longer guns than the demi-cannon and cannon-perier. The culverin was said to have an extreme range of 2,500 yards, and the demi-cannon of 1,700; but the fighting ranges at sea were much shorter, probably not over a quarter of a mile.

We may take as a specimen the armament of the *Revenge* on Winter's proportion: demi-cannons, 2; cannon-periers, 4; culverins, 10; demi-culverins, 6; sakers, 10; falcons, 2; port-pieces, 2; fowlers, 4; bases, 6.¹ As time went on the cannon type gave place to more culverins. The former, as a short, large-bore piece, would give a violent recoil and inflict a greater strain upon the ship.

The fact that few of the ships had their proper complement of guns in 1585 does not imply that armament was in arrear. The chief ordnance store was at the Tower, where a sufficient reserve was kept to arm all the ships. When the whole fleet was ordered to sea its equipment from the Tower probably took no longer than did the victualling, impressment of crews, and other preparations. For the small squadrons sent out from time to time in ordinary years the guns were very likely taken from the ships remaining in the dockyards. The routine work of the yards, the grounding, 'casting over', and general repairs, would have been hampered by the presence of all the guns on board, and the Tower workshops were their proper place of maintenance and repair.

From the close of 1585 there was constant activity in making preparations for what was certain to be no light matter, the mobilization of the entire fleet; and all the

¹ All these details are from documents printed by Corbett, or from his notes upon them, pp. 300-36. Oppenheim's *Administration* also contains a quantity of illuminating facts.

officials worked out the necessities of their particular departments. The estimates are all based upon the service with the Navy of twenty-two of the best armed merchantmen, ranging from 140 to 300 tons in burden. Hawkins, as Treasurer, drew up papers on the cost of everything under varying conditions, and the government certainly could not complain in 1588 that it had been committed to expenditure which had not been calculated: the expense of fighting the Armada had been worked out two years before to the wages of the last man and the cost of the last coil of rope. The victualing department under Edward Baeshe made very careful estimates; and here the difficulty was something beyond the scarcity of money. It was that the requisite supplies for feeding the fleet would not be available at short notice for any money. Apart from the shortage of foodstuffs, there was a prospective deficiency of casks in which to carry them. This at least could be remedied by administrative action, and in January 1586 Burghley sent out orders to the customers throughout the realm to prohibit the export of casks and clapboards (from which the staves were made), and to take bonds from merchants that for every seven tuns of beer exported they should bring home 200 clapboards.¹ The accumulation of a stock of victuals was not seriously pursued. Meat in casks would not keep indefinitely, and the supply would be constantly wasting and calling for renewal until the day arrived. The neglect of this expensive precaution forms the most serious charge against the Queen and her ministers. Yet allowance must be made for what they knew, although few others knew it—the precarious financial position of the Crown. The permanent revenue was barely sufficient for the most parsimonious peace expenditure, and for the rest the Queen had to depend upon her popularity with her people. They were loyal enough, but their representa-

¹ *Domestic Calendar, 1581-90*, pp. 299, 300.

tives in Parliament had always shown a disposition to meddle, with the best intentions, in policies which they did not understand and which could not be publicly explained. There was still a possibility, in the Queen's view, of avoiding the invasion by diplomacy, for which it was vital that she should have a free hand, and so the preparations for defence were in this one respect neglected. It should be borne in mind that many well-informed men were so impressed with the difficulties Philip would encounter in organizing an invasion that they believed he would negotiate after all, unless goaded to extremities. The Queen was by no means alone in holding a view which her critics, wise after the event, have denounced as short-sighted.

The question of manning the fleet had a close connexion with that of victualling and of general expenditure, and also with the fate of the men themselves. Drake took on his West Indian raid of 1585-6 a proportion of one man to 1½ tons of shipping, and lost about a quarter of his force from disease and privation besides having most of the survivors unfit for duty at a critical juncture. Hawkins, it is evident, did not believe that it was desirable so to crowd the ships. The details of his private fighting fleet at Plymouth in 1571 have been preserved. It amounted to 3,170 tons, and for it he demanded from Philip wages and victualling for 1,585 men, or exactly one man to two tons;¹ and he is not likely to have understated the number of men he was employing. Again, in January 1586, he drew up an estimate for five of the Queen's ships intended to cruise in the Channel, and here the proportion is virtually the same, 780 men to 1,470 tons, whilst five armed merchantmen to accompany them were allowed only 390 men to 1,180 tons.² The older tradition, dating from before the introduction of the great gun, died hard. A mobilization scheme

¹ Add. MS., 26056 B, f. 251 (Froude's Simancas transcripts).

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 186, No. 3.

of 1582, to which Hawkins must have subscribed with some misgiving, had laid it down that the proper proportion for a fighting fleet was one man to $1\frac{2}{3}$ tons.¹ But in the warships that actually fought the Armada the numbers did not exceed Hawkins's figure of one man to two tons.² By the end of the war that scale was established, as the statistics of a large fleet in 1602 bear witness.³ The bearing of these figures upon the sea-endurance of a fleet is shown by the statement that the victuals and drink for one man for four months occupied one ton of stowage, or about $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of the ship's gross dimensions.⁴ And since other stores, guns, munitions and ballast had to be allowed for, and the men themselves to be accommodated, the reduction from one man per $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons to one man per 2 tons must have added more than 50 per cent. to the time the fleet could stay at sea without replenishment. Spaniards could starve better than Englishmen, and did not allow nearly so liberal a scale of victualling.

Hawkins was responsible for a kindred reform, that of the improvement of the men's pay, and by consequence, of their quality and comfort. In December 1585, in a letter to Burghley, he said: 'I do also send your lordship a note to show how fit and commodious it would be to augment the sailors' wages, which no doubt would greatly strengthen and benefit the service and nothing at all increase the charge. Your lordship may with honour and safety prefer it.'⁵ The note referred to has been preserved, and shows the reasons at length and how Hawkins identified this reform with the reduction in numbers and the increased range of fleets. It is worth quoting in full:

'The 28th December, 1585. A note to show the commodity

¹ Corbett, p. 265, from S. P. Dom., vol. 152, No. 19.

² Laughton, *Armada*, i. 114, estimate for the four greatest ships, 3,600 tons, 1,900 men. Other figures show that the smaller ships were more lightly manned.

³ Oppenheim, *Administration*, p. 124.

⁴ Corbett, p. 263.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

that would grow to Her Majesty and country by increasing the wages of the servitors by sea in her highness' ships.

First, if it might please Her Majesty to allow for the medium [i. e. average] of all servitors an increase of 4*s.* 8*d.* the man by the month, it would fall out to be to every man (one with the other) 6*d.* by the day; so as the common man that had but 6*s.* 8*d.* by the month shall have 10*s.*, and so every officer will be increased after that rate a third part more in his wages.¹

By this means Her Majesty's ships would be furnished with able men, such as can shift for themselves, keep themselves clean without vermin and noisomeness, which breedeth sickness and mortality, all which could be avoided.

The ships would be able to continue longer in the service that they should be appointed unto, and would be able to carry victuals for a longer time.

There is no captain or master exercised in service but would undertake with more courage any enterprise with 250 able men than with 300 of tag and rag, and assure himself of better success.

The wages being [now] so small causeth the best men to run away, to bribe, and make mean to be cleared from the service. And insufficient, unable, and unskilful persons supply the place, which discourages the captains, masters and men that know what service requireth.

If it shall please Her Majesty to yield unto this increase, her highness' service would be far safer and much bettered, and yet the charge nothing increased, as for example:

The charge of the *Lion* for one month's wages and victual of 300 men, after the old rate of 23*s.* 4*d.* per man doth amount unto £350.

The same ship being now furnished with 250 able men, after the new rate of 28*s.* (wages and victuals) for every man per menssem, will amount unto, even as before, £350.²

So as all the commodities are obtained without any increase of charge to Her Majesty.

The sailors also, in consideration of Her Majesty's gracious

¹ The apparent inconsistency of these figures is due to the 4*s.* 8*d.* being an average increase for officers and men together. The 'common man's' increase was 3*s.* 4*d.* per month.

² Hawkins, in another enclosure of the same date, gives the *Golden Lion* as of 500 tons. Hence it is clear that he had definitely in mind the reduction in manning from one man per 1 $\frac{2}{3}$ tons as laid down in 1582, to one per 2 tons.

liberality, shall be bound for to bring into the said service every man his sword and dagger.'¹

The reasoning was conclusive, and the sailor's pay was raised to 10s. a month in 1586. Henry VIII had raised it from 5s. to 6s. 8d. during the last war of his reign. The cost of necessaries had steadily increased during the sixteenth century in consequence of the influx of the precious metals from Africa and America.

The solicitude of Hawkins for seamen's interests is perhaps more clearly shown in a matter that arose a few years later. In 1591 he and Borough were asked to give their opinion on a proposed new grant of incorporation for the Turkey Company. In their reply, after discussing the affairs of the trade, they added that the masters and mariners employed ought to be allowed to carry merchandise of their own to a value equal to that of their wages for the voyage. In a later memorandum they recurred to the point and expressed a hope that the privilege would be inserted in the Company's patent.² Life and liberty were always risked in these Levant voyages, and Hawkins no doubt felt that the seaman should have a chance of extra profit to compensate for that of ending his days as a Turkish galley-slave. It seems uncertain whether this kindly intervention was successful; the patent issued in January 1593 contains no clause legitimating the employees' trade.

As this chapter has already shown, a great deal had been done in the winter of 1585-6 to prepare the Navy for serious war. By the autumn of the latter year the reforms in the administration had evidently got into working order, for Hawkins was able to be spared for a cruise at sea, his first for many years.³ Borough went with him, whilst Winter and Holstocke were left to carry on the work of the Navy Board at home.

¹ Corbett, pp. 281-2.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1591-4, pp. 83, 95.

³ An account of this voyage is given in the next chapter.

Partly by reason of his sea service, there is no further important document on administration from Hawkins's pen until the summer of 1587. Then, on 27 June, he wrote Burghley a memorandum which foreshadowed the end of the second bargain. He began with a review of the chief circumstances attending the dockyard work before and during his time, and reminded the minister that he was now doing the ordinary and extraordinary for the contract sum of £5,714 annually. He then went on to point out that the Navy was now greatly increased and that ships were going to sea much more often than formerly, with a corresponding increase in the cost and supervision of repairs, 'so as it is impossible for any one man to answer the office of Treasurer and to take this care'. Winter and the rest of the officers, he continued, 'do and will endeavour themselves, and are most desirous to ease Her Majesty's charge . . . and withal to take such substantial care as Her Majesty be not overcharged', a polite way of saying that they may be trusted not to cheat in future. Therefore, he concludes, he asks that a commission may be appointed to consider what new annual sum shall be thought fair for the work, and when peace comes, to make a new navy contract and to divide it among such a number of persons as shall be thought fitting. Meantime, since active service has given opportunity for a good deal of embezzlement of munitions, rigging, and carpentry stores, it would be a good thing to appoint a provost-marshal to be at the Lord Admiral's disposal, 'to do such present execution aboard the ships upon the offenders as should be appointed'.¹

The implication of the above is that Hawkins considered he had accomplished the work he had taken in hand in 1579. He had brought the Navy Board to heel, and thought that the future good conduct of its members could be depended on; therefore there was no reason for continuing all responsibility on his shoulders.

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 202, No. 35; *in extenso* in Corbett, pp. 210-13.

Perhaps he realized at this date that Philip meant business, and he wanted to be free to take his place in the great sea-campaign which was looming nearer. With regard to his fellow-officers, it is noteworthy that from the conclusion of the second bargain in 1585 there is no record of any further complaints or obstruction from them. He had fought them and beaten them, and they had now shaken hands upon it, a tribute not only to his firmness but to his charm of character. He was ever a good loser and a good winner alike. The last batch of accusations, which we have yet to take note of, were to come from outsiders of no standing; and Winter and Borough were to come forward in Hawkins's defence. As for the bargain, it had been drawn up in time of peace, and it was obviously in need of revision in time of war and as applied to a rapidly expanding fleet. Hawkins was still a believer in the contract system, but he now desired to share it with others, a fairly good indication that he was not making the profits his enemies alleged. It should be noted, however, that he proposed to defer the new contract until the end of the war, and it may be inferred that while the war lasted he thought it best to go back to the old system of detailed expenditure on the joint responsibility of the Navy Board. That was only common sense, for no one could foretell how the war-time navy work would fluctuate.

Hawkins soon found that his proposal to terminate the bargain was to excite yet more animosity than its origination had done. It seemed that he was loosening his hold, and interested parties were therefore moved to an attempt to oust him altogether. First there is an attack, anonymous to us but not necessarily to Burghley, on his manner of performing his obligations. It may be from the pen of Thomas Allen, the Queen's Merchant for naval stores. It is headed, 'Articles wherein may appear Her Majesty to be abused and Mr. Hawkins greatly enriched'. They are eight in number, and their sub-

stance is as follows: first, Hawkins has neglected to maintain the ships, 'so that they are brought to their last end and dangerous state', and he now wishes to revoke the bargain so as to leave to the Queen the charge of renewing the ships, whilst he goes away with great profits; in spite of his contract, he has charged extra sums for what repairs he has done; the shipwrights are his instruments, abetting his frauds for such small reward as he allows them; he sells a great deal of timber made up into sugar chests for Barbary, and he also carries on a private ship-building business at Richard Chapman's yard; he overcharges the Queen for masts and timber supplied for sea service, and so not covered by the contract; the ships are in a dangerous state by being caulked with rotten oakum, and the old mooring cables, instead of being made into good oakum, are converted into bad rope and sold; he buys cordage and canvas and sells it at a higher price and under false descriptions to the Queen's storehouses; great supplies of gear go to sea with the fleets, and little is returned, all to his gain. These things considered, Mr. Hawkins may very fairly be required to put Her Majesty's ships in such order as he found them in, and even to rebuild two or three of them; and having done so, he may still go away with a profit.¹

The next document is endorsed by Burghley as being by Thomas Allen. It pre-supposes the corruption not only of Hawkins but of the other officers of the Board, and suggests regulations for curbing their evil practices. The Treasurer of the Navy, it says, ought not to supply any commodities for the use of the Navy, neither ought any of the officers to be themselves builders or owners of ships, since they are enabled to use the Queen's materials for those purposes. The officers ought not to be buyers of any materials for the Queen, but only to supervise the supply of such materials by outside merchants with whom contracts should be made. Hawkins grasps

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 204, No. 17, in Corbett, pp. 213-15.

all such business, great and small, even to the flags and pendants, which are made by his wife and her maids; so are poor artificers deprived of employment. There should be strict order that all supplies should come directly into the storehouses, and that their keepers should enter in the books what they have received and what they have given out. Then follow some details: Hawkins, says Allen, is now very friendly with Sir William Winter and the keeper of the Deptford storehouse and is allowed by them to pass in inferior stores—ropes of English make, for example, falsely described as of Danzig. Matthew Baker will testify that in the time of the first bargain Hawkins insisted on taking half the profits of the two shipwrights, unknown to the other officers, and then persuaded the officers to agree to excessive allowances to the shipwrights for extra work performed by them. Hawkins's accounts are in arrear by as much as two years.¹ Private ships ought not to lie at Deptford as they have done in recent years, for reasons that could be stated; neither ought the Queen's shipwrights to keep their own timber yards or to build ships for private persons.

Much of the above is very proper, although not the practice of any government department at that time. Omitting the innuendoes, it might even represent a single-minded desire on the part of the writer to benefit the public service. But the penultimate paragraph brings the whole composition down from these moral heights, for in it the virtuous Allen suggests that he himself should be appointed to supply to the Navy the stores

¹ It appears from the Exchequer rolls that the navy accounts always were in arrear before being finally declared, often by more than two years. This was unavoidable. Not only had the accounts of several dockyards to be combined, but the return of distant expeditions had to be awaited before their exact cost could be ascertained. The Navy Treasurer had also to get statements from the Ordnance and Victualing departments, not within his own control, before he could begin to put his own accounts into shape for the auditors.

which have been the occasion for the malpractices of the existing officers.¹

Perhaps in consequence of these accusations, but more likely because Hawkins was bent upon terminating the bargain, Burghley ordered Pett and Baker to furnish a report upon the state of the ships. The fact that the task was entrusted to them and not to an independent commission like that of 1583 indicates that no serious importance was attached to it. The shipwrights reported on 12 October 1587, in a guarded manner, saying and then unsaying so much that it is not easy to extract a short summary of their conclusions. The following is a fair attempt to render the substance of the report: The *Elizabeth Jonas*, the *Triumph*, the *White Bear*, and the *Victory* contain many decayed timbers and will not last long, being already very old ships; but they have been repaired of late and may serve for a summer campaign. The *Mary Rose* is very old and so decayed that little can be done for her, so that she ought to be condemned. The *Bonaventure*, *Dreadnought*, and *Swiftsure* need a thorough repair in dry-dock, but may serve on emergency without it. The *Antelope*, *Aid*, and *Swallow* are very old bottoms, although lately rebuilt above water; they are in sufficient state for present service, but will soon require renovation. The *Bull* is greatly decayed, yet still serviceable; she will not last long. The *Revenge* has lately had a thorough overhaul, although not to the extent of rebuilding. The *Lion*, *Ark Royal*, *Vanguard*, *Rainbow*, and *Merlin* are in good order for immediate service. The *Hope* is very ancient but still serviceable. The *Nonpareil* and *Tiger* have lately had much work done on them and are in good state. The *Foresight*, *Scout*, and *Achates* will shortly need repair but are at present serviceable. The *Galley Elenor* is decayed and will not last long. The pinnaces, boats, cocks and skiffs are in good condition. In conclusion, the sig-

¹ Corbett, pp. 213-24.

natories warned Burghley not to rely upon their sole opinion, and disclaimed any motive of seeking to make more work for themselves or to worry Mr. Hawkins.¹ They had evidently found their task invidious.

A month later Hawkins wrote Burghley a statement on the above matters from his point of view, enumerating the chief reforms he claimed to have accomplished.

'For my own part', he went on, 'I have lived in a very mean estate since I came to be an officer, neither have I vainly or superfluously consumed Her Majesty's treasure or mine own substance, but ever been diligently and carefully occupied to prepare for the danger to come. And whatsoever hath been or is maliciously spoken of me, I doubt not but your lordship's wisdom is such that ye may discern and judge of my fidelity, of which Her Majesty and your lordship have had long trial. And hereafter I will speak little in mine own behalf, but endeavour myself with my ability and knowledge to prevent the malice of our enemies, and lay aside the vanity of the defending of every malicious report.'

Then, after referring to an enclosure in which he desired to have the command of a western squadron at Plymouth to meet the invasion, he concluded with a request that Burghley should terminate the bargain at Christmas, and that the Navy Board should be formally notified to that effect. His freedom from the bargain, he urged, would enable him the better to serve the Queen both in counsel and in action. 'And so, wishing your good lordship health and happiness, I humbly take my leave. From London, the 13th of November, 1587. Your honourable lordship's humbly to command, John Hawkyns.'²

We have yet one more indictment of Hawkins to notice, and then shall be quit of an aspect of his story which grows wearisome. The document in question contains a lengthy discourse entitled 'Articles exhibited against Mr. John Hawkins, 1587'. It was probably compiled at

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 204, No. 20; in Corbett, pp. 224-31.

² Corbett, pp. 233-9.

the close of the year or at the beginning of what by our reckoning is 1588. It is unsigned, but the identity of the writer must have been apparent to contemporaries. To us he remains some anonymous servant of the Earl of Leicester. In 1583, he says, he had much talk with Sir William Winter, then an enemy of the Treasurer, all of which made evident 'the baseness of the said Mr. Hawkins in birth, mind, and manners'. He tried also to pump Hawkins on the matters then in controversy, 'but say I what I could, or object what I would, he would seem to make such a sound answer or avoidance of the matter, and would with such a grace and face maintain his matter, that he made me sometimes think that I had mistaken that which now I know I perfectly knew'. Hawkins, the informant continues, used to invite him to his table, where there was talk of the 'botching' of the ships, the frauds over the cordage, the employment of the Queen's timber in private building, and the profits on the moorings; and Hawkins once showed him a paper proving that the other officers shared these unjust gains with him. At the same time Winter protested that he never dealt in such matters, but did not answer for Borough and Holstocke. Hawkins once remarked that when he and his brother parted at Plymouth his share was £10,000, and Winter, on hearing this, answered, 'What a dissembling knave is that! When he was hurt in the Strand, and made his will, he was not able to give £500.' Then follows a great deal of tattle picked up in the dockyards from shipwrights, clerks, and storekeepers, and an explanation of the apparent reconciliation between Winter and Hawkins; Winter, by this account, is still an enemy, but seeks to lull Hawkins into security and so get proof against him.¹ Nevertheless they have lately shared a pretty prize of £5,000, taken by a pinnace sail-

¹ This is the only evidence that the reconciliation was not genuine; and it is hardly worth considering. It is given on the authority of a servant of Winter's.

ing in the Queen's service. With Borough also Hawkins has grown great friends, so that they maintain each the other's cause to the uttermost. Now is the time, when the enemy are upon us, to make of Hawkins an example to others; he is manifestly false, his former familiarity with Spain being considered, together with the present decay of Her Majesty's Navy.¹

There is a great deal more in the attack than is given above; it is in fact the longest of the documents of this sort. But the above summary is a fair specimen of its quality, which can only be described as the gossip of the back-doorstep. If the writer, whoever he was, thought to ingratiate himself with Burghley, he probably found himself mistaken; for the minister had before this read similar effusions against himself. It is, of course, easy to say that there is no smoke without fire, and that although the slanders are exaggerated there must have been some truth at the bottom of them. Those who have studied the state papers of any part of the Tudor and Stuart periods will hardly defend this reasoning, for they will recognize the writer of this attack as belonging to a well-known type, which fabricates the most reckless lies without the least foundation. Any one who doubts this should read the full document and then turn over the Calendars of State Papers of the late Elizabethan time; he will not have to search far before he finds others like it, directed against men of good repute.²

There exists a paper in Burghley's hand which has been held to prove that the minister doubted the integrity of Hawkins. It is badly mutilated by fire, but enough of it remains to show that it is a draft of proposed regulations for the conduct of the Navy Board. Those entries that are complete run as follows:

"That no officers of the Admiralty be builders of ships nor

¹ Lansdowne MS., 52, Art. 43; in Corbett, pp. 242-57.

² Cf. *Domestic Calendar*, 1581-90, p. 260, and *passim*, for slanders on Burghley himself.

[partners] with any other in building of ships. That no officer be a merchant of things to serve usually [as] provisions for the Queen's ships. That no other officer alone make the prices of the provisions. That no payments be made for any provisions or other charges by the Treasurer without the warrant of the rest of the officers. That all provisions do come first into Her Majesty's storehouse, and that none be issued without warrant from all the officers. . . . That none that make ships for the Queen should keep timber yards for [supplying] merchant ships, for by colour thereof they take up timber.'

So much is preserved of the main body of the paper, and then at the bottom there is a foot-note :

'Remembrances of abuses past. John Hawkins was half in the bargain with Peter Pett and Matthew Baker.'

On this the assertion has been based that Burghley quietly satisfied himself that the charges against Hawkins were not unfounded, and drew up a set of stringent regulations for their future avoidance. Such an interpretation is possible, but by no means capable of proof. Hawkins's single control was now coming to an end, and the administration was reverting to the old system by which all the officers had a finger in matters of finance. What that had meant before 1579 we have already seen, and it was obviously with those 'abuses past' in mind that Burghley was meditating rules for the future. It is the foot-note that tells most strongly against Hawkins. A careful examination shows that it is not part of the main document and was written on a different occasion: the writing of the regulations is firm, and the lines straight; the foot-note is in a shaky hand and the lines irregular, and the ink is of a slightly different tint. Burghley was looking over the draft he had previously written (and perhaps forgotten) and added a mere jotting, or rather, two unrelated jottings, the context remaining in his own mind. What that context was we cannot tell, perhaps merely that the first 'bargain' (the contracts

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho E. viii, f. 169.

were always so called) had been shared between Hawkins and the shipwrights. It should be emphasized that this is the sole evidence that Burghley distrusted Hawkins; and there is much that inferentially refutes it.

It remained to terminate the bargain as Hawkins desired. For this purpose it was necessary that he should have a proper acquittance testifying that he had performed his obligations, and Burghley obtained specific reports from the shipwrights and from the other officers of the Board. The shipwrights' verdict may be taken first, although it is of later date. It is carping and hostile in tone. They point out first that during the time of their contract under the first bargain Hawkins, and not they, was responsible, 'for he took from them the benefit thereof from the first day they entered, and they are to abide his reward'. In other words, he allowed them no margin of profit, but converted it to his own purposes. Whether those purposes were his private gain or public economy must be judged on the whole record of his administration. There were, as we have seen, plenty of witnesses against him, but on the other hand the gross figures of expenditure stand on record in the accounts, and they need a great deal of swearing away. Pett and Baker proceed next to the second bargain, under which Hawkins contracted for the payment of the staffs; and here they make the point that the recent service of so many ships at sea had diminished the number of shipkeepers necessary in harbour. On the keeping of the ships in repair, they say it was better done under their contract than it has been since, and that five great ships have recently sailed from Chatham very foul and in a dangerous state. The moorings, they admit, have been well done, but the conversion of old cable into rope has entailed a scarcity of good oakum, formerly made from the cables. Hawkins has not done so much rebuilding as he ought to have done, and now that heavy rebuilding work is due he thinks it a good time to revoke his

bargain. He has used the right of purveyance for timber not only for the Queen's yards but for a private yard at Deptford, 'which breedeth ill speeches in the country'. Here there is a *suppressio veri*; they are evidently referring to Richard Chapman's yard, and Chapman had for some time been building ships for the Navy, for which the use of purveyed timber was legitimate. In conclusion, they say that Hawkins has not made any new ships at his own charge, and has had large additional allowances for ships he has repaired.¹

So much for Pett and Baker, two efficient and fairly honest old grumblers, who nursed their grievances and hated Chapman, the newcomer who was joining their ranks. With all their meanness they knew how to build ships, which was the service England required of them.

The Navy Board, that is, Winter and Holstocke, for Borough was still on trial for his delinquencies against Drake, reported on 9 December:

'Our duty in humble manner remembered unto your good lordship,

According to your honour's commandment by your letter bearing date the 7th of this present, we have considered upon the articles which were set down in the offer made by Mr. Hawkins for the maintenance of the Navy in anno 1585, being the first time of the said offer. We have ever since been careful to see that performed which we thought fit to be observed by Mr. Hawkins, and have from time to time compared his allowances with the equity of the conditions contained in that bargain, wherein we have used our best circumspection to deal indifferently between Her Majesty and him; certifying your lordship hereby, that he hath carefully performed the conditions of that offer in such sort as we have no cause to complain of him, but are thoroughly persuaded in our conscience that he hath, for the time since he took that bargain, expended a far greater sum in carpentry upon Her Majesty's ships than he hath had any way allowance for.

We have in the foot of this letter noted unto your lordship

¹ Laughton, *Armada*, i. 38-44; 22 Jan. 1588.

divers ships that have been repaired in dry docks and ships new made since the time of the bargain, besides the ordinary reparations of the ships and boats in harbour, to the end your lordship may consider and judge that the money disbursed by her highness hath been well employed.

And as concerning the moorings of the ships in harbour, the payment of shipkeepers, clerks, gunners, watchmen, and rents, and the reparation of storehouses and wharves, we find no want, but that they have been paid and sufficiently done by him, with such other ordinary matters as are contained in this bargain. And so, wishing your lordship all honour and health, we humbly take our leave. From Tower Hill, the 9th day of December, 1587. Your honourable lordship's ever to command,

W. Wynter. William Holstok.*

The Navy Board thus resumed its old functions from the opening of 1588, and three of its four members went to sea with the fleet that year. No new contract was ever made, for the war outlasted the lives of all concerned. But Hawkins still remained the administrator of the Navy, although without the particular obligations which had been his instrument for a great achievement and had been likewise the occasion of so much obloquy.

His health had not been good during these years. Malaria, probably, was in his blood. In October 1580 he wrote that he had been very ill with an ague, and expected rather to die than live. In January 1586, again, he told Burghley, 'since I saw your lordship last I have been very sick and continue weak still'. Ill-health handicapped nearly all the ruling men of the time. Burghley was a sufferer from gout, and once told a correspondent that his neck was so stiff that he could not bend his head to see the paper he was writing on. Walsingham was continually laid aside by a malady that was with him all his life. The Queen herself was often ailing. They had no real medical help and pottered much with quack remedies that now seem ridiculous enough. Yet, sick as they were, they made the Elizabethan age.

* S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 206, No. 15; Corbett, pp. 240-1.

of out, I And this is waltt might have willed to to Engage
 unto you that the Lord Disposition please not you please make the
 warrant at is here done untill the demand be performed,

John Hawlyn
 Worthy Solitor
 118

SIGNATURES OF THE NAVY BOARD, 1583

maye be done, as ye have shewed me. And so the 28 of June 1584.
 For the said 28 of June 1584.

28 of June 1584
 Thomas Brough
 F. L. J. 110
 Thomas Brough
 Thomas Brough
 Thomas Brough

Thomas Brough
 Thomas Brough

SIGNATURES OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 1584

IV

OCEANIC EXPANSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SPANISH WAR

NO sooner had the mysteries of the Guinea coasts been sifted and the prospects in the Caribbean reconnoitred than the interest of active minds in England began to rove to a much more distant field of enterprise. The full story cannot even yet be told, but sufficient indications can be gathered to prove that during the fifteen years before the outbreak of the Spanish War there was working in England a group of men whose ambition it was to found an English trading-empire in the East Indies. They had seen Africa, and they had seen the golden West; and having done so, they deliberately relegated them to a secondary position and chose the Far East as their goal. It is an idea which for us involves a rearrangement of values, for the accepted outline of Elizabethan history gives to the eastward push a late and minor importance, and places far more emphasis upon the ravaging of the Spanish empire in America. Nevertheless, if we view the record through the eyes of contemporaries, and correct the distortion arising from the over-advertisement of certain transactions and the undue minimizing of others, we shall find that from the early fifteen-seventies until the very approach of the Armada the East is dominant in the thoughts and actions of the sea-adventurers and their supporters.

Moreover, on this closer view the supposed opposition between the London and the Devon schools of enterprise tends to disappear. The men themselves were conscious of no divergence. John Hawkins was now a Londoner, and his brother William a Plymouth man associated with Grenville and the county families of the west; and John and William worked hand in hand.

Drake stands forth as the leader of Devon enterprise, but one of his chief supporters seems to have been Sir William Winter, who was also active in promoting the London enterprises for discovering the North-West and North-East Passages. The Gilberts, Humphrey and Adrian, were North-West men and Devon men too. John Davis was a North-West man and a Londoner, as were most of those who financed him. The London merchants found the capital that enabled the Muscovy Company to push into Persia from the north and the Turkey Company to reach out in the same direction through the Levant. Both movements had the farther East in ultimate view, and at the same time it was Drake who sailed the first English ship to the Spice Islands. Enthusiasts like Walsingham and Hakluyt helped all the movements, whilst the Court, under Leicester, Hatton, and Raleigh, was also catholic in its sympathies. The whole story of the time is one, and the East is its central thread. Even the political schism between Burghley and the forward party should be accepted with caution. It rests to a large extent upon the reports of Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador of 1578, who may have been misled, and upon a neglect to consider Burghley's own record up to 1573.

These great questions formed the background of John Hawkins's life during the disappointing seventies when he was standing by for the national defence against an enemy who did not come, and afterwards during his weary round of dockyard detail and the battle against fraud and calumny out of which emerged the fleet of 1588. He could take no personal part in the doings of the ocean men in these years, but he was with them in spirit; and, as will be shown, he was one of the springs of action behind the scenes, whilst others of his family supplied his place at sea.

It may be remembered that when in 1570 Hawkins was equipping his ships for a cruise against the plate

fleet, one of the rumours that were circulated in order to mislead Don Guerau de Spes had been that the expedition was destined for the Straits of Magellan. There was at the moment no truth in it, but the thing is interesting as showing that the Straits were in the minds of contemporaries; the essence of a misleading rumour is that it must be probable. There are other indications that the Straits were talked about in England. In the reign of Edward VI Sebastian Cabot had betrayed to Charles V an alleged English plan for a voyage to Peru.¹ A few years later the Frenchman André Thevet published *Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique*, and in it he asserted that he had talked with an English pilot who said he had been through the Straits and had landed on the continent to the south of them.² The pilot was very likely Sebastian Cabot. It is true that he had never been in the Straits, but he was quite capable of saying he had, and if he talked to a Frenchman about them he is pretty certain to have talked in the same strain to the English, who worshipped him in his old age as a patriarch of discovery. Alternatively, Thevet's remark may represent a clue to an otherwise lost adventure. Either way it is evidence for our main point, that the Straits had long entered into English speculations. Drake and his men in 1577 were well acquainted with the story of their predecessor Magellan.

The Straits of Magellan as a route, not to the plunder of Peru, but to trade with Asia and with undiscovered lands in the South Pacific, had been in the minds of a powerful group some time before Drake set sail on his voyage. In 1573-4 a paper was addressed to Burghley by persons who, on its internal evidence, were gentlemen of the West Country. In it they desired the grant of a patent for the prosecution of discovery south of the

¹ Navarette, *Documentos inéditos para la historia de la España*, iii. 512. Probable date 1552-3.

² Edition by P. Gaffarel, Paris, 1878, p. 292; orig. edn., 1558.

equator and for the settlement of lands so discovered. They urged that there would be a likelihood of finding gold and silver, and of obtaining spices. They declared that they had no intention of trespassing upon the actual possessions of Spain and Portugal, and pointed out that the papal bulls of partition had already been disregarded by the Queen, and that even the Catholic French did not respect them. If permission were granted, they concluded, they were willing to equip four good ships and invest £5,000.¹ So far there is no clue to the names of the projectors, and no mention of the Straits of Magellan or of Asiatic trade, other than that implied by the hope of obtaining spices. There exists, however, a draft patent which evidently constituted the answer to the above petition. It is made out to Richard Grenville, Piers Edgcumbe, Arthur Bassett, William Hawkins, and others; and it empowers them to send expeditions to discover new lands not hitherto possessed by Christians; especially those 'having the pole antarctic elevate', and also to find and trade with the territories of the Khan of Cathay.² This patent cannot be shown to have been finally passed. It bears no date, and has been bound with the state papers of 1590; but it obviously belongs to some date not later than 1577, for it describes Richard Grenville as 'esquire', and he was knighted in that year.³

The plan in the minds of the patentees was therefore to find a southern route to eastern Asia, and to occupy some convenient territory as a half-way point in what would be a very long passage. That route might have

¹ Lansdowne MS., 100, ff. 142-7, no date, but endorsed by Burghley, '1573. A discovery of lands beyond the Equinoctial'. A similar paper was addressed to the Lord Admiral, and bears the date 22 March 1574 (S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 95, No. 64).

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 235, No. 1.

³ W. C. Metcalfe, *Book of Knights*, London, 1885, p. 130. The ascription of Grenville's knighthood to 1574 in the *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* is based on a mistake in the *Domestic Calendar*.

gone by way of the Cape of Good Hope or of the Straits of Magellan. But a subsequent document from the Grenville group indicates that the Straits were the way intended;¹ and there is other evidence to show that the Hawkinses at least had no faith in the Cape route.

Serious preparations were made for putting this plan into operation. In May 1574 a Spanish agent in London reported that Grenville and Sir Arthur Champernowne had recently equipped four large ships and three smaller ones for a voyage, as they alleged, to Labrador; but he thought their real intention had been to help the Huguenots on the coast of Normandy. They had, however, been too late for that, and now gave out that they were going to the Straits of Magellan. They were increasing their fleet to ten sail, including the *Castle of Comfort*, and had 1,500 men. The Spaniard thought the whole thing would end in an attack upon the Canary Islands and a cruise for the home-coming treasure fleets.² That may very well have been what did occur, for of any venture south of the equator no trace can be found. Grenville himself is something of a mystery, and his career might be worth recovering. He had sea-blood in his veins, and we find him from time to time implicated in Channel privateering. The blaze of ferocious valour in which he met his end is not consistent with a life spent mainly in adding field to field in peaceful Devon; yet that is almost all that can at present be said of it.

In these years the eastern problem was being attacked in every conceivable way except the right one—the open passage by the Cape, which the Portuguese had for so

¹ Lansdowne MS., 100, ff. 52-4, endd. by Burghley 'Mr. Grenville's voyage'. It is not dated, but seems to have been written c. 1575-7, to prove that the Straits of Magellan were a better approach to the Pacific than that by the north-west.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1568-79, No. 398. La Mothe Fénelon reported that Grenville had long been asking for leave to make this voyage of discovery, but he thought the route was to be by the north. *Correspondance*, vi. 127-8.

long exploited. Why that should have been neglected by the English it is hard to say. Consideration for Portugal cannot have been a powerful deterrent, in spite of the lukewarm attempts at a reconciliation that took place in the seventies. If it was possible to argue that Guinea was not effectively occupied by the Portuguese, and so was open to English enterprise, it would have been equally possible to say the same of the East Indies or of any point on the road thither; and there must have been some among the Portuguese renegades flitting between London and the French ports who could have supplied the necessary pilotage. More probably the dislike of the Cape route arose from the fact that it was known, and known to be difficult, costly, and fatal to men and ships. The temptation was irresistible to look first for an easier path.

With these motives the Muscovy Company, officially the Merchants Adventurers for the Discovery of New Trades, had been founded as early as 1553 on the recommendation of Sebastian Cabot. Its first expedition sought for the North-East Passage, and found Archangel and Moscow instead. In the early years of Elizabeth its servant Anthony Jenkinson descended the Volga, crossed the Caspian, and tried to push through by land to the East. He failed in that, but established a trade with Persia through Russia. The trade persisted until 1580, and had then to be abandoned owing to the anarchy of the Middle East and the difficulties of the long river transport. But in the same year the Company bestirred itself to another attempt upon the North-East Passage. Two ships were sent, and their commanders were enjoined to find a suitable island in the northern sea, in which the traders 'might plant, fortify and staple safely'; and from this island it was proposed to feed the Asiatics with English commodities, and to it to attract 'the navy of Cambalu' to resort with China goods.¹ The

¹ Hakluyt, iii. 264-5.

idea of a shortened passage is here prominent, and so also is that of a half-way house, which appears in all these schemes. The expedition failed to find a strait, and lost one of the ships. Their names, the *William* and the *George*, the names of the brothers Winter, suggest that they had a hand in the scheme, as does also the name of the commander, Arthur Pett, probably a relative of the master-shipwright of Chatham.

Meanwhile, the North-West Passage became a field of English enterprise. Here again, the inspiring idea goes back to very early years. John Rut had made an attempt to find the passage in 1527, and Robert Thorne had written in the same year of its existence and advantages. The Elizabethans seem to have known little of Rut's voyage, but they did know Thorne's book.¹ In 1565 Sir Humphrey Gilbert wrote a tract to prove that the passage could be found, and this also circulated in manuscript until it was printed in 1576. But the actual attempts did not spring from Gilbert's essay, although that may have helped. The credit for them is due chiefly to Michael Lok, who had all his life devoted his spare time and money to the study of the problem. Lok, as a trader in the Levant, had handled eastern produce, and he was inspired with the ambition to find a short route to China by the North-West Passage. His ally was Martin Frobisher, a hardy adventurer, ready for anything that promised wealth, but one who never gave much evidence of geographical skill or originality of mind. The combination promised well. In 1576 Lok raised the money and drew the plan, and Frobisher pushed into the North-West with a couple of pinnaces. He returned to announce that he had found the mouth of the passage. Actually it was a *cul-de-sac* which still bears the name of Frobisher Sound. The good news led to the formation of the Cathay Company to exploit

¹ Hakluyt could find only a meagre fragment about the voyage, but he printed Thorne in his *Divers Voyages* of 1582.

the new trade, and Frobisher sailed again with a larger force in 1577. The finding of some promising ore in Baffin Land diverted the Company's energies to gold-prospecting, and ultimately ruined it, for the stuff turned out to be valueless. Frobisher did little for discovery in 1577, but brought home cargoes of ore. In 1578 he went out again with no less than fifteen ships. This time he was directed to establish a fortified settlement and to leave Captain Edward Fenton in charge of it. Its purpose was not only to watch over the supposed gold-mines but also to act as a halting-point on the road to China; for it was still believed that the passage was discovered. Climatic difficulties prevented the founding of the post, and all came home in the autumn of 1578 to find the ore discredited and the Company bankrupt. So ended for the time the north-western push to Asia, leaving the question of the passage still open.

The quest persisted, but swung into other directions. The years 1578-80 witnessed the negotiations between the London merchants and the Ottoman Government that led to the chartering of the Turkey Company in the latter year. This body, subsequently renamed the Levant Company, sought to push eastwards through the Sultan's dominions. It was locally successful in the Levant, as the Muscovy Company was in Russia, but it was never able to reach the final goal, and, as we can see now, victory by that route was scarcely possible.

The fertile period of the late fifteen-seventies had yet another solution of the problem to try. It led to the most brilliant achievement of the age, and the one which, as the present writer would urge, has been the most seriously misunderstood—the circumnavigation of the world by Francis Drake. The proceedings of that immortal voyage are sufficiently well known,¹ and it is

¹ A full account is in Sir J. S. Corbett's *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, vol. i, and all the points here alluded to may be read fully in that work, with the exception of those antecedent to the beginning of the voyage.

not the purpose of these pages to retell them, but only to draw attention to certain overlooked factors in their interpretation.

The full list of Drake's promoters has never been recovered, but there has long been a certainty or a strong probability that it included the Queen, Leicester, Hatton, and Walsingham. To these may be added Sir William Winter, on the evidence of Hawkins's report of 1578 that Winter had used the Queen's materials for the four pinnaces and one of the ships that Drake took with him.¹ More interesting still is the certainty that John Hawkins himself was an investor, for this tends to connect Drake's undertaking with the schemes of the Grenville, Edgcumbe, and William Hawkins group who, as we have seen, had already moved for a patent for an eastern trade by the Straits of Magellan. John Hawkins's participation is attested by a statement by his widow in 1596, to the effect that his share of the profits was £7,000, but that he had never received it.² The provenance of Drake's flagship, the *Pelican*, has never been cleared up. Early in 1577 there was a *Pelican* at Plymouth, possibly belonging to the Hawkinses.³ In June of that year an estimate was drawn out, almost certainly by John Hawkins, for a voyage to Alexandria to be made by the *Pelican* and the *Swallow*.⁴ It goes into details of loadings, prices, and ports. It is not signed, but the writing looks like that of Hawkins, and one peculiar spelling, 'doughted' (for doubted), is characteristic of him. It certainly seems as though a Levant voyage by these ships was really intended, and its connexion with Drake's project is suggested not only by the *Pelican's* name but by the fact that when he did sail in October it was given out that he was bound for Alexandria.

¹ See above, p. 334.

² *Cal. of Hatfield MSS.*, v. 265.

³ See above, p. 289.

⁴ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 114, No. 44. There had already been more than one *Swallow* in the Hawkins brothers' fleet.

There is nothing conclusive in these facts, but they do serve as straws in the wind pointing to a probability that among Drake's backers were the men who had long been meditating a South-West Passage to Cathay.

We turn now to the incidents of the voyage as narrated by Corbett. First it is to be noted that Drake had a commission, or a paper of instructions of some sort, and that he never showed it to any of his subordinates. Even at the trial of Doughty, a fit occasion for the reading of this document in support of the commander's authority, he did not produce it, but conveniently forgot to bring it from his cabin. The only man who ever saw it was his prisoner Don Francisco Xarate, who could not read English. If this commission either failed to authorize Drake to plunder the Spaniards in the South Sea, or positively forbade him to do so, its concealment is accounted for, since there was a faction among his crews who were inclined to question his authority and would have snatched at the chance of putting themselves in the right in so doing. The Doughty trial and the concurrent speech-making afford further illumination. In chiding the gentlemen-adventurers for grudging manual labour, Drake remarked, 'And as gentlemen are very necessary for government's sake in the voyage, so have I shipped them to that, and to some further intent'. What was the intent? Corbett suggests to train them for further operations against the Spanish colonies, but another interpretation is possible: to train them in dealing with oriental potentates. Again he said: 'We have now set by the ears three mighty princes, as first Her Majesty [and then] the Kings of Spain and Portugal; and if this voyage should not have good success, we should not only be a scorning or a reproachful scoffing stock unto our enemies, but also a great blot to our whole country for ever. And what triumph it would be to Spain and Portugal!' Why Portugal? The first verb is in the perfect tense, but the

reference is to future intentions, for nothing had yet been done to injure Spain; and as for Portugal, they had taken one prize of that nationality at the Cape Verde Islands, a thing so common for the past twenty years that it would hardly by itself have afforded matter for a diplomatic protest. The 'setting by the ears' could only proceed from some weightier cause, such as an intrusion into Spanish *and Portuguese* preserves as yet inviolate.

We pass over the dazzling raid on Chile and Peru and the taking of the *Cacafuego*, things that are almost too well established in the English imagination, for they have implanted the belief that they, and they only, were the purpose of the voyage. After the raid Drake sailed northward as if to look for the Straits of Anian, the North-West Passage of which Frobisher already claimed to have found the eastern mouth. The attempt carried Drake no farther than 48° N. and was then abandoned owing to the severity of the weather. So says the narrative inspired by the Drake family and published in the following century; and critics have found a difficulty in the fact that no such weather has been experienced in more modern times in these latitudes, either by land or by sea. A possible explanation of the discrepancy is as follows. The home authorities of the period were fond of giving their sea-commanders omnibus instructions, whereby two or three difficult and divergent objects were to be economically attained by one expedition. Elizabeth and Burghley spoilt more than one naval campaign by this very fault. It may well be that Drake had orders to look for the Straits of Anian, that he had no great faith in them, and that he wished to reserve his strength for the main objects of the voyage. Therefore his search was perfunctory and soon abandoned on pretext of the bad weather, which one cannot help suspecting of being exaggerated. It must be remembered that he had had an opportunity

of talking to Frobisher and the men of the 1576 Arctic voyage. What he could have learnt from them must have placed the Magellan Strait, with all its miseries, in a more favourable light than the North-West Passage; it was at least free from ice.

But Drake had yet something that he really wanted to do on the Californian coast. He ran southwards until he found a bay a little to the north of the present San Francisco, and there he refitted his ship for the Pacific passage. At this place he stayed for over a month, made friends with the Indians, and annexed the country in the Queen's name. It has been confidently stated that he meant the acquisition to be the foundation of a great colonial dominion, 'of a New England which was to rival New Spain'. It is indeed certain that he attached great importance to it, as may be seen from the original narratives, but it is not so certain that the importance was of the kind above indicated. Can he really have believed in its future as a settlement colony, sustained by a brisk flow of emigration, when it lay at the end of a voyage such as he had already made? It is hard to credit it, when in addition the eastern coastline of America lay open to settlement and was accessible with much less than half the difficulty. But California had a utility of another sort, denied to eastern America. It formed an admirable half-way point upon a route to Asia by way of the Straits of Magellan. A fortified post there would be at once a dockyard, a refuge and an entrepôt, of just the type that Arthur Pett was told to look for on the North-East route, and Frobisher to establish in the North-West. And as a place of refitting and collection of goods for the China trade it was actually used by the American Cape-Horners of the early nineteenth century, when they sailed regularly from Massachusetts to Canton by the south-west route. That would seem to be the true explanation of Drake's enthusiasm for his New Albion. It was indeed to be

a base of empire, but of East Indian, not American, empire.

Thereafter Drake sailed to the Asiatic Archipelago. In the form of his story to which we are accustomed, that seems but as a pendant, a way out when the real work had been done. It is here urged that it was the goal of the voyage, deliberately intended from the outset, and that it was the plundering of Peru that was incidental, a pirate's inspiration viewed with doubt by the more serious minds at home. It is undoubted that when Drake returned a very great importance was attached to his treaty with the Sultan of Ternate in the Spice Islands. It was made the basis of subsequent voyages, and formed the title-deed of the empire the East India Company hoped to establish in the archipelago. Only when the Dutch had ousted us, and we had fallen back on continental India, did Drake's achievement begin to fade from the public mind. What has never faded is his ballast of Spanish silver, with its top-dressing of gold and precious stones. It is time to recollect now, in the name of sober history, that above even these lay samples of all the spices in the Moluccas.¹

Whilst Drake had been absent, Sir Humphrey Gilbert had come forward with a modification of the north-western plan. In this direction, as in the others, the foundation of colonies, or at least of posts, went hand in hand with the exploitation of the Asiatic passage. Gilbert now emphasized the colonial aspect and obtained a vaguely worded patent empowering him to

¹ Since this chapter was written, the author has seen a copy of Mr. Henry R. Wagner's *Sir Francis Drake's Voyage around the World*, San Francisco, 1926, and is glad to find that Mr. Wagner has, after thorough research, reached conclusions about the object of Drake's voyage which support the tentative suggestions put forward above. Not only does Mr. Wagner consider the Spice Islands to have been the goal of the voyage, but he doubts also the supposed opposition between the peace party and the war party in English politics. His book should be carefully weighed by students of the subject.

settle non-Christian lands which, in practice, were to be the coasts of North America. The locality he ultimately favoured was the neighbourhood of Newfoundland, and the passage was undoubtedly a further attraction lying in the background. He gathered a strong squadron in the autumn of 1578, but what he really meant to do with it is a mystery. It was the wrong time of year for discovery or settlement on the American coast, or even for an attack upon the Newfoundland fisheries of the Spaniards or Portuguese. Before he cleared from Plymouth at the end of November dissensions were already breaking up his force. Captain Henry Knolles with three of the ships refused to go with him, and quarrels were distracting the remainder. The season of sailing really suggests that Gilbert was contemplating a southward voyage, although he has never been credited with any such intention. Two other leaders, Captain Sharpham and Mr. Fortescue, were reported at the same time as being ready to sail from Plymouth with five ships victualled for a year.¹ It is possible that they were all bent upon following in Drake's track, but nothing is known of their adventures. Gilbert was back in England in February 1579.

The news of Drake's campaign on the Peruvian coast, with some indications of his haul of wealth, reached England on 3 August 1579, by way of Seville, where English residents obtained the information sent home by the officials in America. The situation was already strained on account of the fleets and armies Philip was collecting for some unavowed purpose, which might be the invasion of England, and by the landing in July of a force of papal volunteers in Ireland. The government thought it well to be prepared, and evidently instructed John Hawkins to make recommendations for the employment of the Navy. He was for an immediate offensive, as appears by a plan dated 12 August 1579. It is

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 126, Nos. 46, 46 (i), 49.

endorsed, 'A provision for the Indies fleet, drawn by Mr. Hawkins. Admiralty.' He proposed to send westwards a squadron composed of four of the Queen's ships of the middle size, five armed merchantmen, and eleven pinnaces, with 1,130 men. They were to look out for the returning plate-fleet, estimated to be laden with two millions sterling, and were then to carry out a thorough raid of the West Indies: 'There is to be stricken with this company all the towns upon the coast of the Indies, and there need not to be suffered one ship, bark, frigate or galley to survive untaken.'¹ Here, as on other occasions, we find Hawkins recommending, years in advance, measures which have been credited to others as original inspirations; for this was the scheme of Drake's operations in 1585-6. Hawkins was denied the opportunity of carrying out his plan. The endorsement of the paper points to its having been drawn up under official auspices, and is one more indication that Burghley was less pacific than he has been represented. For Hawkins, who was at that time moving for his 'first bargain' for the Navy, is unlikely to have lent himself to the purposes of a faction opposed to the policy of his patron.

When Drake returned in September 1580 with his news of the Moluccas and his cargo of treasure and spices, Europe was agitated by the fate of the Portuguese kingdom. The last legitimate king of the old royal line had died earlier in the year, and a pretender of illegitimate descent, Don Antonio, Prior of Crato, had had himself proclaimed in June. Philip II had also a claim, as had Catherine de Medici, both by virtue of intermarriages between the royal houses; and the purpose of the Spanish preparations then became apparent, for Philip lost not a moment in launching his armies to the invasion of Portugal. By October the country was in his hands and Don Antonio a fugitive. Of the Portuguese colonies, only the Azores held out for the preten-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 131, No. 64.

der; all the rest of the wealthy empire was united to the crown of Spain. These events had a profound influence upon English policy in the succeeding years, for English statesmen were quick to see the value of the refugee Antonio. If he could be restored by their assistance he would pay the price by granting trading concessions in Africa, Brazil, and the far East. Even without restoration he might be made a stalking-horse to the expansion England so ardently desired, for he was in a state of war with Philip, and Englishmen might serve as his auxiliaries without technical breach of amity between their country and Spain. It was a situation of which Burghley and his Queen might be trusted to take the utmost advantage. Although this system of war in the guise of peace is impossible now, it has only recently become so. A century ago thousands of Englishmen helped Bolívar to gain the independence of South America without any disturbance of Anglo-Spanish peace in Europe.

The early part of 1581 witnessed the elaboration of English plans for an expedition to the Azores. It was to be led by Drake, but to sail under Don Antonio's flag, and was to secure the islands with English garrisons as a base of future operations.¹ Don Antonio himself came to England, but the scheme broke down owing to the hesitation of Burghley and Elizabeth to commit themselves without first obtaining the alliance of France. They might have consented to naval operations, but the instalment of permanent garrisons was a step from which there could be no turning back without loss of prestige. Catherine de Medici, whose Portuguese claim had been ignored by Philip, felt herself aggrieved. She decided, nevertheless, to play her game alone, and declined to co-operate with England. The Azores voyage of 1581 was therefore abandoned, and in October Don Antonio went over to France.

There he came to terms with Catherine, and in the summer of 1582 he sailed for the Azores with a large

¹ For details see Corbett's *Drake*, i. 346-55.

armament led by Philip Strozzi. The force was mixed, undisciplined, and badly organized, for although it was only a month on the voyage it was suffering from hunger and disease before it arrived at the islands. Hard on its track went a Spanish fleet under the Marquis of Santa Cruz, and he brought Strozzi to action and annihilated his expedition. Strozzi showed no tactical skill. With only a part of his own force in hand he closed with the superior Spanish fleet and was killed with most of his men in a battle of the old medieval type in which the great guns played little part. There is said to have been an English contingent present, and the Spaniards always claimed that it made off at the commencement of the action. It may have done so, disheartened by Strozzi's suicidal proceedings; but in English records no trace can be found of this contingent, and its existence is still in doubt. It can in any case have been no more than a gathering of private adventurers.¹ Next year the Spaniards took Terceira and completed the conquest of the islands. Don Antonio escaped once more to England.

Before the conquest of Portugal by Spain there had been a movement to revive the ancient English trade with Brazil. Hakluyt prints a letter written in June 1578 by an Englishman in that country, desiring some merchants of London to send out cargoes to Bahia, and he gives also an account of a voyage made by a London ship in 1580 in consequence of this request. The Hawkinses had a hereditary interest in this business, and a Spanish report of January 1580 states that John Hawkins was then at Plymouth equipping three ships on pretence of trade with Brazil.² The appeal of Don

¹ The *Foreign Calendar*, 1581-2, No. 529, contains a note by Walsingham of ships to be lent to Catherine—four of the Queen's and a number of merchantmen—but this was at the beginning of 1582 when an alliance with France was still hoped for. It is certain that none of the Queen's ships actually sailed, and there is no evidence that the others did.

² *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 1.

Antonio for English aid produced a plan in 1581 for an expedition to the East Indies to assert the pretender's authority over the Portuguese possessions there, and incidentally to open an English trade. But the Azores business caused the scheme to be dropped for that year. In 1582, however, some really comprehensive plans took shape for the exploitation by England of the trade of the Portuguese empire.

First it is necessary to mention a document whose exact bearing is not clear. It is endorsed, 'Draft of a letters patent for Mr. W. Hawkins', and, like most drafts, it is undated. Its main purport is that William Hawkins is to be empowered to make a voyage to the coasts of Africa and America 'for the better discovery of all trade of merchandises in the said coasts'. But the paper has been worked over and corrected in a different handwriting, and at the end the corrector has added:

'And further we do licence the said W. H. and his company to serve Don Antony, K. of Port., against his enemies, and do hereby allow anything that shall be done in the service of the said K. Don Antony; and such pay, reward, wages, or both, either in money or commodities, as shall be taken in and for the said service, the said Wm H. and deputies may hereby freely and lawfully sell and utter in any place upon the coast of England or anywhere else within our dominions, without anything to be said unto him for the same.'¹

This shows an intention to countenance a plundering warfare against Spain. The date may be 1581 or 1582, or the paper may even relate to a project of 1584, to be mentioned later. The identity of the recipient of the proposed patent is also in doubt, for there were now two William Hawkinses taking a prominent place in sea affairs. One was the Plymouth shipowner and brother of John Hawkins; the other was a younger William Hawkins, son of the elder man and nephew of John. This younger William had been with Drake on the

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 142, No. 44.

voyage of circumnavigation and was eager to repeat the exploit. These confusions reduce the evidential value of the draft patent to that of a mere illustration of the policy favoured in English counsels after 1580.

The first undoubted project of 1582 was the East Indies voyage proposed and abandoned in the previous year. From the outset there was a divergence of opinion about the route, one party favouring the Straits of Magellan, and another the Cape of Good Hope. The latter route was finally determined upon, most likely because the former would almost certainly involve plundering the Spaniards on the Peruvian coast, and it was thought best to simplify the undertaking by limiting it to the inauguration of trade with the Portuguese Indies. Frobisher was at first appointed to the command, but resigned on finding that Captain Edward Fenton was to be attached to him as vice-admiral. Fenton had been one of his officers in his third north-west voyage, and the two had quarrelled. When Frobisher fell out in 1582, Fenton was appointed commander-in-chief of the new expedition. This did not cure the disagreement. The Drake and Hawkins party still held that the Straits of Magellan would be the best route and procured the appointment of young William Hawkins as Fenton's second-in-command, and of young John Drake, also one of the circumnavigators, as captain of the *Francis*, which represented part of Drake's investment in the undertaking. The elder Hawkinses seem to have declined their support; a list of investors omits the name of John and contains that of William crossed through.¹ The final instructions directed Fenton to sail to the East by way of the Cape and not to pass through the Straits of Magellan unless compelled by circumstances; but on his return he was to probe the northern Pacific for the Straits of Anian which Drake had failed to discover.

¹ *Colonial Calendar, East Indies, 1513-1616*, No. 183.

The voyage thus bore with it the seeds of failure from the outset, for it was fairly certain that young Drake and Hawkins would seek to force the Magellan route upon Fenton, who was opposed to it. So convinced of this was Fenton that he tried to shake off his two officers by sailing suddenly without them; but they overtook him at sea, much to the amusement of the company. Fenton then vented his spleen in slights and insults, and finally put Hawkins in irons for disrespect to his authority. The squadron got no farther than the coast of Brazil, where it fought a Spanish force sent out to attack it. The English had the better of the action, but Fenton subsequently abandoned the voyage and reached home in the summer of 1583. Punishment or disgrace for one or other of the parties might have been expected to follow, but the home authorities tacitly admitted that they were themselves to blame for sending out a divided force, and no proceedings followed upon the failure.¹ At one point on the homeward voyage a Spanish prize was captured and 'came to Milford [Haven] under the conduction of William Hawkins', whose father was accordingly required to take an inventory and forward a report. This prize was ultimately adjudged to Hawkins personally, without any mention of Fenton.² The incident is puzzling because, although it undoubtedly refers to William Hawkins the younger, it conflicts with other evidence that shows him to have arrived in the Downs in company with Fenton. One would certainly expect also that the prize would have gone to the subscribers of the joint-stock of the expedition.

Whilst Fenton was at sea the elder Hawkinses promoted an expedition on their own account. It achieved important results, although not perhaps those at first

¹ For fuller details see Corbett's *Drake*, i. 355-60, and the Journal of William Hawkins printed in the Hakluyt Society's *Hawkins Voyages*.

² H. C. A. Exemplifications, 7/22, Nos. 94, 95, 96, Dec. 1583-April 1584.

intended, but its full story is lost, and it has been generally overlooked by historians. On 10 November 1582 Mendoza reported to the King that seven sail had been for some time ready at Plymouth for a distant expedition. He gave their names as the *Primrose* of London, 300 tons, the *Minion*, 180, *Bark Hastings*, 100, two ships of Drake's of 100 tons each, and a pinnace of 80. This, omitting two long-boats also mentioned, makes six, not seven.¹ They were bound, he said, for the island of San Thome and the coast of Brazil, and thence they would go on to the Moluccas. The name of the commander is surprising; it was none other than William Hawkins, brother of John, a man now over sixty years of age, who is not known to have made a tropical voyage before, nor to have had any personal experience of commanding naval expeditions.

The information written by Mendoza is the only evidence that the voyage was destined for the Far East, and it is not, of course, conclusive, for many false rumours were transmitted by Spanish ambassadors. Yet it fits very well with the circumstances. Fenton had already sailed for the Indian Ocean by the Cape route. The Hawkinses preferred the Straits of Magellan and are quite likely to have put their money on a rival expedition which should provide a vindication of their views by beating Fenton in spite of his start. It is also quite natural that Drake should have invested in an undertaking after his own heart, just as he had sent a ship and a kinsman with Fenton to influence that commander's decisions in the same direction.

William Hawkins must have sailed not long after the date of Mendoza's report. With him as vice-admiral went his nephew Richard Hawkins, the only son of John.² Richard was now about twenty-one years of age,

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 294.

² *The Observations of Sir Richard Hawkins*, in Hakluyt Society's *Hawkins Voyages*, p. 212.

and this was his first tropical venture. The first news we have of the incidents of the voyage is contained in a chance remark by the author of the account in Hakluyt of Drake's West Indian voyage of 1585-6. Writing in 1586 or 1587 of the attitude of the inhabitants of Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands, he says:

'The cause of this their unreasonable distrust (as I do take it) was the fresh remembrance of the great wrongs they had done to old Mr. William Hawkins of Plymouth, in the voyage he made four or five years before, when as they did both break their promise, and murdered many of his men, whereof I judge you have understood and therefore it is needless to be repeated.'

Hakluyt therefore had information which he did not print, for he has nowhere any other reference to this voyage. It is one more illustration of what has troubled us before, the editing out of his collection, for political reasons, of incidents that might be offensive to the Portuguese. The disaster suffered by William Hawkins at Santiago may account for the abandonment of his Asiatic objective. The loss of an opportunity of revictualing would entail, apart from casualties to his crews, a severe handicap in such a voyage as that through the Straits of Magellan.

However that may have been, he is next heard of in the West Indies. His nephew says that the squadron was at the western end of Porto Rico 'in anno 1582',¹ which may mean any date up to 24 March 1583. From the same source we learn that, 'in anno 1583, in the island of Margarita, I was at the dredging of pearl oysters, after the manner we dredge oysters in England: and with mine own hands I opened many, and took out the pearls of them, some greater, some less, and in good quantity'.² The pearl fishing may have been lucrative,

¹ Sir R. Hawkins, *ut supra*. Sir Richard, who wrote long after the event, is always very vague in his dates. He gives no account of the voyage, but merely refers to one or two of its incidents for purposes of illustration.

² *Ibid.*, p. 314.

but there was evidently something more accomplished, for on 26 November 1583 Mendoza had some important news to tell. Hawkins and his men, he says, have reached Plymouth, but will not leave their ships until they have a pardon from the Queen. They have captured great booty, and pearls and money have already been brought to the house of John Hawkins in London. Advices from Seville state that the flagship of the homeward-bound fleet from San Domingo is missing, and she may well have contained the pearls, treasure, hides and sugar that Hawkins has brought.¹ Mendoza concludes with a promise to obtain further details, but his correspondence throws no more light upon the affair. At the same time a correspondent of Walsingham wrote from the Netherlands that the Dutch agent in London should be cautioned, for he had been indiscreet enough to write that Hawkins had come home with booty worth 800,000 crowns.²

That is all that can now be gathered about a voyage that made some stir at the time; but it is possible that the Archives of the Indies at Seville contain a full account of it. There is not much doubt that William Hawkins retained his plunder. He is fairly certain to have had a commission from Don Antonio, even if the draft patent described earlier in this chapter was not already completed and in his possession. Negative evidence of his immunity lies in the absence of any reference to his proceedings in the records of the Admiralty Court. One more item is available concerning him. In April 1584 a Spanish letter of intelligence declared that William Hawkins was preparing to leave secretly on a voyage.³ Of what that may have meant we have no evidence whatever.

One result of the patronage of Don Antonio was that

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 362.

² *Foreign Calendar*, 1583-4, No. 277.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 375.

numbers of disreputable adventurers took advantage of his commissions to prey upon shipping in home waters. In former days the English Government had connived at this kind of privateering when practised by the clients of Coligny and William of Orange, but the necessity for so doing had now passed away, and the damage to trade had become unbearable. As early as the close of 1581 these Don Antonio privateers were active, and some of them were operating in the North Sea, where their patron certainly had no interests to be served. Throughout 1582 and the early part of 1583 they became ever more of a nuisance, and then the English Government exerted itself as it had done ten years before. William Borough was sent to sea with a couple of warships and quickly made a large number of arrests along the Channel coast. His prisoners were sent up for trial before the Admiralty Court, and it was ordered that a selection of them should be executed as an example. There is, however, no evidence that this was done, and very probably they were let off. Next year, 1584, as the outrages continued, Sir Francis Drake and Carew Raleigh received a commission from the Lord Admiral to make a like clearance of the seas.¹ These measures show in what light England regarded Antonio. He was to be tolerated where his influence might be useful, that is, on the oceans, but he was not to be permitted any initiative in home waters. The culprits arrested in these years uniformly pleaded that they were in the service of the King of Portugal, but the excuse was not allowed to avail them.

One record of the examination of a prisoner taken by Borough may be more fully described for the light it throws upon the occupations of the humbler type of

¹ For these cases see H. C. A. Exemplifications, 7/21, Nos. 102, 103, 125; 7/22, Nos. 51, 52, 177, 181; Oyer and Terminer, 1/42 and 1/43, *passim* for the years 1583-4. H. C. A. Examinations, No. 25 (16 Oct. 1583) shows that Elizabeth's suitor the Duke of Alençon had likewise assumed the right to issue letters of marque against the Spaniards and Portuguese.

sea-adventurer at this time. The man was William Valentine alias Bauge, a mariner of London. In 1581, he said, he sailed to Algiers in the *Edward Cotton* of Southampton, to take service with the Algerines against the Italians. The ship's captain received a commission from the King of Algiers to fight against the Italians and all other enemies of the Turk, and between Corsica and Majorca they had some fighting with Christian shipping. Having got more blows than booty in this business, Valentine came home and shipped at Plymouth in the *Antonio*, in the service of the King of Portugal. This ship was burnt at Rochelle, and he then sailed for six months with a Frenchman. After that he served for a turn in the Netherland wars, and finally joined the privateer in which he was captured in 1583.¹ This obscure man's story must be typical of hundreds, and it helps us to understand the government's fitful policy towards their class: they must be curbed when too troublesome, but to stamp them out would be to destroy a reserve of fighting-men on whom the country could rely in time of need. For with all their piracy these men had a great deal of patriotic feeling, and they were Protestants one and all.

In the years 1583-6 the ambition of founding colonies in North America at last reached the stage of action. There is no need here to recapitulate the achievements of Sir Humphrey Gilbert and of the Virginian expeditions sent out by Sir Walter Raleigh and advocated by such men as Hakluyt, Christopher Carleill, and Sir George Peckham. They have a very real importance as the foundations of the colonial empire, and as such they have been fully recognized. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the background even of the Virginian colonies there was thought to lie the hope of a Pacific passage to Asia. No one really knew whether some strait might not be found to lead right through the American

¹ H. C. A. Oyer and Terminer, 1/42, 9 Aug. 1583.

continent, or at least some navigable river to connect over a watershed with a similar river opening on the Pacific coast; and the vast extent of North America was not realized. This motive was still pursued in the early days of the permanent Virginian colony under James I, and it accounted also for the exploration by Henry Hudson of the river that bears his name. It was the developed form of the idea latent in Drake's annexation of New Albion, to form an entrepôt on the long passage to the East.

In this connexion it should be noted that Adrian Gilbert, the brother of the dead Sir Humphrey, obtained a patent in February 1585 constituting him and his associates, 'the fellowship for the discovery of the North-West Passage', and granting them a five years' monopoly of attempts in that direction, and that there followed the three voyages of John Davis in the successive years 1585-7. Both Adrian Gilbert and Raleigh were the heirs to the projects of Sir Humphrey, and they were both working in the same ultimate direction, although with a difference of emphasis. Undertakings limited merely to the discovery of the passage were by this time finding it difficult to attract subscribers—that, and not proved failure, caused Davis to cease his efforts—and the colonial school hoped to make the necessary money out of the profits of Virginia.

Meanwhile the Anglo-Spanish war was looming nearer. The Throgmorton Plot of 1583-4 led to the expulsion of Mendoza for complicity, and was followed by an increase of English aid to the Netherlands revolt. Spain, as most men could see, was beginning to realize that she must grasp her nettle, that England must be subdued before any success could be looked for elsewhere. Elizabeth had played for fifteen years a marvellously successful game of keeping herself out of trouble whilst creating trouble for her enemies, but the time had now come when she must prepare to commit herself more deeply. In these circumstances John Hawkins wrote to Burgh-

ley in July 1584 giving a survey of the situation and a plan of action which he thought would meet the case. In reading it we must bear in mind that Hawkins did not necessarily think his plan the best that could be pursued. He had to take account of the persons to whom it was addressed, and to devise something that stood a chance of being adopted. For to outright war, formally declared, he must have known the Queen was not yet ready to resort.

He began by saying that, although personally a man of peace, he believed that war with Spain was inevitable for the defence of church, throne, and country; and accordingly he enclosed a project showing the best means of annoying the King of Spain without charge to Her Majesty, and with great profit to Her Majesty's subjects. An agreement should be made with the King of Portugal (Don Antonio) for Englishmen to fight against Spain under his flag. The Queen should give such Englishmen the right to victual, refit, and sell their booty in some port of the west country, on payment to her of 5 or 10 per cent. of the spoil, and care should be taken to avoid any offence to neutrals. The gentlemen, merchants, and shipowners of England would be ready to enter deeply into the undertaking. The Dutch would also play a great part, and so would the Huguenots of France. Sympathetic revolts would certainly occur in the Portuguese colonies. The Spanish and Portuguese fishery, 'which is their great relief' may be utterly destroyed; this probably refers to the fishing at Cape Blanco on the African coast as well as to that in Newfoundland, and its significance is that from these sources Philip would have to obtain a great part of the victualing of any force for the invasion of England. Not only may the islands be sacked, their forts destroyed, and their ordnance brought away, but the coast of Spain may be kept in continual alarm and all naval preparations checked. Of his own knowledge, says the writer,

he can declare that it costs under normal conditions three times as much to equip a fleet in Spain as it does in England; and the corollary is that under conditions of blockade the thing will be virtually impossible. The voyage offered by Sir Francis Drake may be made part of the same scheme and may be kept secret until all is ready.¹ This, as will appear later, provided for an English entry into the East Indian possessions.

To modern eyes the above is tantamount to a declaration of war upon Spain. Hawkins does not agree, or at least he professes not to. The combination being international, he says, and including French, Scots, and Flemings besides the English, the Queen will be courted by Spain to induce her to withdraw her support from it; and he implies that her diplomacy may be trusted to spin out the game for years to come, as it has done in the past. Whether this reasoning was sincere, or merely a bait to attract the Queen, is not apparent; it may well have been quite feasible having regard to the character of Philip II who, like Elizabeth, had a rooted objection to declaring war. But the essence of the plan is unaffected by this issue, for it is that so long as naval pressure is brought to bear upon the Spanish coast and trade-routes, it will be out of the question for a Spanish fleet to be created strong enough to have any chance against the English Navy. And this, as the future was to show, was the truth of the matter.

This interesting plan was not at once adopted, but some of its parts were applied piecemeal in the succeeding period, and its ideas did supply the policy of the Spanish war, except during 1588-9. We shall find Hawkins presenting a revised version of it in the last-mentioned year.

The project offered by Sir Francis Drake and alluded to by Hawkins took shape in the latter part of 1584, and it is one more indication that Drake considered his

¹ Lansdowne MS., 43, ff. 20-1; 20 July 1584.

visit to the Spice Islands to have been the chief result of the voyage of circumnavigation. The details are set forth in a paper endorsed by Burghley, '20 Nov., 1584. The charge of the navy to the Moluccas'. The Queen is to adventure in shipping some £7,000 and in money £10,000. The other adventurers must provide shipping to the value of £17,000. The fleet will consist of eleven ships, four barks, and twenty pinnaces, worth altogether £20,000. (It follows from the above figures that although the Queen's shipping is to be rated at £7,000, it is actually counted as worth no more than £3,000.) The total tonnage is not stated, but the men are to number 1,600, a thousand being mariners, a hundred gunners, and five hundred soldiers. The total expense of setting forth the expedition will be, by estimation, £40,000. Of this the Queen is already set down for £17,000, and the greater part of the remainder is promised by six adventurers as follows: the Earl of Leicester £3,000, John Hawkins £2,500, Sir Francis Drake £7,000, William Hawkins £1,000, Sir Walter Raleigh £400, and Sir Christopher Hatton £1,000. The money already laid out at the date of the memorandum amounts to over £6,000.¹ An omission in the estimates is significant: the £40,000 is for ships, wages, stores and munitions, and there is no allowance for merchandise. It follows, therefore, that the primary object was not trade but the conquest of the Portuguese Indies, the foundation at a stroke of an English empire in the East. It was a plan worthy of the master minds of the time working in collaboration, but, alas, like so many of their plans, it was destined to be perverted to something not so good. Elizabeth's very real title to greatness rests upon the record of the first half of her reign; that of the last twenty years is a tale of unworthy fears and things half done. And Burghley, if he is to share the credit of the one period, must share the blame of the other.

¹ *Ibid.*, 41, ff. 9-10.

The great East Indian expedition never sailed, and Drake was destined to crown his career in other ways than this. It may be noted, however, that a private adventurer, Thomas Cavendish, was allowed to keep alive the Asiatic connexion. In 1586-8 he made a voyage of circumnavigation very similar in its outlines to that of Drake. He found the Spaniards on the west coast of South America better armed than in Drake's time, and had to fight hard for the plunder he took from them. He reached home successfully just as the Armada had passed up the Channel.

It is hard to make out clearly the date of the abandonment of Drake's East Indies plan, for from the outset the intention had been kept secret, and the public and the Spaniards had been allowed to believe that the West Indies were his objective. This ended by becoming the truth instead of a subterfuge, but it was put into effect only after the lapse of several months. In the spring of 1585 the Queen held up the preparations whilst she negotiated in hope of a general settlement. Then, in May, Philip arrested a number of English corn-ships which he had attracted to his ports to supply a scarcity of foodstuffs in Spain. This is generally held to mark the beginning of the war, although no formal declaration was made by either side. Drake's expedition now became one of retaliation against Spain, and of attack, on the lines laid down by Hawkins, upon the Spanish financial and naval resources ; and the East Indian objectives were postponed. Drake sailed in September and first made a raid upon Vigo and its neighbourhood in retaliation for the embargo. Then he touched at the Canaries, but did no damage, plundered the fishermen at Cape Blanco, and went on to the Cape Verde Islands. There he destroyed Santiago and Porto Praya, and rapidly pushed on across the ocean to the West Indies. His intended points of attack were San Domingo, Cartagena, and Panama. He took and plundered the first

two, but was forced by the mortality among his men to abandon the idea of attempting the third. He had for the same reason to abandon a plan of leaving a permanent garrison to hold Cartagena. He quitted the Caribbean by the Florida Channel, destroyed the Spanish post at St. Augustine in Florida, and brought away the English settlers from Raleigh's Virginia colony, they having grown desperate of making a success of their undertaking. He returned to England in the late summer of 1586. Financially, the expedition had paid in plunder only three-fourths of its expenses, but considered as an operation of war it had been a triumphant success. Drake had stripped the Indies of shipping and means of defence, and had carried off amongst other booty no less than 240 guns. Spanish commerce was paralysed for some time to come, Philip's credit in Europe was shaken, and his colonies were crying out for money instead of sending it to his aid. The soundness of Hawkins's idea that an oceanic offensive would prevent an invasion of England at very little expense to the Queen was demonstrated. That idea may not have been exclusive to Hawkins; it seems to have been part of the strategic thought of the time. But he is the first who can be shown to have expressed it, and it was certainly not the peculiar invention of Drake.

An integral part of the Hawkins plan was a second squadron to patrol the coast of Spain and to watch, between it and the Azores, for homecoming East Indian carracks and West Indian treasure-ships. He was himself allowed to lead this force, and he put to sea with it in August 1586. His sphere of action was more limited than Drake's, and his opportunities of great achievement were curtailed by the timorous instructions that hampered him. Nevertheless, as his proceedings have hitherto received very little notice, they may be described as fully as the surviving evidence will permit. It must be emphasized that the space allotted to the inci-

dents dealt with in this chapter is not proportionate to their importance; the better known have been purposefully summarized and the less known more fully treated with the object of correcting the total impression left upon the mind of the student by the general record of the time.

Hawkins's fleet consisted of five ships of the Queen's, the *Nonpareil* 500 tons, the *Golden Lion* 500, the *Hope* 600, the *Revenge* 500, and the *Tremontana* 150, with pinnaces and armed merchantmen making up the total to about eighteen sail.¹ The original purpose was to complete the work of Drake, but the government allowed itself to be frightened by rumours and diverted the force to other uses. On 30 August the Council directed Hawkins 'to ply up and down' in the Channel and guard the coast against a landing thought to be meditated by the Guise party from Normandy.² No doubt some kind of raid might have been possible, but the distracted state of France precluded any thought of a serious move against England. This false alarm wasted three weeks, and it was not until the latter part of September that Hawkins was down in his proper place on the Spanish coast; meanwhile the great carracks from the East Indies had slipped into port in the nick of time, and a wealth of booty had been missed.³

For what followed we have to rely upon Spanish news transmitted from France, and the watchfulness of the English authorities rendered it very scanty. As Mendoza wrote, it was almost impossible to get information from English ports, for even the neutrals frequenting them thought it wise to keep their mouths shut. As for the possibility of sending spies to reconnoitre, it was out

¹ Oppenheim, *Monson's Naval Tracts*, i. 134-5, on authority of the Declared Accounts.

² *Acts of the Privy Council*, 1586-7, p. 212.

³ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 510. Mendoza, who was now in Paris, reported that the French alarm had been the reason of the cruise; but it was undoubtedly an afterthought.

of the question, for the arrival of a fly, much more of a man not belonging to the neighbourhood, was instantly noticed, and the individual seized and questioned. All travellers had to carry permits from the justices of their last place of residence, and even in London the hosts reported strange lodgers without delay.¹ However, it did ultimately leak out that Hawkins sailed along the west coasts of Spain and Portugal, and then stretched over towards the Azores, but that a storm prevented him from reaching those islands. More probably his return was due to information that the plate-fleet was already missed, as the carracks had certainly been. He picked up one unit of the *flota*, but she was one that had no treasure on board, and he captured also four ships from Brazil. He was back in England before the end of October.²

A statement by one of his prisoners is of interest. This man was the master of a ship taken by the *Nonpareil* on 30 September, thirty leagues from the mouth of the Tagus. He was brought before Hawkins, who questioned him, behaved kindly, and allowed him to keep his personal effects. Hawkins showed him over the flagship, which carried 44 bronze guns and 300 men. There were three other great galleons in the fleet, all being excellently found, the hulls clean and the sails new. Besides the ordinary sea-victuals the companies were supplied with apples and pears, and there were live sheep and pigs on board. Another deponent told much the same story of the *Golden Lion*, where William Borough was captain and vice-admiral of the whole squadron. Both witnesses had nothing but praise for their treatment, and this occurs in depositions made in Spain after their release.³ There is little doubt that the fruits and fresh meat were provided by Hawkins at his own expense,

¹ *Spanish Calendar*, 1580-6, No. 503.

² *Ibid.*, Nos. 499, 505, 510, 516, 525.

³ *Ibid.* No. 491.

for they would not have been issued at the Queen's. They represent his contribution to the problem of preserving health at sea. He seems to have got on very well with William Borough, who was thenceforward a firm supporter of his naval policy.

It is customary to judge all these adventures by the amount of booty brought in and whether its value exceeded the costs of the expedition. By that test Hawkins's voyage was a failure, as were all those of Nelson and almost every admiral before and since his day. But considered as a measure of war, the cruise may have done useful work, although we have no data by which to assess it. Even by the Queen's standards there was no blame attaching to Hawkins, for his instructions had kept him in the Channel whilst the rich trade was entering the Spanish ports. Hakluyt prints no account of the voyage, and most likely Hawkins prevented him from doing so; it was never his way to grumble at the folly of his superiors.

Next year, 1587, his policy was brilliantly continued by Drake, who sailed in good time, wrecked all the Spanish hopes of an invasion that season, and brought in a rich East Indiaman from the Azores. For his success at Cadiz, Drake incurred a stiff reprimand from the Queen, who still clung to negotiation as a defence against invasion and feared to offend Philip too deeply for forgiveness. With that the Spanish ports were left alone, and the Armada of 1588 at last got itself ready in perfect peace.

THE ARMADA YEAR

FOR John Hawkins, as for all good Englishmen, the year 1588 was anxious and critical. In common with the rest he watched with relief the disintegration of the threat against his country, a threat, however, which he seems to have been more confident of countering than were some others. As a maker of fleets he knew that Spain, lacking dockyards, stores, craftsmen, and public-spirited administrators, could never turn out a force materially equal to the English Navy; and to him as to others the patriotism and devotion of the Armada's men, atoning for the faults of their government and making their defeat less signal than he had hoped for, must have come as an unexpected reminder that the moral as well as the material has a place in warlike calculations. Mingled with the public triumph there was for Hawkins the sweetness of personal vindication. Right up to the opening of the year his enemies had not ceased to declare his work dishonest and rotten—and now they had their answer in terms that rang through the world. He had long been weary of his task, but he had seen it through without an instant's looking back. After the proof he considered himself absolved of a hated duty, entitled to his *nunc dimittis*, and his requests to be relieved became frequent and heartfelt. And just as he had never borne malice in the past, so now he refrained from exultation. The public service left no room in his mind for private animosity.

It is this single-minded devotion that makes his career so difficult to follow and has caused it to be so unjustly depreciated, for there is lacking the testimony of what to most public men is the leading witness on their behalf, the man himself. The Tudor age, brilliant and discriminating as it had been, had not as yet been a generous

one. It had been too much a competition of pushing individuals bent upon their own magnification. There was still to be much more of that to mar it, as is shown in the careers of Raleigh, Essex, Bacon, and Robert Cecil. Yet the dawn of a better tradition did cast a gleam upon the last years of John Hawkins, and Lord Howard's generous appreciation of his merits is as honourable to the great Lord Admiral as his good sense in the conduct of the campaign. One may look in vain in the record of previous wars for a commander-in-chief so modest and so eager to do justice to his subordinates.

At the beginning of 1588 all offensive operations were at a standstill, and the Queen was sending over commissioners to negotiate with Parma. Drake was at Plymouth with the nucleus of a western squadron. It was a post which Hawkins had filled in past years and for which he had volunteered on this occasion; but Drake had fairly earned it by his campaign of 1587. The Lord Admiral was with the main fleet in the Thames estuary, and Hawkins was attached to him. A small guard was afloat in the Narrow Seas under Sir Henry Palmer. All the ships except Palmer's had their companies reduced to half strength. Howard protested against the dismissal of the men; but economy of money and victuals demanded it if the negotiation policy was to be adopted. Winter and Borough besides Hawkins were with him, and they occupied the interval in grounding the ships and putting them in final trim for the fighting which they were all convinced would come. In writing his doubts to Walsingham, Howard made it plain that nothing but the reduction of the men gave him anxiety. For the rest he doubted not 'but the ships shall prove some persons notable liars, and if cause fall out, do a better day of service for England than ever ships did for it yet'.¹ The mendacious persons referred to are cer-

¹ Howard to Walsingham, 28 Jan. This paper, like all the others quoted in this chapter, is printed in full in Sir J. K. Laughton's *State*

tainly not Hawkins's fellow-officers of the Navy Board, for he and they and Howard were now on excellent terms. The Admiral had in mind the latest attacks by Thomas Allen and the anonymous follower of the Earl of Leicester, whose effusions have been noted in a previous chapter.

Hawkins, in common with Drake, still thought that the invasion could be frustrated at its starting-point by offensive operations; and when we read of the doubts and difficulties besetting the Spanish administration it seems probable that a raid in force upon the Spanish coast would have had as great an effect as in the previous year. On 1 February Hawkins explained his views in a letter to Walsingham. The right way to peace, he said, is not by hesitation and negotiation; the time for that is past; 'if we stand at this point in a mammering and at a stay, we consume, and our commonwealth doth utterly decay'. Our trade is dead or uncertain, our merchantmen idle, and the poor have no means of livelihood; and the French and Scots are taking the freights that should be ours. 'We have to choose either a dishonourable and uncertain peace, or to put on virtuous and valiant minds, to make a way through with such a settled war as may bring forth and command a quiet peace'—quite in the vein, it may be noted, of British opinion expressed in hundreds of similar pronouncements in 1914-18. The present negotiations, he continues, are doing us harm, for the enemy is increasing his forces whilst we wait. Six good ships of the Queen's, and six smaller ones, should therefore be on the coast of Spain or between it and the Islands (Azores). They can keep the station for four months and may then be relieved by a similar squadron. 'Some will say, the King will always make a fleet to beat us from the coast. There is no doubt but

Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 2 vols., Navy Records Society, 2nd ed., 1895. The present writer acknowledges with gratitude his obligations to this work of very arduous research.

with an infinite charge, he may make an army.' (The antithesis is significant, and can hardly be unconscious.) An 'army' such as he can provide will hardly drive us off, for it cannot keep the sea for any length of time. Meanwhile, our main strength at home will be unbroken and sufficient for defence. 'And therefore I conclude that with God's blessing and a lawful open war, the Lord shall bring us a most honourable and quiet peace, to the glory of his church and to the honour of Her Majesty and this realm of England; which God for his mercy's sake grant.'¹

Hawkins, it will be seen once more, had something more than a service mind. He viewed the situation through the eyes of a statesman, giving due weight to domestic and economic in addition to purely naval factors. His pleading, like that of Drake, had no effect, and England continued to stand on the defensive. William Hawkins, meanwhile, was hard at work at Plymouth, of which town he was mayor this year for the third time, doing the local work of the Navy Board for Drake. He was grounding and tallowing the ships, he wrote, and found them as staunch as if carved from solid timber, and he was keeping the shipwrights going night and day by the flames of cressets and torches.²

A more disinterested testimonial to the state of the navy came from the pen of the Lord Admiral. He wrote on 21 February to Burghley:

'I have been aboard of every ship that goeth out with me, and in every place where any may creep, and I do thank God that

¹ Laughton, i. 58-62: Corbett's comment upon this (*Drake*, ii. 136) is hardly just to Hawkins. In his eagerness to prove that Drake was the begetter of some new strategical discovery, Corbett accuses Hawkins of believing it was possible to win the war by preying on commerce without first gaining the command of the sea—the direct contrary of what Hawkins proposed. It seems in truth that Drake and Hawkins preached very much the same doctrine in different words, and that it was, moreover, the accepted doctrine among thinking seamen, and no particular man's invention.

² *Ibid.*, 73-4, 17 Feb.

they be in the estate they be in; and there is never a one of them that knows what a leak means. I have known when an Admiral of England hath gone out, and two ships in the fleet could not say so. . . . And therefore I do presume greatly that those that have been made in Her Majesty's time be very good and serviceable, and shall prove them arrant liars that have reported the contrary.' ¹

Winter, old jealousies forgotten in the day of service, added his word:

'Our ships doth show themselves like gallants here. I assure you it will do a man's heart good to behold them; and would to God the Prince of Parma were upon the seas with all his forces, and we in the view of them.' ²

It is no more than Hawkins's due to give as much prominence to the opinions of the men who were to venture their lives in his ships as to the calumnies of those who had thwarted his efforts in time of peace. Two more testimonies may therefore be added, both from Howard. On 29 February he wrote to Burghley:

'I protest before God, and as my soul shall answer for it, that I think there were never in any place of the world worthier ships than these are, for so many. And as few as we are, if the King of Spain's forces be not hundreds, we will make good sport with them.' ³

Again, on 9 March, he reported a test of experience:

'The *Elizabeth Bonaventure*, in coming in, by the fault of the pilot came aground on a sand. . . . The next tide, by the goodness of God and great labour, we brought her off, and in all this time there never came a spoonful of water into her well. My lord, except a ship had been made of iron, it were to be thought impossible to do as she hath done. . . . And this is one of the ships which they would have come into a dry dock, now before she

¹ *Ibid.*, i. 79-80.

² *Ibid.*, 81-2. Laughton prints (ii. 266-8) a report from Winter in the old carping tone, dated 11 Oct. But a careful weighing of its terms shows that it was written in 1585, not 1588. The arrangement of the Domestic State Papers is often untrustworthy, and their endorsements are not always infallible.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 85.

came out.¹ My lord, I have no doubt but some ships which have been ill reported of will deceive them as this ship doth. . . . Well, my lord, they will be found good ships when they come to the seas.²

Howard's repeated statements on this topic imply that the campaign against Hawkins was still going on, a circumstance that appears more plainly from a letter written by Hawkins himself. And we may attribute Howard's attitude not only to his desire to see justice done, but also to his indignation against those who for their private ends were trying to create distrust and dependency in time of peril. Hawkins wrote to Burghley on 3 March:

'My bounden duty humbly remembered unto your good lordship,
I have been very ill since I was with your lordship, but am now better, I thank God.

I do daily hear good report of the good estate of the ships abroad, as it may appear to your lordship by the letters I send herewith enclosed; so do I hear many of good judgment that have served now in them report, wondering how these lewd bruits could have been cast abroad, and the ships in that efficient and strong estate. But not to be troublesome to your lordship, when the shipwrights saw I took a course to put the navy in such order as there should be no great cause to use any extraordinary reparations upon them, then they saw the multitude of their idle followers should lack their maintenance, and so began to bruit out weakness in the state of the ships; but they knew not where; and then every man tare up that which was sufficient, and said this, we will weary Hawkins of his bargain. And as this shall be a thing most manifest to your lordship and the whole world, that the navy is in good and strong estate, contrary to their hypocritical practice and vile reports, so your lordship shall find the rest of their informations much like unto this.

I would to God Her Majesty were so well provided of all furniture that belongeth to the ships, which indeed is the least matter I fear. But the provisions that come from foreign countries, and such as require long time to provide, do most trouble me—as

¹ *Vide* report of Pett and Baker, 12 Oct. 1587, given above, chap. iii, p. 375.

² Laughton, i. 96-7.

great cables, anchors, cordage, canvas, great masts, and such like; waste and spoil of boats and pinnaces by this winter weather, as Sir William Winter doth well note.

I am now about to gather together the great issuing that hath been this year of *anno* 1587 of cordage, canvas, and other provisions out of Her Majesty's store, which I think will be 12,000 or 13,000 pound, which must be cared for and supplied in time, without the which the ships cannot serve. There hath been great service abroad these two years past, and the ships mightily supplied from time to time with many provisions, and now call daily in such sort as I am both afraid and sorry to present it to your lordship. Howbeit, it must be done, and care had to do it in time. The expenses extraordinary have been great, and such as before this time have seldom come in use; for the navy is great, and men more unruly and more chargeable than in time past, so as it doth not only amaze me to answer everything, but I do grieve at the charge as much as it were to proceed from myself.

I have been careful to replenish the store, for I found it not worth £5,000; and now I think with [i. e. after] this year's issuing it is worth 16,000 pound. So likewise the ships I found in weak estate, and now they are as your lordship doth see; and this is done in effect upon the sparing out of the ordinary warrant of £5,719, yet I am daily backbited and slandered. But your lordship doth know what a place this is to hold that I am in. Many are to receive out of this office, and among a multitude there are some bad and unreasonable; and although I endeavour myself to pay and satisfy all men with order and equity, yet some be displeased.

The matters in the office are great and infinite. My men are sick and dispersed. The trust I am forced to commit abroad and at home is very much; and with great difficulty I keep things in that order as I can give reason for the things that are paid; and many losses I receive by negligence of servants, by such as I put in trust, and by prests [payments in advance] which be without number.

Therefore, my good lord, consider in your wisdom the burden I bear. My service to Her Majesty I grudge not, but all my ability and life is ready to be employed in her service. When it shall be your lordship's pleasure, I will give mine attendance to inform your lordship substantially what is to be done touching

the provisions that are to be provided for the navy, and the debt that the office doth and will daily grow into. And so, wishing your lordship health and prosperity, I humbly take my leave. From London, the 3rd of March, 1587,

Your lordship's humbly to command,

John Hawkyns.¹

The letter, like most of Hawkins's, is worth reading twice, for its information and its style, in which concentration and lucidity are combined; as a writer he is superior to most of the men of action of his time, and one may imagine what a classic his autobiography might have become if only he had been moved to write it. But had he done so he would not have been the man he was. His son Sir Richard was different, brave but self-pitying and diffuse; and even so his autobiographical fragment is one of the best illustrations of the maritime history of the period.

The victualling of the fleet was not in Hawkins's department, but it was now a subject of concern to all responsible persons. As has been explained, it would have been very expensive to keep up a stock sufficient for the needs of the whole Navy on a service of months' duration; and at the same time, it was not possible to raise such a stock at short notice. That was the dilemma that confronted the government. The Queen, possibly with the approval of Burghley, chose to incur the risks of parsimony; for the peace negotiations, which in one sense do her honour, were leading her judgement astray. She knew of a certainty that Philip, like herself, was a man of peace, and her imagination could not compass the fact that he had now no choice but to fight. That had long been true, although he had been the last Spaniard to admit it; and having done so, his resolution was fixed. Surely there is no war in our history which the responsible persons on both sides have gone such lengths to avoid. Both were the victims of necessity, of a chain

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 209, No. 5. In full in Laughton, i. 87-90.



AN ENGLISH SHIP OF WAR OF THE ARMADA CAMPAIGN

From an engraving by J. Remius

of inevitable circumstances which had grown unbreakable. The victualling was therefore deficient, and when the campaign began, irremediable. Allied to it was the question of manning, and here it was Hawkins's reform of 1585 that just provided salvation. For, had the ships been manned on the previous scale of three men to five tons, they could barely have kept the sea until the Battle of Gravelines. As it was, with the new scale of one man to two tons, they outlasted that victory and no more.¹

Ordnance and munitions were likewise not part of the Navy Treasurer's business, except that the payments for them went through his accounts. Their provision rested with the Ordnance Office at the Tower. As is well known, the supply of powder and shot to the fleet proved insufficient, but the department cannot justly be blamed. It seems to have provided more liberally than on any previous occasion, but the expenditure was altogether unprecedented. No doubt the commanders knew that it would be, and told the government so; but here, even more than with the victualling, it was impossible to obtain supplies at short or even moderately long notice. Ingredients for gunpowder had to be imported, they took long to accumulate, and the manufacture could be conducted only on a petty scale. Preparations should have been made far in advance of the necessity, and for that the responsibility rested rather with the Queen and her ministers than with the subordinate officials. The absolute shortage of powder, moreover, was not so great as has often been declared, for the deficiency in the closing stages of the campaign was partly due to reckless use at the outset. This leads to a question which it may be well to discuss at some length.

Contrasts have often been drawn between the Eng-

¹ The lists of ships and men that actually served, printed by Laughton, ii. 324-31, show that the crews of the Queen's ships were, if anything, slightly below the one to two scale, whilst those of the armed merchantmen were much below it.

lish fleet and the Armada, and it has been pointed out that the units of the former were more weatherly and more heavily armed, even if smaller and less suitable for hand-to-hand fighting. But the question of training has seldom received attention. Yet it had a good deal to do with the disappointment felt by the English commanders at their failure to annihilate the enemy. Gravelines was a decisive victory, it is true, but it was not in the same class with Trafalgar; and there is a great deal more truth than some historians have admitted in the ascription of the ultimate result to the winds of God. On the matter of training it may be said that the Armada was a fine armament of a type seventy years out of date, one such as Henry VIII might have been very proud of at the opening of his reign. It was an army by sea rather than a fleet, and it had the virtues of a good army even if it lacked those of a navy. Its officers followed a definite plan of action, supported their admiral and each other, and were able to preserve order and cohesion during all the vicissitudes of the nine days from their first view of Plymouth to their anchoring off Calais. They owed this good discipline to their experience of war, to the organization of the Armada in squadrons composed of ships of similar type, and to the practice of a sailing order intelligently thought out. The men also were most of them trained soldiers, although they were allowed little opportunity of fighting in the manner they expected. But they did show the prime virtue of their training, that they died under their colours rather than yield. Had this army by sea come up the Channel at the beginning of the century it might well have driven all before it.

The English officers also were great fighting men, but of a type as different as their origin. They had better ships and better guns and, as individuals, greater skill in handling them. But they had sprung from the pirates, privateers, explorers, and armed traders of the past thirty

years. That period had witnessed no great English fleet in action and no English army more than three or four thousand strong engaged in a long campaign. None of the commanders had any great experience of handling large numbers of ships or men. They followed the Armada at first in one great mob, and made little impression upon it, whilst all the time it was moving to its objective; it was only as they went along that they evolved a squadronal organization under four flag-officers, which allowed a more efficient employment of the whole force. The men likewise had no training other than that incidental to their profession as mariners. There were good gunners among them and bad, on the whole better than those of the Spaniards, with whom artillery was not the arm expected to yield the victory; but there is no sign of any serious attention to the fact that the great gun, the primary English weapon, needed systematic instruction and practice for its proper use. Drake, it is true, fired a few rounds of practice ammunition, burst a gun, and killed a man, for which he was mildly reprimanded by the Lord Admiral, but whether on humanitarian or economic grounds is not apparent. During the running fight in the Channel the English gunners wasted at long range as much powder as would have enabled them to administer the *coup de grâce* when the Armada fled up the North Sea a week later. In short, the English fleet of 1588 was a perfect instrument, but its owners had scarcely begun to think of how tactically to use it; whilst the Spanish Armada was hopelessly obsolete, and yet made the good showing, which with its handicap it did make, thanks to the training and discipline of its officers and men in the only kind of warfare they knew. Honour should be rendered where honour is due, and the contempt for the Spaniards so freely implied in the old histories was just neither to the men who died nor to those who overcame them.

As the summer of 1588 drew on and it was seen that

the Armada was really intended to sail in spite of the negotiations, the government at length came round to the views of its sea commanders. In mid-April, Howard was ordered to sail westward to join and incorporate Drake's command at Plymouth. Hawkins was still detained in London by his administrative work, and Howard did not actually reach Plymouth until the latter part of May. He had left Lord Henry Seymour with a squadron to watch the Flemish coast and keep Parma within his ports. Hawkins was at Plymouth early in June, and Howard was soon urging upon the government the unanimous opinion of his senior officers, that it was the proper course to seek battle with the Armada before it left its own coast. On 14 June he wrote to Walsingham: 'The opinion of Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Frobisher, and others that be men of greatest judgement and experience, as also my own concurring with them in the same, is that the surest way to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast, or in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them.'¹ Again next day he urged the same course, attributing it to the united advice of Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Thomas Fenner, 'and I hope', he added, 'Her Majesty will not think that we went rashly to work, or without a principal and choice care and respect of the safety of this realm'.² The whole campaign was in fact conducted on the English side by the time-honoured authority of the commander-in-chief in consultation with his council of war, and not according to the innovation made by Drake in the previous year, whereby the commander kept all decisions in his own hands. A council composed of all the captains would, however, have been too large for discretion, and on 19 June Howard wrote that he had constituted an inner or privy council sworn to secrecy. It consisted of Drake, Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Sheffield, Sir Roger Williams (as the senior soldier

¹ Laughton, i. 200.² *Ibid.*, 202-3.

present in the fleet), Hawkins, Frobisher, and Fenner.¹ At this time Drake ranked as vice-admiral and second-in-command, and Hawkins as rear-admiral and third. It will be noted that although deference was paid to the army and to social prestige, the purely naval element was in the majority.

Ultimately the sailors had their way, and permission was given for a cruise to the coast of Spain. It was delayed by adverse winds, which not only prevented Howard from sailing southwards but held up his victuallers on their way down Channel with supplies. The same weather scattered the Armada after its exit from Lisbon, and drove it back to reassemble at Corunna. At the last moment Howard and his fleet did almost reach the Spanish coast, only to be blown back with empty beef-casks; and the wind which sent them into Plymouth brought up the Armada at an unexpectedly short interval upon their heels. It was on 12 July that the English returned to Plymouth, and on the 19th the Armada's approach was reported, at a time when Howard and his council were discussing a plan for blockading it in Corunna whilst sending a detached squadron to cruise for the Indies fleets.² At the last moment Philip's great armament had by fortune of weather regained the initiative, which it was to hold until the night of its anchoring off Calais. That it did not make more of its opportunity was due to Medina Sidonia's adherence to a faulty plan dictated by his royal master.

During this last week at Plymouth, Howard wrote once more to Walsingham on the state of the ships, which had now received a rough trial at sea: 'Sir, I have heard that there is in London some hard speeches against Mr. Hawkins because the *Hope* came in to mend a leak which she had. Sir, I think there were never so many of the prince's

¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

² The full story of these events is given in Corbett's *Drake*, ii, ch. v, vi.

ships so long abroad, and in such seas, with such weather as these have had, with so few leaks; and the greatest fault of the *Hope* came with ill grounding before our coming hither; and yet it is nothing to be spoken of. It was such a leak that I durst have gone with it to Venice. But may they not be greatly ashamed that sundry times have so disabled [decried] Her Majesty's ships, which are the only ships of the world?' If such persons seek defects to cavil at, he concludes, they may find them in plenty among the hired merchantmen, which are ever the first to shorten sail when the Queen's ships make light of the weather.¹

On the same day, 17 July, Hawkins rendered Burghley his last report on the eve of action:

'My bounden duty remembered unto your good lordship,

By the letter and estimate enclosed, your lordship may see how charges doth grow here daily. My Lord Admiral doth endeavour by all means to shorten it, and yet to keep the navy in strength.

In this demand is the ships serving under the Lord Henry Seymour included: and I do write to Mr. Hussey to stay so much money as may clear them.

The four great ships—the *Triumph*, the *Elizabeth Jonas*, the *Bear*, and the *Victory*—are in most royal and perfect state; and it is not seen by them, neither do they feel, that they have been at sea, more than if they had ridden at Chatham. Yet there be some in them that have no good will to see the coast of Spain with them, but cast many doubts how they will do in that seas. But, my good lord, I see no more danger in them, I thank God, than in others. The *Bear* one day had a leak, upon which there grew much ado; and when it was determined that she should be lighted of her ordnance, her ballast taken out, and so grounded and searched, and that my Lord Admiral would not consent to send her home, the leak was presently stopped of itself; and so the ship proceedeth with her fellows, in good and royal estate, God be thanked. I was bold to trouble your lordship with these few words touching these four ships, because I know there will be reports as men are affected; but this is the truth.

The strength of the ships generally is well tried; for they [the

¹ Laughton, i. 273-4.

captains] stick not to ground often to tallow, to wash, or any such small cause, which is a most sure trial of the goodness of the ships when they are able to abide the ground. My Lord Admiral doth not ground with his ship, but showeth a good example, and doth shun charges as much as his lordship may possible. And so I leave to trouble your good lordship. From Plymouth, the 17th of July, 1588.

Your honourable lordship's humbly to command,
John Hawkins.¹

Hawkins, who could cast his mind back twenty years to the *Jesus of Lubeck* to know what fighting in rotten ships really meant, wrote with a quiet scorn unusual with him of the panics of his noble but fresh-water comrades. The *Elizabeth Jonas* was commanded by Sir Robert Southwell, Howard's son-in-law, the *Bear* by Lord Sheffield, and the *Victory* by Hawkins himself. Frobisher had the *Triumph* and was surely not one of the timorous, but he probably grumbled with them, for it was his habit so to do. But the whole incident shows the serious effects which might have flowed from the disloyal machinations that sought to make Hawkins their victim.

The incidents of the running fight up Channel from Plymouth to the night of the fireships at Calais have been fully narrated by Sir Julian Corbett and other authors of well-known books. The historical material for the story leaves much to be desired; it is neither ample nor clear, and many important matters remain in doubt. But it must be admitted that the best has already been made of it, and any new interpretation would be mainly a compilation of guess-work. Hawkins wrote no more letters until two days after the Battle of Gravelines. We have, however, one or two passing glimpses of him in the writings of others. On Sunday, 21 July, he and Drake and Frobisher were hotly engaged with a Portuguese galleon and with other enemy ships that came to her

¹ *Ibid.*, i. 274-5.

relief. In the course of this *mêlée* the ship of Don Pedro de Valdes lost her foremast and fell behind the Armada, whilst a Biscayan of 800 tons was wrecked but not sunk by the explosion of her magazine. Next day the Armada abandoned both these ships; Drake took de Valdes and his men, and the crew of the other escaped, although they left behind them fifty burnt and mangled wretches still alive. Hawkins and Lord Thomas Howard went on board and reported this pitiful business; 'the stink in the ship was so unsavoury, and the sight within board so ugly', that they were glad to withdraw, and she was taken into Weymouth for salvage. In the cannonades off Portland and the Isle of Wight the *Victory* is mentioned as doing her share with honour.

Ammunition was already becoming scanty, and the Armada was still intact; and there had been little possibility of controlling the actions of the crowd of English ships when once the battle had been joined. On Wednesday the 24th Howard accordingly divided his fleet into four squadrons, under himself, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, an arrangement imitated in principle from the Spaniards. After he had seen the Armada past the Isle of Wight he knew it had no other halting-place until it should reach the Straits of Dover, and thither he followed it without further attack. During this part of the chase the English received new men and supplies of powder and shot from the captains of the forts and the justices of the towns along the coast.

On Friday, 26 July, Howard summoned Hawkins and Frobisher and four others on board the flagship, and there knighted them, as by virtue of his commander's rank he was empowered to do. So, at the age of fifty-six, John Hawkins received the highest reward for merit, as the Queen herself once described it, that England could bestow upon her sons. Peerages were a recognition of wealth and political power; knighthood of the sort here conferred was a title solely of honour, recog-



THE BATTLE OF GRAVELINES

From an engraving by Vischer

nized as quite different from the knighthoods automatically bestowed upon London aldermen when they served as Lord Mayor. It has often been said that the Queen disliked Hawkins, and much has been made of the fact that he received the accolade from Howard. He would probably have preferred it so; no circumstances could have been more fitting to his past career than to kneel on the flagship's deck in presence of the enemy and of the men who had seen what service he had done his country. As for the Queen's hostility, the present writer has discovered no real evidence of it. In earlier life she liked and respected Hawkins. In later years there are one or two passages in his letters which imply that he was conscious of her displeasure. But he grew a little morbid in this respect before his end, and there is nothing to show that the trouble was anything more than an outburst of the strong language which was the lot of all her servants, statesmen, fighters, and courtiers alike. His growing Puritanism, like that of Burghley and Walsingham, was antipathetic to her. She gibed at Burghley and his 'brothers in Christ', and her only recorded sharp speech against Hawkins was provoked by a pious phrase of his. It all amounts to very little as evidence of distrust or hatred.

On Saturday evening the Armada anchored off Calais, and Medina Sidonia sent off couriers by land to the Prince of Parma. The defect of the Spanish plan was now apparent. Parma's ports were watched by a number of small Dutch fighting craft quite able to deal with his transports; moreover, such factors as wind and tide would render it a matter of several days to get his army out even with no opposition. The Armada could not guarantee him a crossing, with the English Navy ready to dispute the narrow seas. It was seen that the first indispensable was to drive off the English, and the second to seize a port of disembarkation; and neither could be attained without a decisive victory, a victory of annihilation.

lation, something more than a mere success. Howard was now stronger than ever, for Lord Henry Seymour and the eastern squadron had joined him off Calais. Sidonia had really nothing to do but wait for a stroke of luck, for he and the bravest men with him knew that to attack the handy ships and powerful guns of England could give him no prospect of a victory. He could never close with them unless they should be mad enough to allow it. His only hope was to try which fleet could outstarve the other, for to that it was rapidly coming with both. So he yielded the initiative to Howard and lay anchored all Sunday with the English just out of range to windward. And that night the English accepted the gift and dislodged him in confusion with the eight famous fireships. Starvation was not their game.

The Battle of Gravelines followed on the Monday, 29 July, 'a day of onsets and despair' in which very little plan can now be discerned through the smoke of the guns and the hazy prose of the combatants. All day the English squadrons made the most of the opportunity yielded by the break-up of the Spanish order of battle in the panic of the previous night. The captains followed as well as they could the flags of their own squadron-commanders, but it is pretty evident that they often lost them. The procedure was that of close fire-action and constant movement, shattering broadsides at any target presenting itself, but never a delay long enough to permit of grappling and boarding. And at the end the Armada had lost hundreds of men but not many ships, about five of importance sunk or driven ashore, which, with the two lost off Plymouth, was not a fatal deduction from the fifty odd powerful vessels present. The English losses, as might be expected, were trifling, no ships and not many men, the largest batch of the latter in playing the Spanish game by boarding a galleasse driven ashore at Calais. A piece of luck, however, preserved the Armada from much more serious losses; for

in the evening its best ships were driving into shoal water off the Flemish coast, unable longer to face the guns, and a sudden shift of wind just saved them and enabled them to edge out into the North Sea.

The English commanders took a sober view of the success. All that Howard could write at the end of the day was that, 'we have chased them in fight until the evening late, and distressed them much; but their fleet consisteth of mighty ships and great strength; yet we doubt not, by God's good assistance, to oppress them;' and in a postscript, 'Their force is wonderful great and strong; and yet we pluck their feathers by little and little. I pray to God that the forces on the land be strong enough to answer so present a force.' Drake, with a better appreciation of the effects of the weather, said: 'God hath given us so good a day in forcing the enemy so far to leeward as I hope in God the Prince of Parma and the Duke of Sidonia shall not shake hands this few days; and whensoever they shall meet, I believe neither of them will greatly rejoice of this day's service.' Two days later, Drake wrote:

'We have the army of Spain before us, and mind with the grace of God to wrestle a pull with him. There was never anything pleased me better than seeing the enemy flying with a southerly wind to the northwards. God grant you have a good eye to the Duke of Parma; for with the grace of God, if we live, I doubt it not but ere it be long so to handle the matter with the Duke of Sidonia as he shall wish himself at St. Mary Port among his orange trees.'

Seymour also considered that the victory had yet to be gained. On 1 August he protested against being ordered back to his blockade of the Flemish coast, and angrily declared, 'I find my Lord [Admiral] jealous and loth to have me take part of the honour of the rest that is to win'.¹ These men still had the invasion as a possibility

¹ These letters are all addressed to Walsingham—Laughton, i. 340-2, 364; ii. 3.

in their minds. They did not yet understand, as Parma did, how impossible it was for an army to cross the seas whilst the English fleet was at large and undefeated. The sailors of those days had a vast respect for soldiers, a sense of inferiority bred of centuries of subordination.

On 31 July, two days after Gravelines, Sir John Hawkins wrote to Burghley and to Walsingham a cool and modest summary of the events of the campaign:

'My bounden duty humbly remembered unto your good lordship,

I have not busied myself to write often to your lordship in this great cause, for that my Lord Admiral doth continually advertise the manner of all things that doth pass. So do others that understand the state of all things as well as myself. We met with this fleet somewhat to the westward of Plymouth upon Sunday in the morning, being the 21st of July, where we had some small fight with them in the afternoon. By the coming aboard one of the other of the Spaniards a great ship, a Biscayan, spent her foremast and bowsprit; which was left by the fleet in the sea, and so taken up by Sir Francis Drake the next morning. The same Sunday there was, by a fire chancing by a barrel of powder, a great Biscayan spoiled and abandoned, which my lord took up and sent away.

The Tuesday following, athwart of Portland, we had a sharp and long fight with them, wherein we spent a great part of our powder and shot, so as it was not thought good to deal with them any more till that was relieved.

The Thursday following, by the occasion of the scattering of one of the great ships from the fleet, which we hoped to have cut off, there grew a hot fray, wherein some store of powder was spent; and after that, little done till we came near to Calais, where the fleet of Spain anchored, and our fleet by them; and because they should not be in peace there, to refresh their water or to have conference with those of the Duke of Parma's party, my lord Admiral, with firing of ships, determined to remove them; as he did, and put them to the seas; in which broil the chief galleasse spoiled her rudder, and so rode ashore near the town of Calais, where she was possessed of our men, but so aground as she could not be brought away.

That morning, being Monday the 29th of July, we followed

the Spaniards; and all that day had with them a long and great fight, wherein there was great valour showed generally of our company. In this battle there was spent very much of our powder and shot; and so the wind began to blow westerly a fresh gale and the Spaniards put themselves somewhat to the northward, where we follow and keep company with them. In this fight there was some hurt done among the Spaniards. A great ship of the galleons of Portugal [had] her rudder spoiled, and so the fleet left her in the sea. I doubt not but all these things are written more at large to your lordship than I can do; but this is the substance and material matter that hath passed.

Our ships, God be thanked, have received little hurt and are of great force to accompany them, and of such advantage that with some continuance at the seas, and sufficiently provided of shot and powder, we shall be able with God's favour to weary them out of the sea and confound them. Yet, as I gather certainly, there are amongst them 50 forcible and invincible ships, which consist of those that follow. [Details here omitted, but given in Laughton].

At their departing from Lisbon, being the 19th of May by our account, they were victualled for six months. They stayed in the Groyne [Corunna] twenty-eight days, and there refreshed their water. At their coming from Lisbon they were taken with a flaw, and fourteen hulks or thereabouts came near Ushant, and so returned with contrary winds to the Groyne, and there met; and else there was none other company upon our coast before the whole fleet arrived. And in their coming now, a little flaw took them, fifty leagues from the coast of Spain; where one great ship was severed from them, and four galleys, which hitherto have not recovered their company.

At their departing from Lisbon, the soldiers were twenty thousand, the mariners and others eight thousand; so as in all, they were twenty-eight thousand men. Their commission was to confer with the Prince of Parma, as I learn, and then to proceed to the service that should be there concluded; and so the Duke to return into Spain with these ships and mariners, the soldiers and their furniture being left behind. Now this fleet is here and very forcible, and must be waited upon with all our force, which is little enough. There would [should] be an infinite quantity of powder and shot provided, and continually sent abroad, without

the which great hazard may grow to our country; for this is the greatest and strongest combination, to my understanding, that ever was gathered in Christendom. Therefore I wish it of all hands to be mightily and diligently looked unto and cared for.

The men have been long unpaid and need relief. I pray your lordship that the money that should have gone to Plymouth may now be sent to Dover. August now cometh in, and this coast will spend ground tackle, cordage, canvas and victuals, all which should be sent to Dover in good plenty. With these things and God's blessing our kingdom may be preserved, which being neglected great hazard may come. I write to your lordship briefly and plainly. Your wisdom and experience is great; but this is a matter far passing all that hath been seen in our time or long before. And so praying God for a happy deliverance from the malicious and dangerous practice of our enemies, I humbly take my leave. From the sea, aboard the *Victory*, the last of July, 1588.

The Spaniards take their course for Scotland; my lord doth follow them. I doubt not, with God's favour, we shall impeach their landing. There must be order for victual and money, powder and shot, to be sent after us.

Your lordship's humbly to command,

John Hawkyns.¹

Until the 2nd of August Howard followed the Armada through the North Sea. In so doing he was, as he said himself, putting on 'a brag countenance', for his ammunition was nearly all gone, and his victuals were little more plentiful. It was this that prevented the final battle which all had been looking to fight. On the 1st the council of war took the decision to see the enemy no farther than the Firth of Forth, where it was doubtful whether King James would not allow them shelter and succour and so permit a recommencement of the campaign. Howard and his officers based their determination upon their lack of supplies and the need for defending southern England against Parma, although he was in reality well enough watched by Lord Henry Seymour. The Armada made no move to enter the Firth.

¹ Laughton, i. 358-62. Two unimportant postscripts omitted.

Sidonia also had no certainty of James's attitude, and even with that monarch's countenance the refuge might well have proved a trap; the fireships of Calais were a fresh and vivid memory. So the Spaniards went ever northwards upon that terrible voyage which less than half of them were destined to survive. The weather had not hitherto dealt hardly with them; on the evening of Gravelines it had saved them from a wholesale disaster. But now with all their battle injuries unrepaired they were in no case to withstand even the summer gales of the northern seas.

The English fleet returned southwards, and on 8 August Hawkins was at Harwich with part of it, and Howard in the Downs with the remainder. Gradually it was seen that there would and could be no invasion from the Netherlands, and with that the chief activity became the paying-off of the men and the laying-up of most of the ships. Epidemic disease was now raging, and it is sad to think that thousands of the men who had defeated the Armada with little loss to themselves fell victims to maladies that are nowadays preventable, and even at that time could have been diminished by the issue of good and adequate stores.

Hawkins as Navy Treasurer was chiefly responsible for the paying-off, and Burghley as Lord Treasurer and finder of the money seemed to expect that it should be no sooner said than done, since every day's delay increased the wages bill; further, the Lord Treasurer looked for a large economy on account of the deaths on service, which he conveniently held to cancel all scores between the Queen and the deceased. At the close of August, Hawkins, toiling manfully at Dover, was obliged to point out some realities of the position:

'Since I came down the weather hath been such as our fleet hath been divided, part in Dover road and part at Margate and Gorend; and never could come either of us to other, and those at the Margate can hardly row ashore, or get aboard when they

were ashore . . . Your lordship may think that by death, by discharging of sick men, and such like, there may be spared something in the general pay. First, those that die, their friends require their pay. In place of those which are discharged sick and insufficient, which indeed are many, there are [or were?] fresh men taken, which breedeth a far greater charge . . . The weather continueth so extreme, and the tides come so swift that we cannot get any victuals aboard but with trouble and difficulty, nor go from ship to ship.'

Howard added a postscript :

'My good lord, this is as much as is possible for Mr. Hawkins to do at this time . . . but howsoever it fall out I must see them paid, and will; for I do not look to end with this service, and therefore I must be followed hereafter.'¹

Before there had been time for this to assuage the impatience of Burghley, another ungenerous letter from him must have arrived, excusable when we remember that the year's expenses had been enormous, sufficient to shake the whole system of paternal government which he and the Queen had hitherto practised with success. Hawkins replied at great length on 28 August, in a letter from which some extracts will be sufficient:

'My honourable good lord,

I am sorry I do live so long to receive so sharp a letter from your lordship, considering how carefully I take care to do all for the best and to ease charge. The ships that be in Her Majesty's pay, such as I have to do for, your lordship hath many particulars of them and their numbers; notwithstanding, I do send your lordship all these again. I had but one day to travail in, and then I discharged many after the rate that I thought my money would reach; but after that day I could hardly row from ship to ship, the weather hath been continually so frightful. . . . I am in gathering of a book of all those that have served, and the quality and time of their service, as I can overcome it. Your lordship shall see it in the best order I can. Some are discharged with fair words [i. e. without money]; some are so miserable and needy that they are holpen with tickets to the victuallers for some victual to help them home; and some with a portion of money,

¹ Laughton, ii. 162-5, 26 Aug.

such as my lord Admiral will appoint to relieve their sick men and to relieve some of the needy sort, to avoid exclamation.¹ The sick men are paid and discharged, that are in Her Majesty's pays; the soldiers also, for the most part, we discharge here; the retinues, some have leave to go to London, and are to be paid there; and thus there is left but convenient companies of mariners and gunners to bring home the ships to Chatham. . . . It shall hereafter be none offence to your lordship that I do so much alone; for with God's favour I will and must leave all [i. e. resign]. I pray God I may end this account to Her Majesty's and your lordship's liking, and avoid my own undoing; and I trust God will so provide for me as I shall never meddle with such intricate matters more, for they be importable for any man to please and overcome it. If I had any enemy, I would wish him no more harm than the course of my troublesome and painful life; but hereunto, and to God's good providence we are born.'²

So, whilst the landsmen were ringing bells and dancing round bonfires, the Navy was facing the worst realities of service, statesmen were at their wits' end to pay the bill, and old friends were tormented into thinking hard things of one another. On 4 September Hawkins reported that there were still more than 4,000 men in pay and advised a complete demobilization, since there was nothing more to be feared from the Spaniards. He was eager also to get the ships into the dockyards for a thorough overhaul in readiness for new enterprises. He found it hard to forgive Burghley, whose letters must have been indeed severe.

'I know I shall never please his lordship two months together,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'for which I am very sorry. . . . My pain and misery in this service is infinite. Every man would have his turn served, though very unreasonable; yet if it be refused, then adieu friendship. I yield to many things more than there is whereof, and yet it will not satisfy many. God, I trust, will deliver me of it ere it be long, for there is no other hell.'³

¹ The above sentences evidently refer to the crews of the hired ships whose owners should have received the total debt from the Admiralty and have paid their men themselves.

² In full in Laughton, ii. 175-9.

³ Laughton, ii. 214.

The dreary work went on until by the end of the year the most pressing demands had been met, and Hawkins could sit down to consider the ordering of his accounts. They must have been terrifying even to his hard head, for multitudes of officials, some temporary and unknown to him, had been issuing, promising, and acknowledging in his name, and rascality had found fine opportunities. It would have been better if he had not gone to sea that year. But to fight a Spanish fleet had been the wish of his heart for twenty years, and now he had to pay for his fun. On 14 December he addressed a petition to the Privy Council asking them to intercede with the Queen for the grant of a year's leave from his duties as Treasurer of the Navy. Otherwise, he said, he could not reduce his accounts to order with satisfaction to the Queen or to himself. He proposed that his substitute should be Edward Fenton, his brother-in-law, for whose fidelity he would stand surety by bonds delivered to the Exchequer. Elizabeth in due course granted the request, the year to date from 1 January 1589; but she made the reservation that Sir John Hawkins should nevertheless hold himself in readiness during that time to give service and counsel in any naval enterprises that might be undertaken.

VI

AFTER THE ARMADA

THE year's leave proved to be an illusion. From the outset, administrative work forced itself upon Hawkins, as may be seen from various documents relating to the Navy Office. Then, before many months had elapsed, Sir William Winter and William Holstocke both dropped out. Winter, an old man who had been slightly wounded at Gravelines, died this spring, and the same is probably true of Holstocke. Winter's name is last found in documents in February, and Holstocke's in March, 1589. This left of the old Board only Borough and Hawkins, and the latter was compelled to take a more extensive share in the management than he had contemplated. There seems no reason to doubt that the reconciliation between Hawkins and Winter had been genuine and lasting. The only witness against it is the anonymous traducer of 1587, whose evidence is worthless.

The filling of these vacancies casts a light upon the government's opinion of Hawkins. For to him was given Holstocke's post as Comptroller in addition to that of Treasurer; William Borough was promoted to Winter's office of Surveyor; the Mastership of the Ordnance (naval), if still existing, was not continued; and a new man, Benjamin Gonson, was brought in as Clerk of the Ships. This Benjamin was a relative of the former Treasurer, Hawkins's father-in-law, but whether his son, nephew, or grandson does not appear. He had seen service as captain of various ships of the middle or minor sort. The total effect was that the reconstituted Navy Board consisted of three men, Hawkins, filling two offices, Borough, now well known as a devoted adherent of his, and Gonson, a relative by marriage. Had the Queen been distrustful of Hawkins, she had here an opportunity of

introducing two new officials as a check upon him. Her actual course placed responsibility more completely in his hands than ever before, for Borough was a man of no initiative or force of character.

In October of this year died also William Hawkins, Sir John's elder brother, aged about seventy. An inscription to his memory was put up in the Church of St. Nicholas at Deptford. It described him as a practiser of true religion, beneficent to the poor, most learned in maritime affairs, a promoter of distant voyages, a just judge in difficult causes, and of singular faith, probity and prudence. He was twice married and had eleven children. 'Johannes Haukyns, eques auratus, classis regiae quaestor, frater moestissimus, posuit. Obiit spe certa resurgendi 7 die mensis Octobris anno domini 1589.'¹ Of his sons only one, the William Hakwins already mentioned in this book, left any mark in the national records. Markham thinks that it was this William Hawkins who afterwards entered the service of the East India Company and died on the way home from the East in 1613; but the identification is not strictly proved.

Two years later Sir John suffered another loss by the death of his wife Katherine in July 1591. They had been married thirty-two years, and had one child, Richard, who was knighted by James I and died in 1622. The unnamed servant of the Earl of Leicester, whose slanderous statements of 1587 have already been examined, alluded in the course of them to 'a base son' of John Hawkins who took a Spanish prize in that year. If that means an illegitimate son, it is the only discoverable reference to his existence, and it is not likely to be more veracious than the rest of the effusion. Perhaps it is only a description of Richard Hawkins; it would seem natural to the writer who spoke so loftily of the baseness of John's birth, mind and manners, that his offspring should exhibit the same qualities. John Hawkins mar-

¹ Markham's *Hawkins Voyages*, p. xlii.

ried again some time after his first wife's death. His second wife was Margaret Vaughan, daughter of a Herefordshire gentleman. They had no children, and she died in 1619. Between Richard Hawkins and his step-mother there was no love lost. He complained that she refused to hand over a sum of £3,000 left him by his father's will. With this money he could have paid the ransom that would have delivered him from the Spaniards who captured him in 1594, and in default of it he had to endure nearly eight years of captivity.¹

The salary of John Hawkins as Navy Treasurer did not go very far in meeting his expenditure, and he proved fairly conclusively that he did not make illicit gains from his office. There are indications that he remained a ship-owner until the end of his life, he was an investor in the ventures of others, some of which turned out well, and he secured one or two of the crumbs of patronage that fell from the courtiers' tables. In 1582, for example, he was granted a licence to sell and export 200 tuns of beer.² He may have found means to extend its limits, for a paper of January 1588, shows that he had sent 135 tuns to Holland and Germany in the past fourteen months.³ On the capture of a Portuguese carrack in 1592 a vast quantity of pepper came into the Queen's possession. Hawkins and a merchant syndicate took it off her hands in 1594 and secured a prohibition against any further importation for two years, during which time they might sell their stock at a maximum price of 3s. per lb.⁴ References to his privateers in these latter years are numer-

¹ In his *Observations* (Hakl. Soc. edn., p. 90), Sir Richard Hawkins speaks of 'the Lady Hawkins, my mother-in-law', in very affectionate terms, quite incompatible with the above facts. But a reading of the context, which connects the remarks with the launching of the ship *Repentance*, renamed the *Dainty*, shows that Sir Richard was really speaking of his own mother; for the *Dainty* was at sea in 1590, some time before she died.

² Patent Roll, 24 Eliz., part 9.

³ E. 122, 172/5.

⁴ *Domestic Calendar*, 1591-4, p. 560.

ous,¹ and it was the unattached cruisers that made the profits so often lost by the greater expeditions. But Hawkins was no money-grubber. He held it his duty to subscribe to ventures that might extend the national power even if experience showed that they seldom made a profit, and what he gained with one hand he spent with the other. It was the Queen's method of financing the war at sea, and before joining in condemnation of her meanness we should remember that it was forced upon her by the fiscal position of the monarchy: had she borne the whole burden herself she would soon have been in the same troubles with her parliaments as ruined the early Stuart kings even in a time of peace. In the end, Hawkins left £10,000 after all his debts were paid,² and he had probably been worth as much when he first took over the administration of the Navy. It was a fortune smaller than that of Drake, who inherited nothing from his father as a commencement, and it does not justify the implication of Laughton's remark that 'while Drake was winning fame and fortune by unsurpassed feats of daring, Hawkins was enriching himself as a merchant shipowner and admiralty official, whose integrity was suspected'.³

In 1590 Drake, Hawkins and others founded a useful fund for the relief of sick and worn-out mariners. It was known as the Chest at Chatham, and the money was obtained by a deduction of 6*d.* a month from the wages of able seamen serving in the fleet. So long as honest administration prevailed the fund was of great benefit to the unfortunate, but during certain infamous periods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries not only were large sums taken from the Chest to meet the debts of the state, but persons who had no claim on account of sea-service were provided with pensions out of the seamen's contributions. These abuses lay far be-

¹ See, among others, Landsowne MSS., 144, f 35; 145, f. 103.

² *Calendar of Hatfield MSS.*, vi, pp. 577-9.

³ *D. N. B.*, art. Hawkins.

yond the ken of the founders, and would have been unthinkable in their day. The corruption of Elizabethan England was pure integrity compared with that of the times which followed.

Another charitable institution was more exclusively the work of Hawkins. In 1592 he founded a hospital for aged and infirm mariners and shipwrights at Chatham. In August 1594 he obtained a charter providing for the endowment and future government of the foundation, which was to be called Sir John Hawkins's Hospital. The grant contained the names of the first governors, at whose head was the Archbishop of Canterbury.¹ The good work took firm root, and the charity survives to this day.

After the defeat of the Armada the offensive power of England should have gone from strength to strength, but the achievement fell short of the expectation. Drake gained the ear of the government and was given leave to prepare an expedition for the restoration of Don Antonio to the throne of Portugal. With Drake, as commander of the land-forces, was associated Sir John Norreys, a soldier of fine repute in the Irish and Low Countries wars. Great advantages would have proceeded from success—the humiliation of Philip II, if not an immediate peace with him, and the entry of England into the trade of the Portuguese empire. But even a preliminary success depended upon one of two assumptions, either that the Portuguese were so enthusiastic for Antonio that they would rise on his behalf as soon as he appeared amongst them, or that England could send forth an army sufficiently strong to drive the Spaniards out of Lisbon by itself. Given either of these conditions, the idea was sound enough. But no serious effort was made to gauge the capabilities of the Portuguese, and the difficulties of preparing an efficient army at short notice were underestimated. The Queen was unwilling to bear

¹ Patent Roll, 36 Eliz., part 17.

the whole expense, and the undertaking went forward upon a joint-stock to which she made a liberal contribution. This introduced an element of profit-hunting into what should have been a purely strategic plan.

The reputation of Drake was at its height, and his name attracted a sufficiency of adventurers, both financial and personal. As was usual and almost invariable, government hesitations imposed delays, and the expedition sailed in April 1589 short of victuals and short of its estimated numbers of men. The final instructions to the commanders are not recorded, but it seems plain that the Queen insisted upon at least one task being attempted before the landing near Lisbon; she was uneasy although she had no need to be, about the remnants of the Armada collected in the northern Spanish ports, and she desired that these should be destroyed as a preliminary to the main business. This produced delay and dissipation of strength, and the sacrifice of the advantage of surprise in Portugal. The commanders neglected the Biscay ports where most of the Spanish ships lay, but they did land their troops at Corunna. They took the lower town, but not the fortress, and withdrew with their men demoralized by captured wine and already hungry and suffering from epidemic disease. Norreys then landed his army at Peniche and marched on Lisbon, expecting Drake to bring the fleet up the Tagus to his support. Complete failure ensued: there was no Portuguese rising, a weak Spanish garrison showed a bold front at Lisbon, there was no siege-train to batter the walls, and Drake's ships remained far below the city; Norreys retreated with loss, and a mob of sick and dying men re-embarked. There was a further plan for the best ships to go cruising at the Azores, but it was not proceeded with, and the commanders returned to England at the end of June, having lost thousands of men, a great deal of money, and some of the prestige gained before the world in 1588.

The fundamental mistake of the adventure was the neglect of a patent fact, the fact that England was not a military power. She had a number of talented officers but she had no army and made no attempt to train one. The thousands of men collected at Plymouth gained an ill reputation for disorderliness before they sailed, and hunger and sickness soon destroyed what small pretensions they had to discipline. Even had it taken Lisbon, such a force could hardly have held it long; for as soon as its real character appeared it would have had the population to contend with in addition to the Spanish armies. In so far as strategy is an adjustment of ends to means, the strategy of the Portugal expedition hardly justified the encomiums that have been bestowed upon its authors.

Drake fell into disgrace with the Queen and had no great employment for several years to come. She has been criticized for allowing so splendid an instrument to rust, and she was ungenerous in visiting upon the commanders the blame that was primarily her own. Perhaps her distrust of Drake was due solely to her disappointment; less probably it proceeded from an estimation of his powers. His successes hitherto had been gained by his courage, his personal magnetism, his capacity for hard work, and the dashing quality that had enabled him to seize the favourable moment to go in and win. These attributes had made him irresistible with compact expeditions under his sole command. But with large and mixed forces and with colleagues attached to him their effects were diluted, for they depended upon his ascendancy over men who could come within the range of his personal influence, a diminishing proportion as the circle expanded. It is notable that all his large expeditions suffered from more than the ordinary shortage of victuals, that they were not conspicuous for good discipline even by the lax standards of that age, and that his relations with his colleagues were often un-

happy. Elizabeth may have considered these matters. Even if she did she was unwise in keeping Drake ashore, for there was much for him to do that no other man could have done as well. Whether she was also unwise in refusing to give him once more the command of an expedition like that of 1589 is a question not admitting of a hasty answer.

Sir John Hawkins had been an onlooker at the Portugal project, although he and his brother had assisted in its victualling and other preparations. He was anxious to obtain a sea command himself, but he refrained from criticizing the failure of others. All that can be discerned is the barest hint of a reflection on the conduct of the late expedition, in a letter to Burghley written on 6 July. There he remarked in a postscript that he was aware of Burghley's preference for passing great affairs 'by order', and that he shared it: 'by good order good effects will follow'.¹ By good order in a sea expedition Hawkins primarily meant a strict attention to victualling and equipment, and the following of a sound plan; and these things had been absent from the armament now straggling back to Plymouth Sound. Apart from this there is no comment from his pen.

The purport of Hawkins's letter was to place before Burghley the war plan which he had already explained to Walsingham in February 1588. He had drawn it up, he said, whilst lying at Queenborough with the Lord Admiral in December 1587. Other enterprises had since postponed its application, but he still thought it the best scheme to be pursued. Howard was, by implication, cognizant of this plan, and his approval of it may in part account for his disappointment at the adoption of the Portugal project at the opening of 1589. In the Domestic State Papers as at present arranged there is enclosed with Hawkins's letter a scheme for an attack upon Cadiz,² but it is evidently wrongly placed, for it

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 225, No. 14 (i).

² *Ibid.*, No. 14 (ii).

is not the Hawkins plan or anything like it. The right document is to be found in another volume, endorsed, 'A discourse for obtaining a good peace, December, 1587'.¹ In reading it, we must bear in mind that any passages appearing to reflect on the Portugal expedition are merely prophetic, for that enterprise had not been thought of at the time of writing.

After some opening remarks on the best way to attain a sound peace, Hawkins went on: 'In the continuance of this war, I wish it to be ordered in this sort, that first we have as little to do in foreign countries as may be (but of mere necessity), for that breedeth great charge and no profit at all.' Instead, the seas between Spain and the Azores should be continuously held by an English squadron, for whose strength under present conditions six principal ships of the Queen's and six smaller ones will be sufficient. They may be victualled for four months and relieved at the expiration of that time by a similar squadron. Each squadron will need 1,800 men, and the monthly cost for wages and victuals will be £2,730, 'and it will be a very bad and unlucky month that they will not bring in treble that charge, for they can see nothing but it will hardly escape them'. The charge may be met by private investment, the Queen paying nothing but the cost of equipping the ships, for which she will take the usual third of the prize-money.² It will not be in the power of Spain to drive such squadrons from the seas, for the Spanish administration is not capable of turning out a force with the requisite sea-endurance. The effect will be that the Indies fleets (East and West) will not be able to reach port, 'which [fleets] if we might once strike, our peace were made with honour, safety

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 206, No. 61.

² Adventuring on thirds is alluded to, i.e. one-third to the owner of the ships, one-third to the victuallers, and one-third to those paying the wages. Sometimes the crews would serve without wages, and take that third themselves in lieu.

and profit'. Hawkins did not add that the mere holding of the trade-route from the Azores to Europe, quite apart from an actual capture, would have ensured the same result; but that was certainly true. For this was not mere commerce-destroying against a power able to exist in spite of it. The Indies treasure was as vital to Philip's empire and its wars as foreign food supplies are to industrial England. It is very doubtful if he could have survived two consecutive years of such a blockade.

To his plan Hawkins appended schedules showing that ample force existed for the purpose. The two alternate cruising squadrons would absorb twelve ships of fighting rank and twelve pinnaces. Permanently at home there would be left twelve fighting ships and six pinnaces for the defence of the Channel, and during most of the time one or other of the cruising squadrons would also be at home, although it would be undergoing a refit in the dockyards.

In the covering letter to Burghley, Hawkins offered to take the ocean command himself and revealed some of his own thoughts and hopes a little more expansively than was usual with him. The soreness of the previous autumn had passed away, and he wrote as to an assured friend:

'And forasmuch as I shall never be able to end my days in a more godly cause for the Church of God, a more dutiful service to Her Majesty, or a more profitable service for our country, I did desire this way, chiefly for that I know this thing executed to order will work great effect and fit best for the ability of this commonwealth to maintain; and thereupon offer myself and my ability to execute it. By which example I doubt not but other more able than myself in ability and knowledge will for the like good endeavour to continue this good purpose.

The revenge which I desired long since for the injuries I received of the Spaniards, time hath made me to forget it and refer it to God, who is the avenger of wrongs.

My years requireth rest from enterprising matters of importance. I am out of debt, and no children to care for; and although not rich, yet contented with mine estate.

I can within this month satisfy your lordship plainly in what estate I stand with Her Majesty in mine accompts, which I am sure will be found that I shall not be in debt.

And touching mine own contentation, in my wife, my friends, or any other worldly matter, I am as well pleased and contented as I desire; all which I lay aside and forego if it shall be thought meet by Her Majesty that I shall proceed in this service, which I doubt not but our good God shall bless with a happy success, being intended chiefly for his glory; and so humbly take my leave of your lordship, from Deptford, the vjth of July, 1589.'

The innate generosity of the man may be seen in the omissions from this letter, when it is remembered that Drake had come into Plymouth before the end of June, and that the news of his defeat was then fresh in London. Not many men of that time would have refrained from a sarcastic word on the failure of a rival.

Hawkins's ideas as set forth above have been condemned on the ground that they constituted mere commerce-destroying, and that they were tried and failed. That description of them has been shown to carry a wrong implication; and it is not true that the plan was ever tried. Its essence was continuity of pressure by successive squadrons, and in fact not one squadron was ever sent out to relieve another. The actual history of the succeeding years was that of isolated cruises of a few months' duration, in the intervals of which the Indies fleets slipped home. Hawkins knew his Queen and had devised a plan involving the minimum of effort, risk, and resolution on her part, and even to that minimum she could not rise. Old Burghley could not or would not supply the deficiency, and together they doddered through their last years in ever growing instability of purpose, the despair of the men of action who waited vainly on their word.

It seems fairly evident that Hawkins's plan was at first accepted in principle, and it had the advantage that there were already undertakings at sea upon which it

could be grafted. In June 1589, just before Drake's return, the Earl of Cumberland had sailed with the *Victory* of the Queen's and some private warships belonging to himself and others. He went by way of the Spanish coast to the Azores, with the object of intercepting the West Indian plate-fleet and the East Indian carracks. He seems not to have understood the niceties of Azorean geography and the points of navigation upon which an intelligent pursuit of his plan would have been based. He was also very ill supplied and spent much of his time threatening or cajoling the inhabitants for water instead of looking for his quarry. As a result, although he remained about the islands throughout August, September, and October, he missed both the fleets. The carracks evaded him, pushed through the islands, and reached Lisbon in safety. The treasure ships took refuge in the fortified port of Angra and waited there until hunger compelled him to withdraw. He had taken a number of minor prizes and one stray unit of the West Indian fleet. This vessel, worth £100,000, was wrecked on the English coast and totally lost.¹ All this was a fair indication of the soundness of the Hawkins plan. Hawkins or Drake or another of the experienced admirals would probably have had the carracks or some of them. If a squadron had appeared in time to relieve Cumberland, it would in the end have taken the West Indian fleet or would have kept it indefinitely at Angra. And as for expenses, it was the sheer bad luck of the wreck of the rich prize that prevented the expedition as it was from paying a handsome profit. Hawkins might well claim that with ordinary luck and his own management the thing would promise success.

Another cruise of the autumn of 1589 provided an elaboration of the plan, which was repeated in the following year. In September, Sir Martin Frobisher sailed with some of the Queen's ships and took station off the

¹ M. Oppenheim, *Monson's Tracts*, i. 266-37.

coast of Portugal, his function being to intercept anything that might elude Cumberland. He was too late for the carracks, but took four of the West Indiamen, they having continued their voyage after Cumberland's withdrawal. Although he also lost two of his prizes by wreck, the other two paid a profit on his voyage.¹ Had he gone straight to the Azores, which his instructions probably forbade, he would have joined Cumberland, and together they would have had a chance of taking the whole fleet. It should be noted that Spain was unable this year to get a fleet to sea to the rescue of the threatened trade. Philip could only sit still and pray for good fortune, which this time he received.

The return of Cumberland and Frobisher left a gap in the ocean blockade which was not immediately filled. Although it was mid-winter the deficiency was serious, for it seems that the *flota* missed by Cumberland had been that of New Spain only, that of Tierra Firme having delayed its passage from the West. Hawkins was therefore hard at work on his own preparations to sail early in the following year. Then, he hoped, the plan might be continuously applied. Papers of 2 and 12 December show him getting his six fighting ships ready at Chatham, and others of January and early February indicate that the victualling and enlistment of crews were in progress.² Then came a check. A note of Privy Council agenda, dated 23 February, includes the question: 'Whether it be convenient that Sir John Hawkins shall proceed in his voyage?'—and in the margin the answer: 'Thought unmeet for him to go.'³ It was the oft-repeated vacillation, inspired this time by a report of Spanish warships gathering at Corunna, and of

¹ *Ibid.*, i. 238-9.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1581-90, pp. 632, 634, 644, 647. But there is a reference in one of his letters to Burghley as early as 12 Sept. 1589, which shows that the enterprise was already 'in hand'.—S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 226, No. 30.

³ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 230, No. 80.

rumours that Philip meant to conquer Brittany and use it as a base for the invasion of England. The threat was feeble and distant enough, as practical men could have told the Queen; but, once at war, she had lost all sense of proportion, and any bogey was sufficient to frighten her into a passive defence. So the orders went forth for Hawkins to stay in port and for Drake to utilize his talents in fortifying Plymouth and Scilly.

Poor Hawkins was cut to the heart and for the first time gave vent to something like despair:

'I am many ways burdened and brought behind hand', he wrote to Burghley on 1st March, 'and especially by the overthrow of this journey which I had with great care and cost brought to pass, hoping, as your lordship did see an orderly and sparing beginning, so if it had pleased God that it should have proceeded there should have been seen with God's favour a rare example of government, wherein matter of great moment might have been performed; but seeing it is thus I can but say, the will of God be done. . . . But now, being out of hope that ever I shall perform any royal thing, I do put on a mean mind and humbly pray your lordship to be a good lord to me.'¹

He had good reason to abandon hope, for in March the *flota* reached port with five million ducats. To capture such a fleet had been the 'royal thing' he had long desired to do, and he must have known of the expected arrival of this one from the examinations of the prisoners taken by Cumberland and Frobisher. It was not that he was greedy for prize-money. He was growing old and had hoped to see his country's future assured by an honourable peace before he died; and now his perverse mistress had thrown away the chance on a childish alarm. Perhaps he knew also that the opportunity would not remain open indefinitely. Philip was in fact with slow pertinacity creating an ocean navy, and the Azores station in years to come would demand larger English forces than were sufficient in 1589-90. In this year also the

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 231, No. 2.

Spaniards were preparing to adopt a different method of forwarding their treasure. It was to go no longer in the great helpless merchantmen of the *flotas* but in a new type of small warships,¹ heavily armed and designed for speed, able to defend themselves against single privateers, and to run away from more regular squadrons.

For some months the alarm of the government continued, and preparations in England were conducted on nearly as large a scale as in 1588, a ridiculous overestimate of the capabilities of Philip for offence. He was actually contemplating an expedition to Brittany to support the Catholic League against Henry of Navarre, who had been rightful King of France since the assassination of Henry III in 1589. But Spaniards in Brittany, as the event was to show, could expect little leisure to meddle in any force with England. Their new entanglement in the French wars of religion was to be almost as advantageous to us as their long struggle with the Dutch. Philip's early preparations miscarried, and it was not until October that some of his troops reached Brittany; even then they were under 3,000 strong.²

Gradually the Queen's panic subsided, and towards the end of May the ocean force was at last permitted to sail. Even now Hawkins found his plan diluted by a secondary motive. It was decided that Frobisher should lead one squadron to the Azores, but that Hawkins with an equal force should lie off the Spanish coast to watch for the sailing of the Brittany expedition. The instructions, it is true, have been lost, but such appears to have been their tenor if we may judge from the actual proceedings. Hawkins was no doubt expected to look out also for the home-coming trade, but the two motives were incompatible, for he could not watch Corunna and Lisbon at the same time. It is evident that the Frobisher

¹ The *gallizabras* or treasure-frigates, described and illustrated in Corbett's *Drake*, ii. 362-6. They had oars as well as sails.

² Oppenheim, *Monson*, i. 251-2.

and Hawkins squadrons were independently organized. The former was victualled for four months only, and had to return at the end of that time. Hawkins undertook his own victualling and provided for six months at the rate of eightpence per man per day instead of the sixpence allowed by the Queen.¹ He must by now have had very little hope of a relieving squadron following up his work, and he determined to stay out himself as long as possible.

The captains drew pay from 25 May, which was probably not long before the date of sailing. Frobisher sailed in the *Revenge* and had with him five other middle-sized fighting ships and a pinnace. Hawkins made the *Mary Rose* his flagship. George Fenner in the *Hope* was his vice-admiral, and the other four ships were the *Nonpareil*, commanded by Richard Hawkins, the *Swiftsure*, *Foresight*, and *Rainbow*.² There is no mention of hired merchantmen, but it may be presumed, on the analogy of other expeditions, that a certain number of privateers attached themselves to the Queen's forces.

The chief quarry was now the treasure-convoys of 1590 and the East Indian carracks of the same season, all of which for reasons of navigation would be obliged to pass close to the Azores even if they did not call there for water. Frobisher reached the islands towards the end of July, once again too late for an opportunity, since a consignment of treasure in the new *gallizabras* had been there just before his arrival and reached Portugal at the beginning of August.³ He remained about the islands until early in September and was then forced by lack of victuals to turn homewards, arriving at Ply-

¹ *Domestic Calendar*, 1591-4, p. 78.

² Details in Oppenheim, i. 242, on authority of the Declared Accounts.

³ Oppenheim, i. 249 (citing Duro, *Armada Española*). The present writer must here acknowledge his indebtedness in writing of this voyage to Mr. Oppenheim's exhaustive analysis of the evidence.

mouth on the 29th. He captured a number of minor prizes and threw the Spanish maritime world into transports of alarm, vividly described by the Dutchman Linschoten, who was then at Terceira. Frobisher, as appears by an undated note of his to Howard,¹ was a believer in the possibility of strangling Spain by pressure on the silver-route, and the plan, applied this year for no more than six weeks of actual cruising, caused Philip to countermand the sailing of any more treasure until 1591. To blame the policy itself for the failures of its application is like blaming a man for not being able to carry water in a sieve.

Hawkins, hampered by his duty of watching the Brittany project, did not succeed in closing the gap left at the Azores. At the beginning of July he put into Plymouth with some prizes, two of which, Hanse ships suspected of carrying Portuguese cargo, caused lengthy proceedings in the Admiralty Court. He sighted a part of the Brittany expedition, but failed to capture it, and missed some East Indiamen which had also eluded Frobisher. One carrack, however, was taken by the *Dainty*, a private warship of his which was making an independent cruise, and the prize was brought safely into Dartmouth.² As the time drew near when Hawkins knew that Frobisher's stores would be exhausted, he himself sailed to the Azores,³ but there was now nothing of importance to intercept there. All that his son records is a collision between the *Rainbow* and the *Foresight* near Flores. There might have been a more interesting piece of service, for this year Philip did send a squadron to sea. It numbered twenty ships under Don Alonzo de Bazan, but was driven back by bad weather. Had it reached the islands it would have found Hawkins alone on the station, for Frobisher had departed about the

¹ Cotton MSS., Otho E. viii, f. 266, printed by Oppenheim, i. 75.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1581-90, pp. 697, 702.

³ Hakluyt Soc., *Hawkins Voyages*, p. 288.

time it had left Spain. Hawkins would very likely have considered six good Queen's ships a fair match for a mixed score of Spaniards. But fate sent a westerly gale and deprived him of his only chance of commanding in a fleet action in the course of his life. He was called home by a Privy Council message conveyed in a pinnace at the end of October, the reason being a new outbreak of alarm consequent on the arrival of the Spaniards in Brittany. He had at least given a proof that an English squadron could cruise for five months without any large death-roll from hunger and disease. His son, who was with him, says that he kept strict control over his captains and held them responsible for the safe keeping of all captured property, the ship's papers of prizes, and the principal persons found in them. Any deficiencies (i.e. private plundering) were to be answered 'upon great punishments'. A further remark of Sir Richard's implies that the voyage was not so fruitless as has been generally supposed: 'I am witness and avow that this course did redound much to the benefit of the general stock, to the satisfaction of Her Majesty and council, the justification of his government, and the content of his followers.'¹

Nevertheless John Hawkins himself was disappointed and regarded the expedition as a failure, for it had not struck the blow that would have led to a triumphant peace. On his return he wrote to Burghley that he had no good news to report:

'And thus God's infallible word is performed, in that the Holy Ghost said, Paul doth plant, Apollos doth water, but God giveth the increase; for I may boldly say unto your lordship I was very well provided, both of shipping, victual, furniture, and a quiet and sufficient company; but seeing this hath been the good pleasure of God, I do content myself and hold all to come for the best.'²

¹ Hakluyt Soc., *Hawkins Voyages*, p. 250. The remarks are not specifically made of the 1590 voyage, but there is no other to which they can apply. Sir Richard was not with his father in 1586.

² S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 233, No. 118.

Upon this the dividend-hunting Elizabeth's comment was, 'God's death! This fool went out a soldier and is come home a divine'. A quotation from a modern critic may fitly conclude the matter: 'The success of Hawkins and Frobisher was not obvious to those who measured the fortune of a cruise by the amount of plunder brought back, but the effects were seen in starving and mutinous soldiery and in the paralysis of Spanish military operations in France and in the Netherlands.'¹

For the next four years, 1591-4, Drake and Hawkins both remained on the shelf, and the policy of fitful summer cruises to the Azores, carried out with an ever-decreasing proportion of the Queen's ships, was continued. Its net result was that Philip, with the greater part of the English Navy doing absolutely nothing, was enabled to recreate his own, and that he received nearly all his western treasure although he sometimes had to wait for a safe opportunity to get it through. The carracks from the East were less fortunate, but the majority of them also came home in safety. The war therefore bade fair to continue indefinitely. A brief summary of these events is all that need here be attempted.²

In 1591 Lord Thomas Howard was sent to the Azores with a squadron of the Queen's ships which ultimately numbered seven, and with Sir Richard Grenville as his vice-admiral. They sailed in April and intended to remain at the islands until the autumn with the aid of food-supplies sent out from England. Owing to the stay of last year's treasure in the West Indies, a double *flota* was expected this year, but the English had no exact information of the time at which it would appear. Philip

¹ Oppenheim, *Monson*, i. 251. An Antwerp report stated that Hawkins was suspected of having an understanding with Philip II and of having purposely let the Brittany force get through.—*Fugger News-Letters*, 2nd ser., No. 404.

² The following pages are based chiefly upon Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, and Corbett's *Drake*.

could not do without this treasure, and so had to make an effort to drive Howard from its path. He sent out Alonzo de Bazan with fifty-five sail of all kinds and 7,000 men. Howard received only a few hours' warning of the Spaniards' approach, which caught him on 31 August in the act of changing ballast and rummaging his ships as a measure against an epidemic that had rendered half his men incapable of duty. He must have had less than a thousand fit men and was in no condition to fight. He therefore retreated with all his force except the *Revenge* under Grenville, who stayed to fight the whole Spanish fleet for reasons that have been variously stated. Whatever Grenville's faults may have been, he did prove something that not even the Battle of Gravelines had proved—the true fighting value of an English galleon handled by a resolute man; for, with only a hundred sailors in place of the normal complement of 250, he sank four large Spaniards and beat off every attempt at boarding before his surviving hands surrendered. When we remember Raleigh's eloquent description of the fight, reprinted by Hakluyt and known to educated men of the following century, it is easy to believe that it was a greater inspiration even than the Armada story to Blake and Monck and the other grim fighters of the Dutch wars. There, in spite of all criticism, must Grenville's justification be sought. It is worth noting that he had not himself fought in 1588, and it may well have been that indiscreet boasts and hot rejoinders at the admiral's table in 1591 were the cause of his wild action and heroic death. Howard drew off and left the islands, and a day or two later the huge *flota* began to straggle in from the West. It included the ships that ought to have returned in 1590, all thoroughly rotten from long lying in tropical waters. A great storm swept over the Azores as it arrived, numbers of ships were lost, and in the end less than half of them reached Spain. The loss, however, was of valuable shipping and

merchandise, but not of treasure, for that had been held back and came on later in the fast warships specially constructed to carry it. From June to August of this year the Earl of Cumberland was on the Spanish coast with one Queen's ship and a number of privateers. It was he who sent the pinnace that warned Howard of Bazan's approach, but he had returned to England before the remnants of the *flota* came in.

Spain had shown in 1591 that she was again becoming a sea power. The result was to frighten Elizabeth into keeping her own ships at home and entrusting the Azores blockade to the private enterprise of her subjects. It need hardly be said that if continuous pressure had been exerted from 1588 Philip would have been unable to send to sea a fleet like that of Bazan, and would more likely have been negotiating for peace. In 1592 Frobisher was allowed one ship of the Navy with which to cruise on the Spanish coast and Captain Robert Crosse one other for the Azores, but otherwise the Queen did nothing. A crowd of privateers, including Hawkins's *Dainty*, went to the islands, some under Crosse and Sir John Burgh, and some equipped by Cumberland. The West Indian *flota* was ordered not to sail, but the English scored a success against the home coming carracks, four or five of which approached the islands at the end of July. One was hotly attacked, and was beached and fired by her own crew to avoid capture. Another, the *Madre de Dios*, was taken on 3 August after a desperate fight, the brunt of which was borne by the *Dainty*. The English mariners got out of hand and filled their pockets with East Indian jewels and other valuables. The authorities were very indignant, but on a broad average their seamen were not overpaid. The prize was brought home and her bulky cargo sold for £140,000. Her value at the time of capture was said to have been half a million, or perhaps five million pounds of our money; she was the richest ship ever taken in the old wars.

Next year, 1593, Cumberland went in person to Spain and the Islands with a fleet comprising only two of the Queen's ships. The *flota* drew near in April and disembarked the treasure at Angra, whence it was forwarded to Spain in July after the danger had passed. Philip sent out twenty-four sail to bring home the carracks, and Cumberland found himself too weak to fight. The season's campaign, therefore, produced little result.

During all this time the presence of the Spaniards in Brittany in alliance with the Catholic opponents of Henry IV had been a great trouble to the English Government. In the autumn of 1594 Frobisher led an expedition against them. He stormed a new fort they had occupied near Brest and was mortally wounded in doing so. After this the Spaniards still held an inferior anchorage at Blavet, which gave them little power of offence against England but proved a disturbing factor to the plans of Drake and Hawkins in the following year. Frobisher's effort exhausted the Queen's activity, and it was left for Cumberland to send a privateer force to the Azores in 1594 without royal support. His men had a hard tussle with a carrack, which was burnt and lost, and then found themselves too weak to attack another which showed fight. But even this poor effort was sufficient to make Philip countermand the *flota*, since he had no force to send to its rescue. Both English and Spanish troops were now campaigning in France, and land-warfare was sapping the energy of the combatants at sea; but Philip had certainly more excuse for inactivity than had Elizabeth. To this feeble trickle had dwindled the comprehensive policy advocated by Hawkins in 1589.

Drake had been virtually idle since his Portugal voyage, but Hawkins, although not employed at sea, had been busy with the administration of the Navy since his return in 1590. It was a post in which he had already done his great work of economical reform, and he had

little taste for continuing in it, for he saw that the use rather than the forging of the weapon now made the most urgent call upon the nation's talents. He was to get his way, with the usual crippling modifications, in 1595, but meanwhile some transactions of the last stage of his management must be considered.

It will be remembered that the contract for the routine work of the dockyards had been ended at the close of 1587, and that the steady increase in the number of the ships had made it inadvisable to frame another whilst the war endured. The expenditure was rapidly mounting, and, even after the maximum effort of 1588 had been defrayed, could never be reduced to its former level. The government had reluctantly to recognize this fact, and in 1590 it gave order to the Exchequer to increase the old annual warrant of £5,714 to £8,973 from that year onward.¹ Additional warrants were, of course, always being called for, fluctuating from year to year in accordance with the extent of undertakings at sea. The Armada campaign had shown that the Navy was neither so weak as doubters had predicted nor so strong as to be sufficient for all possible emergencies. In the winter of 1588 the admirals demanded a programme of new construction, and the following year saw the launch of four fighting galleons of the *Revenge* type and of a number of minor craft.

Hawkins had stated his wish to resign the Treasurership as early as the autumn of 1588. In the following year he hoped to compass the same end by obtaining a more or less continuous command at sea in pursuance of the blockade policy. This is implicit in a letter to Burghley, in which he wrote:

'I have now gathered together my receipts and payments for xj years ended the last of December 1588, which note I send your lordship herewith; if it may please your good lordship to give order to clear this surplusage as is noted in the foot of this

¹ *Domestic Calendar, Addenda, 1580-1625*, p. 304.

declaration, I shall ever be bound to pray for your lordship, I shall be able to clear the office with credit, and I shall go forward the better with ability and courage to furnish this enterprise I have in hand, which shall be a rare example of order and benefit for Her Majesty's service. . . . I hope within 8 or 10 days to be able to wait upon your lordship that I may at large declare the manner of my proceeding, which your lordship will easily conceive to be substantially done and with easy charge; although many make mountains of molehills.'¹

But the government showed no intention of letting him hand over his charge to any one else. In April 1590, still smarting under the postponement of his Atlantic cruise, he wrote again to the minister, offering his resignation in explicit terms, and complaining that the Queen was dissatisfied with his work.² He was in a mood of depression, due perhaps to ill-health, and bemoaned his 'careful, miserable, unfortunate, and dangerous' life. His next reference to resignation was certainly coincident with an infirmity. On 8 July 1592, he wrote:

'When the *Swiftsure* was launched at Deptford, the ship sitting very hard, we were forced to use great violence upon the tackles, whereof one gave way and brake, so as one end of a cable ran by my leg and hurt me in vj places.' After expressing once more his sense of the Queen's disapproval he concluded: 'I would to God the ability of my body and strength were such as I could thereby promise better, but as it is I will not fail to do the best I can. With me I do confess it is at the best, for I am not able to perform that which I desire to do. Therefore I do most humbly pray your good lordship to be a mean to Her Majesty that some discreet and able man may be thought upon to supply my place, which to instruct I will abide such a convenient time as shall seem good unto your lordship, and will nevertheless ever during my life attend her Majesty's service any other way that I shall be appointed, wherein my experience and skill will serve; for with good favour of Her Majesty's and your lordship's I shall

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 226, No. 30, 12 Sept. 1589.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 231, No. 83, printed in full in Oppenheim's *Administration of R. N.*, pp. 147-8.

ever acknowledge myself more bounden than if I had received in gift great treasure.¹

We may read in this that the weight of sixty years of 'painful' living was troubling him more than the smart of his leg; but it was of no avail, for as long as he lived he was indispensable. It is curious, in view of the fact that his letters have so long been available to research, that the legend has persisted of his having been a mannerless boor; surely no man of action ever worded a resignation more gracefully than in the last sentence quoted above.

In February 1594 he returned to the matter for the last time now on record. As this is the last of his letters which we shall have occasion to quote in full, it is given with the original spelling and punctuation as an illustration of their style. The spelling may be described as good, for it is at least consistent, which cannot be said of that of many highly placed persons of the period.

'my most honorable and especyall good lord,

I do send herewith unto your lordship the estatte of xv yeres of myne accomptes of which ix yeres are past before your lordship by duplycements, the boockes of fowre yeres are with the audytours and have byne longe, and ten yeres are redde lying by me fyrmyd² by thofficers, so as, as muche as ys in me to do ther ys no tyme neglectyd, yett I ame troblyd with presses owt of thexchecquyre, the busynes ys very great that ys to be performyd, my wyffe ys in that wekenes yett that I cannot remove her from dedford, and by that occasyon I remayne there with my howshold, this dede tyme of the yere with passyng in and owt by watter I do hardly escape sycknes, wherefore I humbly pray your lordship I may have the favour to attend upon my lord cheffe barron and mr. fanshew, the next terme, her majesties service shalbe the better fortheryd and reseave lesse damage, and so your lordship may have me with gods favour to do her majestie service some longer tyme.

after I had servyd one yere in this office I was ever desyrous to be delyveryd from yt, mr gonson told me thoffice was of great

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 242, No. 79.

² Signed.

care troble and charge and of no benyfytt, but I wold not beleve hym, when he said I shall plucke a thorne owt of my fotte and put yt into yours which now I fynd too trew, for I may justly say that besyde my ordynary fee and dyett ther ys not any fees or vayles in all my tyme worthe xx^s to me.

all that I gett by my travaylle and industry otherwyse I consume in the attendance in this office, therefore I humbly pray your lordship to favour me to be delyveryd from this contynewall thrawldome which I mynd to procure by all the meanes I can, and so prayinge to god for your lordshipes hellthe do humbly take my leve from deptford the [blank] of feb 1593

your lordships ever most bounden

John Hawkyns.¹

The routine of the dockyards was in these years similar to that described in earlier chapters, and it is hardly necessary to go into further details here. There was one proposed new departure of which Hawkins expressed disapproval, that of making Portsmouth instead of Chatham the head-quarters of the Navy. Portsmouth was more accessible to squadrons cruising in the Channel or westwards, but it was more open to attack and had other disadvantages. Hawkins and Borough wrote jointly to the Lord Admiral in the autumn of 1591, pointing out that the staff of shipkeepers and the supply of ground tackle would need to be doubled owing to the insecurity of the riding, that unrigged ships could be surprised and burnt by a small force, and that the forts were an insufficient defence; their shot had recently failed to stop a Scotsman from sailing out in broad daylight, although he was under arrest. The transportation of gear also (from the Tower and other store places) would be 'tedious'. The ships should therefore lie always at Chatham in the winter, even if they used Portsmouth in the summer.² This opinion seems to have settled the matter, for the predominance of Portsmouth was not revived.

¹ S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 247, No. 27.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1591-4, p. 116.

The capture of the *Madre de Dios* in 1592, and the ungodly plundering in which the privateer crews indulged, called forth the energies of most of the Queen's faithful servants in an effort to preserve something for her. The carrack was brought into Dartmouth early in September, but her choicest spoils were already in the English ships, most of which made for Plymouth. There speculators were soon at work buying diamonds and rubies by the score and the hundred from private mariners, whilst the officers thought more of bestowing their own booty than of searching their men's chests. Sir Robert Cecil journeyed westwards and met the men dispersing over the country; he could smell them as they came along by the amber and musk they had in their bundles. Raleigh, then under arrest for his unlicensed marriage, was released from the Tower to go and exert his influence over the seamen, and Hawkins did what he could to the same end in London. Most of it was labour lost, for discipline was at an end. It was of no use to put the suspects on oath; the ceremony was mere 'offence to God'. Hawkins's own ship the *Dainty*, under Captain Thompson, had done hard service in the capture, and as she had lost her masts by the carrack's fire she was not in at the death. Her people had made very little. As she approached Gravesend, not having touched at Plymouth, Hawkins was careful to have her searched like any other for concealed spoil, and would not see her captain until it had been done.¹ After a long and indecent wrangle the Queen took an undue share of what was saved, but most of those concerned had done pretty well. What became of the carrack is nowhere recorded. She was an immense ship, but probably in poor condition. Her crew had made an honourable defence, and

¹ Hawkins's letters on the subject are in Lansdowne MS., 70, ff. 88, 96-7, 119, 153. His first thought had been to order the Channel guard to cover the prize lest she should be cut out by the Spaniards from Brittany.—H. M. C., *Marquis of Bath MSS.*, ii. 38.

her captain, who had sworn to burn her rather than surrender, had been killed by the *Dainty's* shot.

In 1593 Richard Hawkins, now a sea-captain of varied experience, planned a voyage into the Pacific Ocean by the Straits of Magellan. He took with him the *Dainty*, a pinnace, and a victualler, and the preparations for so distant a voyage, even with a small squadron, involved an appreciable fraction of the family fortune. He took leave of his father in June—a last farewell, as it was to prove—and made his way southward to the Straits. The details of the voyage do not belong to this book; they may be read at length from the commander's own pen in the celebrated *Observations of Sir Richard Hawkins*. Here it is enough to note that Hawkins reached the coast of Peru with his flagship alone, and was there overwhelmed by a superior Spanish force to which he surrendered on 22 June 1594. The news of his disaster came to England after the lapse of nearly a year. It was a sad blow to his father, and an augmentation of the melancholy which increased upon him in his later days. But with John Hawkins melancholy did not induce indolence; work was always his antidote for affliction of the spirit. The Queen had already decided that he and Drake should come forward again to try whether the men of the old school could not galvanize the English war effort into some promise of success. It was certainly time for something more vigorous than the privateering of recent years, for men were beginning to say with truth that King Philip had been 'wakened, not weakened' by his early disasters.

VII

THE LAST SERVICE

IT is unfortunate that to tell the truth about Hawkins involves in some passages an appearance of decrying Drake. But it is only an appearance, for the real Drake is unaffected, the brilliant man of action, the most daring and fortunate of the sea-adventurers, the first demonstrator of the hollowness of Spanish power. It is the Drake of the too generous eulogist, the great organizer and original thinker, who is attacked, and who is seen, by comparison with the taciturn figure in the background, to have been neither great nor original in those respects. Nowhere is this more clearly apparent than in the story of the last voyage. Historians, drawing their impressions from the biographers of Drake—for there have been few of Hawkins—have told how all the brisk plans of Drake were foiled by the jealous tardiness of Hawkins, a dotard who should never have been sent to encumber a hero. The following pages will be compelled to point out that this is the opposite of the truth; that, although the Queen and her ministers must bear the chief part of the blame, there was yet a chance of success when the expedition left Plymouth; that all depended on the swift prosecution of the plan; that it was Drake who, by neglect of administrative duty, compelled a fatal postponement; and that Hawkins died in the knowledge that the expedition was cast away by his colleague's fault in a matter wherein he himself had ever been most scrupulous to do his duty.

As early as 1593 there had been talk of a new expedition to the West Indies, to attack the sources of Spanish wealth as a variation upon the policy of intercepting it on its way to Europe; but at that time nothing had come of the idea. To Elizabeth the weak Spanish force on the Breton seaboard was an ever present bugbear, and whilst

it remained she could not nerve herself to send a great expedition so far away from the call of home defence. It is probably more than a coincidence that the first evidence of an immediate western design occurs just after Frobisher's success at Brest at the beginning of November 1594. That exploit left the Spaniards in possession of Blavet alone, a port which even the Queen could not take too seriously as a base of invasion. However that may be, we have a vague statement that the commanders for the new venture were chosen in November,¹ and administrative documents to prove that they were busy with their preparations early in December.²

The plan, as at first conceived, was for the fleet to land a small military force at Nombre de Dios. The troops were then to march across the Isthmus and capture Panama with a view to 'possessing', by methods not stated, the treasure which came up the Pacific coast from Peru. This done, the commanders were, if they saw fit, to leave a permanent garrison in Panama, but they were to bring the ships home without delay. These details we have on the authority of Sir William Monson, a sea officer then serving, although not a member of the expedition;³ the official instructions given to the leaders have not been preserved. It is undoubtedly true that the capture of Panama was intended, but it seems hardly possible that any one thought of holding it with a few

¹ Thomas Maynarde's account of the voyage, Add. MS., 5209, printed by the Hakluyt Society as *Sir Francis Drake His Voyage*, ed. W. D. Cooley, 1849. Maynarde, whose account goes into most detail, was a land officer who served in the fleet. He had a poor opinion of Hawkins, and is the source of the current estimates of the two commanders. It may be fairly said that, although a keen observer, his writing does not give the impression that he was a judicious critic, for he lacked the knowledge that would have enabled him to probe beneath the surface of the transactions he noted.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1591-4, p. 566.

³ Oppenheim, *Monson's Tracts*, i. 313.

hundred men cut off from relief for months at a time.¹ Their surrender would have been inevitable. As for the taking of the Peruvian treasure, it could only have applied to the stuff actually found in Panama, for the English force would have had no fighting ships at its disposal on the Pacific coast. It is true that Oxenham had gone across the Isthmus in 1575 and had captured treasure-ships by means of boats constructed on the spot; but he had succeeded only by surprise at a time when the Spanish vessels on the coast were unarmed. There was no hope of repeating the exploit twenty years later. The object, then, resolved itself into the acquisition of the problematical gains of a raid on Panama, after a march with unseasoned men through the most fever-stricken country in America. Drake is held to have been the originator of the scheme, but Hawkins must at least have consented, or he would not have taken part. It is not surprising that when later news arrived of more accessible booty at Porto Rico, they made that their primary aim and relegated Panama to a secondary position. This point must be emphasized, for upon it depends a correct appreciation of the whole story: the expedition actually sailed to attack Porto Rico.

The commanders, as has been indicated, were Drake and Hawkins, and they were appointed not as principal and subordinate but as colleagues with equal powers. It was an arrangement not hitherto adopted,² and it was a fatal mistake. It would, of course, have been impossible to have sent out either man as the subordinate of the other. But common sense required that one should have gone in sole command whilst the other was employed elsewhere; and if the plan was Drake's, he ought to have been entrusted with its execution. It would have been fairly hopeless to set any two leaders of that

¹ Oppenheim's opinion, p. 79.

² In the Hawkins-Frobisher campaign of 1590 the two leaders had commanded separate squadrons operating far apart from one another.

day to work together with equal authority; and the Drake-Hawkins combination was the worst that could well have been chosen. It was not that they were on bad terms, or even on terms of rivalry. The joint undertaking is a sufficient refutation of that idea, for neither was fool enough to stake his fame and fortune on a project of which he could foresee the failure. The error lay in more recondite matters, familiar enough to our modern generation accustomed to historical analysis, but not so apparent to Elizabethans who occupied themselves more with the making than with the discussion of history. The two men were of fundamentally different natures which impelled them to approach every problem in a different manner. Hawkins was all for 'good order', by which he meant much more than discipline—careful organization, methodical preparation allowing always a balance of necessities in hand, the thinking out of plans in detail, and thereafter punctual adherence to them;—although with all this he was ready, as his past had shown, to rise to an emergency and adapt himself with cool judgement to its call. Perhaps in that respect his brain had become less supple; it was long since he had been tested, and one cannot judge; and there is nothing in this last voyage to prove that such was or was not the truth. Drake, as his whole career bears witness, was a man who refused to think ahead, a born opportunist and improviser, disdaining calculation, rising to his best in a crisis that found other men hesitant. In place of planning he relied on vision, and intuitive process rather than conscious reasoning inspired his decisions; that was why he could not work easily with a council of war. At his best he was invincible, but there were times when he was not at his best, as perhaps at San Juan long ago, and certainly in the Portugal campaign when his vision had clouded and his nerve had failed.

These were the two whom Elizabeth in her wisdom yoked together. The bitterest foe of either could have

hit upon no surer means of closing their careers beneath a cloud. What Burghley thought of it we cannot tell. He was growing very old, and there are indications that in these last years he ceased to think deeply or care very much about anything; the unruly younger forces had worn him down, and his son Robert, a smaller man, was grasping at control.

The conditions of the venture are expressed in an agreement between the Queen and Hawkins, in which Drake's name does not appear. The Queen undertakes to put in order and furnish six of her ships, for which expenditure she is to receive one-third of the booty taken. Hawkins is to victual the squadron for four months, for which he is to take one-third. The remaining third is to go to the mariners, or alternatively Hawkins may pay them fixed wages and take it himself. If the Queen stays the voyage, she is to reimburse Hawkins for his outlay. If she employs the fleet in any other service than that proposed, she shall pay its charges during that service.¹ From subsequent evidence it is clear that Drake not only shared the responsibilities here undertaken by Hawkins alone, but that the two commanders independently victualled and manned each his own half of the fleet,² and that they did so on different scales in accordance with their divergent views of what was necessary. The agreement makes no mention of the score or more of private ships that eventually formed part of the expedition. It may be assumed that their owners ventured them on the same terms as did the Queen, and that for the victualling and wages they came in as subpartners to Drake and Hawkins.

The date of assembly of the fleet at Plymouth is not certainly known, but would seem to have been before

¹ *Domestic Calendar*, 1595-7, p. 66. The date, June, suggested by the editor, is evidently too late; the agreement must have been framed earlier in the year.

² Maynarde explicitly says so (p. 5).

the end of April. At that place the victualling and manning were completed. The anonymous account in Hakluyt says that the men numbered 2,500, mariners and soldiers included. Maynarde puts the total at 3,000, and there was some uncertainty about the exact figures even at the date of sailing. Hawkins, we may be sure, worked to the recognized scale, but Drake exceeded it. Volunteers came in freely, and he did not weed them out with a sufficiently strict eye to the endurance of his victuals. In the provision of the supplies their difference in method once more appeared. Hawkins laid in his stock, or most of it, in London, whilst Drake was still completing his in mid-July from the countryside about Plymouth. On the 16th of that month a correspondent wrote to the younger Cecil that the ships were in good state, for which the methodical work of Hawkins deserved the praise; and that Drake was but little in the town, being busy about provision in the country.¹ Both the Queen and the Lord Admiral subsequently blamed the leaders for the long delay that postponed the start until August, and if there was justice in the criticism it may possibly have pointed to arrears in Drake's preparations. During this time the commanders concealed their differences in public, but Maynarde remarks, 'yet was it apparently seen to better judgements before our going from Plymouth, that whom the one loved, the other smally esteemed'. The constant fret between method and improvisation must have been a trial to the tempers of both. Maynarde, who observed the surface of these things and was not a man of much technical knowledge, put a false construction upon them and evolved a judgement which has been uncritically repeated in many books: Hawkins, he says, was 'a man old and wary, entering into matters with so laden a foot that the other's meat would be eaten before his spit could come to the fire'. It would have been well, as the outcome was to show, if

¹ *Domestic Calendar, 1595-7*, p. 73.

Drake had exhibited a little more of the laden foot in providing meat for his followers. In such a matter the steady game was preferable to the swift.

The Declared Accounts contain a roll¹ exclusively devoted to the expenses of this expedition. The details include some interesting items showing the comforts and necessities thought fit for a long voyage by the man who had devoted more thought than had any other to the subject. In addition to the victuals there was carried a reserve stock of clothing to replace the kits provided by the men themselves and worn out on service. It is not clear whether these garments were to be issued free or their value deducted from wages. They include 400 shirts, 100 pairs linen breeches,² 100 pairs linen netherstocks (drawers?) 1,020 pairs of stockings, 432 Monmouth caps, 2,018 pairs of shoes and 83 'curran buttes', a mysterious item. These quantities do not appear very liberal for 2,500 men, but they were probably provided for the companies of the six Queen's ships only, who would not have constituted much more than half the force. It should be remembered also that the men were not as a rule provided with any clothes by the promoters of sea expeditions. When they had worn out those they brought aboard they went without, and one of the first actions of the captors of a prize was usually to strip their prisoners and appropriate their garments; the Spanish shipmasters taken by Hawkins in 1586 had reported as an especial clemency that they had been allowed to keep their clothes.

Under the head of 'phisickes and chyrurgery' occur lengthy details of the suitable stores and their prices, which should prove valuable to the historian of medicine. Another apparent innovation was that of 927 'Brasill

¹ Exchequer, L. T. R., Decl. Acc., No. 2233.

² The linen would not be fine linen. A paper of the period shows that the coarser qualities shaded imperceptibly into canvas, and that there was sometimes a difficulty in distinguishing between the two.

beds', probably hammocks, which were long afterwards provided at the rate of one to two men, for only one watch could be below deck at a time. The early colonists of Guiana in the next century reported hammocks as used by the Indians of that region, and since in Tudor times Guiana was sometimes reckoned as a part of Brazil, the meaning of the term is fairly certain. Hammocks are seldom or never mentioned in the English sea service before the date of this voyage, although they may have been slowly coming into use since Englishmen had first visited South America under old William Hawkins in 1530. Amongst the victuals Hawkins made a small experiment with a new type of foodstuff, 'lasting victuals, a new kind of victuals for sea service, devised by Mr. Hugh Platte, 4 barrels at £4. 10s. the barrel'. These and other hints from earlier passages in his career, although fragmentary, are sufficient to entitle Hawkins to the credit of being a pioneer in the matter of hygiene at sea, just as he was clearly a benefactor of the sailor on more general grounds. The censorious Maynarde thought the victualling was meanly done, and accused the commanders of 'miserably providing' in order to make a profit for themselves. He betrays no knowledge of the strict auditing of every detail of the accounts, which would have permitted of such a profit only by collusion between the commanders and the contractors in the production of falsified receipts. When we remember the malevolent scrutiny to which all Hawkins's affairs had been hitherto subjected, we can dismiss the possibility of such a fraud, apart from the fact that he and Drake were honourable men. It is, however, likely that Drake in his haste was imposed upon and that his men paid the penalty. But Maynarde is a bad witness, a landsman unbroken to the normal hardships of sea life.

The six Queen's ships were the *Defiance*, *Garland*, *Hope*, *Bonaventure*, *Adventure*, and *Foresight*. The Declared Accounts give also thirteen private vessels,

but this is not a full list. There were altogether twenty-seven sail in the fleet, by the evidence both of Maynarde and of the Hakluyt narrative. The names of four not given in the Accounts are known, and there was probably an uncertainty whether one or two pinnaces should be classed as separate units or merely as great boats. The Hakluyt and Maynarde stories imply that Hawkins sailed in the *Garland* and Drake in the *Defiance*, both new galleons of the *Revenge* pattern. Sir Thomas Baskerville, a soldier of repute, commanded the land forces and brought the expedition home after the admirals were dead.

The long and unexplained delay in the preparations allowed Spain to gather ample warning. By the middle of April news had reached the West Indies that a descent upon them might be expected,¹ and a spy's report from Lisbon in June declared that the Azores and Canaries were being fortified and that a Spanish fleet of twenty-five sail was getting ready for sea.² If this fleet should hasten its going, the Panama project would become yet more precarious unless the English should first achieve a decisive victory at sea. Actually the Spaniards did not reach the Caribbean in time to stop the attempt, but they did fight an action off Cuba with the homeward-bound expedition after the raid on Panama had failed. In view of these facts we are left wondering more than ever what was the real history of the inactive months at Plymouth, for they are so utterly out of keeping with the previous record of both Drake and Hawkins. The causes of the final three weeks of delay are clear enough, but those of the longer period are impenetrable.

Philip, when anxious for his treasure-convoys, had more than once played a card which had delayed the English projects of attack. He had found that in order

¹ Add MS., 13964, a Spanish relation printed and translated in the Hakluyt Soc. volume which contains Maynarde's account, p. 47.

² *Domestic Calendar*, 1595-7, p. 51.

to make Elizabeth countermand an ocean expedition he had only to threaten a movement in home waters, upon which the Queen's timidity could be relied upon to accomplish his wishes. At the close of July 1595, when Drake and Hawkins were at last ready to start, he resorted again to the old device. There were at Blavet fewer than 1,000 Spaniards with four galleys and some unarmed sailing craft. He authorized their officers to make a raid upon the Cornish coast, a mere tip-and-run proceeding which could do no real damage but must look for its justification in moral effect. On 23 July news came to Plymouth that 400 Spanish soldiers were burning Penzance and the neighbouring villages. The commanders at once sent men overland to the rescue, and ships from Plymouth Sound to cut off the galleys. The Spaniards did not await their coming, judged the time to a nicety, and regained Blavet unscathed. In government circles the effect was considerable. The Queen at once began to see visions of a new Armada, and grew especially nervous about an invasion of Ireland. Her first impulse was to order the admirals to take station off the Irish coast. They replied that they could not do so under the terms of the agreement, whereupon she consented to entrust the duty to a separate squadron under Sir Henry Palmer.¹ Two days later she wrote again, blaming them for not having been at sea long before. Their former delays, she said, had given the Spaniards time to take counter-measures, and this further delay was the result. The expedition was now to shape its course along the coast of Spain, find out what was preparing there, and resist it with diligence; and if it heard of any move upon Ireland, to counter it before all else. After that, it might spend one month in cruising for the plate-fleet from Havana.²

This decision meant the overthrow of the West Indian project, for the fleet would certainly not go farther

¹ *Domestic Calendar*, 1595-7, pp. 88-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 90-1.



AN ENGLISH SHIP OF THE EXPEDITION OF 1595

than the Azores. It is possible that traitors at court were working on the Queen's fears. A letter of intelligence, dated 12 August, says so, and that the King of Spain had received assurances that he need fear nothing from Drake and Hawkins, for their voyage should be broken at the outset.¹ On the 13th the commanders wrote to Sir Robert Cecil and the Queen a stiff protest in which they said plainly that if she desired to delay or divert the intended purpose she must pay the whole cost of the fleet. It was, they continued, not a suitable armament for blockade or protracted cruising, and they must decline responsibility for such a course.² Elizabeth composed a furious reply, containing detailed rebukes and ending with a prohibition to sail at all. It was drafted by Burghley but endorsed as 'not sent'.³ Perhaps it was Burghley's counsel that provided the answer which was sent, namely, that they might sail westwards if they would promise to be back within six months; for the Queen had now veered to the opinion that Philip was preparing a great invasion for the following year. Into the midst of these debates came a piece of news that solved all difficulties and reconciled the Queen to an immediate start.

In the middle of March the plate-fleet of *Tierra Firme* had left Havana, its rendezvous for the ocean passage, and had passed out through the Florida Channel. In doing so it had run into a storm in which the flagship had lost her mainmast, broken her tiller, and sprung a serious leak. The rest of the fleet went on to Spain, but this crippled vessel, with two million ducats in gold and silver, made for San Juan de Porto Rico, where her commander lodged the treasure in the citadel and sent word to Spain of what had occurred. Philip, after considerable delay, got ready five of the armed gallizabras to go and bring home the treasure, but these had not sailed

¹ *Domestic Calendar*, 1595-7, p. 92.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

from Spain by the end of August.¹ In the middle of that month privateers brought into Plymouth some prisoners who revealed the existence of the treasure at Porto Rico. Drake and Hawkins at once snatched at the way out of their troubles. Porto Rico was an easier and nearer mark than Panama. With a swift stroke they might gain a brilliant prize and be home within the time stipulated by the Queen. They wrote to her and suggested the alteration in the plan, and she, perhaps ashamed of her former shabby behaviour, bade them begone at once with her blessing.²

Everything now depended upon rapid movement. The admirals knew that a Spanish fleet was preparing, although they can only have guessed at the advance squadron of gallizabras. But the latter were a possibility that must have occurred to their minds, for two million ducats were a sufficient stimulus to wits and energies on both sides. An immediate run to Porto Rico, a bold handling of ships and troops, and the place might fall before relief could arrive. The English fleet sailed eagerly out of Plymouth on 28 August.

Four days out, and only seventy leagues from Plymouth, Sir John Hawkins called a council on board the *Garland*. It was the usual practice to take advantage of the first calm to do this for the purpose of settling details about course and rendezvous, things that might have leaked out had they been determined before leaving port. At this meeting Drake revealed an ominous fact. He had taken on board his ships three hundred men more than their proper complement, he was anxious about victualling, and he proposed that Hawkins should ease him of his surplus hands.³ Drake was either culpably ignorant at the hour of sailing about his numbers and the state of his stores, or he had deliberately concealed

¹ The Spanish relation in the Hakluyt Society's 1849 volume, already cited, pp. 46-7.

² Maynarde, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

from his colleague a departure from the plan, and now sprang it upon him as an accomplished fact. The methodical Hawkins felt outraged and, says Maynarde, 'gave no other hearing to this motion, but seemed to dislike that he [Drake] should bring more than was concluded betwixt them, and this drew them to some cholerick speeches. But Sir John would not receive any [men] unless he were entreated; and to this Sir Francis' stout heart could never be driven.' Captain John Troughton, another eye-witness, says, 'there passed many unkind speeches, and such as Sir John Hawkins never put off till death'.¹ The council then proceeded to the business of nominating its own future members, laying down the course, and providing against separation in foul weather; and gave orders 'what allowances we should put our men into for preservation of victuals', four days out from England. As the officers came on deck to return to their ships the fire broke out again, and old Hawkins lost his usual self-control, 'revealing the places whither we were bound in the hearing of the basest mariner, observing therein no warlike or provident advice; nor was it ever amended till the time of their deaths'.² The present is governed by the past, and in the mind of Hawkins, strive as he might to forget, that ugly memory of the flight from San Juan de Ulua could hardly fail to arise, to exasperate his indignation and to whisper that his colleague was still the untrustworthy comrade of thirty years before.

At the council Drake had not revealed—perhaps he did not know—the full extent of his deficiency. But a week later he hung out the flag of council from the *Defiance*, and when the officers were assembled he declared that his squadron could not proceed on the voyage without replenishing its victuals. He proposed therefore to make a raid upon Madeira or Grand Canary, pre-

¹ Journal of Capt. Troughton, in S. P. Dom. Eliz., vol. 257, No. 48 (i).

² Maynarde, p. 6.

ferably the latter. Drake had won over Baskerville, but the council was divided, some thinking of the immediate advantage, others of the peril of delay to the principal object of the voyage. Hawkins very justifiably declared that the idea was preposterous and that Drake was to blame for shipping too many men; nevertheless, if he would acknowledge his fault, he (Hawkins) 'would rid him and relieve him the best he could'.¹ This caused another angry outburst, Hawkins self-righteously determined to inflict humiliation, Drake obstinately refusing to acknowledge his offence. This is Maynarde's impression, but he had no love for either commander. It is conceivable that Hawkins realized that the divided command could only lead to disaster, and that he was striving for the common good to establish his own ascendancy; and that Drake was acting with a similar motive. Baskerville calmed the violence of the dispute and restored some semblance of decorum; and all agreed to dine together next day on board Hawkins's ship.

Troughton gives some additional details. Hawkins, he says, utterly refused to go to the Canaries, alleging that there could be no necessity in view of the short time since they had left England, that it would mean a fight serious enough to hazard the whole expedition, and that it would waste time that could never be recovered. To this Baskerville replied that he would undertake to capture Las Palmas in four hours, and that within four days they could collect the ransom and be off. It was hardly the word of a prudent soldier about a place of whose strength he was ignorant, but he seems to have made up his mind that necessity left no alternative and that it was best to put a bold face on the decision. Still neither admiral would yield. Drake declared he would go to the Canaries with such ships as would follow him, and Hawkins that he would lead the remainder straight to Porto Rico. At this point the meeting dissolved, and

¹ Maynarde, p. 7.

peace-makers afterwards patched up an agreement; Drake 'confessed need', and Hawkins 'was content to assist them, yet in his judgement labour lost, with much hazard of all'. Maynarde represents that the decision was concluded at the dinner next day, 'when it was resolved that we should put for the Grand Canary, though, in my conscience, whatsoever his tongue said, Sir John's heart was against'.

On 24 September the fleet sighted Lancerota and Fort-eventura, and on the morning of the 27th came abreast of Las Palmas. Four hours elapsed while Drake looked for a landing-place and Baskerville got 1,400 men into the boats. The place selected was a beach between the town and an outlying fort, but the sea ran high upon it, and the delay gave time for the Spaniards to bring up field-guns and 900 musketeers. With these they manned entrenchments already constructed. The smaller English ships stood close in to cover the landing with their fire. But wrangles and divided leadership were not conducive to the dashing conduct requisite for an affair of this sort; the more Baskerville looked at his task the less he liked it, and he ended by going to the admirals and asking 'if they would put their voyage thereon or no'.¹ Not even Drake was prepared to stake all on the chance, and so the men were taken on board the ships again and the expedition weighed anchor. It stood along to the western side of Grand Canary, and there some men went ashore for water, and others 'for pleasure'. A land-captain named Grimston was set upon by peasants, who killed him and captured some of his companions. The Hakluyt account says that from their disclosures the governor learned the destination of the voyage and sent off a fast caravel to warn their quarry. Not one of the narratives mentions the taking of any food-stuffs, and it is certain that none were obtained. And yet, after all, the fleet sailed over to the Caribbean with-

¹ Troughton.

out any more complaints of scarcity, a sufficient justification of Hawkins's objection to the Canary venture. It would seem that when Hawkins consented to share resources with his colleague the food problem was solved, and that it was only Drake's self-esteem that then demanded the Las Palmas attempt. Maynarde says the moral effect of the fiasco upon the men was disastrous, and one may well believe him.

The Atlantic passage occupied a month, and the expedition made its rendezvous at Guadeloupe on 28 and 29 October. It had been scattered by a storm shortly before, and two of the small vessels, the *Francis* and the *Delight*, had not yet rejoined on the 30th. The Spanish government had in the meantime sent off five gallizabras to bring home the treasure from Porto Rico. They had started after the English departure from Plymouth but, being fast ships and having made a direct passage without halting by the way, they came in sight of the Lesser Antilles just after the English had arrived there; and they had the luck to fall in with the *Francis* and the *Delight* whilst the latter were still separated from their commanders. The *Francis*, a bark of 35 tons, was taken, whilst the *Delight* escaped to Guadeloupe with the news.¹

Don Pedro Tello de Guzman, the commander of the gallizabras, learned from his prisoners the strength and destination of the expedition. Maynarde blames for this the indiscretion of Hawkins in talking in the hearing of the mariners; but in fact it made no difference, for instructions in writing were found on board the *Francis*, whose captain had omitted to destroy them. Don Pedro made all sail for Porto Rico. Drake wished to chase and head him off. Hawkins, says Maynarde, would not con-

¹ Hakluyt, Maynarde, Troughton, and the Spanish relation are all in substantial agreement. Five gallizabras were seen by the English, and only five are mentioned by the Spaniards, but the English thought there were three or four more near the scene of action. They were of 200 tons each.

sent, and the idea was abandoned. There were good reasons for refusing to chase. Eight or nine of the armed gallizabras were reported to be in the vicinity, they were swift sailers, and a general chase would have scattered the English fleet with no great likelihood of achieving its object; for if a single one of them had got away Porto Rico would have been warned. In addition to this, the main Spanish fleet, known in June to be preparing, might be following on behind. Hawkins, therefore, insisted upon staying at Guadeloupe 'to trim his ships, mount his ordnance, take in water, set by some new pinnaces, and to make things in that readiness that he cared not to meet with the King's whole fleet'. Hawkins was over-cautious about the Spanish fleet, and it might have been a justifiable risk to ignore it; one cannot appreciate the point without knowing what information the English had at the time of their departure. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Drake's pursuit would have gathered in all the gallizabras and left Porto Rico in ignorance of its enemies' approach. In actual truth, unknown to all at Guadeloupe, Porto Rico had been independently warned by the dispatch-boat from the Canaries, which arrived there at the same time as the English reached Guadeloupe.¹

These events left no chance of taking Porto Rico by surprise, and Hawkins saw very little hope of success in a regular siege; for neither Drake nor Baskerville had so far done anything to inspire confidence in their officers and men. On 31 October, says Troughton, 'Sir John Hawkins, not able to bear his griefs any longer, sickened'. Within a day or two he took to his bed and never rose from it again.

The expedition left Guadeloupe on 4 November, and came to anchor on the 8th among the Virgins, a group

¹ Spanish dispatch cited by Oppenheim, *Monson Tracts*, i. 328. The Hakluyt account implies the same thing, for its writer could only have heard of the dispatch-boat at the Porto Rico end.

lying to the westward of Porto Rico. Then ensued another halt of three days for the organization of the land force in its proper companies, which were drilled on shore by their captains. Hawkins was now very ill and took no further part in the conduct of affairs. Drake is thought to have stayed at the Virgin Islands in order to delude the Spaniards into the belief that the expedition had changed its plan and gone elsewhere; but for this purpose the delay would seem to have been too short. On the 11th he weighed and next day came in sight of San Juan de Porto Rico.

On 3 November (English style) Tello de Guzman had reached the place with his news. The Spanish commanders debated two courses, either to lade the treasure on board the gallizabras and send them at once for Spain, or to use their men and guns for defence and to stand a siege. They rejected the former as too risky, the gallizabras needing a refit and the English being so close at hand; and they adopted the latter plan. They planted new batteries armed from the gallizabras, and sank the crippled treasure-ship and another vessel in the mouth of the harbour. Having done this, they felt confident of resisting any attempts the English might be in a position to make. As the event turned out, they were justified. On the night of the 13th Drake sent in a boat party to attack the shipping in the harbour, whose entrance was too well blocked for the larger English vessels to pass in. The attackers fired one gallizabra and were then beaten off. The fight was hot, and the English lost about a hundred men. Thereafter nothing further was done, and after lingering for ten days in the neighbourhood the whole expedition made sail from Porto Rico to look for easier prey. As is well known, it found nothing of moment, the Panama attempt was made and failed, Drake died at the end of January, and Baskerville brought the survivors home in the spring of 1596.

In all this Hawkins bore no part. On 12 November,

at three in the afternoon, just as the fleet was anchoring for the attempt on Porto Rico, he died in his cabin. Maynarde gives the time as above; the Hakluyt writer, not so precise an observer, says his death occurred at night. Troughton's journal gives the date as the 12th, without specifying the hour: 'this day also died Sir John Hawkins, whose death of many was much lamented'. In a letter to the Queen, written after the return to England, Troughton went into greater detail:

'Sir John Hawkins, upon his deathbed, willed me to use the best means I could to acquaint Your Highness with his loyal service and good meaning towards Your Majesty, even to his last breathing; and forasmuch as, through the perverse and cross dealings of some in that journey, who, preferring their own fancy before his skill, would never yield but rather overrule him, whereby he was so discouraged, and as himself then said his heart even broken, that he saw no other but danger of ruin of the whole voyage, wherein in some sort he had been a persuader of Your Majesty to hazard as well some of your good ships as also a good quantity of treasure, in regard of the good opinion he thought to be held of his sufficiency, judgement and experience in such actions; willing to make Your Majesty the best amends his poor ability could then stretch unto, in a codicil as a piece of his last will and testament did bequeath unto Your Highness two thousand pounds, if Your Majesty will take it; for that, as he said, Your Highness had in your possession a far greater sum of his, which he then did also release; which £2,000, if Your Majesty should accept thereof, his will is, should be deducted out of his lady's portion and out of all such legacies and bequests as he left to any of his servants and friends or kinsfolk whosoever, as by the said codicil appeareth.'¹

The navy accounts, when finally settled, showed that Hawkins was slightly in debt to the Queen, and the sum referred to as being in her hands was probably the £7,000 which he had never received of the profits of Drake's voyage of circumnavigation. There may have been other debts of a similar nature. The Lady Margaret Hawkins

¹ *Cal. of Hatfield MSS.*, part vi, p. 163.

was well provided for when all was cleared, apart from her private fortune. It does not appear that her husband thought much about her in his last hours. The marriage could hardly have been more than one of convenience, and the dying man was concerned with the fate of his son, a prisoner in Spanish hands. Yet before all he placed loyalty to the Queen, who treated her servants so hardly yet could ever command their devotion.

In that loyalty he died as he had lived, scrupulous that no obligation of his should be neglected; and as the men who had known him passed in their turns the record of his actions died also out of English memory. In the popular mind he remains to this day only as the man who began the slave-trade. Deeper students have known that he did good work for the Navy, but have been led to believe that he was selfish and covetous with it all, enriching himself whilst others ventured their lives at sea, a perversion of the truth that should long ago have been exposed. Yet men like John Hawkins do not live in vain. Their record may perish, but something indestructible survives. They have made their contribution to the national tradition, and many who have never heard their names may be moulded in their likeness. The great Elizabethans, like the great Puritans and the great Victorians, live still in the English people of to-day. So lives every man in his degree, his personality tingeing the stream that flows without a pause. There is our assurance of immortality.

APPENDIX

BRITISH MUSEUM, COTTON MSS., OTHO E. VIII
ff. 17-41 b.

An Account of Hawkins's Third Slaving Voyage.

(An edition of this MS., with an introduction forming the basis of Bk. I, Ch. VI-IX, of this biography, was awarded the Julian Corbett Prize, 1926, at the Institute of Historical Research.)

For some remarks on this MS. and its probable authorship, see the opening pages of Bk. I, Ch. VII.

The missing portions at the top of each leaf probably represented three or four complete lines and, as will be seen, a larger number are defective. In the version here given the missing words have been supplied, where possible, in square brackets; words which are fairly certain are printed in Roman type, and those which are more conjectural in Italic. Punctuation and capitals have been supplied.



Outline of a leaf (folio 27 a) of Cotton MSS., Otho E viii, to show extent of destruction by fire. One-third actual size.

... ships which ... before the ij ships¹ wayed ... in the Jhesus f. 17. to cale the co. ... being but haulfe steadie mounted up over ... then slewe a mayden, a pitifull chaunce ... fortunes to happen in the vioadge thus t ... wyndes which almost ... arived in Plemowth in thende of the monethe [of August], when we fownd the 4 aforesaide ships named the [William and John], the Swallow, the Judith & the Angell with [a pinnace of] the burthen of vij tonnes to serve divers tournes in [the voyage. *As*] we were in Plemowth providing and taking in such [things as there] were for vs, there came from London by land ij P[ortugals, by whose] procurement the vioadge was begonn, to goe with [us *on the voyage*]. After the ij were come oure generall aforesaid [*had them well*] entertayned and also shewed them in what order all the ships and al[l *other things stood*]. The Portugals, confessing that they had never sene this [better *performed*], saide that they thought them selves happye that vnder su[ch a *captain* and of] so greate experience as oure generall was knowen to be of, they shoulde goe, and [therefore] they were sure they shoulde the better thorowghe him q[uit their] promise to the Quenes Majestie and the adventurers in this vioa[dge and even] enlarge it. Oure generall taking great paynes to dispatche [*all things so*] that we were at the sea, being abourde the Jhesus, [*tidings*] were browght him that these Portugals aforesaide, whoe lay ashore for theire pleasure and were accompanied with marchaunts by-caw[se that] they not be trowbled in any thing but to have all thinges to their [own] content, were fledde awaye. [*And*] these villaynes as it appeareth that long before they had pretended to wor[ck] this feat, for nowe having made a great some of moneye in the [*hands of*] the marchaunts adventurers, after, it was vnderstood, went over into Britaine in a barck of [the] same cowntrey. The generall writt vnto the Quenes Majestie the [*premises*] and to others of the Cownsaile with the marchaunts adventurers in the vioadge, and to knowe the Quenes pleasure what sh[ould] be done sence they were gonn.² About this

¹ The *Jesus of Lubeck* and the *Minion*.

² Actually the flight of the Portuguese took place after the entry of the Flemish squadron into Plymouth. The latter event happened at the end of August, whilst Hawkins wrote to announce the escape of the Portuguese on

tyme there came into the hav[en] of Plemowth owte of the sea vij sayles of great shippes and in them 4000 soldiers besides mariners, and ij small barckes who wayghted on them. The Lorde of Camphyere,¹ Admyrall of Flavnders, was generall of them and [came] with their banners of the kinges armes of Spaine displayed, meaning to ank[er] in Catt Water where the Jhesus and Mynion

f. 17b. . . . the bowndery . . . in the aste water. The . . . loofed to for this, but stobornlye . . . enes aforesaide. Vpon this oure generall . . . of their presomptuos worcking might . . . of the Jhesus and the Mynion haulfe a . . . ge]nerall and made readye to defende the [*Catwater, thinking that*] this was a signe of small frendshippe and [*evil intention th*]at strawngers, seying the Quenes ships and [*Her Majesty's flags*], for f . . . wolde not obeye. And these aforesaid[e ships, namely the] admyrall and vizadmyrall, the Jhesus and the My[nion, shot at the adm]yrall of the Lord of Camphyre, wherevppon bothe s[he and all her] companye loofed into Aste Water and being thorowghly [*daunted of their*] couradge furred there flaggs and ankered to the [. . . of the island] that lieth in the middest of the haven somewhat to asteward. [And when they] had ankered the Lorde of Camphyer sent ashore to the [mayor of] Plemowth and complayned that he was verrey yll [*entreated of*] the ij ships which ridde in Catte Water, [*the which*] ships he knewe not what they were. The mayor had [little] taulke with the messenger, but willed him to goe aboute the [aforesaid] ships and he showld be satisfied as towchinge [his] messag, for they were ships of the Quenes Majestie of Inglond[e and] the worshipfull M^r John Hawkins esquyre was generall of them. The messenger came about the Jhesus and desired to speake with oure generall. Oure generall whoe walked in the wast of the Jhesus, having his garde of partisans in both sides where he walked, comaunded that the messenger showlde be browght before him, whoe when he was come before oure generall with great obesiaunce he declared his messag as followeth: Right worshipfull sir, the Lorde of Camphyre, my master, generall of this fleet, whoe to daye therowghe fowle wether at the sea

16 Sept. This is the only large error of chronology (if it is not merely one of arrangement) discoverable in the MS.

¹ Alphonse de Bourgogne, Baron de Wachen: the title accorded to him by the Cotton author is something of a mystery, not apparently being used elsewhere. 'Camphyere' stands for the port of Veere.

came into this port, being as he is a subject vnto the King of Spaine with whome youre prince hath amitye, mervayleth why you shoulde eyther shotte at his ships or forbidde him this place where you ride . . . navy . . . ry in my mystres, not geving . . . that f. 18. these ij ships wherof [*I am general are ships*] of the Quenes Majesties, in the which [*behalf I will here*] have no such neighbors who on [*their part and for no cause*] wold shewe them selves so stob[orn. *Therefore* the Lord] of Camphyre shoulde consider that thowghe there is great frendshippe betwene th[*em and us*] that the haven [which he] entered was the Quenes, the ships that ridde [therein hers also], that any strawnger owght to be obedi- ente in [*such case to*] this prince, and not seeme to enter aft[er *such manner*. With] this awnswere the messenger departed. Within an h[our after, our] generall sent a present of one dossen wethe . . . London beare, with capons, chikins and other fe[*asts, all the*] which he receaved and gave oure general great thanks for his cu[rtesy. But the] Lorde of Camphyre writte vnto the Spanish [ambassador that] was at London complayning as afore- saide of our[e generall] for shotinge at his ships. Alsoe abowt this tyme [there were] certaine prisoners Fleminges condemned to the gallyes [lying] in a Spanish shippe of Biscay, riding in Catte Water, [and one] after none, the Spaniardes being all most all as[leep, there] came abourde the Spaniard by theire owne report certeyn [men] in a Flemish [*boat*], booted and spurred, with their faces covered, and stowing the Spaniardes, st[ruck off the irons] the Flemynge had on, and caryed them away and sett [them] aland at theire libertye. The captaine of this shippe burthened oure generall herewith, that some of his menne shoulde doe it a[lthough] withowt dowbt he knewe nothing thereof. This Spaniard al[so] writte to the Spanish ambassador complayning on oure generall for the losse of his prisoners. These thinges, first the departure of the ij Portugals which oure generall writt to the Quenes Majestie of, secondly the complaint of the Lord of Camphyre, and thirdly the complaynt of the Spaniard that had his prisoners taken from him, by the Spanish ambassador vnto the Quenes Majesty, it moved Her Grace not a litle. But as fortune was as towchinge the firste matter, the departure of the Portugalls, they had written, belike when they determyned to make of, . . . had letres from . . . den took the boy with him . . . to deliver f. 18b. his generalls letres & left the boy . . . chardge with him. The

Quenes Majestie, [*when that from oure*] generalls letres¹ she per ceaved the depart[ure of the Portugals, *thought he*] had misused them, and they shoulde therefore departe [*out of fear*], but the letres the boy caryed of ther[*es were brought to the*] Quene, in the which letres vnto their frendes [their good usage was] sett oute, oure generall declaring alsoe that [he had very genero]usly vsed them. The which seene, the Quenes [Majesty received] alsoe the complaint of the Spanishe embassador abowt the Lord [of Camphyre], and abowt the Spaniard that had his prisoners taken, [the which the] Quenes Majestie s[tuck] at, but the generalls letres to Her Grace [shewed how] proudly the Lorde of Camphyr entered, & for the prisoners he knewe nothing thereof. [*And to*] him the Quenes Majestie gave new comaundments [that he] shoulde, seing the Portugals were gone, make his v[i]oadge unto] Guynea, and there making slaves negros, with [them] to sayle over from that coast to the Weste or Span[ish Indies] as he had heretofore done in other vioadges. Oure generall [with all] spede nowe made ready to goe to the sea, and abowt the² . . . sett sayle owt of the range of Plemowth with the aforesaid [ships] and pinace, havinge in all in them menne & boyes 408 persons.³ The thirde daye after we had bene at the sea oure generall gave instructions to all the ships that if there shoulde [fort]une to come any fowle wether and thereby they shoulde be sondered one from another, they shoulde repaire to Sancta Crux, a road in the ile of Tenerife of the Canaria, where he wolde water and take in other necessaryes, with divers other articles besides this in the saide instructions. The 4th daye after we departed owte of Plemowth there arose a great tempest and lasted 4 dayes, in the which time, the tempest being verry great and the wether darck, oure fleete were sondred, the Mynion, the William and John & the Swallow together, the Judith alone by her selfe, the

¹ Hawkins's letter referred to here and on f. 17 is evidently the one printed on pp. 137-8 of this book. The fact that the writer of the Cotton MS. was correctly informed of its contents strengthens the authority of other documents quoted by him. He seems to have seen much of Hawkins's correspondence, and to have been entrusted with the task of writing the official record of the voyage. It was evidently for the information of the adventurers, and not for publication.

² Hawkins's account gives the date of sailing as 2 October.

³ This is valuable information, for Hawkins's force has hitherto been variously estimated, but always much in excess of this figure.

Jhesus and the Angell by them selves. In this storm the Mynion lost her long boate with 2 menne in her at her stern, the Swallow lost the pinace afore named which she towed at her stern and 2 menne in her, the Jhesus lost her long boate which she towed at her sterne, but thorowghe the generalls industriesaved the menne. The wether was verrey extreame and browghte the Jhesus insuche case that she opened in the sterne afte, and leakes broak vp in divers places in her, but where she oppened in the sterne the leake was so great that into one place there was thrust 15 peaces of bese to stoppe the place . . . looked ever . . . rde. Oure gene- f. 19.
rall bare a good [countenance *although he*] sawe the storme still endured and [*the ship kept from sinking only with*] continuall pumping night and day [*and the company weary, yet*] knowing moore then he wold the co[mpany should know of the] weaknes of the shippe, had driven it of [*to tell them thereof*] hitherto, but nowe not being able to doe it, [*or to forbear if the*] storme showlde continewe any longer to say [*to them that it was not*] possible to keape the shippe above the water, [for as fast as we] stopped one leake another broake vp, he [called the company] together and oppened vnto them that which th[ey knew not, and saying] that we were but dead menne and in [a ship that was] so weake that she was not able to endure [the wind or the sea] either, desired them to praye vnto allmyghtye [God that he would] take vs to his mercye. His cowntenance never [*shewed his*] sorrowe, but his wordes perced the hartes of all his [company], and it semed vnto them that deathe had somoned th[em] when they harde him recite the aforesaid wordes, for they [knew] such wordes cowlde not issue owte from so invincible a mynde [without] great cawse. There was not one that cowlde refraine his eyes from teares, the which when oure generall sawe he begann to enter in prayer and besowght them to praye with him, the which¹ indeed he yet letted not with great trayvayle to serch the shippe fore and afte for her leakes. Thus we passed the 4th daye at the mercye of God. About midnyght the wynd beganne to cease and the wether to be faire. When the daye, being the 5th daye, came oure generall called the companye together, and geving thanks vnto allmyghty God that he had preserved vs in this tempest, being before determyned to put rome with Ingland if the storme [held], tolde them that nowe, the wynde being northerlye

¹ 'Wch, in MS., but probably an error for 'while'.

and the wether faire, he wolde goe onwarde in the vioadge, and then with the Angell in oure companye we sayled towards the
 f. 19b. isles of [Canaria] . . . generall . . . she was the Judith . . . and saluted the admirall . . . thus we sayled to the roade of [Sancta Crux in Tenerife, and when] we came neare where we shoulde
 [anchor, {they of the castle fired
 our general commanded to fire}] a piece of salvo, and so did a Spanish [ship . . . that] ridde in the roade, that was bounde to the Indies [whereupon our general] comaunded to geve them a dossen peces againe [for a courtesy and] after we had ankered oure generall sent of [a message to the governor] that he came thether to gather his fleet together, which with [extremity of weather] was separated, and for his moneye to provide him [self with divers] necessaryes. Beinge, as he was, verry well knowen [in this is] land before, both the governor and all others said [he was] wellcome and shoulde have anye thing that was in [their power] to serve his tourne. He had divers presentes se[nt to the] shore and divers of the principall of the iland [came] abourde, whom he feasted in all that might bee. That [shew]ing as it semed great frendshipp to oure generall, [they aun]swered him that he wolde come ashoure, but he aunswered [that] the Quenes Majestie had geven him comaundment to the contrarye. [It] happened the second daye after that we came into this roade [that one] M^r Edward Dudley, a gentillmanne whoe oure generall had [with] him to accompanye him, fellowt at woordes with another gentillmanne named George Fitzwilliams.¹ These ij appointed to meet ashore in the ilond to fight. The saide M^r Dudley wente ashore first with his weapon, the generall knowing nothing to what entente, but when it was tolde him he stayed the same George Fitzwilliams and sent ashore for the saide M^r Edward Dudleye to come abourde. When he was come, the generall talking with him and persuading him that he shoulde forgett or put vp the rencor vntill he came in suche place as he might satisfye his mynde, and not have to meane any suche thing in the
 f. 20. midst of oure enemyes the Spaniardes whoe wolde . . . entertayne th . . . him to desiste and . . . M^r Dudley as afore s[aid took this not well but] rather worse. Vppon this oure generall [be-

¹ This is the only reference to Fitzwilliam in the extant parts of the MS. The Hakluyt accounts do not mention him as a member of the expedition. Hakluyt records that he had accompanied the second Hawkins expedition in 1564-5

ing angered with M^r Dudley] strook him with his fiste, and the [said M^r Dudley drew his d]agger vppon the generall, which was ij [feet long. Our general] seing that, drew his rapier dagger w[hich was of the same] lenghe, and thus having betweene them han[d strokes, our] generall cutt him in the hand and arme and [M^r Dudley] thruste the generalls right eye vpper lidde. O[ur men came by] and by betweene the generall and M^r Dudleye an[d laid hands on M^r] Dudleye. The generall, seyng that, with-drewe him[self and forbore to] strike him any more. Imediatlye when it was [known of the deed] of M^r Dudleye it was wonderfull to se how the c[ompany had] bene against and had slaine him owt of hand, but [nevertheless our] generall straightly comaunded that no manne shoulde [hurt him]. This done, the generall comaunded a paire of gyves to be [put on his] legges, and so the generall cured his eye and afterwards [in the] presence of all the companye cawsed the said M^r Dudleye [to be] browghte before him in his irons, when oure generall recited vnto him his [fault] and asked him whether he did think that he did verry well vse him self towards him being generall. He fell downe on his knees and with teares confessed that he had comitted suche an offence that he was vtterlye ashamed thereof and acknowledged that, he having had the chardge of menne, if any soldier of his bande had done the like vnto him he wolde have hanged him therefor, but he besowght the generall to be good to him. Oure generall aunswered and saide that vnto him M^r Dudleye had done no suche offence but he cowlde with his hart pardon it, but consideringe the place where they were and the ships the Quenes and so many menne that Her Grace had geuen him chardge of, that by his disobedience all might be put in dawnger, he must needes be punished therefor. And the generall bringing in an example of a navy that . . . determynd the ver . . . selves to his f. 20b. . . that . . . and cowlde not them hence againe . . . generall seyng him selfe intreated by . . . hole company to take his former chard[ge . . . saide he wold not medle therein except . . . to obeye him hereafter and take him as gen[erall . . . that place did present the king his master. . . Thus he comaunded the beginners of the rebel[lion . . . to all suche passe the hargabusse or to be shotte thorowghe with hargabusse [shot].¹ Oure generall hav-

¹ To this point the subject matter appears to be the historical example cited by Hawkins.

ing ended this taulke, the saide Mr [Dudley confessed] that he knewe this to be trewe for sure, [and that he ha]d hede thereof and therefore besowght oure gener[all to do vn]to him as he might. Oure generall by and by comau[n]ded a har[gabuz to be charged with ij bullett, the which while it was [being done] he willed Mr Dudleye to prepare him self to dye. [The piece] charged, having a furlock & primed, oure generall tooke in his hande. The [aforesaid] Mr Dudleye, seing that his ende was at hande, shedde many g[reat tears], and though the deade which he had done had greatly [angere]d the companye, it was strawnge to se that they that in [their] anger wold have killed him for drawing his dagger on [our] generall bare him now companye weping as fast as he, for the terror of the punyshment which shoulde be executed on him represented vnto them how a manne is the miserablest creature and subject to moste casualtes. Divers of the company fell downe on their knees and besowght the generall to be mercifull vnto Mr Dudleye and made all the intretye they cowlde, but for all they cowlde doe they never cowlde gett grawnt of his life at the generall his handes. This done, the company making great lamentacion and sorrowe, oure generall demaunded of Mr Dudley whether he were readye and had made his prayers vnto God. He awnsvered with teares that he had done with the worlde and was readye to receave the punyshment that the generall wolde appointe him. Great was the

f. 21. sorowe at that instante of all the companye for . . . mans eyes flowing . . . that sorowfull manne beholding . . . shoulde dischardge . . . his irons to be stroken of and threwe not . . . the companye made when they sawe this . . . inward. The sorrowe and teares were . . . before, and before he wolde suffer his irons [to be struck off] he fell downe on his knees before the gener[all and earnestly] besowght that if he wolde that he shoulde lea[ve them, he would pardon] him and forgeve him his offence and for ever forgett it, or els to ende [presently his life] as he that had so forgotten his dewty towards [him did deserve]. Oure generall verry gentilly took him vp from [the ground and] comforting him saide that this matter was nowe vn[done as it] had never bene, the which was sene after, for [he loved the] saide Mr Dudley after farr better then before. A[nd now] there came owte of Spaine abowte that tyme a new [governor] for this ilond where we ridde, whoe after he was lan[ded shewing] a faire face to oure

generall, wente privilye abowt t[o set a trap] which was this. The 4th daye we came thether, at the shutt[ing of] nighte they cawsed all the Spanishe ships and barcks to voyde from betweene the castell and vs, and determyned the nexte morning to shoote at vs owte of theire castell and to sinck vs if they cowlde. Oure generall perceaved by and by by theire woorking theire intente, and at midnight comaunded to waye and bring of the ships ij leagues from the towne, and neverthesse all this ankered there, sent his boat ashore to another place, and drave of the tyme filling water. The next morning when the governor of the ilond and Spaniards when they sawe that the ships were gone, knewe not what was best to doe, for the (*sic*) suspected that oure generall had espyed what they ment to doe and therefore had browghte him selfe vnder sayle. In thend, dowbting there might come some mischiefe hereof, they sente divers of the best of the ilonde abowrde to him, whoe saide that the governor greatlye mervayled whye so suddainlye he had departed and sett sayle. He . . . I thowght I . . . neverthesse I will . . . courtesy vpp hav- f. 21 b.
inge being the sub . . . Inglond and in Her Graces ships . . . the mightye prince the King of Spaine . . . have alsoe bene and with my navye am comaunded . . . Grace my mystres if occasion serve then to . . . shall geve me to the contrary.¹ With this he sen[t ashore and] comaunded his men that were there to con[tinue no longer and] with them to bring away all thinges which were [*to be had and* ne]dded for the ships. The governor thowgh the letre [*had surprised him*] somewhat, when he sawe plainlye that oure generall [*had discover*]ed their worcking, seyng that oure generall [*would not stay*] travayled that all they . . . abowrde vs, the which done and all oure menne com[e aboard], oure generall comaunded to waye, and thus as we passed [by the] town they gave vs haulfe a dossen peeces for a farew[ell]. We gave] them as many againe and departed towards Adessia, [another] place in the ilond, where after we had ridden one [da]y we hard newes that the Mynion, the William and John [and] the Swalloo were at the Gomera, an ilond harde by th[is] Ile of Tenerife. Oure generall, hearing this, departed to Gomera with the Jhesus and

¹ These appear to be fragments of a letter of remonstrance from Hawkins to the governor. On later occasions, as will be seen below, Hawkins claimed in such letters that he was an old servant of Philip II, and that he was ordered by the Queen to assist Spaniards if need arose.

the Angell, having sente the Judith thether before to geve them knowledge of his [being] in Tenerife, and thether we came also, where abowte allhalowntide in the beginning of November we mette all together againe, and for joye everye shipp discharged divers peces of ordnaunce. The governor of this ilond came abowrde to oure generall and offered him that any thinge that was in the ilonde was at his comaundemente. Oure generall gave him thankes, and after he had fullie watred here and taken in other necessaryes, within ij dayes after we had ridden there oure generall comaunded to sette sayle and departed, directing oure

f. 22. course towardes Cabo Blanco . . . almost vnrigged and . . . this tyme sight of ij sayles. [Our generall *because that h*]e wolde vnderstande howe the [*said ships were left without a*]ny bodye in them comaunded the Judith [and the Angel to go] with the aforesaid ij sayles and to will [*their masters to come*] on to the port where he now was come to [wherein certain oth]er ships did ride with much saltfish of divers [kinds, and the ne]xt daye after we were within the Judith and [the Angel came] with one of the ij sayles with them that they went af[ter, which was a] carvell of Viana in Portugall. Oure generall sente fo[r the master a]bowrde and demaunded of him what vessels these [were and what] the menne that belonged to them were become. Th[e master answered] that not 20 dayes paste there came thether certain [Frenchmen] whoe both spoyled all thinges they fownde and verry [*many of them*] were Portugals alsoe, for the feare of the which the [Portugals had] all fledde thence at that tyme to a castell that they [had in the] cowntreye and never came to the porte sence. After tha[t he had] vnderstoode this by the Portugall aforesaide, oure generall tolde [the] Portugall that seing he had founde these three vessels with[out] any living thing in them they were his by the lawe of [the sea and] that he had bene abowrde with them and had appoincted to have one of them, which was a carvell, a newe shippe, alongest with him to serve his towrne in the vioadge, and the other ij, except he might taulk with the owners or some manne that had chardg in them, he muste needes sette them afyre at his departing, considering that the cowntreye in the which we were was of infidels. Oure generall desired the said master of the carvell of Viana to se whether he cowlde fynd owte any of the menne of the said ships and bring them with him to him. The aforesaid master was ij dayes seek-

ing for to meete some of the menne of these saide ships, and the second daye towards night he mette with the masters of ij of them . . . to sett them afyre at . . . ew it to the quenes majestie f. 22b. his m[istress . . . suche a foote in the lande of I . . . the master] of one of these ships awnsvered oure g[eneral that he] did confesse that the ships were forfeited [according to] the lawe of the sea, but seing that he [had need of] but one of them it were greate pitye to burn [the others]. Oure generall asked the saide master whether he wolde [buy them] of him. The Portugall awnsvered that he had no [money and] for wante thereof cowlde not. Oure generall [answered] that if he wolde buye the ij ships with all things [in them] he shoulde finde him reasonable, for he shoulde geve him for them 40 duccattes [and give] him a bill of his hand to paye them to him in London [in . . .] yeares. The Portugall did it, but he mervayled thereat that the [ships] with all other thinges in them [which] was worthe above . . . duccattes the generall wolde requeste no more for them; [and] oure generall wolde not have demaunded one penny for them if it had not bene nedfull so to doe considering his righte to them. This ended, after we had ridden here abowte 15 dayes we departed with this newe carvayle in oure companye towards Cabo Verde in Guynea, leaving the ij other ships behinde in the possession of the Portugall aforesaide. Abowte the 26th of November we arived at Cabo Verde in Guynea where oure generall determynd, beinge as it was the firste place that we came vnto of negros, a place where the negros that come owte thence are best solde in the India of any other, to goe alond with 200 menne and to take as many of them as he might. The next morning, after we came to anker harde by the Cape ij howers before it was daye, oure generall, meaning, if it wolde have bene, to take the negros sleping, went him self ashore and with him the said 200 menne, but he was no soner ashore but the negros perceaved it and lefte their howses . . . and greate villan . . . of Cabo Verde to English- f. 23. m[en . . . alsoe divers other howses and . . . d therin howses and all other thinges . . . took to the number of 9 negros, menne, w[omen and children. At the] break of daye the negros which fledde from [the houses gathered the]m selves together and here and there at a sodda[in onset str]oke oure menne with their in-venimed arrowes, [being to the nu]mber of 600 or therabowte. When oure menne wolde [turn on them the]y wolde fly and escape

by swyftenes of foot. [Neverthel]esse there were many of them slaine with [*arquebus shot*] and abowte 20 of oure menne hurte with the arro[wes . . .]. And oure generall was shott in the lefte arme. Th[e wounds] which oure menne receaved then were thowghtenoth[ing at the] beginning, for the point of the arrowes made [in the place] they strook to the semeing of a pinnes heade, and oure m[en that] were hurt semed to make a laughter thereat. But [before ij] dayes were passed there was sene amongst vs the [*strangest*] manner of deathe that ever any manne had sene to f[ore]. The poyson, thowghe all was donne possible to the contrary, so wroughte that those that the arrowes had perced in the legge and other places of litle daunger, but the verry skinne, within the said ij dayes dyed after such a sorte that it amased all the companye. The strengthe of the poyson was suche that it cawsed their jawes to shutt, the which when they did, there wolde come vp into their throtes suche abundance of corruption after the manner of fleame that it wolde stoppe their breath. Those menne them selves wolde open their mowthes with a wedg and, after the said corruption was cleared owte, taulk as hartely as they had no hurte, but neverthesse all wolde not serve, for as

f. 23b many as the poyson shutt their . . . hardly escaped . . . and the arrowe brake . . . splinters therein the seconde daye a . . . seeing that] we cowlde doe no god, oure generall com[aundered *us to come aboard again*]. Thus we sette sayle thence alongest [the coast and¹ . . .] fell over borde and was drowned, a greate misfortune [to us. The] nexte daye betymes we had sight of 6 sayles [*who when*] they saw, being before at an anker with[in] a league [of us, they w]ayed and sett sayle and bare owte into the sea. [Oure generall] comaunded to make after them to know what they [were. When] we came neare them we vnderstood they were [Frenchmen] whoe there did trafik with the negros of the [coast for] hides and other thinges. Oure generall cawsed them [to stay while] he taulked with the chiefe of them, of whom [he bought diver]s necessaryes for oure vioadge and paide them therefor. [And] among these saide ships he fownde j which was one [of those] that had made the spoyle at Cabo Blanco among the [Portugals], the which had no wares in her but soldiers, and the [ship her]selfe was no French shippe, but one that the French-

¹ The name of the person drowned is not recoverable, the other accounts not mentioning the occurrence.

[men] had taken from the Portugalls. Oure generall took her [and her] captaine¹ [and] all her menne to goe with him in the vioadge. Thus the nexte daye after we ankered there we wayed again to depart alongest on oure vioadge. When we were readye to sette sayle, nowe beinge 8 sayles with the Portugall barck that the Frenchemenne had taken, one of the Frenche ships which had divers wares as iron and others sente her boate aborde oure generall and offered their servyce to oure generall in the vioadge and to do as oure company & ships did. Oure generall tolde them that if they wolde he was verry well content. Vppon this the boat departed, and we sette sayle, and the French manne wayed and sett sayle with vs, so that nowe we were 9 sayles in all. Thus we departed all together towardes Cabo Roxo, where in the way being calmed our generall sente oure boates ashore 8 leagues to the northward of Cabo Roxo, where with margaritas and other wares which the negros esteeme they enticed the negros to come to them and to feche them water, and at the lyke oure menne, thinking to sette vppon them to take them, they dowbted and fledde even as oure menne pretended to doe their feat. . . . d f. 24. about . . . te to her and cawse . . . barck [being] a Portugall of the Ilond of Cabo Verde, had divers thinges in [her, *some of which*] oure generall bowghte and gave [them wares in recompence]. By this barcke oure generall vnderstood that in the haven] of Rio Grande there were many [other carvels of the] Portingalls that make theire negros to the [West Indies,² who] towche here before they goe hence and [take with them divers] necessaryes hence. Oure generall, to se wh[at might here be] done sente in to the river a barcke and [*certain* boats armed] thoroughlye in company with this Portugall, [*and when* our] menne came vp into the river they found [*certain Portugal*] carvayls besides other small vessels whoe d[id, being] full of ordenaunce of brasse, shott at oure ba[rck and boats] all that they might. The master of the Jhesus, Ro[bert Barrett, knowing] the King of Portugall hath comaunded vnder penalties that his subiectes [*trade not and that*] he here had the governmente by oure general[*l given him for*] the semelye entertaynment, proved yet by so[*me fair speech*] to pacifye the angrye Portugals, declaring that he [was

¹ Hortop calls him Captain Bland.

² That is, of the combination of Portuguese traders holding the contract for the slave trade, from the Spanish Government.

sent] thether by his generall the worshipfull Master John [Hawkins] esquyre to trafique with them wares for negros and [to no] other intent. The Portingals wolde not awnswere a wo[rde], but plyed theire ordenaunce, the which were brasse bases that shotte good, demi colveringes, sakers, mynions and suche like shott. When the master sawe that they mente to sinke the barck if they could, seying that wordes booted not he cheered his menne and boarded the saide carvels with the barck and pinaces. The Portinga[ls], seying that oure menne feared not to enter vpon their shott, never defended theire carvels but fledde all alonde, being more, twyse more, in nomber then oure menne. The best pece of ordenaunce that oure barck had was a fawconet, and but 40 menne in all the barck and pinaces. When oure menne had seased vpon the carvayls the master sente to the Portingals & desired them to come to theire ships againe, for he wolde not minish any thinge they had, nor hurt any manne. This he had

f. 24b. done was for . . . barck . . . in this river of¹ . . . taken there were of the ships and Portuga[l . . . enter in all haste into the r[iver . . . c]hardge to make all strong what so ev[er. . . The master tarryed there to se, and thowg . . . trafique while these barckes and menne of . . . on to the river. The Portingals had come [with false words to] the master, promysing him trafique, for seing [his small numbers], it was but to dally with him till they had [gathered] thether abowte 6000 negros at the leaste, all [well armed], and then they beganne both to denye theire [promises] and alsoe to vse opprobrious woordes. The master seying [this, our gen]erall comaunding him to the contrarye at his [departure], he having auctoritye above any there vpon the [place, when our] menne and barckes were come, wente ashore well [armed] with 240 menne, mynding to spoyle a towne which [was abo]wt a myle from the water side where oure shippes did [lie, to see] if he cowlde take any negros there. The [Porting]als when they sawe this suffered oure menne to [come] allmost to the towne quyetlye, but when they sawe [that] oure menne were nowe a greate waye from oure boates they gave a watch worde to the negros whoe laye embosked, and soddainlye there were in the fieldes, besides the Portugals which might be abowt 100, above 6000 negros. [Some] of oure menne had entered the towne and sette certaine

¹ From what follows, it is evident that this is not the Rio Grande of f. 24.

howses afyre, but they retyred seyng so great a number of enne-meys, and joyned together. The Portugals nowe encoraged the negros to sette vpon oure menne, the which the negros did with great bates and hachets, dartes and inuenimed arrowes, and fowght at hand strookes. The fight was cruell and 4 of oure menne were slaine by and by, and many of oure menne hurt, and thowghe many of the negros were slaine and hurt, yet they so pressed one of oure menne that oure menne beganne to geve grownd, for the negros wold ronne vpon the hargabuz withowte feare. When the Portugals sawe oure menne beginne to retyre they by and by . . . Master Edwarde Du[dley . . . dowbting at f. 25. the firste s . . . way betweene the water syde . . . oure menne in such neade and every . . . ht, he issued owte when he had . . . he saw of the negros and spedde every . . . This so astonied the negros that, dowbtinge [*our men's force was*] suche betwene that and the water side, th[ey forbore to come on] any further, and thus oure menne came to the [water side to] their boates. And to se the stowtness of this [*barbarous negro*] people, as oure menne were putting of one of the boates, [*a certain*] negro lepte into the water and perforce plucked [an oar out] of oure mennes handes, and thowghe one of oure menne [shot him so] into the bodye that the arrowe went cleane thor[owgh him, he] caryed the oare and rann with it abowte 40 [*paces* and then] fell downe dead. Oure menne thus went abo[ard and the] master sente worde owte to oure generall what had happened [and that] there was no good to be done there. Oure generall when [he heard] this was sore displeased for the yll order and that the [master] after such a sorte put so many menne in jepardy. Oure [general] wolde not that he shoulde have had to doe with them a[land], but that he shoulde have gone vp the river and there have seased vpon the ships that were there, where alsoe the King of Portugal's factor was, and at his handes there mighte trafique have bene had soner then any other wayes. But oure generall, seyng the tyme lost, determyned to go into the river him selfe in his ship called the William and John, and proving to goe over the barre cowlde not fynde water inowghe for her to passe over. Therefore, bycawse he wold not lose more tyme, he sente in to the master and comaunded him to come awaye and to bring 2 or 3 of the carvayls owte with him, seyng the Portugals wolde not come abourd them, and thereby they shoulde be gladde to come

owte and trafique with him where he ridde withowte the barre to have theire ships againe. Thus we ridde withowte, and the vessels aforesaid were browghte owte, but the Portugals wolde not come, therefore bycawse oure generall wo[ld] not delay the tyme he toke the saide carvayls with him alongest, meaning to

f. 25b. . . . for negros bu . . . es they had so scoured these [coasts] and taking manye of them . . . es were many that dwelt here [*had removed themselves over*] into the mayne lande which is in sight [of these islands. The] nexte day that we ankered here there [came a certain negro to] oure ships and yelded him selfe to oure generall. [*Our general com*]aunded one that we had within borde, that cowlde [*speak the tongue*] of the same place, to know the cawse that he [had so of his] voluntarye will yelded him selfe to captivitye ow[te of *knowledge* of] his cowntreye. He awnswered that he was [*a lesser c*]hief belonging to the King of Zambulo, whoe [ruled over] a greate parte of the mayne and these ilonds [where we] ridde alsoe, and as the kings in Guynea [had many] wyves he had comytted advoutrye with one [of them] and was not knowen in many dayes after. But now [he hear]de by other of his friendes that Kinge Zambulo [knew] thereof, wherevppon they cownsayled him to shifte for [his] life; if the king shoulde take him he wolde put [him] cruelly to deathe. Therefore he was come to yealde [him] self to vs, bycawse thowghe he shoulde live in captivity [he] knewe that we wolde not take his life from him. Oure generall enquired of him and if he cowlde bring him where Sambulo was. He awnswered that he cowlde and pointced that his towne that he dwelled in was on the other side of a pointce of the mayne land, which we saw plainly where we road vnder one of the ilonds. Oure generall left of taulk with the negro for this tyme and discharged awaye his smaler ships, some to the river of Calowsas and some to the river of Casteos to se what good they cowlde doe in those rivers by trafique, meaning alsoe to departe him self within 2 dayes towards the river of Lengarrame, where the other small ships of oure companye shoulde meete him after they were discharged. The third morning after oure cominge thether, iij howers before daye, oure generall departed from oure ship in pinaces with 120 menne to seeke King

f. 26. Zambulo, having . . . ever in warre . . . the prisoners they take th . . . whoe doe ly still in the river . . . In] this place, so in all other places that we [*were in which are nigh*] of this place in

Guynea, they doe eate [*very barbarously each*] other. Among these
 negros there is a greate [*feast whenever*] the soldiers have taken
 any of them, eve[n *one man*. They] binde him to a stake and
 make a fyre hard [by and rou]nd abowt it, and the miserable crea-
 ture [*while he is yet*] alive they will with their knives cutt of his
 . . . laces and roste it, eating his owne fleshe by p[ur]pose before
 h[is] eyes, a terrible kinde of death. The others [in other places]
 doe not thus eate them, but kill them owte of h[and] and at the] first
 and cutt them of by the loynes and eat the[ir] flesh as] we wolde
 befe or mutton, the which oure owne menne [did witness] as
 hereafter I will declare. This eating one [another, it is] said, is
 bycause they shoulde be withowt pity and [*fear*, as] well putting
 in theire myndes that they doe not only [slay their] eneymyes
 but gett them selves sustenance having, as in[deed they] have,
 no manner of cattayle and littell or nothing els to b[roil]. Thus
 within 3 dayes after we ankered here we sett sayle and [sail]ed
 towardes Tagarring, otherwyse called Sierra Lion, where we
 arrived and came to anker the 23th of December, when, after we
 had ankered, oure generall sent vp certain pinaces into the same
 river to se if there were any Portugals there to have trafique with
 them, and he in the meane while gave order in oure watering
 and many other nedefull thinges which muste be done here by-
 cause this place is the last and most comodious for a manne to
 provyde him self in before he goe over with the Ind[ies] when he
 hath his complement of negros. Abowt thende of December,
 oure generall being verry busy as aforesaide, the small ships that
 oure generall sent to the river of Calowsas came to Tagarrin,
 having done no good and yet lost ij menne and one of theire
 pinaces sonk, and all they that were in the river so full thereof
 that they feare . . . but they thowght . . . they had not rowed a f. 26b.
 flight [shot . . . when they saw a] greate many monsters like vnto
 hors[es . . . vp in the water, somtyme above, som[tyme beneath;
one of which], as they cowlde perceave, strooke one of t[he] pin-
 naces under the] water. The bloe was suche that it drave [*in her*
planks and] tymbers, so that the pinnace sonck imediatly [with
 28 men] in her. The menne were in such feare that [it was a
*great ch]awnce that any escaped, but there were other boats
 [near, which save]d 26. The other ij it is thowght the monsters
 did [carry away], for they cowlde swym verry well and yet never
 [were seen]. Oure menne forsooke seking any further and re-*

torned [*towards*] their ships againe with all spede possible, and [towed the] su[nken] pinace with them a littell way, but the [monsters] biganne to followe them, wherevppon they cutt of [the foot of] one of the monsters, having put in his fore foot [which is] like vnto a horses foote over into the boat that towed her [and] allmost pulled her over therewith. These monsters [by the] report of the Portugals doe not only sinck boates [but] alsoe they have soncken carvayls that have bene 60 tonnes [of] burthen. These monsters doe as well live on the shore [as] in the water, and eat grasse, and divers tymes are taken and killed by the negros in this sort: theire forefeet are verry shorte and theire hinder feet verry long, so that they cannot goe but leapinge ij feet at once, and bycawse their hinder feet are so long over their fore feet the[y] cannot rise above a foote hie with their fore legges when they leape. The negros when they will take them marck when they be feding in the pastures, and in the waye they must come downe they laye a tree or some such thinge acrossse, vnto the which when they come and canne not passe over they stande still, when eyther the negros kill them or they dye them selves, being lett from the river withowt the which they cannot live. Oure genèrall, seing there was no good to be done in the Calow-sas, sente into the river of Magrabomba, which is to the sowthward of Tagarrin, certain of the smaller ships to se what good f. 27. might be done . . . of which was . . . ready abowte this tyme . . . oure] generall taking greate care how [*he should proceed*, there] came ij ambassadors with one message [*to him. There came one*] of them from there the King of Serra Lion [*had his town, and*] the other from Yhoma, King of the Castros, [*to ask his aid*] against Zacina and Zetecama, ij kinges which [*fought with them in the w]arres. These ij kinges desired oure ge[n]erall, as they ha[d] be-seged the other in a towne called Conga¹ [which was in the] river of Tagarrin where we ridde, and th[*ey had not prevailed*], that oure generall wolde bycawse it stondeth in [*. . . assault*] it by the river and batter it, and for his m[*erit* they would] help him to negros. This towne was b[uilt after the] vse of that cowntreye verry warlike, and was wal[led round with] mighty trees bownd together with greate wythes [and had] in it soldiers that had come thether 150 leagues. The [kinges within] it had in it of*

¹ The break in the MS. renders it uncertain whether this name is spelt in full.

principall soldiers negros 6000, bes[ide *thereo*]f innumerable sight of other menne, women and ch[ildren]. Oure] generall, thowghe it was a harde enterprise, yet by[cawse] he must have departed to the Indias with the negros [above] mencioned, grawnted that he wolde ayde the saide kinges, [and] with this awnswere the embassadors, whoe afterward gave oure generall gages for sauf goyng and comyng of oure menne and alsoe took gages of vs, and the tyme appoincted that oure generall shoulde send his ayde, whoe shoulde doe their parte by the river to anoye and enter the towne, and the ij kinges oure frendes likewise by londe with their campe. Abowte the 27th of Januarye oure generall sent vp a small shippe with certain pinaces, and in them 90 menne well appointed, to the ayde of the ij kinges, and sent Robert Barratt, master of the Jhesus, to governe them. When they came before the towne and had talked with the negros of the campe what order there shoulde be in the assaulting of the towne, there was for the espace of ij dayes divers skirmyshes where there were above 20 of oure menne hurte besides divers negros oure frendes, for the negros of the towne issued owte divers tymes and shewed them selves verry valiaunt, also oure menne . . . when oure f. 27b. generall saw . . . arde, he went vp him self [*to our men's camp and*] when he came thether he sente the kinges [our friends a message] to their campe that to ende this warre [*with good speed* he] was come him selfe in person, and appoincted [that on the] nexte daye in the after none at the sound of his trompett [they should m]ove with their campe and geve assault to the [town, for the which] he sent them abowte 40 soldiers [*from his camp*] whoe shoulde be an ayd vnto them, and [*desired that they*] shoulde goe to it with stomack on both sides. [For this the] kinges oure frendes gave oure generall great thanks [*for that* in his] owne person he wolde come to their ayd, [and also] said that as he had appoincted they wold doe, [sending] him divers presentes of gold and captives. The [next] daye after oure generall came thether, somewhat [before] the tyme of assault appoincted, the beseege[n] negros beganne to treat of peace with the negro kings oure frends by imbassadors, but they were sente awaye withowte doying any thing. In the after none, as the generall had appoincted, he comaunded to sownde the trompette and, having all thinges readye, beganne to sett menne ashore and put in order, gave assaulte by that parte of the towne which ajoyned to the

river. The negros had made many engines, as false diches covered with light stickes, leaves and suche tromperie, to overthrowe oure menne in, and with their invenimede arrowes and dartes so defended the walles, having made loopes in everye place to shote owte at for their savetye. Oure generall was everye where incoraging his menne, whoe were so overmatched that allmost all wounded and some one manne having 7 or 8 woundes thether, f. 28. yet his sighte cawsed them to pluck . . . comfortable wordes . . . be at the walles againe, oure gen . . . gnes letted them not a whit but in . . . assaulte againe to the walles and ad . . . spite of all those in the towne the might . . . efence for entering in the manner of a . . . gether with wythes by this tyme the camp . . . alles on the other side but the negros within . . . and thowghe vpon the generall attempte to . . . but a handfull it semed that the negros made . . . every manne was a thowsand for a greater no . . . eache and within to defende it then were vse . . . was yet hole and where the hole camp did g¹ . . . abowte this tyme oure generall, meaning [*once and for all* to go] thorowghe with it seyng that the breache was made [*on the river side*], comaunded to lighte fire pykes and [charge the pieces] with fyre worckes, and shott them into the howses w[hich were] made of drye flagges, that thorowghe the breache oure menne [*should begin*] to sett them afyre, and thus some with fyre pykes burning in their handes, with force, the negros being put in greate feare with the straungenes of the fyre, gott within the breache and were no soner within but the howses being dry flagges were afyre by (them) and by the arrowes that were shott into them with fyre woorckes. The negros stode stowtlye in defence and [*sought*] to quenche the fyre a while, but when they sawe the fyre cowlde not be stayed bycawse the howses stood thickly, but wolde consume all, they beganne to scatter and ronne every way. Oure generall for all this kept his menne together dowting the worste, for the camp was not come in, nor had not so sone as they did if the howses we sett afyre had not bene foes. When the negros oure [e]nemyes sawe the towne a fyre when as we had geven assault, the campe having made no breache as yet, they fledde, and so the kinges oure frendes brook downe the walles & entered with

¹ Up to this point it has not seemed possible to reconstruct this page, although the fragments indicate that the general conditions of the siege were being dealt with.

theire hole camp, fynding no resistance . . . negros that were . . . f. 28b.
 might gett a great number . . . the river was full of menne,
 [women and children], whoe, proving to escape over the water,
 [*were drowned, save those our friends*] took and slewe. For all that
 the fyre b[urned a great part] of this towne, yet we left standinge
 . . . The kinges Sacina and Setecama escaped, [but there we]re
 slaine a greate number of menne of name [who had come] in
 soccor of the towne, as the Kinge of Cesta [. . . Our] menne here
 sawe the negros oure frendes eate [the prisoners whom] they
 slewe everye daye in the camp. The negro [kings coma]unded
 oure menne that served with them in the campe [to have] rice
 dressed with palmito oyle dressed everye daye [for them. T]hus
 oure generall having done what [he could in] saving negros,
 when nighte came on drewe above [the town] oure companie,
 as well those that were in the kinges [camp and] all other, [whiles]
 the negros oure frendes taryed in the towne and in the campe.
 We had 4 menne slaine owte of hande of [those] that were with
 oure generall at the making of the breache, [and] many hurte,
 whereof there died 4 or 5 afterwarde. There were slaine of the
 negros oure frendes Sheri Bangi, the sonne of King Sheri, in the
 assaulte with divers others, and divers others were hurte, and
 abowte 5 of oure menne that were with them were hurte, but
 they escaped all. Abowte midnichte the campe of the kinges
 oure frendes removed towardes the Castros and sett the place
 where they had bene in campe afire at their departure. Oure
 generall mervayl[ing] what it might be, the negro kinges sente
 him worde that for the death of the kinges sonne of Sierra Lion
 they departed, but neverthelesse oure generall shoulde sende to
 the Castros and there they wolde make readye negros for him.
 Thus they departed as aforesaide, and oure generall came downe
 to his ships and browghte with him abowte 260 negros that he
 had taken in the towne. When he was come downe he sente to
 the Castros, where with the negros the kinges sent and them the
 generall took and others that he had in the rivers by trafique, we
 had nowe abowt 470 negros in all . . . Guynia is . . . sicknes there f. 29.
 died more . . . The] 7th daye of February oure generall [departed
 from Sierra Leone with] the Jhesus, the Mynion, the William
 [and John, the Swallow, the] Judithe, the Angell, the carvayle
 that we had at [*Cabo Blanco*], and the ij Fre[nchmen, together
 with the] small barck which he bowght of the Portingalls afore-

saide.¹ [Thus we set our] sayles and directed oure cowrse over with the [*West or Spanish*] India named America or the Newe Worlde the[re to trade with the sa]id wares and with the comodi-tyes of that countr[y and from *America*] the aforesaide to retourne home into Inglonde. [We were not *ill sped*], thowghe thorowghe divers calmes the corientes w[hich we met with] over there, we mighte have bene, and arived in an [island of the] saide India called Domenica abowt thende of Marche [*the year 1568*, an]d the ilond being inhabited with wild Indians and [*no Christ-ians*, w]e refreshed oure water and departed thence the same [month to]wardes an ilond called Margarita, plentiful in victualles of all manner of fleshe, inhabited with Span[iards, where we] arived within 2 dayes after. At oure comynge thether the Span[iards, who are] not above 50 in all the ilond, fledde owte of their towne [*inland*], not knowing what ships oures mighte be, being as they w[ere all] spoyled by Frenche menne.² Oure generall, being nighte, oure [*master fearing to*] come into the porte with the Jhesus, sente in a small barcke [before] to geve knowledge whoe he was, with a letre from him to the g[overnor] which was as foloweth, Worshipfull, I have towched in your ilond only to thentente to refresh my menne with fresh victualles, which for my mony or wares you shall sell me, meanyng to staye only but 5 or 6 dayes here at the furthest. In the which tyme you maye assure youre selfe and so all others that by me or any of myne there shall no domadge be done to any manne, the which alsoe the Quenes Majestie of Ingland, my mystres, at my departure owt of Ingland comaunded me to have great care of, and to serve with my navye the Kinges Majestie of Spaine my olde master, if in places where I came any of his stode in neade. This letre was sente ashore in the shutting of nighte. The Spaniardes, not being well assured what we mighte be, came towards the water side a horsebacke and demaunded afarre of what we were. Oure menne awnswered, Inglishe menne, and the worshipfull Master John Hawkins, esquyre, was generall over vs, and that they had a letre from him to their governor. They by and by

f. 29b. put away all . . . whoe . . . lesse in the morning . . . a letre back

¹ The transaction here referred to was probably recorded in a part of the MS. now lost.

² The town was Cubagua, which had been sacked by the French as early as 1542, and since then had suffered again on more than one occasion.

againe from the gov[ernor of the island, which was] as followeth,
 Ryght worshipfull, [your presence here is] as joyfull vnto vs as
 of any other capt[ain, you havin]g deserved by youre excele[nt
 . . . atly beauty. The majesty of the Quene youre [mistress and
likewise] youre great worthines is [*so well known in these*] partes
 that not only all menne wolde gladly [serve you, but] alsoe, I am
 sure, any navye of the Kinge [would yiel]de you meiority; and
 bycawse you shall perceave the [will I have] to serve you, I will
 be at the towne at 9 of the clocke before none to receave you,
 thowghe [my sickness] wolde not that I shoulde rase owte of my
 bedde. [All things] that are in this ilond and may pleasure you
 shalbe[at your] comaundement, with desire that you shoulde tary
 here longer [unless your v]ioadge requyreth you shoulde depart.
 All the ships [were in the] porte at an anker by daye, where oure
 generall [made rea]dye to goe ashore at the hower appoynted
 well accompanied. [And as] sone as he came to the towne to goe
 ashore, the governor, [who was] as he wrote verrye sickely and
 weak, came with a greate [number] of Spaniardes to receave him,
 where they had verrye frendlye [communi]cation, and the
 governor shewed oure generall the town, which[was] in a manner
 all spoyled and many howses burned by Frenche menne whoe,
 as the governor said, arived there the Alholowentyde before we
 nowe came thether. This done, he banqueted oure generall, the
 which ended, oure generall requested the governor he might
 have certaine oxen and shepe provided for his ships, the which
 the governor sawe done with spede, as alsoe all other thinges
 which was there to serve oure torne. We were here abowte 9
 dayes, in the which tyme oure generall feested the governor with
 all his company abourd the Jhesus, shewing him all the pleasure
 possible, and the governor for his part was not behind, but feast-
 ed oure generall divers tymes ashore. Thus the generall, after
 we had taken in victualles, water and other necessaryes, paying
 therefore in wares, comaunded to sett sayle to departe hence the
 9th daye after we came hether. Thus we sayled hence towardes
 Borboroata in the mayne land, a verry good porte, and where
 oure generall heretofore in other vioadges had solde muche wares
 and negros. We arived there on Easter eve, being the 17th of
 Aprill . . . him selfe in pin . . . as he vnderstood that w . . . f. 30.
 generall he was glad and ligh . . . generall alowed concerning the
 cawse . . . Our] generall writte vnto the governor of this [*country*

at *Santiago de*¹ Lion abowte license to trafique with the inha[bi-
tants for his wares, w]hoe laye within the lande above 60 leagues.
[His letter was as folo]wethe, Worshipfull, This vioadge on the
which I [am was ordered by] the Quenes Majestie of Ingland,
my mystres, another [way, and not to th]ese partes, and the
charges being made in I[ngland, before I] sette sayle the pre-
tence was forcably overtorned. [Therefore I am] comaunded
by the Quenes Majestie my mystres to seek [*here another*]
trafique with the wares which I all ready had and negros [which
I should] procure in Guynea, to lighten the great chardges
h[azarded] in the setting owt of this navye. I knowe the
[King of] Spaine your master, vnto whome alsoe I have bene a
servaunt, [and am] comaunded by the Quene my mystres to
serve with my navye [as need] requyreth, hathe forbidden that
you shall geve lice[nce to any] straunger to trafique. I will not
therefore requeste any su[che] thing at your hand, but that you
will license me to se[ll 60²] negros onelye and a parcell of my
wares, which in all is but littell, [for] the payment of the soldiers
I have in my ships. In this you shall not break the comaunde-
ment of your prince, but doe him good servyce and advoyd divers
inconveniencies which happen often tymes thorowghe beyng to
precise in observing precepts withowt consideracion. If you
may, I most instantly desire you that you will take the paynes
to come hether, that I might conferre with you my selfe. Trew-
ly it wolde be lever to me then 10,000 doccatts. If you come you
showlde not fynde me ingratefull nor cownte youre travayle
lo[st]. This letre oure generall sent by a spedye messenger, and
bycawse the generall writte this, you shall vnderstand that the
Kinge of Spaine hath forbidden his subjectes that inhabit the
India to trafique with any straunger vppon great penalties, and
f. 30b. more then that, with no Spaniard that cometh not . . . cown-
treye of India . . . ds wrowghte and perles with . . . beinge setled
here and being a verrye com . . . aborde shipping and others sette
s . . . shipping, some others to divers thinges ash[ore, *as the set-
ting up of*] boothes ashore where there was watche kepte night
[and day to give warning] if the Spaniards showlde meane to in-
vade [*the goods that were brow*]ght ashore, as alsoe to se that the
negros that [*we had still on*] borde showlde not ronne awaye.

¹ Compare f. 31.

² Cf. the letter to the Bishop of Valencia f. 30 b.

Here we [*set some men on work*] to fill fresh water which is one of the chiefeste [*things to be looked*] vnto in suche a vioadge. Oure generall having bene [here certain] dayes, he vnderstode by the Spaniardes aforesaide that [. . . leagu]es thence there was a bishopp whoe likewyse bar[e great rule] in the cowntrey. Oure generall herevppon thowghte [it well to writ]t vnto him alsoe, chiefly for to be provyded thorowghe [him of certain] victualles, as befe and such like, for his money, whereof there [was great] plentye vp in the land, and all that he might [make this] bishopp his frende, that he might, having his [*favour*, the] better procure license of the governor to trafique. [His letter] was as followeth, Right reverend father in God, I arived [here] in this port of Borboroata 4 dayes agone, where I have [heard] of youre good fame, the which had stirred me [to] write vnto you and to desire you that I may have browghte hether to the porte 100 oxen to serve my torne while I am in this porte, and I will pay for them and for the bringing of them hether as you shall appointe. I have to sell 60 negros and a percell of my wares to helpe lighten the chardges of this vioadge whereon I nowe am, and was not thowght to have bene made to any of these partes but that thinges have happened contrary. I besече you to be a meane to the governor all that you maye that my request to him may take effecte, and any thing that I may pleasure you in you shall comaund it, the which you shall have the better prooffe of if you wolde doe me so muche honer as to visite me in this port.¹

. . . be browght to the . . . respect to your desertes th.² . . . f. 31.
 whoe maketh accompt of all . . . bidding not only trade but alsoe that the . . . kind of comoditye we . . . vse to trafique, I will doe with the gove[rnor all that I m]ay therein by my letre, and alsoe cawse ot[hers to do the like, for] the cowntrey desire all in generall to trafiqu[e. And though I] dowbt the condicion of the governor th[erein, you may be] sure of that I will doe what I may there[in to cause the] license be grawnted. That I maye not be suspected, thowghe age and sicknes [*also let me, I may not*] trayvaylle . . . se you in youre ships. The bish[op sent this] letre to oure generall by one of his owne servantes, [whereupon] oure generall sent divers presentes to the bishopp [*to the end*] to make him his

¹ Line not written to end, and therefore, presumably, letter ended at 'port'. The author nowhere transcribes the signatures of these letters.

² This seems to be the Bishop's reply.

frend, the which he receaved with g[reat goodwill] as afore. Oure generall had sente a letre to the govern[or of] a province called Venesuela, of the which he had awnswere [back] againe within 14 dayes by a letre from the saide governor [as] followeth: Right worshipfull, Youre arivall here, seying I cannot showe you any pleasure, is vnto me a greate greif, considering youre merites. I am sure you knowe what straight chardge the King of Spaine my master hath geven that no straung[er] be licensed to trafique in no part of the India, the which if I shoulde break, before my eyes I sawe the governor my predecessor caryed awaye prisoner into Spaine for geving license to the cowntrye to trafique with you at your laste being here, an example for me that I fall not in the like or worse. I pray you therefore holde me excused, and thinke that as you wolde observe the comaundement of youre mystres the Quene of Ingland, so I muste not breake one jot of that the King my master comaundeth me, with the which the proverbe agree the well that sayethe, doe thy masters will and comaundement and thou shalt sitte with him at his table.¹

f. 31b. . . . the place where . . . golde, and came downe together² . . . were license grawnted by the go[vernor . . . to trafique, and taryed there still a great [while until at the] last they, fearing plainly that there w[ould be no licence gr]awnted, determynd to departe homeward ag[ain]. But oure general was] enformed that if he sent a companye of menne [to the town of Vale]ncia, he might laye handes of the saide marchantes whoe als[oe desired to] be taken by oure generall, that by these meanes they [might buy neg]ros vnder color they were forced to doe it, other[wise, if they b]owght any they shoulde be forfected and they themselves [punished. Oure] generall sente 60 menne well appointed with weapons [to Valencia] with a guyd, [with Robert] Barrat, master of the Jhesus, for governor of them, whoe departed from the ships in the night [. . . , and] the wayes beinge verry fowle with rayne, were longer [on the road] then it was thowghte they shoulde be, whereby they were [discovered], and before they cowlde come to Valencia there was knowledge [brought to] the justices there thereof, whoe by and by tooke the [marchan]tes aforesaide that were with them with [. . . a]ll their treasure and lefte the

¹ Line not written to end, and so letter presumably ends here.

² From what follows, it would appear that the missing portions refer to the desire of the Spaniards of Venezuela to trade with Hawkins.

towne. The bishoppe alsoe [went] with them leaste he shoulde be suspected that he had cawsed oure [gene]rall to send those menne thether, but neverthelesse he left [in] his howse provision of victuals for oure menne whoe when they came thether and fownde no bodye but a prest that was sicke, seying that their purpose was voyde, after they had refreshed them selves in the bishops howse they retorned againe withowte havinge done any good to the ships. Thus having bene here above a monethe, oure generall, before he wold depart with all the ships from hence, sente certaine of them awaye to Coresau,¹ an ilond which lieth in the sea in the waye that we shoulde goe, there to provyde beef and motton whereof there is greate plenty in the ilond, and to drye it to serve vs for victuals homeward. Alsoe he sente ij barckes to a place named Coro, not farre from Borborata, to se what good there mighte be done there in selling of wares. With the greate ships he taryed here still, yet selling everye daye some wares, till the beginning of June, and then meaning to departe, the bishoppe sent oure generall letres of favor for all the coast where we shoulde come afterward. Thus as aforesaide in the beginning of June we sette sayle from Burboroata . . . comyng f. 32. the ij barckes² . . . whoe bycawse they cowlde se . . . directly to meete with oure gen . . . they had ridde here abowte 10 . . . ing desired license to fetche water ash[ore of the Treasurer who was] chiefe here. He denyed them and shotte at th[e ships, where-upon our] menne, not well pleased with this intertaynment, [made like answer to] them, shoting to the shore, in the which tyme the [*Spaniards struck one*] of oure menne with a hargabuz shott and hurte o[. . . Our general, he]aring of this at his comyng, semed not to be mo[ved, and know]ing the Treasurer of this place and governors of [*the country were*] comaunded to defende that no straunger have [any traffic o]r sustenance, he put it vp, and beinge nowe come [*to the port*, he] writte ashore to the Treasurer a letre as followeth, [Worshipful], My ships which I sente hether the laste yeare with negro[s and other marc]haundize, you being the chief cawse, cam all in a [*miscarriage*], which being reparted among divers venturers, my los[s was the] more tollerable, and I

¹ Curaçao.

² The context reveals that we have here to do with the arrival at Rio de la Hacha of Drake's *Judith* and the *Angel*, sent on in advance of the main body. Cf. Hortop's account.

cannot laye the fault so much [*the less* upon] you that I blame not muche more the simplenes of my [*deputies*] whoe knew not howe to handle these matters. The negros th[ey left] here behinde them I vnderstand are solde and the money to the [King's] vse, and therefore I will not demaunde it of you.¹ This I desire [now], that you will geve me license to sell 60 negros only, towarde the payment of my soldiers to help to lighten the chardges of this vroadg which was appoincted to be made otherwayes and to none of these partes. If you se in the morninge armed men[ne] aloud, lett it nothing trowbell you, for as you shall comaund they shall retorne abowrde againe. Shewing me this pleasure, you shall comaunde any thinge I have. Oure generall sent this letre ashore before the shutting of night, [and] when the Treasurer had receaved it and redde it, he sente worde vnto oure generall that he had prepared for his comyng and his soldiers had better be vnpaid then to buy theire wages so deare as they shoulde this if they came ashore, for he had provided a great many as good or better soldiers then oure generall had any, and that he shoulde fynde if he sett his foot ashore there. Oure generall hearinge

f. 32b. the boastēs of the Treasurer and that . . . oure generall shoulde . . . cawse that oure generall had . . . governor was alsoe chiefe governor of [*this country* and the Tre]asorer his deputy. The nexte morning [at the rising of the] sonne oure generall went ashore here [*to march towards*] the towne with the aforesaid menne, and land[ed . . . At] the landinge there appeared abowte 20 horsemen [*with the Treasurer*, who]e kept them selves abowte 12 score from vs. Oure [generall here ha]d browghte with him a Spaniard from Borboroata [*who desired, having*] bowght 22 negros of oure generall there, to have [*more negroes rend*]ered him here, and came alongest with oure generall [*to this place*]. This manne, when oure generall was placeing [his men] in order to marche forwarde to the towne, oure [general] sent to the Spaniardes, as one whoe had sene [our genera]lls doynge in the other place aforesaide and knewe [of his] meanyng to trafique, as alsoe the Treasurer, neve . . . him that he wold misvse him selfe, to shewe [him] all his requeste to trafique and to be a meane all that [he] might that he might have license. The Spaniard went towarde the horsemenne among the which the Treasurer was

¹ The above is of interest as throwing light upon the hitherto unpenetrated mystery of Lovell's voyage of 1566-7.

and returned againe to oure generall with a determinate answer from the Treasurer that he shoulde doe what he thought he mighte doe, for he wold never geve him any license at all to trafique. Oure generall seying there was no other remedye, having sett his menne in array, comaunded to marche towards the towne, and having marched a quarter of a myle we perceaved a greate many hargabuzers whoe, with an ensign spredde in the sighte of a bulwarck, made ready to skermishe with vs. The nomber were above 90 hargabuzers, Spaniardes, besides negros with divers weapons, and a great nomber of Indians with inuenimed arrowes. The horse menne followed vs a farre of, when we came within hargabuz shotte of this bulwarck aforesaid, which was placed in the waye which we shold goe to . . . anoyed as also f. 33. . . . and other with other weapons [*wherewith they hurt some of our men w*]hereof ij died afterward. The horse[*men did not charge home up*]on vs, but made a shewe still at oure [*men. During this time*] the Spaniardes in the forte skirmished with [*us, and our general bein*]g in coverte comaunded to enter the forte by and by daie the Spaniardes never defending it. [*Our men gave wel*]come that hand weapon might trye the matter [*to an end whe*]re in they might se the Spaniardes flye with a in towne alsoe. The horsemenne made to the towne [*after the foot*]. The generall never stayed, but comaunded to followe [*them and to*] enter the towne alsoe. It was no soner comaunded but [*the chase of the Spaniar*]des might be so muche that oure menne that went afore were [*so speedy that*] they overtook the Spanishe foote menne or they cowlde [*come to the to*]wne and made them take the woodes, and were at the to[wne as soon] in a manner as the horsemenne, who seying oure menne at their [heels avoided] the towne and fledde alsoe. Oure menne in the chase took a Span[iard whom] oure generall lette goe after we had entered the towne. Oure gene[rall sent] the Spaniard that as aforesaid came from Borboroata with vs nowe the se[cond] tyme towards a horsemanne whoe came in sight of the towne with a white linen clothe on the toppe of his [lance], a signe to have truce to speake with vs, and desired him that he wolde perswade the Treasurer in the aforesaid request to trafique. Oure generall alsoe sent others to knowe what the Spaniarde wolde that came in sight on horsbacke aforesaid. The Spaniardes mes-sag was that the Treasurer wolde that oure generall shoulde

- knowe that thow[ghe] he had taken his towne that he shoulde never therefore have trafique and that he shoulde depart and not persiste therein, for he wolde dye in the feild rather then grawnt him any license. The Spanish marchaunt aforesaid, which oure generall had sente to taulk with the Treasurer and to tell him that if he wolde not grawnt him license he wolde sette his towne on fyre, retorned with awnswere from the Treasurer that
- f. 33b. thowghe he sawe all the India afyre he wold geve no license . . . he grawnted it. While [*these messages were passing and oure gen*]-
 erall busye abowte other thinges, certain [of our men without kno]wledge of oure generall sett fyre in certaine [houses of the town, which] when oure generall sawe made shifte to quenche [the flames lest the] hole towne had bene burned, but neverthesse [the houses which as] aforesaid oure menne sett afyre were burned to the [*ground and destroyed*]. The Treasurer seyng this sente oure generale worde [that the fire] pleased him well, for oure generall did him no [sort of hurt the]rein, and for the howses that he had burned, if h[e had burned] the towne altogether the Kinge of Spaine his master [would build] it againe for the inhabitants much better the[n before at] his owne proper chardges, and that the longer [he stayed] in this place it shoulde be the worse for him, for [he would so] prepare for him that he shoulde wyshe him self [elsewhere]. Oure generall awnswered this messag vnto divers that [came thither] vnder suerty of truce with the messenger, that this [stubborn]nes of the Treasurer was nothing for the good servyce [of] the King his master, but for his owne lucre, thinking to provoke oure generall to passe the bowndes of reason with his foolish bragges, and to rayse treble chardges to the King if any thing shoulde by oure generall be ruynated. But oure generall saide that what soever he had done or mente to doe he wolde awnswere it the King of Spaine his master, and for the Treasurer he wold nowe, seyng he had put him self and his goodes in savetye and cared not for the common losse, seke him owte in any place in the cowntrye and make him willing or he had done to grawnt him license to trafique with the inhabitants, and for the howses that were burned he wolde paye therefore vnto the owners of them. Oure generall, after he had awnswered them thus, cawsed ij fawcons in field cariages to be brought alond, and the second daye after we had entered the
- f. 34. towne . . . ab]owt a myle somtyme we . . . wold not tarye longe

as oure gen[erall . . . of the aforesaide howses the . . . oure generall wolde not leave but g . . . oure generall, being 3 of the clock, [*went out from the town and*] after he had visited 3 of the howses that . . . rned themselves and fownde nothing, retorned [*to the town again, fin*]ding hidden in the way he retorned certaine [*guns . . .*], and one of oure menne fownde the Treasurers ensigne.¹ [The Spaniards had f]or 3 dayes rawnged the cowntrye adjoyninge to the [town. Our general] bidde the Spaniardes that they shoulde no more [come within sight] of the towne, and comaunded that if any horsmanne [*should come over*] the hill which was abowte 14 score of, the gonners sholde shott at th[em, and therefore] the ij field peeces were bent that waye. After we had [been here] abowte 5 dayes there came in an [*informer*], a negro whoe was a slave vnto the Treasurer and desir[ed speech] with oure generall, whoe when he was browghte before oure generall he saide that he was ronне awaye from his master, and if oure generall wolde carye him away and lett him live at his libertye he wolde shewe where moste parte of the stuff that belonged to the towne was, and alsoe the ordenaunce and powder with other municion. Oure generall, seynge this to be a thing that wolde some how bringe his purpose to passe if he might once laye handes on these th[ings], grawnted the negro his request, and the same night verry priv[ily] sente 120 menne with a governor over them and the negro for guyd to the place where these thinges were, which mighte be abowte 6 myles from the towne, comaundinge that assone as they came thether, if there were any suche thing they shoulde send him worde and tarye by it, minyshing nothing, and he wolde come thether him selfe. The companye aforesaid went and founde the stuffe as the negro hadsaide . . . thinges were . . . come to the towne and . . . gh oure f. 34b. generall demaunded of [him why the Treasurer] wolde not geve him license to trafique, [to the which he answe]red that the Treasurer was a manne of [*greed and without con*]science and cared not what mischief [*he caused to be done un*]to others, being sure him self to lose nothing but [*to gain*] verry much by this he

¹ John Prince's *Worthies of Devon*, 1810 ed., p. 472, says, on the authority of a grant of arms made to Hawkins in 1571 by Clarencieux Cook, that Hawkins was resisted at Rio de la Hacha in 1568 by Michael de Castiliano, but took the town and brought away the ensign of the said Michael. The latter was evidently the Treasurer; no other account gives his name.

had done, and that all [the Spaniards were] willing and desired in theire hartes to trafique for [the gains they would] all gett thereby, but for all they cowlde doe they [could never] cawse the Treasurer to geve his consente therevnto. [Oure general]l, after he had taulked with the Spaniarde, took [. . . men] well appointed with him, and so with the Spaniard [that came] to him that morning and the other marchaunte [that came] with him from Borboroata, whom oure generall ever [kept] with him to be a wittnes of his doynge, he marched [toward]es the place where oure menne were in possession of the [stuffe and other thinges which the negro had browght them to. The Treasurer this morning begonne to skirmish with certaine hargabuzers and Indians with oure menne that were here before oure generall came, but oure menne cawsed them all to fly. When oure generall was come thether he comaunded all thinges that was there to be laden into ij greate cartes which the aforesaide negro browght thether with oxen, and while thinges were alading desired the Spaniarde that came to him in the morninge to take the paynes to goe to the Treasurer and to tell him that he ment to carye away these thinges to his ships and never to leave till he wolde make the Treasurer to take as muche paynes to entreate him to take license as he had to desire the Treasurer to grawnte it. One thinge he willed the Spaniarde to tell the Treasurer in the presence

f. 35. of others, that he . . . oure generall so th . . . king to traffique migh . . . rall. When this Spaniarde had . . . the Treasurer was all one manne st . . . seyn]ge that theire goodes was laden to be [carried to the ships, besought the] Treasurer he wolde grawnte to taulke w[ith our general at the least. No]thing moved the Treasurer more then th[is request to the which] he furiouslye answered them, There is [not one of you t]hat knoweth John Hawkins. He is suche a ma[nne as that any] manne taulking with him hath no power to deny h[im anything] he dothe requeste. This hath made me hether[to to be careful] to well to kepe my self farre from him, and not any villany that I knowe in him but greate nobilitye, and [so do not] desire me to do no suche thing, for therein ye shall [be in] dawnger to preferre his desire before the comaundemente of my [master the King]. The Treasurer thus awnsvered them, but they desired him tha[t he should] taulke with oure generall before their goodes were carye[d away], beinge oure generall so good a gen[eral], they said, the Treasurer

showld not shunne to taulke with h[im], and seyng he had the generalls worde to goe and co[me] saufewithout any feare in any thing, he showlde doe well to take some order with him that at the leaste wayes they showlde not lose their goodes. Thus, knowing that oure generall coveted no mans goodes wrongefully but wolde paye for any thing he did take, with this and many other wordes of all menne in seuerall that were abowt him, he was perswaded to taulk with oure generall, and in the after none the same daye oure generall and he mette alone together in a faire plaine and taulked together the space of an hower, where at the laste they departed, oure generall having gotte a secrette grawnte of him to have license to trafique, thowghe the Treasurer wold not that it sho[ld] be knowen to be so, but that oure generall showlde sende againe to him . . . he had with him . . . that were f. 35b. with the . . . oure generall . . . promysed them he wolde paye them for [the houses that we]re burned and any other thinge they cowlde [*find amiss* and for] all thinges that were laden in the cartes in the same place, [and wh]en these Spaniardes which oure generall sente [thither told t]he other that were with the Treasurer this, they [persisted and n]ever lefte the Treasurer till he had grawnted [licence to] oure generall to trafique.¹ Thus word was sente [to oure gene]rall what was done, and the Treasurer, being [*requested* so] to do by the rest, came where oure generall [was, and they] embraced eche other. This done, oure generall yelded [up all the] thinges there that were taken in the same place [and so re]turned to the towne whether the Treasurer [*promi*]sed to come the nexte daye, as he did with divers [others] with him and taulked with oure generall and departed into the contrey afterwarde. We beganne to trafique here and [sold] abowte 150 negros with certaine other wares. Oure generall [w]hile he was here presented the Treasurer with divers riche [p]resentes, and when he was readye to goe awaye lefte a certaine of negros for the payment of the howses that were burned, and all other thinges to the full contente of the Spaniardes; and having made the trafique we mighte here we sett sayle and departed in the beginning of the moneth of Iulye towards Saincta Marta, where we arived abowte the xth of this monethe. We came into the roade abowt the shutting of nighte, neverthesse oure gene-

¹ This appears to describe the public yielding of the Treasurer to extreme pressure; f. 35 shows that he had already privately decided to give way.

rall sente a lande a letre to the governor of the towne as followeth, Worshipfull, I browght owt of Guynea certaine negros, the which I had there by trafique. To helpe to lighten the chardges of this vioadge which was determyned, I have in a manner solde them all saving a fewe. I beseche you, being as they are a small number that are lefte, you will license me to sell or trucke them here for suche necessities that you maye helpe me to, which I lacke.¹

- f. 36. . . . nges hath . . . it is you of whom . . . for fear but know . . . mady . . . them to retorne againe by x of the [clock in the morning] you shall have an awnswere wh[ich *I will make*] towching youre request, and I truste [*to entreat you as*] you deserve, and I wish for your firste [. . . Oure] generall, seyng by this letre that the gove[rnor was his] frende, was verrey gladde hereof and made [ready next mor]ning to goe ashore well accompanyed at th[e hour which the] governor had written him that he shoulde be a[*waited*]. The] towne was of abowte 45 howses, which was the bett[er reason] for the governor to geve license to oure generall [to trafique] bycawse he was not able to make many menne [to forbid] oure generall the towne. Alsoe another thinge that at [. . .] of this towne; the Indians that inhabit are wa[rlike and e]nemyes to the Spaniardes. Oure generall wente ashore [as afore]saide, where he was courteously receaved of the governo[r and] secretly enformed what he shoulde doe, which was as followe[th]: oure generall retowrned abowrde againe and by and by prepared to goe ashore with 150 menne appointed with sondry weapons, and at his goyng ashore comaunded to shoote owte of the ships haulf a score shott over the towne for a color, and to enter the towne with his menne and so, this done, the governor wold so order the matter that the generall shoulde be licensed to trafique. This was done, and oure generall in his arm[our] with his menne aforesaide entered the towne, where when he was come into the markett place there was one came with a white cloath vppon a rodde in signe of truce, who being comaunded by oure generall to come near and to saye wherefore he was come, he awnswered that the governor with others awayted his worshipp at the townes ende to speke with him. Oure generall herewith
- f. 36b. . . . divers others . . . be]sowghte him that he wolde not [burn their houses, for if he did] he must alsoe carye the inhabit[ants

¹ Line not written to end, and so letter probably ended here.

away with him in his] ships, for their towne being burned they might not tary [amid so many thous]and Indians their enemyes. Oure generall [answered thereupo]n that the burninge of their towne cowlde [not give him any] pleasure, nor it was never his condicion to hurte [any man, and more than] this, that he had a greate number of menne whoe [*in case that* he] had not trafique he cowlde not paye them their [wages . . .] being nowe in place had sworne that . . . grawnt thereof . . . With this the governor, semyng to have dischargd[ed his duty], with all the rest that were with him grawnted [that our ge]nerall shoulde have license to trafique, the which [being gran]ted oure generall cawsed all oure menne to retorne [aboard] againe saving certaine that was necessarye shoulde [remain] in the towne, and we beganne to trafique [there]. The governor [and] the chiefe banquetted oure generall there divers tymes while we were there, and oure generall likewyse banquetted them abowrde his ships, showing them all pleasure possible. We had here fresh victualles as beefe all the tyme we were here, and trafiqued verry frendly together and sold abowte 110 negros with certaine other wares. Oure generall gave the governor divers giftes for his frendshippe, and seyng that there was no more to be done here, abowte the 26 of July comaunded to sett sayle herehence towardes Carthagena, where we arived the first of August. At oure passing by the towne a seabord, the entering of the haven being haulfe a league beyonde, oure generall gave the towne haulfe a dosen peces of ordnaunce of salva, and the towne gave vs as many againe. Thus we passed and entered the haven, which is the best in all this countrey thorow owt . . . many rich march[aunts . . . the which mighte d f. 37. . . might have recowrse from the . . . [our gene]rall thowght best to writ vnto the gov[ernor *to request of him*] to provyde him or geve license he [might trafique for provisi]ones of bisquits, wyne, skoste and other nece[ssaries for his voyage home]warde, the which he did, sending alonde a letre [which was a]s followeth: Worshipfull, I have made sale [at divers places of] such wares and negros as I browght with me [*out of Guinea*], and am come hether to youre [*town in order*] to provyde my self of such necessaryes as I sh[all have need of] homeward, that you maye help me to for my [money. That which] I request I am sure tendeth nothinge to any breach of [your] princes comaundement, and therefore I dowbt not but according to your [*good*] condicion you

will gawnt it me. The generall sent this letre away and had prepared presentes to send to the governor and others the chiefe of the towne, the which he will[ed] the messenger he sent to advertise them prively. The governor at the first refused to receive the letre, but at the last divers of the chiefe of the towne, thinking it fitt it shoulde be sene, cawsed him to receive it. When he had redde it he awnswered oure generall by another letre back againe as followethe: Right worshipfull, as I have the chardge of governor geven me in this place by the king my master, I¹ . . . the king] my master comaund[eth me that I shall give no leave to strangers] to trafique here and [that any that asketh it shall be] taken as an enemy of [the king and shall have no provision of] victuall or other. Therefore seyng that [I can do you no pleasure in] no manner of thing [I desire you to depart nor think it] best to persist therein . . . After this] letre was sente to oure generall, the governor[proclaimed and] gave comaundemente that no other messanger [of our generall should] be suffered to come into the towne with any [messages] or letres from oure generall more, [and those] oure generall sent he sent backe againe and wolde not receive them. There [were in] the towne at oure comyng into the porte abowt [. . .] horsemenne and above 500 footemenne Spaniardes, [with] as many negros theire slaves and above 6000 [Indi]ans, all appoincted with weapon if oure generall shoulde [att]empt to goe ashore or to shewe any force. Oure generall, seyng there was no good to be done nor no kinde of victualles to be had, browght in the greater ships within demycolvering shott of the towne and the small ships harde vnder a fort in the which they had placed certaine small ordnaunce, to se if by bringing his ships neare he might bringe them to any thinge to goe ashore here with his menne, having instante English and Frenche not above 370. He sawe it was a mere folly considering the force of the towne, so we ridde here as neare as to cawse them by feare to doe somewhat if it mighte be, but it awaylide not, where for oure generall determynd to waye and fall downe againe lower from the towne and to seeke all the [haven] with pinaces to se if by f. 38. chawnce he might fynde any thing that wolde serve . . . the towne haveinge . . . our general writ unto the] governor as followethe:² . . . giveth me cawse to thinke that I ha . . . at youre

¹ The brevity of the above page is accounted for by extensive cancellations.

² This letter is a mass of cancellations and corrections, as if the writer were

handes, the which I will p . . . I might but doe youre master ser-
 vyce in the bear . . . showld fynde you did verry . . . ein if as with
 me with such as you of littell . . . to doe. That manne were
 vtterlye vnhappy that were . . . hat showlde be constrayned
 to be beholding . . . will not grawnt vnto Christians which at
 home in youre c . . . shame when you say you wold shewe
 me pleasure is not denyed vnto infidels. Well, I will not be
 beholding vnto you at this tyme, but . . . selfe at the least with
 water which you denye me and cannot kepe . . . and content my
 selfe therewith . . . you shall perceave that all that you wolde
 then . . . that I maye . . . but . . . in peace. The governor re-
 ceaved this letre and answ[ered] never a word therevnto ney-
 ther by mouthe nor writing. [Our] generall nowe with pinaces
 sowght an Ilond in the same haven wherein he fownde a verry
 goodly springe of pleasaunt water with a garden of pleasure, such
 a one that there was not the like in all that cowntrey and to the
 which the inhabitantes of Carthagena did often resorte to passe
 the tyme in. In this ilond oure generall alsoe fownd certaine
 wyntes and divers other marchaundize the which he wolde not
 break open, the which certaine that kept the ilonde gave to vn-
 derstand thereof to the owners in Carthagena, whoe were the
 chiefe. Then these marchauntes, vnderstanding that oure gene-
 rall had fownd those . . . can]vas for sayles. After he had . . . f. 38b.
 bowrde the saide cloath for sayles . . . and lefte the keyes with
 him th . . . with alsoe payment in kerses and other wares for all
 thinges [he had taken], having alsoe in all places ever sence he
 [came out o]f Ingland payed every manne for eny [thing which
 he] took to his content to thuttermost as alsoe [the *full* custo]me
 to the king in all places of the India, [and so havin]g bene in this
 port about 7 dayes, theight [day] we sett sayle and departed
 hence, and being [without] the haven we were becalmed the
 space of 2 dayes, [in the] which tyme oure generall dischargd
 one of the 2 French [ships] owte of his servyce, that which they
 had taken from the [Portu]gall and he browghte with him from
 Cabo Verde, the [Fre]nch menne having made great entreatye to
 oure generall [to] be gone. But the other French shipp which
 was the bigger and came with vs from Cabo Verde willinglye
 kept with vs company still. While we ridde at anker this calme

translating as he went along. The MS. is so defective that it has seemed best
 to give the decipherable phrases without attempting reconstruction.

oure generall comaunded to have all thinges that were servisable owte of the small barcke which oure generall had at Rio Grande in Guynea, and bycawse she was weak and not able to serve the towrne any longer to sincke her in the sea,¹ all the which done we sett sayle the second daye after we came owte of Carthagea with 8 sayles nowe, leaving the aforesaide Frenchmanne oure generall had dischargd riding still at an anker. Thus we sayled, directing oure cowerse with Cabo Saint Anton of the Iland of Cuba, meaning nowe to stave no where but to desemboke the

f. 39. channell of Bahama and . . . the shipp . . . she had were . . . so much that . . . we kept by a wynde still . . . faire to sease the cape, but the wy[n]de . . . an[d] grewe to greate tempest and fowle wether [*wherein the Jesus was*] browghte in such case that she was not ab[le to bear the sea] longer, for in her sterne on eyther syde of the [*sternpost her plan*]kes did open and shutt with everye sea, the s[ea]s *being*] withowte nomber, and the leakes so bigg as [*the thickness of*] a mans arm, the living fishe did swimme vpon [*her ballast*] as in the sea. Oure generall seynge this did [*his utmost to*] stopp her leaques, as divers tymes before he had . . . ynes about her. And trewlye withowt his great experience had bene, we [*had bene su*]nck in the sea in her within 6 dayes after we came [*out of*] Ingland, and escapinge that, yet she had never bene [*able to have*] bene browght hether but by his industry, the which his [*trouble and*] care he had of her maye be thowght to be bycawse she [*was*] the Quenes Majesties shipp and that she shoulde not perish vnder his hand. But all that he might doe nowe wold not help, but that we must needes beare rome before the wynde for the easing of the shipp, and at all adventures seeke some harborow wherein to dres[se] her leaques. It was before night in an eveninge that we put romer, where being the wether still terrible, one of oure companye kept aloofe still, whoe we saw not after; the ship was called the William and John. Thus we bare romer, being nowe but 7 sayles, somewhat quarteringe with the coast of Florida within the Goulfe of Nueva Espania till we had sight of the land, the which coast when we had sight of, we bare romer 2 dayes all alongeste the coast in verry shoal water with oure pinaces by the shore seking for harborowe,

¹ This is apparently the vessel mentioned on f. 29. The caravel brought from Cape Blanco is not accounted for. If still with Hawkins, she would raise by one the number of ships he is generally stated to have had at San Juan de Ulua.

but cowlde fynd none . . . to beare . . . Juc]utana which by the f. 39b.
 carde . . . shoales, we had sight of the [land of Nueva Espana] the
 11th daye of September, having bene [*in foul weather*] in the
 goulfe aforesaide from the 22th of [August. Thence] sayling
 alongeste the coaste, the nexte [morning af]ter we had sene the
 lande we escryed a sayle, [which was] no litle comferte vnto oure
 generall and to all the [company], consideringe the case we were
 in and not knowing [the land] nor where to fynde any harborowe.
 Oure generall [therefore] comaunded to geve chase after the
 sayle, whoe by [and by] the smaller barkes overtooke and
 browght [*her master*] abowrde oure generall. These menne were
 Spaniardes and came owt [of . . .] laden with wyne for this
 cowntrey. Oure generall fell in comunication with them [what
 havens] there were in those partes. They declared vnto him that
 [they] had bene in a port called Campeche which was abowte 40
 [lea]gues awether vs, which is somewhat a wild road but for cer-
 taine [ilo]ndes, and had bene put in thether with the same fowle
 wether we had at the sea. And nowe they were bownd to an-
 other port, the principall and best in all the goulfe, there to
 make sayle of their wyne, called Saincte Juan de Vlva, vnto
 which porte for the good harborowe therof there cometh yearly
 in thend of September a fleete of abowte 20 sayles or vnder,
 laden with merchaundizes of all sortes and wyne for the cown-
 trey called Nueva Espanna or Newe Spaine.¹ Oure generall de-
 maunded whether there was any other porte to lewarde besides
 this. He awnsivered, none. Oure generall, seying that there was
 no remedye but he must forcably put with the same porte of
 Saincte Juan de Lua for the savegarde of the shippe and mens
 lives, shewed the Spaniardes in what case his shippe was and that
 he must needes beare with a harborowe to repaire her, besides
 that victualles was scant the . . . and divers tymes w . . . was no f. 40.
 other waye, sente for . . . whoe came abowrde. We direct[ed
 our course, sailing] with the Spanishe barcke in oure companye
 [towards San Juan de] Vlva, having abowte 70 leagues thether.
 [*We were in say*]ling thether abowt 4 dayes, in the which ty[me
 we fell in] with 3 other sayles, whoe were alsoe bownde t[hether.
 Our general sta]yed them to goe in his company least they sh[ould
 sail on] before and geve knowledge in the porte of his [coming.

¹ It seems possible that the wine ship encountered by Hawkins was a detached unit of the annual fleet.

So on] the 15 daye of September we had sight of the po[rte, and on the] 16th we entered peesably into the port, the Span[iardes that were] within thinking we had bene the Spanish [fleet which as] aforesaid yearlye cometh thether and was not come y[et. One thing] helped well that we entered thus, and was that the [Spaniards sent a] boat owt to the sea to vs a league from the porte [before] we came in, and in her the Kinges Treasurer of V[era Cruz] or La Vera Crux, and the Teniente or deputy vnto the Alcaide [Major] or chiefe governor of the same towne. These came towards vs thinkinge that we had bene the Spanish fleete whom they vse to goe owt to receave at the sea as nowe, and oure gene[rall] comaunding to kepe in all the flagges of Sainct George, he war[e] the Quenes armes in the mayne topp, and the Mynion in the fore topp, which were so dimme with their colors thorowghe the fowle wearinge in fowle wether that they never perceaved the lyons and flower de lucis till they were hard abowrd the Jhesus, whoe went in formost as the generall comaunded, and the rest a good waye a sterne one another. The Treasurer and the other wolde have bene further gladly when they sawe what we were, which when oure generall perceaved he weahd

f. 40b. them abowrde . . . that the] worshipful [Master John Hawkins esquire was the gene]rall. When they hard this [the Treasurer and the Alcaide's] deputy entered the Jhesus and [*had speech with our gen]eral and he receaved them verry courte[ously]*¹ and kept them [with him on] bowrde till all the ships were entered, with[owt which he cold]e not have entered this porte so quietly if [*the Spaniards had had*] knowledge of oure comyng, for there was [there a platform] with 16 peces of brasse, the which were shotte [off by those] Spaniardes that were ashore of pleasure to vs withowt shotte, [no man] there knowinge otherwyse then that we were [the fleet of the King]e of Spaine. Oure generall ordered all thinges [so well that] when we were in and the Spaniardes of [the port] had escryed oure flagges of the Quenes armes and [saw by our] ships that we were Englishmenne in deade, [they all] begann to flye over to the mayne shore from the [ilon]de, being as it is an ilond where the ships doe moare. Oure generall when he saw them fly as fast as they mighte and carye awaye divers thinges owte of about 8 Spanishe ships that ridde there unriggered at oure comyng in, he sente and persuaded them to tarye and

¹ There is an extensive cancellation at this point.

kepe theire ships, for he wolde doe them no hurt nor minish the worth of a pennie of theire goodes, but this wold not staye them. Alsoe within the ilond divers negros with the Spaniardes made waye over to the mayne likewyse. Oure generall sent thether geveing them to vnderstand that they mighte tarye still in the ilond, for he ment them no hurte nor any manne. There was [in] the ilond a Spaniarde, captaine of the same.¹ Oure generall sent for him and desired . . . victualls he wold . . . have theire f. 41. frendshippe [and would pay every man for any] thing he did take to the vttermost. [*The captain made relation*] vnto them of all thinges the saide . . . y of the Alcaide Mayor. [*They made promise unto*] oure generall that they wolde doe [all things in their power] that he shoulde have all thinges he [had need of, and the] deputye desired license of oure generall t[o depart unto Vi]lla Rica, from whence he wold advertise the Oydor[es and the Roy]-all Cownsell of the citey of Mexico, which lyeth abowt 72 leagues thence, of oure g[eneralls ar]rivall, and declare vnto them by writting the [causes of hi]s comynge to the port and [*see*] what they wold determyne therevppon. Oure gen[erall therefore li]-censed him to depart and kept the Treasurer which [likewise w]ritte vnto the Oydores of the said riall [city of] Mexico, delivering the letre vnto one Maldonado, the [captain] of the saide Spanishe barck that we mette with firs[t as] aforesaide at oure first sight of the cost of Jucutana, whoe as a witt[ness] of that he had sene the leaques and many other things that forcablye made vs come to the porte, oure generall sent to with his letre, accept-ing it willinglye him selfe, as it semed, but like a villaine went not, but kept him selfe owt of sight nor yet sent the letre; there-fore seyng it came not to theire handes I doe not note it sence the deputy aforesaide sente owt of hand a poste to Mexico with lettres to the Oydores as aforesaid; thus this day we passed. The nexte morning, being Fridaye, by the sonne rising we escryed 14 sayles at the sea. Oure generall sent by and by for the captaine of the ilond and demaunded of him and the Treasurer what sayles these mighte be . . . generall of the . . . the fleete worde f. 41b. that he sh . . . firmed with his owne hand if he came . . . in any manner of thing shoulde [have in the port all] such thinges as he needed for his moneye, other wyse he wolde defend them the port. [The said captain] of the ilond wente him selfe owte in a

¹ The Spanish official relation gives his name as Delgadillo.

boat [and our genera]ll beganne to fortifye the ilond with menne and artelery in the meane [time] and alsoe his [ships], and the Spaniarde being come to the Spanish ships, whoe had [the wind against] them contrarye and cowlde not come in the same [*day*, he came] abowrde the admyrall, declaring that suche [and such an Engli]sh captaine was in the port, driven thether forcabl[y by divers] leaques and other wantes, and that he wold defend [the port so] that the Spanishe fleete shoulde not enter [therein except he were assured by the generall of the [Spanish] fleet that he shoulde ride quietly and be provyded [for] his money of such thinges as he did want, that he [was] in possession of the ilonde all readye. There was [with] these ships that came owte of Spaine in them a Vizrey or leiftenaunte of the King of Spaine of this province of Nueva Espanna or Newe Spaine, the chiefest in auctoritye in this cowntrey, named Don Martin Enriquez, whoe had alsoe at the sea auctority above the generall.

(Finis; f. 41 b. not written to end of page.)

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